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COPYRIGHT DEPOSIT. 



1815 



WATERLOO 



BY 

HENRY HOUSSAYE 

Of the French Acaiiemy 



TRANSLATED BY 

S. K. WILLIS 



PUBLISHED BY 

FRANKLIN HUDSON PUBLISHING CO., 
Kansas City, Mo. 



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JUBRARYof OONGRESS 
I fwo Oopies riscwveu 

JUN 29 1905 

\ CUiSf a AA.C. iMoi 

I ./(/3 2 69 

I copv e. 



Copyright, 1905, by 
Franklin Hudson Publishing Co. 
Kansas City, Mo. 



TABLE OF CONTENTS. 



BOOK ONE. 
Entrance into Campaign. 

'Chapter I. — The Last Army of the Empire. PAGE 

I. — The transition from a peace to a war footing. — Recall of 
the men on leave of absence. — Mobilization of the Na- 
tional Guard. — The conscription of 1 8i 5 9 

II. — The armament and clothinj^. — Supplies.^The fortresses. 

— The war budgf t 17 

III. — First and second distributions of the troops into army 
corps. — Strength of the first army and the auxiliary 

army on June 15, 1815 24 

IV. — Removals and promotions 26 

V. — The command: The Marshals of France 30 

VI.— The command : The Chief of Staff 35 

VIT. — The command- The Generals 38 

VIII. — The spirit of the Army 43 

Chapter II. — The Plans of Campaign. 

r. — Idea of an invasion of Belgium in the first days of April. . 51 

II.— The Allies' plan of campaign 53 

III. — Napoleon's plan of campaign 55 

IV. — Concentration of the French Army (June 8-14). — Arrival 
of the Emperor at Beaumont. — Strength and positions 

of the armies on June 14th 38 

Chapter III. — First Combats. 

I — Passage of the Belgian frontier (June 15th). — The deser- 
tion of General Bourmont 61 

II. — Capture of Charleroi 64 

III. — Interview between Napoleon and Ney. — Combat of Gilly 

on the right wing 66 

IV. — The operations of Ney. — Combat of Gosselies. — Combat of 
I Frasnes. — Quatre-Bras 70 

3 



4 Table of Contents. 

BOOK TWO. 

LlONY AND OUATRE-BrAS. 

Chapter I. — The Morning of June i6th. page 

I. — The plans and orders of Napoleon (from five to eight 

o'clock) 73 

II. — The departure of Napoleon for Fleurus (half-past nine). . . 75 

III. — Concentration of the Prussian Army to the north of the 
Ligny. — Inactivity of the English Arm}' during the day 
of June 15th. — The ball of the Duchess of Richmond 
(night of June I5th-i6th).. . 77 

IV. — Arrival of Wellington at Quatre-Bras (June i6th, ten 
o'clock). — Interview betwpen Wellington and Blticher 
at the mill of Bussy, near Ligny (one o'clock in the 
afternoon) 81 

Chapter II. — The Battle 0/ Ligny. 

I. — -The field of battle. — Dispositions of Blxicher and Napo- 
leon 85 

II. — From three o'clock until four: Attacks of Saint- Amand by 

Vandamme and of Ligny by Gerard 89 

III. — From four o'clock until half-past seven: Counter-attack 
of Bliicher. — Appearance of a supposed column of the 
enemy upon the flank of the French Army. — Demon- 
stration of Grouchy against the Prussian left. — Stub- 
born fight in Saint-Amand and Ligny 92 

IV. — From half-past seven o'clock until half-past nine: Final 
assault. — Capture of Ligny. — Combats o 1 the hills. — 
Retreat of the Prussians 98 

Chapter III. — The Battle of Quatre-Bras. 

I. — Inaction of Marshal Ney during the morning of June i6th. 

Reiterated orders of the Emperor 10,3 

II. — Attack of Quatre-Bras bv the corp-; of Reille (two o'clock 
in the afternoon). — ^Return of WeUington to Quatre- 
Brai and arrival of the first English reinforcements 
(three o'clock). — Death of the Duke of Brunswick (half- 
past four o'clock) 106 

III. — False movement of Count d'Erlon 1 10 

IV. — The charge of Kellermann's cuirassiers (six o'c1ock).^Of- 
fensive movement c^f Wellington (seven o'clock). — The 
French driven back into their first positions (from 
eight to nine o'clock) 113 

Chapter IV. — The Retreat of the Prussian Army. 

I. — The first plans of Napoleon for the day of June 17th. . . . 118 
II. — The orders of the Emperor to Grouchy (between eleven 

and half-past eleven o'clock) 121 



Table of Contents. 5 

PAGE 

III. — Retreat of the Prussian Army on Wavre 124 

IV.— Movements of Pajol and Exelmans towards Namnr and 

Gembloux in pursuit of the Prussian columns 126 

V. — March of the army ot Grouchy — Bivouac at Gembloux.— 
Letter of Grouchy to the Emperor (ten o'clock in the 
evening) 128 

Chapter V. — The Retreat of the English Army. 

I. — Exchange of despatches between Bliicher and Wellington 
(morning of June 17th). — Retreat of the English Army 

(ten o'clock) . 134. 

II. — Arrival of Napoleon at Quatre-Bras, still occupied by the 

English cavalry (two o'clock) 136 

III. — Vigorous pursuit of the English rear guard by Napoleon 
in person — Combat of Genappe. — Cannonade of Mont 

Saint-Jean (seven o'clock) 1 39 

IV. — The night bivouac 141 

V. — Uncertainties of Napoleon. — Letter from Bliicher to Wel- 
lington. — Orders of Napoleon (night of June lyth-iSth) 143 



BOOK THREE. 
Waterloo. 

Chapter I. — Bliicher and Grbuchy. 

I. — Dispositions and movements of the Prussian Army on the 
morning of June i8th — Departure from Wavre of 

Field Marshal Bliicher (eleven o'clock) 149 

II.— Dispositions of Grouchy _. . ^5^ 

III. — Discussion between Gerard and Grouchy at Walhain 

(noon) i.'^S 

Chapter II. — The Battle of Waterloo. — Morning. 

I. — Topography of the field of battle , . 158 

II. — Positions of the Anglo-Dutch Army 160 

III. —Luncheon of Napoleon at Caillou.— Letter to Grouchy. . . 163 
IV —The last review (ten o'clock).— Order of battle of the 
French Army. — Disposition of Napoleon for the attack 

(eleven o 'clock) 167 

Chapter III. — The Battle of Waterloo. — From half-past eleven to 
three o'clock. 
I. — Attack of Hougoumont by Jerome Bonaparte's division of 

Reille's corps • • '73 

II. Appearance of Bulow's corps upon the heights of Chapelle 

Saint-Lambert. — New despatch of Napoleon to Grouchy 175 
IIT__Attack 01 La Have Sainte and of the plateau of Mont 

Saint-Jean bv the corps of Count d'Erlon 178 



6 Table of Contents. 

PAGE 
IV. — Counter-attack of the English of Picton. — Charge of the 
Horse Guards of Somerset. — Mishap of the cuirassiers 

in the hollow road t8o 

V. — Charge of the dragoons of Ponsonhy. — Rout of d'Erlon's 
infantry. — Counter-charge of the lancers of Jacquinot 
and the cuirassiers of Farine. — Burning of Hougoumout. i8i 

Chapter IV. — The Battle of Waterloo. — From three o'clock until seven. 

I. — Second attack of La Haye Sainte — The order from Ney 

to Milhaud i86 

II. — First and second charges of the cuirassiers of Milhaud and 
of the light cavalry of the Guard. — Order from the 
Emperor to the cuirassiers of Kellermann and to the 
cavalry of Guyot 189 

III. — Entrance into line of Bulow's corps. — Lobau's defense. — 

Capture and recapture of Plancenoit 192 

IV. — Third and fourth charges of the cuirassiers of Milhaud, sup- 
ported by those of Kellermann, the dragoons, and horse 

grenadiers of the Guard 195 

V. — General attack of the plateau by the infantry of Reille and 
d'Erlon and by the debris of the cavalry. — Capture of 
La Haye Sainte. — The English line shaken. — New com- 
bats at Plancenoit 198 

Chapter V. — The Battle of Waterloo. — From seven to mne o'clock. 

I. ^Dispositions for the final attack. — Strengthening of the 

English line. — Approach of Ziethen's corps 202 

II. — Assault of the plateau of Mont Saint-Jean by the Middle 

Guard 205 

III. — "The Guard recoils!'' — General advance of the English 
Army — Irruption of the Prussians of Ziethen. — The 

panic 209 

IV. — The squares of Christiani, Roguet, and Cambronne 211 

V. — Arrival of Pirch's corps to the support of Bulow. — Butch- 
ery in Plancenoit. — The melee on the plateau of La 
Belle Alliance. — Ihe last squares of the Old Guard. ... 213 

Chapter VI.— The Rout. 

1. — Meeting of Wellington and Bliicher in front of La Belle 

Alliance (quarter-past nine). — The rout of the French 217 

II. — Attempt at resistance in Genappe (eleven o'clock) 219 

III. — Pursuit of the Prussian cavalry (night of June i8th-i9th) 221 
IV. — Halt of the Emperor at Quatre-Bras. — The Army passes 

the Sambre at Charleroi (morning of June 19th; 223 

V. — Retreat on Laon. — Departure of the Emperor for Paris 

(June 20th) 226 

Chapter VII. — The Combats of Wavre and the Retreat of Grouchy. 

I. — March of Grouchy on Wavre. — Combat of La Baraque, — 

Attack of Wavre (afternoon of June 18th); 231 



Table of Contents. ' -j 

PAGE 

II. — The second despatch of Soult. — New assaults against 
Wavre and Bierges. — Passage of the Dyle at Limale 
and night combat 235 

III. — Renewal of the combat and defeat of Thielmann (morning 
of June 19th). — News of the disaster (half-past ten in 
the morning). — Retreat of Grouchy (afternoon and 
evening of June 19th) 238 

IV. — Combats of La Falise and Boquet (morning of June 20th). 
— Defense of Namur (from three to nine in the even- 
ing). — Rallying atOivet of the army of Grouchy (June 
2ist) 242 

Chapter VIII. — The Campaign of 181 5. 

I. — The operations of June 15th. — The battles of Ligny and 

Quatre-Bras 246 

II. — The error of Napoleon 252 

III. — Marshal Grouchy 256 

IV.— Waterloo 263 



WATERLOO. 



BOOK ONE. 

Entrance into Campaign. 



CHAPTER I. 
The IvAst Army of the Empire. 

J. — The transition from a peace to a war footing. — Recall of the men 
on leave of absence. — Mobilization of the National Guard. — 
The conscription of 1815. 
II. — The armament and clothing. — Supplies.— The fortresses. — The 
war budget. 
III. — First and second distributions of the troops into army corps. — 
Strength of the first army and the auxiliary army on June 
15, 1815. 
IV. — Removals and promotions. 
V. — The command: The Marshals of France. 
VI.— The command : The Chief of Staff. 
VII. — The command: The Generals. 
VIII.^The spirit of the .\rmy. 

I. 

On his return from the isle of Elba the Emperor found no 
more than 200,000 men under the flags. If he had felt himself 
to be all-powerful as formerly, he would have had recourse for 
doubling the Army, to an extraordinary levy of the classes of 
1806 to 1 8 14, to the recall of the class of 1815, and to the an- 
ticipated call of the class of 18 16. But, having hardly resumed 
the throne, he hesitated before so unpopular a measure as 
the reestablishment of the conscription, which had been abol- 

9 

—2— 



lo Watekloo. 

ished by lyouis XVIII. He had then for sole resources the re- 
turn into the ranks of the soldiers on limited and unlimited 
leave and the recall of numerous deserters carried on the muster- 
rolls as "absent without permission." The men on six months' 
furlough amounted to 32,800, the deserters to 85,000. Almost 
all of the men on six months' furlough could be counted on to 
rejoin their colors ; already three or four thousand had arrived 
at the depots, in conformity with the royal ordinance of March 
9th. But among the 85,000 men "absent without permission" 
it was necessary to admit that there would be a great number 
who would not rejoin their regiments and also a great many 
who would be entitled to receive definite discharges, either on 
account of infirmities, or as supports of their families. Marshal 
Davout, Minister of War, estimated that the recall of soldiers 
of every category would give scarcely 59,000 men. 

The decree calling out the reserves, which had been pre- 
pared on March 2 8tli, was not made public until April 9th. 
This delay was attributable to reasons of a political nature. 
The Emperor, who at that time was attempting by all possible 
means to enter in negotiations with the powers for the main- 
tenance of peace, feared that the putting of the Army on a war 
footing would belie his pacific protestations. Towards the 
French population, who so ardently desired peace, he felt 
constrained to show the same consideration. The West was 
in agitation, the Midi was in arms; in the rest of France the 
Royalists were laboring to destroy the popularity of the Em- 
peror by predicting war. This was not the moment to alarm, 
to dissatisfy all the country by calling out the reserves. More- 
over, Napoleon still preserved a ray of hope that there would 
not be a rupture with Europe. This illusory hope diminishing 
from hour to hour, he decided to publish the decree in the 
Monite.ur of April 9th. As he foresaw, this decree struck a 
blow at piiblic opinion. In a few days the rente fell eight 
francs. Sadness and discouragement prevailed throughout 
the land. The peasants, generally very happy at no longer 
having to endure the vexations of the country nobility or to 
fear the reestabli'^hment of privileges and the replevin of the 
property of the emiare'^\ felt their sentiments for the Emperor 
growing weaker at the thought that his return was about to 
bring, if not a second invasion, at least an interminable war. 
By reason of the time necessary for the transmission and 
the posting of orders and legal delays, the mustering-in of the 



The Last Army of the Empire. h 

men began only on April 25th. Public opinion was so opposed 
to the idea of war that among the men recalled, though all of 
them ,vere old soldiers of Napoleon, a great many presented 
themselves only in order to show cause why they should be 
■exempted or discharged from further service. It is true that, 
though a great number of these men had deserted in 18 14 in 
order to avoid wearing the white cockade, a great number had 
left their corps because they were weary of war. During the 
last year they had resumed vvork in the fields and workshops, 
and a great many of them had married; hence they were still 
less disposed to take up arms again. In the departments in 
which the Royalist spirit predominated, and in which those 
who had been recalled to arms felt themselves supported by 
the population, the meetings of the Board of Examiners were 
tumultuous. The men cried: "We will not set out. Long 
live the King!" Fearing an insurrection in the West, the Em- 
peror authorized many prefects of that region to apply the de- 
cree with great circumspection, and even to suspend its exe- 
cution. In spite of everything, the levy gave 17,000 men 
more than Davout, Avho was little inclined to illusions, had 
presumed. In the first days of June 52,446 men had been 
incorporated and 23,448 were en route to rejoin their regiments. 

The voluntary enlistments, which had been so rare during 
the Campaign of France, amounted to nearly 15,000 men. A 
royal ordinance of December 31, 18 14, granted to each en- 
rolled volunteer a bounty of fifty francs. The Emperor sup- 
pressed this bounty. "This method," said he, "is not in ac- 
cord with the sentiments manifested by the French in the de- 
fense of their independence." In order to increase the enlist- 
ments, the Emperor thought of causing to be read by officers 
of the Guard calls to arms, accompanied by the beating of 
drums, upon the public places, around the workshops, and in 
the villages. But, Davout having represented to him that 
"this would cause useless disorder," he abandoned this ex- 
pedient of the recruiting sergeants of the eighteenth century 

Reduced to a few vessels in condition to take the sea, 
without crews (two-thirds of the sailors had been sent home 
on furlough), and without supplies, the fleets could only be 
employed in some cruises in the Mediterranean. With the 
available men in the ports and the naval reserves the Emperor 
hoped to constitute fifty or sixty battalions of sailors. It was 
onlv with great difficulty that twenty were formed, and by 



1 2 Waterloo. 

the middle of June only one had been put en roide; it formed 
the garrison of Calais. The three regiments of the artillery 
of the Marine, of a real effective of 5,284 men under the Restor- 
ation, were raised to nearly 6,000 by the organization of a new 
battalion. Six battalions remained in the ports, whose de- 
fense they assured; two were detached to Paris, one went to 
Lyons, and another fought in Brittany in the mobile column 
of General Bigarre. 

Of the three foreign regiments which existed under Louis 
XVIIL, the Emperor preserved the second (Isenberg) and 
the third (Irish), presenting together 875 bayonets; the first 
{La Tour d' 4 uvergne) , which had remained faithful to the 
Duke of Angouleme during the short campaign in the Midi, 
was disbanded. The Emperor would have liked to have kept 
the four Swiss regiments, but the opposition manifested by 
the officers to taking the tricolor cockade necessitated the 
disbanding of these troops. Napoleon busied himself with 
organizing five new foreign regiments: one of Poles, quickly 
raised to 800 men, thanks to the soldiers of the ex-legion of the 
Vistula, who, although disbanded in 18 14, had not yet returned 
to Poland; one of Swiss, into which entered 502 men of the 
four regiments suppressed on April 2nd; one of Italians, one of 
Germans, and one of Dutch-Belgians. These three last were 
to be formed with deserters from the armiies of Frimont, 
Bliicher, and the Prince of Orange. At the beginning of June 
the Dutch-Belgian regiment counted 378 bayonets. Finally 
there were raised in the Gironde a battalion of negroes and a 
few companies of Spanish refugees. 

The country being threatened, the laws and decrees of 
1791, 1792, 1805, and 1813, which had not been abrogated, 
gave the Emperor the right to increase the Army by means of 
mobilized National Guards. Some days after his return to the 
Tuileries he occupied himself, with Davout and Carnot, in re- 
organizing the National Guard. There were at that time in all 
France nearly 200,000 National Guards, aged from twenty to 
sixty years, and Carnot estimated that this number could be 
raised to 2,500,000. A decree, rendered on April loth, pre- 
scribed that all citizens liable to ser^dce in the National Guard 
should be inscribed upon the muster-rolls in order to be 
formed into battalions. The Emperor did not think of organiz- 
ing such a multitude, but he counted on taking therefrom 
a great number of mobilized battalions, composed solely of 



The Last Akmy or the Empike. 13 

men from twenty to forty years old. He remembered that at 
Fere-Champenoise in 18 14 the National Guards had fought like 
old soldiers. By new decrees the Emperor ordered the mobil- 
ization of 326 battalions of 720 men each, which were to be 
directed immediately upon the frontier places and the en- 
trenched camps. This was putting again in force the decree 
of the lyCgislative Assembly of July 11, 1792, with this attenu- 
ation, that in the war battalions the providing of substitutes 
was fixed at the small sum of 120 francs. 

In a score of departments, notably in Aisne, Ain, Ar- 
deche, Ardennes, Aube, Cote-d'Or, Isere, Jura, Marne, Meurthe, 
Meuse, Mont-Blanc, Haut-Rhin, Bas-Rhin, Rhone, Haute- 
Saone, Saone-et-Loire, Seine-et-Marne, Seine-et-Oise, Vosges, 
and Yonne, the levy was effected very easily, the battalions 
soon received their full complement of men, and the mobilized 
National Guards quitted family and fireside with cries of 
"lyong live the Emperor!" and with the enthusiasm of 1791. 
Those of the Guards who were able to do so purchased their 
own arms and uniforms. But the same patriotism and the 
same good- will did not animate the whole of France. In half 
of the country, in spite of the Guards and mobile columns, 
hardly one-fourth of the fixed contingents could be raised. 
By the end of May Orne had furnished 107 Guards out of 2,160 
demanded, Pas-de-Calais 437 out of 7,440, and Gers 98 out of 
1,440. At Amiens this proclamation was circulated: "Who 
has recalled Bonaparte? The Army. Well, let it defend him. 
His enemies are our friends. We will not arm to defend a 
man whom hell has vomited forth." In Vendee and Brittany, 
where an insurrection was feared, the National Guards were 
not called out; but when civil war began, some thousands of 
citizens took up arms spontaneously and seconded the troops 
against the RoyaHst bands without, howeyer, leaving their 
department. 

Out of the 234,720 National Guards called into rervice by 
the decrees from April loth to May 15th, nearly 150,000 were 
by June 15th assembled in the fortresses or on the march for 
them. A third of the officers for the battalions were named 
from the officers on half-pay and for the other two-thirds from 
the civil element. The Emperor had not wished to leave the 
selection of the officers to election. He named them from civil 
lists, prepared in each department by a committee composed 
of a prefect, a councillor-general, two generals, and a superior 



14 AVateeloo. 

officer. Almost all of the National Guards not only appeared! 
resigned to do their duty, but determined to do it willingly. 
They drilled their best, yielded docilely to discipline, and en- 
tered the cities with branches of lilac in the muzzles of their 
guns, singing the "Marseillaise," and terminating each couplet 
with cries of "Long live the Nation! Long live the Emperor !" 
If there sometimes arose complaints, it was from those who 
were vet neither armed nor clothed and who demanded guns, 
overcoats, and shoes. Mortier, Jourdan, Leclerc des Essarts,. 
Rouver, Lanusse, Berckheim, and all the general officers who 
commanded mobilized National Guards or passed them in re- 
view, praised the good spirit and fine attitude of these im- 
provised soldiers. Gerard wrote Vandamme, June 5th: "The 
ten battalions of National GuardvS of the reserve of Nancy are 
superb. In three weeks there will be no difference between 
them and the troops of the Line." 

If the war lasted any length of time, the men from twenty 
to fortv years of age, forming the first ban of the National 
Guard, could be counted on to give at least 150,000 more men, 
for a great number of refractory men from the departments of 
the Centre and Midi would end by submitting to the law ; thanks 
to the pacification of Vendee, which was near and certain, the 
decrees relating to the mobilization of the National Guards 
could be applied in the departments of the West ; and, finally,, 
there would be an opportunity to decree new levies in the pa- 
triotic departm.ents of the East. For the second ban of the 
militia, its organization was not pressed, save at Paris and 
Lyons. When the lack of time and arms prevented the forming 
of the mobilized battalions, it was not the hour to increase the 
sedentary battalions, which, by reason of the pacific services 
which they were to render, were already sufficiently numerous. 
In the mass of citizens aged from forty to sixty years there 
were, however, a great many men who could be used advan- 
tageously in the defense of the fortresses. They were the old 
officers, subalterns, and soldiers retired after a minimum ser\dce 
of twenty-four vears. Since the month of April man}^ retired 
officers had requested permission to reenter the Army; but 
there were so man}^ officers on half-pay that all of them could 
not be utilized. With the retired officers and soldiers Davout 
thought of forming battalions of veterans for the fortresses. 
"They will set an example for the National Guards," wrote he 
to the Emperor, "and will inspire them with the military 



■ Tpie Last Army op the EiLPiiiE. 15 

spirit." Napoleon did not fail to adopt this proposition. 
On May i8th he rendered a decree inviting all retired soldiers 
I0 resume service temporarily, in order to be organized into 
battalions and batteries for the fortresses. The retired soldiers, 
who numbered 94,000, but of whom hardly half appeared eligible 
for service, hastened, to present themselves at the mustering- 
places. With the most robust there were formed fifty-six 
battalions and twenty-five companies of artillery, of a total 
strength of nearly 25,000 men. 

At Paris the sedentary National Guard was raised to 
36,518 men. The workmen of the faubourgs had demanded 
spontaneously to cooperate in the defense of the city, and 
from these workmen twenty-four battalions of Federate Sharp- 
shooters were formed. These 18,000 sharpshooters, com- 
manded by officers on half-pay, were destined to occupy the 
advance posts and the works of the first line. At Lyons there 
were by June 12th 4,000 sedentary National Guards, and 
Mouton-Duvernet was busy forming fifteen battalions of Fed- 
erate Sharpshooters. In Aisne and Ardennes and in all the 
departments of the East the levies en masse could be counted on 
in case the country was invaded. Composed of foresters, gen- 
darmes, custom-house officers, sedentary National Guards, and 
in general of all the able-bodied citizens, the levies en masse 
were to assemble at the sound of the tocsin upon the order of 
the military authorities in order to occupy the mountains 
and defiles. 

With the 150,000 mobilized National Guards, the 25,000 
retired soldiers, the 26,000 Federates of Paris, Lyons, Toulouse, 
and Nancv, the urban and rural National Guards, the free corps 
and the levies en masse, it seemed that the fortresses, the large 
cities, the defiles, and the bridge-heads would be sufficiently 
provided with defenders. But in spite of voluntary enlist- 
ments and of the return of two-thirds of the men on furlough, 
the active army was still too weak. After much hesitation, 
the Emperor decided to call out the class of 18 15. The con- 
scription had been aboHshed by Article XII. of the Royal 
Charter; and this article ha dug been interpreted as having a 
retroactive effect for the conscripts of 1S15, though a senaius- 
consulte of October 9, 18 13, had called them under the flags, 
it was to be feared that the recall of these conscripts would be 
regarded as an abuse of power. Davout himself, ordinarily 
so resolute, represented to the Emperor that it would not be 



1 6 Waterloo. 

prudent to pronounce the unpleasant word "conscription. ' 
"It would be better," said he, "to change the name of the thing, 
and declare that all young men having entered into their 
twentieth year since the ist of January last will make a part 
of the National Guard and vvill be directed upon the depots of 
the Army, with the promise of being discharged after the end 
of the war." The Council of State, to which the projected 
decree relating to the conscription of 1815 was submitted in 
the meeting of May 23d, refused to give its adherence to the 
measure, "the le\'ying of men being within the jurisdiction of 
the legislative power." 

To await the meeting of the Chambers! But would the 
enemy await until they met before entering France? Now, 
the conscription of 1815 would furnish 120,000 soldiers, of 
whom 20,000 had fought during the last campaign. The Em- 
peror removed the scruples of the Council of State by proposing 
to assimilate the conscription of 18 15 with the soldiers on 
leave of absence. To recall them a decree would be no longer 
necessary; a simple administrative measure would suffice. 
The Council of State enunciated a favorable opinion, and in 
the first days of June Davout was able to issue instructions 
for the levy of the class of 18 15. The country had then de- 
cided that, since war was inevitable, it was necessary to make 
the best of it. The departure of the conscripts was effected 
without the resistance and rebellions which had been occasioned 
in so many of the departments by the recall of the soldiers on 
furlough and in a less degree by the mobilization of the National 
Guards. On June i ith — that is to say, one week after the de- 
cree had been made public — 46,419 conscripts had assembled, 
ready to set out, in the chefslieux of the departments. In 
Alsace, Lorraine, Champagne, Franche-Comte, Burgundy, and 
even in many provinces of the Centre, an extreme good- 
will was reported. The Prefect of Seine-et-Oise wrote: "The 
conscripts of 18 15 have assembled in three days with an aston- 
ing facility." The Prefect of Mont-Blanc remarked that his 
department had furnished more combatants than at any time 
of the Revolution. Aisne, which from April ist to June 12th 
had given 18,200 volunteers, recalled soldiers, conscripts, mo- 
bilized National Guards, irregular sharpshooters, and retired 
soldiers — among whom were to be seen some old men of seventy- 
three years — merited these words from Napoleon: "In this 



The Last Army of .the Empike. 17 

•department (Aisne) there will be found as many men as there 
will be guns with which to arm them." 

II. 

A great many guns, munitions, provisions, horses, uni- *' 
forms, and shoes were necessary, and there were very few. 
Almost all of the material had to be improvised. If the ar- 
tillery possessed 13,947 pieces of ordnance, it was in need of 
horses, harness, and 600,000 projectiles. In the infantry and 
cavalry regiments, both with greatly reduced effectives, the 
armament was complete; but to arm the recalled soldiers, the 
enlisted volunteers, the naval reserves, the mobilized National 
Guards, the Federate Sharpshooters, and the conscripts of 18 15, 
who, according to the expectation of everyone, would amount 
towards the middle of September to more, than 500,000 men, 
there were in the arsenals and magazines but 195,000 muskets, 
of which 74,000 were in need of repairs. 

"The safety of the country," wrote Napoleon, "depends 
upon the quantity of guns with which we shall be able to arm 
ourselves." The imperial factories, to which all the gunsmiths, 
exempted from the different conscriptions since the year VIII. 
(1799), were recalled by decree, received an order for 235,000 
muskets and musketoons and 15,000 pairs of pistols. The 
bayonets were made in the cutleries of Langres and Moulin s. 
Ten thousand fowling-pieces and 4,000 blunderbusses were 
distributed among the peasants of Alsace, Lorraine, Cham- 
pagne, and Burgundy. For repairing the unserviceable guns, 
one had recourse to private industry. Workshops were estab- 
lished in the principal cities, in which were employed all the 
gunsmiths, locksmiths, cabinet-makers, and braziers; in Paris 
there were six of these shops, which employed 2,000 workmen. 
The Government also attempted to purchase some guns in Eng- 
land, and a few thousand were brought from Belgium and the 
Rhenish provinces, concealed in coal barges. Others were 
brought in by the peasants, a reward of 12 francs being offered 
for each gun restored; and others still were requisitioned from 
the merchants and ship-owners, who had been notified by 
means of placards to furnish a list of all the arms in their 
possession. 

In spite of the activity displayed and all the means em- 
ployed, the men arrived at the depots faster than the arms 



1 8 A¥atJ':rloo. 

entered into the arsenals. The factories and shops could 
furnish but 20,000 new and almost the same number of re- 
paired guns per month. In the first days of June hardl}^^ half 
of the mobilized National Guards had received muskets. As 
for the short swords for the infantry, the making of which had 
been suspended, for it was first necessary to make bayonets, 
it was decided that, even in the Line, only the companies^ of 
grenadiers should be provided with them. Cuirasses were 
lacking. "Cause the men to rejoin anyhow," wrote Napoleon ;^ 
"cuirasses are not indispensable for making war." Every- 
where the making of cartridges was pressed in such fashion as 
to raise the supply to 100 cartridges per man; 50 in the car- 
tridge-box and 50 in the caissons of the park. At Vincennes 
12,000,000 were manufactured in two months. On June 
ist the reserve supply of the Army of the North amounted 
to 5,500,000 cartridges, and the soldiers of all the regim^ents 
in the first line had, with a few exceptions, their complement 
of 50 cartridges. 

Not only the Government of the Restoration had done 
nothing to restore the magazines of clothing emptied by the 
gigantic armaments of 18 12 and 18 13, but it had not even 
provided for the maintenance of the troops who had remained 
under the flags. From May, 18 14, to February, 181 5, the "\A'ar 
Department had allotted to the service of clothing but 4,000,000 
of francs, of which sum 1,000,000 alone had been paid. The 
uniforms were in rags. In more than twenty regiments the 
men were in need of shoes; and in the crack corps, such as 
the Royal Chasseurs, some of the men had neither boots nor 
shirts. In the 14th Light the men had worn for two years, in 
winter as well as in summei, linen trousers. To the 27th of 
the Line there were due 30,000 francs for the clothing" of the 
prisoners repatriated prior to January i, 18 15. These men 
made the campaign in police caps. The Emperor was forced 
to raise to 30,000,000 the credits for the sendee of clothing, 
and the Administration of War estimated that it would be 
necessary to increase them to 51,000,000 in the course of the 
3^ear. Some shop's established in Paris furnished 1,250 coats 
per day. A\'ork was pursued actively in the depots, to which 
the manufacturers were invited to advance supplies, the cities 
guaranteeing the payment. As blue cloth was not to be had 
in sufficient quantities, some overcoats were made from cloth 
of different colors. 



The Last Aemt of the Empire. 19. 

On March 20th the cavalry possessed onlv 27,864 horses, 
the artillery and auxiliary services 7,765. Of these 3.5,629 
horses, 5,000 had been, as a measure of economy, loaned to the 
farmers; these horses were ordered to be returned in haste to 
the corps. The departments were struck with a requisition 
of 8,000 horses against reimbursement, whilst at the central 
depot of remounting at Versailles the horses presented vol- 
untarily by the breeders and farmers were purchased. The 
horses of the military household of the King and of the RoyaL 
Volunteers were distributed in the Guard. The depots of each 
corps were authorized to make direct purchases. Finally 
the Emperor had the excellent idea of taking half of the horses 
of the gendarmerie. Bach gendarme received an indemnity 
of 600 francs; he was to remount himself under fifteen days, 
which was easy for him to do by reason of his situation in the 
country. Thanks to this expedient, 4,250 vigorous and trained 
horses were immediately distributed between the cuirassiers 
and dragoons. The requisition in the departments gave more 
horses than bad been expected; but at the great depot of 
Versailles the remounting proceeded very slowly. From the 
past services of General Preval, it seems that he should have 
been selected to resume the command of this depot, where he 
had performed such prodigies in 1814. Rightly or wrongly, 
he was suspected of being a Royalist. The Emperor sent or 
rather exiled him to the depot of Beauvais, and appointed to 
Versailles General Bourcier. The latter was a formalist, a 
slave of regulations, stopping at trifles. He refused the horses 
over eight years old and those that were lacking a half -inch of 
the height required by the regulations. In the midst of war, 
during the single month of March, Preval had collected more 
than 7,000 horses; in two months of peace Bourcier had been 
able to find but 2.579! In spite of this disappointment, there 
was on the day when the Army took the field a fine body of 
horses. The cavalry counted 40,000 with the armies and in 
the depots; the artillery, including the train and equipages,, 
16,500. 

Threatened by the whole of Europe, Napoleon knew that 
he would be unable to prevent the invasion on all points of 
the territory. Perhaps he would be reduced, as in the pre- 
ceding year, to commence operations only on this side of the 
Oise, the Aisne, and the Marne. Even upon the most favorable 
hvpothesis, his next campaign must be at the same time of- 



20 "W'atehloo. 

fensive and defensive. The putting in a state of defense of 
the fortresses was therefore no less necessary nor less urgent 
than the reorganization of the Army. On March 27th the 
Emperor gave orders for this work, which was not undertaken 
until April 15th. It had been necessary to await the reports 
on the state of the fortresses, the instructions of the Committee 
of Engineers, the opening of credits, and the establishment 
of workshops. At Metz, 7,000 A-orkmen were employed; at 
Rocroi, 500; at Toul, 700; at Landrecies, 400; at Dunkirk, 
1,000; at Huningue, 500; at Grenoble, 400; at Cherbourg, 
500; at Bayonne, 400; at Bordeaux, 200; at Perpignan, 150; 
and upon the entrenched camp of Maubeuge, 1,000. On the 
15th the defiles of the Vosges and the passages of Argonne 
were provided vvith redoubts, abattis, and bhnds; everything 
was prepared to inundate the departments of the North ; and 
in more than eighty tovvns the works were either completely 
terminated or in a way to be promptly finished. Besides, in 
almost all of the fortresses, there existed no breaches in the 
ramparts. It had been only necessary to raise the talus of 
the counterscarp, prepare the platforms for the barbettes, 
repair the embrasures, the banquettes, the glacis, and to 
establish accessory and a few outworks. 

Lyons and Paris needed works of far greater importance. 
At Lyons 4,000 workmen were engaged. The old wall of Four- 
vieres, as well as that which extended from the Rhone to the 
Saone, was restored; some bridge-heads were erected at La 
Guillotiere and Brotteaux and some redoubts at Pierre-Seise, 
Saint-Jean, and Croix-Rousse. Fearful, doubtless, of alien- 
ating from him the Parisians by showing them the peril with 
which they were threatened. Napoleon, urgent as appeared 
to him the necessity of fortifying Paris, gave his first orders 
in this regard only on May 1st. This was much time lost, all 
the more as the Emperor desired a vast system of fortifications 
with continuous lines, horn- and crown-works, redoubts and 
forts crossing their fire. Generals Haxo and Rogniat laid out 
these fortifications. It was only towards the middle of May 
that the works began to be actively pressed. Fifteen hundred, 
2,000, and then 4.000 workmen were employed upon these 
works, without counting numerous detachments of volunteers 
from the Guard, the Line, the National Guard, and the Fed- 
erates. When Napoleon set out for the arni}^, the entrench- 
ments and the works on the right bank, which had been un- 



The Last Army of ti-ie Ejmpire. 21 

dertaken first, as being destined to cover the most probable 
points of attack, were partly finished, but those on the left 
bank were hardly begun. 

The works upon the fortifications, the arming and pro- 
visioning of the fortresses, were actively pushed. The arsenals 
of Metz, Douai, Lille, Grenoble, and Toulouse, furnished can- 
non and powder for the fortified towns in which the material 
of artillery was insufficient. Foundries were established for 
the casting of projectiles. The Marine sent from Toulon to 
Lyons by way of Aries and the Rhone 100 twenty-four-, twelve-, 
and six-pounders, and from Brest and Cherbourg to Paris 300 
pieces of ordnance by way of Havre and the Seine. The arma- 
ment of Paris comprised, moreover, 300 field pieces, 100 of 
which were distributed into movable batteries. "We must 
place guns wherever we can," wrote the Emperor, "for one 
fights with cannon-shots like one fights with blows of the fist." 

In order to gain time, Davout at first charged the com- 
manders of army corps to occup}^ themselves, in conjunction 
with the prefects and ordonnateurs, with the victualing of the 
fortresses. But it was to be feared that by this system, which 
moreover gave rather good results, the requisitions would be 
neglected. There existed an agreement concluded between 
the Government of Louis XVIII. and the contractor, Doumerc. 
This agreement was maintained. But Doumerc, a brother of 
the cavalry general, was only the proxy of Ouvrard, who failed 
to fulfil his obligations. There were complaints everywhere; 
it became necessary to encroach upon the reserve supplies in 
order to nourish the men and horses. Ouvrard was accused 
of using in speculations upon the Bourse the money advanced 
by the Treasury. Davout authorized the prefects to purchase 
what was necessary, regardless of the price, for the account of 
the contractor. The general application of this measure would 
have ruined Ouvrard. He proposed through Doumerc a new 
contract, which was entered into on May 24th with Davout 
and Daru; according to the terms of this contract the vict- 
ualing of the fortresses was to be completed within thirty days 
by means of an anticipated payment of 4,000,000 francs. 
By the middle of June the places of the first and second Hues 
were, with a few exceptions, provisioned for four months on 
an average, and the convoys in the rear of the Army of the 
North carried a supply of provisions for eight days. 



22 Waterloo. 

In order to push .a successful conclusion this immense 
armament, more time and money would have been necessary. 
The royal budget of war of 1815, which was to be presented 
to the Chambers during the April session, amounted to 298,000,- 
000 francs, of which 25,000,000 were for the military house- 
"hold, the Swiss regiments, and the pensions of the emigres and 
Ven'deans. The Emperor was quick to see that, in spite of the 
saving to be realized under these heads, the military budget 
must be increased by 100,000,000. Still, the estimate was 
modest. If the war had lasted any length of time, the expenses 
would have greatly exceeded these expectations. Napoleon 
was not in favor of loans, because, according to his saying, 
"he did not wish to spend income in advance," and also be- 
cause he did not believe in credit. In 1815 he did not desire 
to increase the imposts, for fear of rendering himself unpopular. 
Far from seeking resources in new taxes, he suppressed the 
tax on drinks, the home tax, and, in communes of less than 
4,000 inhabitants, the tax on liquids. This reform, which 
historv has passed over in silence, in the midst of such great 
■events, had nevertheless som^e influence upon public opinion. 
The Bourbons, who had solemly promised the suppression of 
the droits reunis, had taken great care to change nothing, and 
Napoleon, who had promised nothing, abolished those imposts 
which were regarded as the most vexatious and the most in- 
tolerable. Among the peasants, the small stock-holders, and 
in the already influential class of grog-sellers and wine-brokers, 
this reduction rallied more men to the imperial cause than 
were driven away by the Additional Act, especially attacked 
by the wits of the salons and the political professors. 

The Emperor found an unhoped-for resource in a coin 
reserve of 50,000,000, which existed in the Treasury on March 
20th. The Minister of Finance, Baron Louis, had employed 
a part of this fund in stock-jobbing: he had not felt at libertv 
to carrv the remainder to Ghent. The imperial Government 
profited by the time at which the revolution had taken place. 
On March 2()th the tax-payers had as yet paid very little of 
the imposts which had become due. There was, in fact, a con- 
tinual flow of money into the chests of the receivers during the 
months of April and May, for generally these contributions 
were paid without difficulty. Nevertheless, the ordinary re- 
ceipts and the available money being insufficient to meet all 
the expenses, Gaudin, upon an order from the Emperor, ne- 



Ti-iE Last Arjmy or the Empire. 23 

gotiated a loan of 3,600,000 francs from the Sinking Fund, 
and deposited as collateral checks to the same amount, re- 
deemable out of the national funds. This transaction, man- 
aged with the cooperation of Ouvrard, produced, clear of all 
discount, 40,000,000 in cash. 

The expenses of arming, equiping, and clothing the mo- 
bilized National Guards, expenses estimated at 24,000,000, did 
not figure in the budget of war. They were charged to the de- 
partments, which were to provide for them out of the tax on 
substitutes, which had been fixed at 120 francs, and by the 
setting aside of one-tenth of the communal revenues and the 
proceeds arising from the sale of one-fourth of the forest re- 
serves. There was allotted, moreover, to the expenses of the 
National Guards the entire sum arising from the patriotic gifts, 
and a reserve fund of 6,000,000 to be taken from the Sinking 
Fund. 

Thanks to these resources and to these expedients, France 
was put on a war footing. But in how many fortresses was 
"the work interrupted for the lack of money! How many sol- 
diers carried equipments that were unfit for service! And 
how many National Guards, already brigaded, awaited, useless 
and dissatisfied, for their arms to be given them ! In May 
they had received their pay only after great delay and many 
difficulties. On June 1 2th th^re were for +he entire Army of the 
North but one thousand pairs of shoes in reserve; the gratuity 
promised the soldiers on taking the field had not been paid 
them, and, at the time when the pay amounted to 5,000,000 
per month, the military chests contained only 670,000 francs. 

The extraordinary resources (coin reserve left by Baron 
Louis and the product arising from the alienation of 3,600,000 
francs of the Government funds) were exhausted, and the reg- 
ular receipts began to fall off. Though the Emperor and his 
councils were opposed to exceptional measures, it became 
necessary to resign themselves to them, for the expenses fore- 
seen by Davout for the month of July alone amounted to 
72,000,000. In the budget presented to the Chambers on June 
19th there figured a national loan of 150,000,000, guaranteed 
by the forests of the State. All the tax-payers were to sub- 
scribe an amount equal to the sura of their realty and personal 
taxes. It was a forced loan. 



24 AYateeloo. 



III. 

The Emperor did not even await the commencement of 
the mobihzation in order to organize the army corps. Thanks 
to the concentration of the troops under Paris ordered by Louis 
XVIIL, to the numerous regiments which had rejoined the 
Battahon of the Isle of Elba since Grenoble, and finally to the 
strong garrisons of the frontier towns of the North and East, 
Napoleon, immediately after his return to the Tuileries, found 
that he had in a manner under his hand a great part of the 
available forces of the Army. In order to be ready for every 
emergency, he hastened, on March 26th, to order the formation 
of eight army corps, called corps of observation. The ist 
Corps was to assemble at Lille ; the 2nd at Valenciennes ; the 3d 
at Mezieres; the 4th at Thionville; the 5th at Strasbourg; the 
6th at Chambery ; the 7th at the foot of the Pyrenees; and the 
8th, or reserve corps, at Paris. Temporaril}^, the regiments 
entering into the composition of these army corps would be of 
two battalions. The skeletons of the 3rd battalions and the 
depots would be concentrated in the military government of 
Paris and in the towns of the interior until the calling out of 
the reserves would permit of the forming of the 3rd, 4th, and 
5th battalions, which would go immediately to rejoin the Army. 
The mobilized National Guards would replace the troops of 
the Line in the fortresses. 

The light cavalry was distributed at the ratio of one di- 
vision for each army corps. With the surplus of this cavalry 
and the dragoons, cuirassiers, and carbineers, there were formed 
eight divisions of reserve cavalry, to each of which was attached 
a battery of horse artillerv. 

On March 20th the Imperial Guard comprised only the 
two regiments of grenadiers and the two regiments of chasseurs 
of the Old Guard and four regiments of cavalr3^ The Emperor 
augmented the effectives of the cavalry regiments, created a 
third and fourth regiment of grenadiers, a third and fourth 
regiment of chasseurs (Middle Guard), eight regiments of 
voltigeurs and eight of tirailleurs (Young Guard), and a second 
regiment of horse chasseurs. He reestablished the two regi- 
ments of horse and foot artillery of the Old Guard, as well as 
the regiment of the train, the squadron of picked gendarmes ,^ 
the battalion of marines, and the company of sappers. The 



The Last Army of the Empire. 25 

Young Guard was organized with the enrolled volunteers 
and the recalled soldiers having formerly belonged to this 
corps, and in which each man received a sou as extra 
pay. The men of the Elba battalion were incorporated with 
the Old Guard. For the Middle Guard, the artillery and cav- 
alry, it was necessary to recruit them from the gendarmerie 
and the lyine. The gendarmerie gave 500 men. Each regiment 
of the Line was to furnish thirty of its best men, large and 
strongly constituted; a minimum service of four years in the 
infantry and of eight years in the cavalry was required. 

When, at the end of May, the recalled soldiers, the mo- 
bilized National Guards, and the volunteers had increased the 
army, the Emperor made a new distribution of his forces. 
The I St Corps (under Drouet d'Erlon), the 2nd Corps (under 
Reille), the 3rd Corps (under Vandamme), the Army of the 
Moselle, called thenceforth the 4th Corps (under Gerard), and 
the 8th Corps (become the 6th, under Lobau), the cavalry re- 
serve (imder Grouchy), and the Imperial Guard, formed the 
Arm}^ of the North, 124,139 men strong, and commanded by 
the Emperor in person. The 5th Corps became the Army of 
the Rhine (23,097 men, of whom 3,000 were mobilized National 
Guards, under Rapp) ; and the 6th Corps became the Army of 
the Alps (23,617 men, of whom 13,000 were mobilized National 
Guards, under Suchet). The 7th Corps was divided into two 
fractions — one fraction took the name of Corps of the Western 
Pyrenees (6,280 men, of whom 3,000 were mobilized National 
Guards, under Clausel) ; the other, that of Corps of the Eastern 
Pyrenees (7,633 men, of whom 3,300 were mobilized National 
Guards, under Decaen). The Emperor created finally three 
new army corps: the Army of the West (nearly 10,000 men, 
under Lamarque), whose duty it was to repress the Vendean 
insurrection; the Corps of the Var (5,544 men, under Brune), 
and the Corps of Jura (8,420 men, of whom 5,500 were mo- 
bilized National Guards, under Lecourbe), both destined to 
second the army of Suchet in the defense of the Alps. 

Four divisions of picked National Guards, of a total 
strength of 17,466 men, camped under Avesnes, Sainte- 
Menihould, Colmar, and Nancy; 90,000 mobilized National 
Guards and 25,000 retired soldiers were assembled in the fort- 
resses and in the depots; 11,233 cannoneers of the Line and 
6,000 cannoneers of the Marine assured in the fortified towns, 
in conjunction with 2,071 veteran and 6,000 sedentary can- 



26 Wateeloo. 

noneers, the service of the artillery; 13,934 soldiers of all arms 
were en route by detachments to join the active armies; finally, 
59,559 available and non-available men Avere in the depots of 
the Line and 5,559 in the depots of the Guard. There were, in 
addition to these, 4,700 men of the war battalions detached to 
the island of Elba and in the colonies; 8,162 men in the hos- 
pitals; 10,000 marine and 5,129 veteran fusiliers; 14,521 foot 
and horse gendarmes; finally, 12,000 custom-house officers or- 
ganized militarily and 6,000 partisans. Thus the Emperor had 
raised the active army from 200,000 men to 284,000, and he 
had formed an auxiliary army of 222,000 men. 

One month later these two armies would have been aug- 
mented, first, by 19,000 recalled soldiers, who had received 
their orders of route prior to June loth, but had not yet reached 
the depots; second, by some thousands of recalled soldiers 
who, on June I5tli, had not arrived in the chefs-lieux of the de- 
partments; third, by 46,500 conscripts of 181 5 who, at this 
same date, were assembled in the chefs-lieux of the departments ; 
fourth, by 15,000 mobilized National Guards, put en route by the 
middle of June for the points of concentration. Finally, from 
July 15th to September 25th, there would have been the 74,000 
men forming the complement of the contingent of 1815 and 
the 84,000 men forming the complement of the levy of the 
mobilized National Guards. It would have been possible t0 
mobilize even 60,000 or 70,000 more National Guards, in ap- 
plying to the departments of the West, for which they had 
been deferred, the decrees calling the National Guards into 
active service, and in ordering a new levy in all the extent of 
France. When Napoleon said that by October ist the Army 
would have numbered 800,000 men, he was not so far from the 
truth. 

IV. 

In execution of the decrees of Lyons, the officers who, 
having emigrated or quitted the service at the time of the Rev- 
olution, had been introduced into the Army since April i, 18 14, 
were struck from the muster-rolls. But, as many of these 
officers were provided with employment in the military house- 
hold and in the staffs, this wholesale removal produced but 
few vacancies in the Line. The officers in line of promotion 
sufficed to complete the lists. The officers on half-pay were 
placed in the battalions, squadrons, and batteries of new 



The Last Army of the Em pike. 27 

formation, in the Young Guard, and in the Federate Sharp- 
shooters. In the midst of May 2,500 oflicers of this category, 
to whom, moreover, the Emperor had given their entire pay 
pending employment, were still available; they were directed 
upon the frontier places to command the mobilized Nationa' 
Guards. 

Certain of the devotion of the officers Avho lived in im- 
mediate contact with the troops, Napoleon had legitimate 
reasons for mistrusting many colonels and generals. Among 
the general officers, there were in 18 14 some weakness and 
treason; in 18 15, some hesitation and resistance. Numerous 
changes imposed themselves in the high military Personnel. 
But it was rather the interest of the Army than personal 
rancor or sympathy which dictated to the Kmperor his ex- 
clusions and selections. Pitiless for the officers who had shown 
themselves during the Campaign of France incapable, as 
Augereau and Oudinot, or criminal, as Marmont and Souham, 
Napoleon knew how to forget the conduct of those who from 
the ist to the 20th of March had attempted to change his 
triumphal return into a miserable failure. Colonel Cuneo 
d'Ornano, who had imprisoned twenty-five grenadiers in the 
citadel of Antibes, was promoted general; General Miolhs, who 
had led the garrison of Marseilles in pursuit of the little im- 
perial column, was invested with the comiuand of the place of 
Metz; Colonel Roussile, the tenacious defender of the gate of 
Grenoble, remained at the head of the 5th of the Line; Colonel 
Dubalen, of the 6th, who had pubhcly giveri his resignation to 
Ney upon the place of arms of Lons-le-Saunier, was recalled to 
his regiment ; General Marchand might have also returned 
into favor, but he refused, he said, "to figure upon the Hst of 
traitors." A Republican under the Empire and converted 
under Louis XVIII. to constitutional monarchy, Foy had put 
himself, on March 24th, at the head of the Bonapartist move- 
ment at Nantes, only after having done everything to arrest it. 
He was none the less provided with a fine division in the Army 
of the North. Many officers of the loth of the Line, promoted 
by the Duke of Angouleme during the campaign in the Midi, 
were confirmed in their new grade. Harispe and Lleudelet, 
though seriously compromised by their manifestations in favor 
of the Bourbons, had, nevertheless, a command. The Em- 
peror employed Rapp, BeUiard, Ruty, Haxo, Kellermann the 
younger, and Gourgaud, just as if the>^had not served in 



28 AYATEltLOO. 

the army assembled at Villejuif under the orders of the Duke 
of Berry- "Would you have dared to fire on me?" said Na- 
poleon to Rapp. "Doubtless, sire; it was my duty." And 
Napoleon gave him the Army of the Rhine. 

The Emperor, however, removed or retired a hundred 
officers of every rank: Dupont, whose favor under Douis 
XVIIT. had not effaced the dishonor of Baylen; Dessolles, who 
had so well seconded Talleyrand in April, 1814; Beurnonville, 
Donnadieu, and Bourdessoule, who had emigrated to Belgium ; 
Maison, also an emigre, and who, solicited by the imperial Gov- 
ernment to return to France, replied that he would return 
there only at the head of 500,000 bayonets; Curto, whose 
furious woicds against Napoleon had provoked a mutiny in the 
garrison of Thionville; Generals d'Aidtanne, Monnier, Ernouf, 
Loverdo, Briche, and the colonels of the loth of the lyine and 
of the T4th Chasseurs, who had fought in the Midi under the 
Duke of Angouleme eight days after the imperial Government 
had been recognized by two-thirds of France. AA'ithout re- 
morse for his complicity with Marmont in the defection of 
Kssonnes, Souhani had hoped to preserve his command of 
Perigeux; removed, he presented himself at the Tuileries at a 
public audience in order to attempt to move the Emperor. 
"What do you still wish from me?" said Napoleon, turning his 
back on him. "You see that I no longer know you!" 

At the request of Davout and the corps commanders, many 
colonels, majors, captains, and lieutenants were, on account of 
their persistent hostility, struck from the lists. The disgrace 
of Colonels Moncey, Oudinot, and Zoppfell appears less expli- 
cable. Moncey had only sought to maintain the 3rd Hussars in 
obedience to the King, and that only up to the 13th of March; 
now Napoleon had shown himself indulgent to many analogous 
acts. Oudinot could be reproached only for bearing the name 
of his father, and Zoppfell for being a protege of the Duke of 
Feltre. Denoi:nced as a Royalist, Bugeaud was put on half- 
pay by Davout in the course of April, but Suchet, Grouchy^ 
Gerard, and Bertrand hastened to speak in favor of "the best 
colonel of the Army." Replaced at the head of the i4tli of the 
Dine, Bugeaud received, as a compensation for his momentar}^ 
disgrace, the rank of commander in the Legion of Honor. 

General de Bourmont was also unemployed for some time. 
From Eons-le-Saunier he had hastened to Paris to join Louis 
XVIII. The Emperor ordered his arrest at the request of Ney; 



The Last AincY of tile EmpipvE. 



29 



but the latter was the first one to soHcit Napoleon to give a 
command to this general. Gerard, who had had Bourmont 
imder his orders during the campaigns of 181 2 and 18 14, de- 
manded him as a general of division in his army corps. After 
having hesitated for a long time, the Emperor finally yielded. 
It was necessary for him to impose his will upon Davout, who 
yelded only to a formal order. ' 'Gerard answers for Bourmont 
with his head," said the Emperor. "Gerard is wrong," replied 
the Prince of Eckmiihl ; "I answer for no one. I only answer 
for myself." 

Lenient, as we see, towards those who had wished to com- 
bat him, the Emperor did not lavish recompenses upon those 
who had first compromised themselves for him. If he pro- 
moted La Bedoyere, already proposed during the Campaign of 
France, and Mallet, commander of the Battalion of the Island 
of Elba, to be generals of brigade, if he promoted Simmer, who 
had brought him two regiments at Lyons, to be general of di- 
vision, and if he named Brayer peer of France, Dessaix, Gir- 
ard, \llix, Ameil, Mouton-Duvernet, Gilly, Pire, Protean, and 
Chartran received no favors of any kind ; they were employed 
in the armies only according to the strict rights of their rank. 
Now, Dessaix had accepted the command of Lyons seven days 
before the Emperor's return to the Tuileries, Girard had com- 
manded from Avallon the imperial advance guard, Allix had 
proclaimed the Empire at Nevers, Ameil had been arrested at 
Auxerre as an emissarv of Napoleon, Chartran was to pay with 
his life for his devotion to the imperial cause, and Mouton- 
Duvernet, Gilly, Pire, and Protean had ardently and effica- 
ciously seconded Grouchy in the campaign of the Midi against 
the Duke of Angouleme. General Porret de Morvan, who, for 
having led to vSens the foot chasseurs of the Old Guard, flat- 
tered himself that he would be selected to replace Curial as 
colonel of this corps, saw Curial disgraced, but the command 
of the chasseurs was given to Morand. Prince Jerome, im- 
perial highness though he was, was only invested with the com- 
mand of a division of infantry. Merlin, who had forced the 
Governor of Vincennes to capitulate, received the three stars, 
but Sebastiani. wholiad hastened the defection of the army of 
the Duke of Berry, was charged with a mission which he justly 
regarded as unworthy of his merit and services — namely, the 
organization of the National Guards in the i6th Military Di- 
vision. Exelmans, who had been first to enter the Tuileries 
on March 20th, was given a corps of cavalry, but Kellermann, 



30 



Waterloo. 



who had been employed in the Army of Villejuif , was also given 
the command of one. Lallemand the elder, one of the princi- 
pal chiefs of the conspiracy of the North, was made lieutenant- 
general; but Lefebvre-Desnoettes and Lallemand the younger 
were simply replaced at the head of the horse chasseurs and of 
the artihery of the Old Guard. After the fiasco of Compiegne, 
Colonel Marin had gone at full speed to rejoin Napoleon at 
Auxerre; he doubtless hoped to obtain the command of the 
horse artillery of the Guard, of which he had been major. It 
was Colonel Duchand, of the artillery of the Line, who was 
selected. 

V. 

Of the twenty marshals of France, three — Berthier, Mar- 
mont, and Victor — had accompanied or rejoined Louis XVIIL 
in Belgium; the Kniperor ordered their names to be struck 
from the list of marshals. Perignon, who had foolishly com- 
promised himself with Vitrolles at Toulouse, and Augereau, 
whose recent recantation could not redeem his pitiful conduct 
at the head of the Army of Lyons in 1814, were the object of 
the same measure. Napoleon also desired to remove both 
Gouvion Saint-Cyr and old Kellermann; the first for having 
disregarded his orders after March 20th and for having caused 
the troops of the 22d Military Division to resume the white 
cockade ; and the second for having voted the Act of Deposition 
on April i, 18 14. Madame Gouvion vSaint-Cyr wrote a letter 
to Davout which appeased the Emperor; the Marshal escaped 
with a forced sojourn in this chateau of Reverseaux. Napoleon 
also failed to carry out his first decision in regard to the Duke 
of Valmv. Serurier, who had also, as senator, voted the Act 
of Deposition, was maintained in his functions as Governor 
of the Invalides. The Emperor contented himself with not 
naming him to the Chamber of Peers, and the lesson was 
well merited. 

Oudinot, like Gouvion Saint-Cyr, had refused, after 
March 20th, to obey the orders of Napoleon. He had not per- 
mitted the Empire to be proclaimed at Metz until the garrison 
and the revolted populace had forced him to do so. Relieved 
of his command, he used every effort to obtain his pardon. 
He addressed a letter to the Emperor, and supplicated Davout, 
Suchet, and Jacqueminot to intercede for him. "Go at once to 
the Emperor," he wrote to Suchet, ' ' and tell him what you think: 



The Last Army of the Empire. 31 

of me ; tell him that you did not forward your letter and that of 
Ney to me until the evening of the 27th. You will also tell 
him that never has Oudinot forgotten what he o\\es to Na- 
poleon; and that if Oudinot has been guilty of any wrong, he 
will no sooner know it than he will expiate and repair it. I am 
in need of your intercession for my wife and children, who all 
share the misfortune which prostrates me." The Emperor re- 
voked the order exiling him to Lorraine and consented to re- 
ceive him at the Tuileries, but he left him without employment. 
Doubtless Napoleon would not have harbored anv ill-will 
against the Marshal for his conduct at Metz; but he could not 
forget that the Duke of Reggio had, the preceding year, caused 
himself to be beaten at Bar-sur-Aube, on account of his faulty 
dispositions on the eve of the battle and by his fatal indecision 
during the combat. 

Though Macdonald had shown himself to be a very zealous 
Royalist, and though he had done his utmost at Lyons and 
Villejuif to organize resistance, the Emperor was, disposed to- 
give him a command. But the Marshal, who had returned to 
Paris after having accompanied Louis XVIIL as far as the 
frontier, was firmly resolved not to serve under the new Gov- 
ernment. It w^as in vain that General Maurice Mathieu, his 
old chief of staff in the .'Xrmy of the Grisons, supplicated him tO' 
come to the Tuileries, where the Emperor awaited him ; it was 
in vain that Davout himself forced his door in order to de- 
termine him to accept a command; he remained inflexible. 
Being tired of w^ar, the sole favor that he would deign to ask 
of the Emperor was permission to be allowed to live like 
a good bourgeois on his property of Courcelle, near Gien. 
Napoleon granted his request. 

After having published a violent order of the day against 
Napoleon, Moncey had left Paris on March 20th. He wrote 
two days later to the Emperor that he intended to retire to 
the country. Napoleon had already replaced him as In- 
spector-General of Gendarmerie by Rovigo. But should he 
not have remembered w^hat Moncey had done in 18 14 at the 
head of the Parisian National Guard and restored this com- 
mand to him? He contented himself with naming him a 
member of the Chamber of Peers, the same as Lefebvre, who 
had had no command during the Campaign of France and who 
had remained without employment under Louis XVIII. In 
justice to Lefebvre, we should state that he was sixty-seven 



32 Wateeloo. 

years old, and the Emperor rightly wished to have young men 
in command of his arm}'- corps. 

Massena had seconded but feebly the Duke of Angouleme 
during the short campaign upon the banks of the Rhone, and 
immediately after the capitulation of La Pallud he had hastened 
to proclaim the Empire. On April 14th he addressed to Na- 
poleon a report justifying his conduct, which closed as follows : 
"I can not conceal from Your Majesty how desirous I am of 
seeing you again in order to assure you of my boundless de- 
votion." The Emperor wrote to the Prince of Essling a letter 
of congratulations, summoned him to Paris, and received him 
there with great marks of friendship ; but, in spite of his half- 
promise, he preferred not to restore to him the government of 
the 9th Military Division. In order to contain the Royalists 
of Marseilles, it was necessary to have a man who had not com- 
manded there in the name of Louis XVIII. The Emperor 
offered to Massena, whose infirmities rendered him incapable 
of serving in the active armies, the government of the 4th and 
5th Military Divisions, comprising the Moselle, the Meurthe, 
and the Vosges. The Marshal refused this post, and remained 
in Paris, where he showed himself very assiduous in attending 
the sittings of the Chamber of Peers. 

Although Mortier, Governor of Lille, Suchet, Governor of 
Strasbourg, and Jourdan, Governor of Rouen, had remained 
faithfiil to the King during three or four days after March 
20th, they had not compromised themselves like Oudinot and 
Gouvion Saint-Cyr. The Emperor could not feel towards them 
anv resentment. He did not wish, however, to maintain them 
in the posts which they held from Louis XVIII. This was with 
him a principle. Charged at first with the inspection of the 
places of the Northeast, Mortier was selected to command the 
cavalrv of the Guard and finally put at the head of the Young 
Guard. vSiichet was invested with the command of the Army 
of the Alps; and jourdan received the command of Besan^on, 
a fortified town of the first line, where Davout judged it neces- 
sary that there should be a marshal of France. 

In disgrace ^itice 18^7 for having, it is said, closed too com- 
placentlv his eve; upDn the peculations of Bourrienne in the 
Han^eatic towni, Brun"; had demanded vainly, at the begin- 
ning of the Campaign of France, permission to resume service. 
During the Restoration he had also remained without employ- 
ment. After the return of the Emperor, Brune again oft'ered his 



TjfE Last Army of the Empire. 33 

sword. The administrative qualities, of which he had given 
-proof in Belgium, the Gironde, Vendee, and Tuscany, designated 
him for the government of one of the provinces in which the 
troubles still existed. Sent to Marseilles as governor of the 9th 
Military Division, he was at the same time charged with the or- 
ganization and the command of the army corps of the Var. 

Marshal Ney, having arrived with his troops at Paris on 
March 23rd, was entrusted on the same day with a mission in 
the departments of the north and east. The patent object of 
this mission was to inspect the fortresses; the secret object, 
to judge of the state of minds, to furnish information regarding 
the officers and functionaries, and to propose, if necessary, 
some removals and substitutions. Ney performed this mission 
with zeal, but he had the bad taste to manifest against the 
Bourbons sentiments of an unheard-of violence. In the meet- 
ings of the officers he exhaled insults against the King and 
Princes. "It is a rotten family," said he. These words were 
not of a nature to pacify public opinion, which was generally 
hostile to him. Among the Bonapartists, and even in the 
entourage of the Emperor, his conduct at Lons-le-Saunier was 
criticised. This malicious plav upon words was repeated all 
over Paris: "// fallait ctre rie (Ney) pour <;al" — ("One must 
be born for this!") — and his sudden change of sides did not 
free him from suspicion. "If Ney is employed in the field," 
wrote an anonymous person to the Emperor, "he should be 
given a staff upon which one can depend." There were no 
lack of men to recall to Napoleon the never-to-be-forgotten 
scene of Fontainebleau, and perhaps one had reported to him 
the words of Ney at the time of his recent passage through 
Dijon: "I had congratulated myself on having forced the 
Emperor to abdicate, and now I must serve him !" In addition 
to all this, the Marshal, on returning from his tour of inspection, 
about April 15th, had been so uttterly lacking in tact as to at- 
tempt to excuse himself to the Emperor for his words con- 
cerning the iron cage. "This speech is true," he said, "but 
it was because I had already made up my mind, and I did not 
think I could say anything better to conceal my projects." 
Napoleon remained silent, but in his eyes the Marshal saw a 
flash of lightning. 

Desperate, full of confusion and remorse, accusing every 
one and himself, Ney retired to his property of Coudreaux. 
For six weeks nothing was heard from him. It was said that 



34 Watekloo. 

he was in disgrace; it was even reported that he had been ar- 
rested. He returned to Paris for the ceremony of the Champ 
de Mai. Named peer of France on June 2nd, he went to the 
Elysee four days later to obtain the written order for the pay- 
ment of a sum of 37,000 francs due him for back pay and the 
expenses of his tour. "Here you are," said Napoleon to him; 
"I thought you had emigrated." "Would that I had done 
so sooner!" bitterly replied the Marshal. On June nth he 
again returned to the Tuileries, but there was no question in 
these two interviews of a command for him in the Army of 
the North. Ney doubtless, who knew that Napoleon called 
him la bete noire, dared not solicit one. But on June nth, at 
the moment of quitting Paris, the Emperor became doubtful 
as to the wisdom of his course. Could he condemn to a de- 
grading repose the hero of so many battles? Could he, in the 
hour of peril, deprive both France and himself of such a soldier? 
He wrote to the Minister of War: "Summon Marshal Ney; 
tell him that, if he wishes to be in the first battles, he must be 
by the 14th at Avesnes, where will be my headquarters." Na- 
poleon, no doubt, believed that he was acting in the interest of 
the Arm^y or, what was identical, in his own interest. He acted 
also through commiseration. The tone of his note indicates it. 
It is not an order; it is only a notice, which leaves the Marshal 
free to do as he pleases. Let Ney come if he desires. But 
Ney could not but desire to be present in the first battles, 
should it be only in the hope of being killed. He set out from 
Paris on June 12th and reached Avesnes on the 13th, where he 
dined with the Emperor, but he received the command of the 
I St and 2nd Army Corps only on the afternoon of the 15th — 
that is to say, after the operations had begun. 

Since he had "passe roi," according to the expression in 
vogue in the Army, Murat figured no longer upon the list of 
marshals. Three weeks before Napoleon took the field, Joa- 
chim, who had fallen from the throne, had sought refuge in the 
environs of Toulon. Not even his soldier's saber remained to 
him. He besought the Emperor to restore it to him. "I de- 
sire," he wrote, "to shed for you the last drop of my blood." 
Napoleon refused his offer. He could not see his way clear to 
give a command in the French Army to a Frenchman who had 
fought against it one year before. Besides, he was angry with 
his brother-in-law for having commenced too soon, in spite of 
his instructions, the war against the Austrians; he was espe- 



The Last Army of the E:mpire. 35 

daily angry with him for having allowed himself to be defeated. 
Later, in his reveries at St. Helena, Napoleon regretted his 
decision in regard to this great cavalry leader. ' 'At Waterloo," 
he said, "Murat would have perhaps gained us the victory. 
What was necessary? To overthrow three or four EngHsh 
squares. Murat was precisely the man to do this." Would 
Murat, who possessed the double gift of inspiring in his horse- 
men a furious elan and of terrifying the enemy, have succeeded 
in riding down the English? It is possible. 

The memory of Grouchy is henceforth so intiniatelv asso- 
ciated with the cursed remembrance of Waterloo that the fine 
services and brilliant actions of this valorous captain have 
been forgotten. If he had not the magnetic elan of Murat, 
he knew like him how to maneuver masses of cavalry. Second 
in command of the expedition to Ireland in the year V. (1796), 
Governor of Madrid in 1808, colonel-general of the chasseurs 
and chevau-legers in 1809, and chief of the Sacred Squadron 
during the retreat from Russia, he had contributed to the vic- 
tories of Hohenlinden, Eylau, Friedland, Wagram, and the 
Moskowa. After Vauchamps it is said the Emperor had 
thought of naming him marshal of France. In disgrace under 
Louis XVIII. , Grouchy was sent to Lyons on March 31st to 
combat the Duke of Angouleme. Promoted marshal after 
this short and easy campaign, he was put at the head of the 
Army of the Alps, then recalled to Paris on May 8th. The 
Emperor intended to give him the four cavalry corps of the 
Army of the North. It was as commander-in-chief of the 
cavalry that Grouchy entered Belgium on June 15th; for his 
misfortune, he was on the next day to be charged with a still 
more important command. 

VI. 

The selection of a major-general seriously preoccupied 
Napoleon. By whom could he replace Berthier? The Prince 
of Wagram was neither a great captain, an organizer, nor a 
man of superior intellect ; but he possessed extensive technical 
knowledge, and he had raised to the hundredth power the 
qualities of a good clerk. Indefatigable, conscientious, dihgent, 
quick to grasp the most complicated orders, skillful in trans- 
lating them in all their details with wonderful accuracy, pre- 
cision, and clearness, and, finally, punctual in transmitting 



^6 AYaterloo. 

them at the right moment, he had been for Napoleon a perfect 
instrument. With him as chief of staff, the Emperor was 
tranquil; the orders were always drawn up in such a manner 
that those who received them had no doubt or hesitation as to 
the manner in which they were to be executed. And these 
orders always reached their destination, even should Berthier 
be forced to cause each order to be carried, when he deemed it 
prudent, by eight officers, taking as many different routes. 
It was said that Berthier had grown feeble in mind and body. 
In 1 8 14, however, his correspondence bears witness that his 
pen had lost nothing of its activity and luminous precision. 
The Emperor, who remembered the services of the Prince of 
Wagram during the last campaign, regretted him and despaired 
not of seeing him return to France. "That brute of a Ber- 
thier!" said he to Rapp, "he will return. I will pardon him 
everything, but on condition that he will don his uniform of a 
Life Guardsman and appear before me." 

Berthier, in fact, attempted to return to France, where he 
had left the Princess of Wagram with his son and his two 
daughters. Having remained a short time at Ghent, he went 
to the Chateau of Bamberg, a property of his uncle by mar- 
riage, the King of Bavaria. At the beginning, of May he set 
out to gain by way of Bale the French frontier; he was unable 
to pass beyond Stockach, where he found the headquarters of 
the Prince of HohenzoUern. The Allies, no doubt, preferred 
to keep Berthier a half -prisoner in Bavaria than to know that 
he was in Napoleon's staff. He returned very sadly to Bam- 
berg. In the afternoon of June ist, as a regiment of Russian 
dragoons on the march for France was defiling in front of the 
chateau, Berthier was seen to quit suddenly the window on 
the first floor, from which he was watching the soldiers, to ap- 
pear shortly afterwards at a window .on the third floor and to 
fall upon the pavement. He was picked up dead, with his 
skull fractured. 

For three weeks the Emperor had decided to take for 
major-general Marshal Soult, who, as it seems, had offered 
himself for this position. 

Suspected by the friends of the King, hated by the Bona- 
partists as well as by the Liberals, and execrated by the entire 
body of officers, vSoult had retired to Villeneuve-l'Etang. This 
retreat being near Paris, he came to the Tuileries on March 
26th. It is hardly probable that this visit was made in order 



Tile Last Army of the Empire. 37 

to remind the Emperor that he had spoken of him as a madman 
and adventurer in his last order of the day. At the end of 
this interview, of which nothing has become pubhc, Soult 
exchanged many letters with Davout, who manifested some 
friendliness towards him. But, in spite of Davout's steps in 
his behalf, the Emperor was some time in reaching a decision. 
"I desire," wrote Soult, on April nth, to the Minister of War, 
"that your excellency will have the kindness to reply to my 
letter written to you a few days since, in order that I may be 
in position to conform to the decision of His Majesty in my 
regard." vSome days later Soult, who had sent his oath in 
writing, was invited to come to renew it solemnly before the 
Emperor. Thenceforth the Duke of Dalmatia could regard 
himself as being restored to favor. On May 9th he was named 
major-general. 

Soult was as superior to Berthier as a man of mind and 
action is to a good clerk. But he had never discharged the 
duties of a chief of staff in an army corps; he had had no ex- 
perience in this office, and was lacking in the qualities of appli- 
cation and exactness, which are so essential to the proper dis- 
charge of its duties. Bailly de Monthyon, who, regarded as 
Berthier' s right arm, had been chief of the General Staff from 
1812 to 1814, and who, in 1813, during the absence of the 
major-general, had twice discharged the duties of this office; 
Drouot, aide-major-general of the Imperial Guard; Behiard, 
Murat's chief of staff from 1805 to 1808 and aide-major-general 
during the campaigns of vSaxony and France; Reille and 
Drouet d'Erlon, both old chiefs of staff 01 Lannes; Bertrand, 
for so long an aide-de-camp of the Emperor, and so accus- 
tomed as grand marshal to receiving and transmitting his 
orders; Gerard, ex-chief of staff of Bernadotte; Ruty, chief of 
staff in 1 813 of the artillery of the Grand Army; and so many 
other generals of division, would have been perhaps more 
capable of replacing the Prince of Wagram. But for hier- 
archical reasons, or etiquette, the Emperor desired to have 
a marshal of France for major-general. Now, none of the 
marshals, save Davout and Suchet, appeared more capable of 
discharging the duties of this office than Soult. At the moment 
when France was in the midst of a military organization, on 
the eve of a war which threatened to embrace in its theater of 
operations La Vendee, the northern frontier, the Alps, and 
the Pvrenees, and at a time when a pohtical crisis might arise. 



38 AVateeloo. 

it was of the utmost necessity that Davout should be left in the 
ministry of Avar and in the command of Paris. But there was 
Marshal Suchet, ex-chief of staff of Joubert and Massena. It 
seems that, at least from the standpoint of moral effect, the Em- 
peror would have been well inspired in preferring him to Soult, 
for Suchet could have awakened no suspicion nor provoked any 
mistrust. Soult would have replaced, without disadvantage, 
the Duke of Albufera in the command of the Army of the Alps, 
and this post, being less in evidence, would have attracted 
less attention upon him. Thus would have been avoided that 
great scandal, that the first man in the Army, after the Em- 
peror and the Minister of War, should be, of all the general 
officers, he who had rendered himself m.ost odious to the Army 
under the ro3^al Government. 

Soult having addressed an order to Vandamme before his 
nomination had been rendered official, the haughty general 
wrote to Davout the following ironical letter: "I have re- 
ceived a letter from the Duke of Dalmatia, in which he an- 
nounces himself as major-general. I think it best to forward 
it to your excellency before answering it. As the Duke of 
Ragusa could give me the same notice, I shall regard it as null 
and void until I am informed of this nomination by 3"our 
excellency or by an imperial decree." 

VI 1. 1 

Before occupying himself with the marshals the Emperor 
had selected for the principal commands the generals who were 
desirous of obtaining the mashal's baton, and whom he had 
already promoted in his mind. He expected to find among 
these men "having their road to make," as he said, more 
ardor and devotion than among his old comrades loaded down 
with glory and honors. He gave the ist Army Corps to Drouet 
.d'Erlon, a general of division since 1805, a combatant of Jena 
and Friedland, and one of the best lieutenants of Massena and 
Soult in the Spanish wars. Reille, a veteran of the Italian 
campaigns, a general of division since 1807, commanding a 
division of the Guard at Wagram, and entrusted at the end of 
1 81 2 with the chief command of the Army of Portugal, had 
the 2nd Corps. Gerard, colonel at Austerlitz, brigadier-general 
at Jena, general of division at the Moskowa, one of the heroes, 
with Ney, of the retreat from Russia, and the sole officer of his 



The Last Army op the Empire. 



39 



rank who had commanded an army corps during the cam- 
paign of France, received the 4th Corps. The 5th Corps (later 
Army of the Rhine) was entrusted to Rapp, the man of twenty- 
two wounds, the heroic defender of Dantzig, a general of di- 
vision since 1807, and an aide-de-camp of Napoleon for twelve 
years. Mouton, Count de Lobau, one of the most skillful 
officers of the Army in the art of maneuvering troops and a 
general division since 1807, had the command of the 6th Corps, 
in formation at Paris. Charles Lebrun, a son of the Duke of 
Plaissance, and a valiant cavalry general, was placed tem- 
porarily at the head of the 3rd Corps. The Emperor intended 
to replace him, at the proper time, "with a more skillful gen- 
eral." About the middle of April he gave this army corps to 
Vandamme. Napoleon did not love this rude soldier, bad bed- 
fellow that he was; but the superior military qualities of Van- 
damme and his seniorit}^ of rank (he had been named general of 
division, in 1799, when only twenty-two years old), designated 
him among all others for a command. He exercised it, at 
least so long as left to himself, with an incomparable consci- 
entiousness, firmness, and zeal — careful of all the details per- 
taining to the organization, the clothing, and the instruc- 
tion of the troops; prompt in proceeding against those who 
wished to persuade the soldiers to desert and the alarmists; 
ardent in inflaming the munds' of the soldiers, the mobilized 
National Guards, and the inhabitants of Ardennes and the 
Meuse. Vandamme merited this praise from Davout: "You 
have communicated all your fire to the country where you 
command. ' ' 

Sent to Bordeaux to cause the imperial Government to be 
recognized in that city, Clausel, who had particularly dis- 
tinguished himself in Italy and Spain, remained in that city 
as governor of the nth Military Division. He received, more- 
over, the command of the Corps of the Western Pyrenees. 
General Decaen, a veteran of the campaigns of the Rhine and 
La Vendee, and for six years Governor of the isles of France 
and Bourbon, had sincerely wished to preserve Bordeaux for 
the King; but, like the Duchess of Angouleme, he had been 
compelled to yield to the force of events. He returned to 
Paris, from whence he set out for Toulouse at the end of May. 
The Emperor had confided to him the command of the 8th 
and loth Military Divisions and the Corps of the Eastern 
Pyrenees. Decaen would have preferred a corps or a division, 



40 Waterloo. 

in the Army of the North to this post, at the same time poHtical 
and military. On account of his conduct at Bordeaux, he was 
about to find himself at Toulouse under the alternative of 
awakening the suspicions of the Emperor, if he showed little 
zeal, or of rendering himself doubly odious to the Royalists, 
if he acted with the rigorous firmness demanded by the cir- 
cumstances. Decaen took this last course, a.s he should have 
done, and caused himself to be execrated throughout all 
Languedoc. 

vStruck from the list of officers in 1804 for having man- 
ifested openly his indignation at the trial of his comrade 
Moreau, Lecourbe had been restored to his rank by Louis 
XVIII. At Lons-le-Saunier he had attempted to prevent the 
defection of Marshal Ney, and, upon the report of the latter. 
Napoleon had ordered his arrest. But he came to the Tuileries 
to protest his devotion. Happy to attach to his cause this 
tried officer, who passed for a Republican and whose name 
had remained dear to the veterans of the armies of the vSambre- 
et-Meuse, of the Rhine, and of Helvetia, the Emperor gave 
him the command of the Corps of the Jura. 

Lamarque had, on March 20th, installed himself in the 
command of Paris. Replaced tw^o days later by General 
Hullin, who had occupied this post from 1807 to 18 14, he re- 
ceived the command of a division in Reille's corps; then he 
was sent to La Vendee as general-in-chief of the Army of the 
West. He had formerly combatted the bands of Abruzzes 
and the guerrillas of the sierras of Aragon. His experience in 
partisan warfare caused him to be selected to command against 
the Vendeans. 

General Durosnel, ex-aide-de-camp of the Emperor, was 
second in command of the Parisian National Guard, Napoleon 
being nominally commander-in-chief. Durosnel had greatly 
distinguished himself in the cavalry; but, whilst Moncey, 
Ornano, Hullin, d'Heriot, and Lespinasse had found them- 
selves in Paris during the campaign of 1814, he, having been 
made prisoner at Dresden, had not returned to France until 
after peace had been declared. Thus, being ignorant of what 
the National Guard had done, and especially of what it might 
have done, he found himself badly prepared for commanding 
it. With a little zeal and energy he might have made up for 
his lack of experience; but he permitted himself to be cir- 
cumvented by his staff, which numbered a great many secret 



The Last Akmy o]*' the Empire. 41 

Royalists and deluded Liberals. Far from breathing the spirit 
of patriotism and abnegation in all the National Guard, he was 
not long in contracting the sentiments of egotistic prudence 
which guided the elite of this militia. Charged with the re- 
vision of its personnel, he carried out this work in a half- 
hearted manner, as if he only wished to appear to give satis- 
faction to the Emperor. It was, indeed, necessary for him to 
strike from the lists some ofHcers at the same time too compro- 
m.ised and too well known, like Decazes and Remusat; but 
he maintained upon the lists such men as Major Billing, an 
intimate friend of Comte, editor of the Censeur, and Colonel 
Aclocque, who prohibited the band from playing "Let us watch 
over the safety of the Empire," under pretense that it was 
"an incendiary air." Some very warm partisans of the Em- 
peror were removed, notably Major Beck, the only one of the 
superior officers of the 6th Legion who had fought at the Buttes- 
Chaumont in 181 4; Captain Albert, who had made the trip to 
the isle of Elba; and Captain Ollivier, who had equipped at 
his own expense half of his company. 

Moreover, Durosnel set everything at work to prevent the 
creation of the Federate Sharpshooters, then to delay their 
organization. "To arm such men," he said, "would create 
uneasiness and dissatisfaction in the National Guard." Now, 
commanded exclusively by officers on half-pay, and having for 
commander General Darricau, who had gained all his grades 
at the siege of Toulon, in Egypt, in the Grand Army, and in 
Spain, and who, contrary to Durosnel, had faith and ardor, 
the Federate Sharpshooters would have contributed effica- 
ciously towards the defense of Paris. As Carnot and Davout 
said, the creation of these battalions of workmen could impress 
unfavorably only the hostile and pusillanimous spirits. 

The promotions in the Army were made by the Emperor 
motu propria, or upon the proposal of Davout ; sometimes even 
the Minister of War promoted the officers to the posts without 
referring the nominations to the Emperor. Davout was no 
more infallible than Napoleon. There were some awkward 
selections — nay, some pitiful ones. Berckheim and Millet, 
who had never served but in the cavalry ; and Molitor, a gen- 
eral of division since 1802, who, on account of his great mihtary 
qualities, should have been employed in the active armies, 
were called to command some National Guards; whilst Mar- 
cognet, a poor officer, and Donzelot, who had lost the habit 
—4— 



42 Waterloo. 

of war during the seven years that he was Governor of Corfu, 
were both given a division in the ist Corps of the Army of the 
North. A few days after having been reHeved of his command, 
the colonel of the 14th Chasseurs, one of the most faithful 
officers of the Duke of Angouleme during the campaign of 
the Midi, was proposed for a regiment of mobilized National 
Guards. Another colonel, whose cowardice under fire had led 
to his retirement, was also proposed for a regiment of the Line. 
Finally, General Moreau, the pusillanimous commander of 
Soissons in 18 14, who had avoided a capital condemnation 
only thanks to the fall of Napoleon, was selected to command 
a brigade in active service. The Emperor was justified in 
saying: "It seems to me that, among the general ofiicers, 
there are a great many young men more skillful than those 
proposed to me." 

Overtasked and absorbed by the gravest cares, the Em- 
peror often ratified the nominations of Davout without exam- 
ining them. He then visited his displeasure upon this min- 
ister, who, as it appears, was disliked at the Tuileries on account 
of his stiffness and severity in the service. So there was no 
lack of individuals in the imperial entourage to incriminate all 
his acts that were susceptible of criticism. In order to have 
one guarantee more for the military personnel, the Emperor 
charged his aide-de-camp Flahault with revising the nomina- 
tions proposed by the Minister of War. "Collect," he wrote to 
Flahault, "all the information possible upon the generals and 
ofiicers, for, if I make some bad selections, it is you whom I 
shall hold responsible." Very brave and an excellent staff 
officer, Flahault had shown himself as brilliant a cavalier at 
Friedland and the Moskowa as skillful diplomat at Neumark 
and Eusigny. None the less, his truly extraordinary advance- 
ment was attributed to favor. In fact, though he had never 
commanded more than a squadron, he had been named, at 
twenty-eight years of age (in 1813), general of division. So 
young a lieutenant-general should have, perhaps, declined this 
mission — very delicate with a man like Davout. At all events, 
without displaying less zeal, he might have discharged it in a 
more discreet manner. Each day he installed himself for 
many hours in the War Office, overturning the documents, 
causing reports to be made directly to him, erasing of his own 
authority some names upon the lists, and even giving some 
orders directly opposed to those of Davout. The selections 



The Last Akmy of the Empire. 



43 



were no better, for, in spite of his devotion and intelligence, 
the Emperor's aide-de-camp could judge no better than Davout. 
The Prince of Eckmiihl was deeply wounded by this inquisi- 
tion, from which he was quickly delivered. He had an explan- 
ation with the Emperor, telling him that, if it were not an act 
of cowardice to abandon his post under such circumstances, 
he would not remain one hour in the ministry. 

Among the officers provided with commands, there were 
some men incapable, worn out before their time, or of doubtful 
devotion; but the high personnel of the last Imperial Army 
formed, nevertheless, an admirable whole. We may even say 
that, unless in revolutions or in wars analogous to those which 
succeeded each other from 1789 to 18 14, never will the French 
Army possess such chiefs. Independently of their innate mil- 
itary qualities, they possessed this advantage — experience, and 
this virtue — youth. All had made war for more than twenty 
years, and none were fifty years old. Napoleon was forty-six; 
Davout, forty-five; Soult, forty-six; Ney, forty-six; Grouchy, 
forty-nine; Drouet d'Erlon, forty-nine; Lobau, forty-five; La - 
marque, forty-five; Kellermann, forty-five; Reille, forty -four; 
Vandamme, forty -four; Rapp, forty-three; Clausel, forty- 
three; Suchet, forty-three; Pajol, forty-three; Gerard, forty- 
two ; Drouot, forty-one ; and Exelmans, forty-one — this for the 
commanders of the army and cavalry corps. Among the 
generals of division, many — Allix, Pire, Flahault, Berckheim, 
and Teste — were less than forty. The youngest of the generals 
of brigade was La Bedoyere; he was twenty-nine. 

VIII. 

Among these men who had so often led the French to 
victory, their faith in success, unfortunately, did not equal 
their physical vigor and military talents. They were too well 
informed regarding the formidable armaments of Europe and 
the feeble resources of France, both in soldiers and materiel, 
not to see that, unless favored by Fortune, which, however, 
was always possible in war, the Emperor would be unable to 
to fight long with his small army against the masses of the co- 
alition. On June loth, in passing through La Fere, General 
Ruty, commander-in-chief of the artillery, said to Colonel 
Pion des Loches: "Bonaparte is irretrievably lost. The 
King will soon return. What will become of us? Miserable 



44 Waterloo. 

army that would not fire a shot three months since !" In a re- 
union of officers, on the eve of the passage of the Sambre, 
another general uttered words so discouraging that, in con- 
tempt of all discipline, Major de Negrier severely criticised them : 
"It is not for you," he cried, "to make such reflections. The 
wine is drawn, and you should drink it, and not attempt to de- 
moralize us." Confidence was lacking, even in the general 
officers who had been led by their sentiments or by the force of 
circumstances to declare themselves first for Napoleon, and 
who, compromised as they were, should have had so great a 
interest in strengthening the morale of their comrades. But 
they were all the more uneasy, as they felt their heads would 
be one of the prizes of this lost game. 

Variance reigned in the staffs. The generals who, without 
being very fervent Royalists, would have demanded nothing 
better, however, than to finish tranquilly their career under 
the Bourbons, were vexed with the accomplices of March 20th 
for having thrown the country into an adventure and provoked 
a frightful war. These last suspected the others, and de- 
nounced them as officers without energy, lukewarm patriots, 
and timid Royalists. Finally, more ardent than ever were 
the competition, rivalry, and jealousy for commands. As 
sparing of recompenses as the Emperor had been in regard to 
his true partisans, the other generals feared none the less that, 
after the first battle, there would be advancement only for 
the former. And, on the other hand, those who had rallied to 
the Emperor from the first hour were astonished to see still in 
the Imperial Army men like Soult, Durutte, Brimy, Bourmont, 
and Dumonceau. General Pire protested against the insuffi- 
ciency of the indemnity for taking the field. "It is the lack of 
attention to private interests," said he, "that often leads to 
the loss of the general cause." General Maurice Mathieu 
asked to be retired in order not to become the subordinate 
of Clausel, his junior in rank. Duhesme, who had at first 
been attached to the 3rd Corps, was given a command in the 
Young Guard. "He can not," wrote Davout, "be placed under 
the orders of Vandamme." General Bonnet accused General 
Ornano of having spoken disparagingly of him to the Emperor, 
challenged him, and lodged a ball in his chest. Vandamme, 
who had a corps of 18,000 men, complained to the Minister of 
War that some generals younger than he were given more im- 
portant commands. Gressot wrote to Soult that the generals 



The Last Army or the Empiee. 45 

of the Army of the Rhine were unanimous in regretting being 
under the orders of Rapp, "a man of complete nulHty." If it 
had not been on the very day of taking the field, more than one 
general would have refused to serve under the Prince of the 
Moskowa, and Vandamme, and even Gerard, passed with dis- 
pleasure under the command of Grouchy. An oflEicer of the 
Emperor's staff wrote to Davout: "All regard themselves as 
crusaders, engaged in the same venture, but without any 
obligation towards one another." 

As to the comradeship and solidarity existing among the 
generals of 18 15, we have these fine words of Cambronne be- 
fore the Council of War: "I refused the rank of lieutenant- 
general because there were so many jealous persons. You saw 
the effects of this at Waterloo; we had a renowned captain. 
Well, even he was unable to put everything in order. One 
would have said that my nomination was an injustice; that I 
was too young. I would have been placed in an embarrassing 
position, and I was unwilling to run the risk of compromising 
the safety of the Army." 

Contrary to the staffs, the soldiers and almost all of the 
regimental officers were full of ardor and confidence. Whilst 
the generals saw things as they were in reality, the soldiers re- 
commenced the dream of glory which the invasion had inter- 
rupted, but which they could not believe ended. Had not the 
Emperor, whose return had been predicted for a year by the 
barrack refrains and the marching songs, returned to his own? 
In the eyes of the soldiers Napoleon was invincible. If he had 
been conquered in 1S12, it had been by the snow; in 18 14, it 
was by treason. This faith, so suitable for strengthening the 
morale of the Army, and which the Emperor, moreoever, had 
always attempted to inspire, had, unfortunately, for counter- 
part the suspicion of everything that was not Napoleon. One 
may be conquered only by treason, but the soldiers suspected 
treason everywhere. "Do not employ the marshals during 
the campaign," one wrote to the Emperor. The quarters of 
the corps commanders, the Tuileries, and the War Department 
were flooded with complaints and denunciations of the officers 
who, during the other reign, had manifested sentiments in 
favor of the Bourbons and the Orleanists, or who were only 
members of noble families. 

At the advance posts of the Army of the Rhine a sentinel 
fired upon an individual who was seeking to reach the German 



46 Watekloo. 

bank by swimming. The report spread among the troops that 
a note had been found upon the dead body announcing that 
there was a plot to blow up the powder magazine at Stras- 
bourg. The commandant of Conde, Colonel Taubin, excused 
himself for certain delays in the provisioning of the fortress 
by saying that "his orders were not obeyed" ; and driven mad 
by the harsh reply of the assistant chief of staff of the ist Corps, 
that "an officer who could not command obedience was un- 
worthy to command," he blew out his brains. The garrison 
believed that he had killed himself to avoid being sent before 
a council of war as an accomplice of a conspiracy. The minds 
of the soldiers being thus troubled by the fear of treason, we 
can imagine what an emotion was caused in the ist Army Corps 
by the distribution of false cartridges. The fact was, indeed, 
very grave, for the ordnance department of Tille had delivered 
not wooden cartridges, used in drilling, but ball cartridges, 
containing bran in place of powder. Drouet d'Erlon had the 
colonel in charge of the ordnance department shadowed. 
"For a long time," said he, in a report to Davout, "I have had 
some suspicions regarding his opinions." Davout ordered an 
investigation, which, like all investigations, ended in nothing. 
It was impossible to ascertain how, wh}^, or since when these 
strange cartridges came to be placed in the magazine. 

The bonds of discipline, which even in the armies of Auster- 
litz and Wagram were not near so strong as one imagines, be- 
came still further relaxed from the effects of this almost uni- 
versal suspicion, as well as from the events that had occurred 
during the past year. Soldiers are not quick to obey chiefs 
whom they believe capable of ragusades (this was the word in 
vogue), and to respect generals and colonels who, after having 
caused them to march against their Emperor three months 
before, henceforth manifested the most ardent Bonapartism. 
Only the officers who, during the period extending from March 
5th to the 20th, had by their words or acts encouraged or pro- 
voked the men to desert to the Emperor, preserved their au- 
thority. And not always was this the case. Six officers of 
the ist Cuirassiers, having been advanced a grade by the Em- 
peror for having won over their regiment, were installed in 
their new grades, according to the regulations, before the as- 
sembled regiment. The cuirassiers received them with mur- 
murs and hisses. ' 'We have done as much as you," they cried, 
"and we have received neither advancement nor other recom- 



The Last Army oe the Empike. 47 

pense." In more than one regiment it was hoped that all the 
officers would be replaced by the subalterns; in more than 
one address from the regiments to the Emperor the soldiers de- 
manded the removal of their colonel. "We demand," wrote 
the dragoons of the 1 2th Regiment, "the removal of our colonel, 
whose ardor for Your Majesty is not abreast with our senti- 
ments." "We are persuaded," wrote the officers, subalterns, 
and soldiers of the 75th of the Line, "that the intention of Your 
Majesty is not to maintain a traitor at the head of a French 
regiment." 

There was still another reason for this spirit of indiscipline. 
Deceived by appearances, as were almost every one at that 
time, the soldiers imagined that they alone had brought about 
the revolution which had brought back the Emperor to the 
Tuileries; consequently they believed that no one but them 
had a right to cry, "Long live the Emperor!" Had not Da- 
vout declared that the abandonment of their regiments by 
the soldiers during the late events should be considered only 
as a proof of devotion for the Emperor? and had not the sage 
Drouot himself decided to reinstate in the cadres of the Old 
Guard the subalterns cashiered in 18 14 for having deserted 
"from grief at the departure of His Majesty?" What an 
example for an army ! 

On March 20th the dragoons of the Guard arrived from 
Tours; they learned upon the quays that the Emperor was 
holding a review. A year had passed since they had last seen 
their idol. They hurried their officers along with them, filed 
through the gate of the Louvre, and debouched at a rapid trot, 
all covered with mud, and horses reeking with sweat, upon 
the Place du Carrousel, vociferating, "Long live the Em- 
peror!" Some days later, at an inspection with open ranks, 
some dragoons gave the signal. Suddenly the first rank 
wheeled about, and the two ranks raised their sabres and 
crossed them above the head of the Emperor. He laughingly 
bowed his head, and finished the inspection under a vault of 
steel. Fanaticism for Napoleon may excuse this lack of dis- 
cipline and these caprices contrary to the regulations. But 
there were graver faults. 

The troops of Grouchy, on the march from Pont-Saint- 
Esprit to Marseilles, after the capitulation of La Pallud, were 
guilty of the greatest excesses at Orgon, under pretense that 
the preceding year, when the exiled Napoleon had passed 



43 Waterloo. 

through this town, the inhabitants had wished to hang him. 
At Aire (Pas-de-Calais) the 105th of the Line, en route for the 
frontier, commenced to demolish a new house whose fagade 
was decorated with fleurs de lys. Tn order to calm the soldiers, 
the commandant of the place was compelled to imprison the 
unfortunate owner. At Aix some cannoneers, offended at 
seeing some young Royalists walking about with enormous 
white roses pinned to the lapels of their coats, dispersed them 
with sabre-blows. At Saint-Germain the sharpshooters of 
the Young Guard mutinied and refused to enter their barracks 
because there was no tricolor flag over the entrance. In the 
theatres the soldiers maltreated the spectators who did not 
applaud the "Marseillaise." In the cafes they beat the men 
who refused to cry, "Long live the Emperor!" Having en- 
tered Belgium, they pillaged as hard as they could. "The 
Army," wrote General Radet, commander of the gendarmerie, 
to Soult on June 17th, "is infected with the spirit of marauding 
and pillage. The Guard itself sets an example. Some maga- 
zines of flour have been pillaged and horses at picket stolen. 
All night the homes of the Belgians, who have given every- 
thing willingly and have cared for our wounded, have been 
sacked. The soldiers do not recognize the authority of the 
gendarmerie. I herewith tender my resignation as provost- 
general of the Army." 

vSome of the regiments refused the sea-biscuits. PViant 
complained that the grenadiers of the Guard carried women 
with them. A voltigeur of the 96th deserted in arms to visit 
his parents. He returned at the end of • ight days, and his 
colonel only inflicted upon him a slight disciplinary punish- 
ment. Two hundred and ninety-two soldiers of the 39th and 
59th of the Line declared that they would desert if they were 
not placed in the Guard. Some men of the train, who had 
followed the Emperor from Grenoble, had themselves incor- 
porated with the ist Hussars, and some hussars belonging to 
this regiment caused themselves to be placed in the Guard. 
General Barrois, commanding a division of the Young Guard 
in formation, received this singular request: "Monsieur le 
Comte, we are 1,374 men of the ist and 2nd of the Line and of 
the ist Light who have always served with honor. We believe 
that it is our duty to inform you that we do not wish to remain 
longer in our regiments, although we have nothing to complain 
of. But, having served in the Guard, we wish to continue to 



The Last Army of the Empire. 49 

do so. It would be imprudent to attempt to hinder us, as the 
course which we have taken is irrevocable. You can prevent 
the fault which we are about to commit by obtaining our re- 
instatement in the Guard. But we do not wish to wait longer 
than four days. Our colonels are informed of our intentions." 

There existed a state of rivalry between the different reg- 
iments, which provoked brawls and duels. The Emperor was 
forced to order the suppression, in the five regiments of cav- 
alry bearing the No. i, of the white shoulder-knots, of which 
the other regiments were jealous. The soldiers belonging to 
the Battalion of the Isle of Elba having been lodged in the 
Hotel des Cent-Suisses, Place du Carrousel, some enthusiastic 
persons substituted for the inscription above the main en- 
trance that of "Quartier des Braves." The other braves of the 
Army, though they were all Bonapartists, looked upon this as 
an insult. The grognards were joked by their comrades of 
the Line and even of the Old Guard. Many sabre-blows were 
exchanged. It became necessary to efface the inscription. 

But if the Army was enervated by indiscipline, it was an- 
imated by impatience to fight, resolution to conquer, idolatry 
for the Emperor, and hatred of the foreigner. A spy wrote 
from Paris to WelHngton about the middle of May: "To give 
a just idea of the enthusiasm of the Army, I need only to draw 
a parallel between the epochs of '92 and the present year. 
Still the balance will be in favor of Buonaparte, for to-day it 
is no longer enthusiasm ; it is frenzy. The cause of the soldiers, 
who have nothing to hope for after the fall of their chief, is 
inseparable from his. So I can not conceal from your excel- 
lencv that, whatever the Bourbonists may say, the fight will 
be bloody and bitterly contested." "The troops," relates 
General Hulot, "were exalted to the highest degree; their ar- 
dor was a species of fanaticism." "The moment chosen for 
taking the field," writes General Foy, on June 15th, in his 
daily notes, "is well timed. The troops experience not patri- 
otism, not enthusiasm, but a veritable rage for the Emperor 
and against his enemies." It was in all sincerity that a deserter 
and traitor, the Adjutant-Commandant Gordon, sent this in- 
formation to Clarke: "The King, on his return, should_ dis- 
band the Army and create a new one. The soldiers are furious ; 
their spirit is dreadful." 

"The spirit of the soldiers is dreadful"— that is to say, 
all the soldiers demanded to be passed in review by the Em- 



50 Waterloo. 

peror. They received the new eagles with enthusiastic ac- 
clamations and threatening oaths. They replied to the cries 
of "I^onglive the Army I" by cries of "lyong live the Emperor!" 
They put for prizes small tricolor flags in the muzzles of their 
muskets. They swore, with sabres crossed above the flames 
of punch, to conquer or die. They said, showing the bust of 
the Emperor: "He will be with us!" They raised at their 
expense a monument at the Gulf of Juan. They ordered 
medals struck commemorative of the Emperor's return. They 
abandoned one, two, and even five days' pay for the expenses 
of the war. They quitted their gairisons and traversed towns 
and villages crying, "Long live the Emperor!" and singing 
"Le Pere la Violette!" They tore the white flags in rags, 
which they put to the vilest uses. They arrested those who 
attempted to entice the soldiers to desert and beat them with 
the butts of their muskets. They tore the deserters from the 
hands of the gendarmes and degraded them without further 
trial. They wished to double the marches in order to be in 
the first battles. They declared they had no need of cartridges, 
since they would attack the enemy with the bayonet. They 
said "they cared not what became of them, provided the 
Emperor thrashed the Allies." 

Sensitive, insolent, undisciplined ; suspicious of its chiefs, 
troubled by the fear of treason, and thus accessible, perhaps, to 
panic, but inured to and loving war; athirst for vengeance; 
capable of heroic efforts and furious transports, and more 
haughty, more exalted, and more ardent in fight than any 
other Republican or Imperial Army- — such was the Army of 
1 8 15. Never had Napoleon had under his hand an instrument 
of war so redoubtable nor so fragile. 



CHAPTER II. 
The; Plans of Campaign. 

I — Idea of an invasion of Belgium in the first days of April. 
II. — The Allies' plan of campaign. 
III. — Napoleon's plan of campaign. 
IV. — Concentration of the French Army (June 8-14). — Arrival of the 

Emperor at Beaumont. — Strength and positions of the armies 

on June 14th. 



On March 25, 18 15, when, at Vienna, the sovereigns were 
busy hatching a seventh coalition against France, they had, 
to resist a sudden attack of Napoleon in Belgium, no more 
than 80,000 soldiers — 30,000 Prussians, 14,000 Saxons, 23,000 
Anglo-Hanoverians, and nearly 10,000 Dutch-Belgians. Fur- 
thermore, the Saxons were disposed to mutiny, and defections 
among the Dutch-Belgians were to be feared. The greater 
part of the latter had served under Napoleon ; and in Brussels, 
in all the Walloon country, and particularly in the provinces 
of Namur and lyiege, which were subjected to the harsh occu- 
pation of the Prussians, there was a French party. 

Stationed from Treves and Coblentz as far as Courtray 
and Antwerp, over an extent of seventy leagues, the allied 
troops had, on March 15th, commenced some movements of 
concentration; but Napoleon would have none the less been 
able to cross the Belgian frontier with 50,000 men on April ist, 
and three days later to enter Brussels without striking a blow. 
Wellington was at Vienna and Bliicher at Berlin. The French 
would have met with no resistance, as the Prince of Orange 
and General Kliest, who commanded the Prussian Army in the 
Rhenish provinces, had decided to effect their concentration, 
in case of an attack, at Tirlemont (eleven leagues to the east 
of Brussels). 

Would this easy success have sufficed, as the Emperor 
imagined, to raise Belgium? At all events, without imposing 
upon experienced soldiers, the occupation of Brussels would 
have produced a great effect in France and in foreign coun- 
tries. The Prussian generals, the Prince of Orange, and even 

51 



52 Waterloo. 

Wellington, feared this sudden attack. "It is necessary to 
cover Brussels," wrote Muffling to the King of the Low Coun- 
tries, "in order that this city may not become the focus of a 
revolution." "It would be of the utmost importance for 
Bonaparte," wrote Wellington to Gneissenau, "to cause us to 
retrograde behind Brussels, to drive away the King of France, 
and to overturn the order of things which has been established 
by the King of the Low Countries. It would have a terrible 
effect upon public opinion." But this audacious blow, of 
which Napoleon had conceived the idea, and the execution of 
which he judged easy and certain, was abandoned by him as 
soon as conceived. He understood too well that a victory 
gained over only one-tenth of the forces of the coalition would 
be regarded by the Allies as a simple advance-guard affair, 
and that this victory, even should it result in the uprising of 
Belgium, would not end the war. In passing the Sambre on 
April I St he would have then compromised the future for an 
ephemeral success, for the ex-Royal Army, while being able 
to furnish immediately 50,000 excellent troops, was not in 
condition to undertake a campaign of some duration. Men, 
arms, horses, supplies — all were lacking. Now the Emperor 
could not at the same time direct the operations in Belgium 
and reorganize the Army. Moreover, in order to form an army 
of 50,000 men, it would have been necessary to take all the 
available men in the garrisons of the northern departments, 
whose population was so hostile to the Empire, and to employ 
the reserve of Paris, destined in case of necessity to act in the 
West, where the Vendean chiefs were very active, and in the 
Midi, where Bordeaux, Toulouse, and Marseilles still recognized 
the authority of the Duke of Angouleme, who was preparing 
to march on Lyons. 

If the militar}^ state of France prevented the captain from 
taking the field too quickly, the political situation prohibited 
the sovereign. Eight days after having re-ascended the throne. 
Napoleon could not abandon the government to fight unless 
circumstances imperiously demanded it. It was more urgent 
to reorganize the administration, to fill the treasury, and to 
pacify the country. For gaining the hearts of the French, all 
of whom so ardently desired peace, what an admirable ex- 
pedient would have been the invasion of Belgium ! Would 
not the effect produced by the capture of Brussels have been 
counter-balanced by the fright occasioned by seeing Napoleon, 



The Pla]\'S of Campaign. 53 

hardly returned to France, putting on his seven-league boots 
to hasten to new conquests? The Emperor had still another 
reason — and it was better than the others — not to commence 
war before having exhausted all means of accommodation; 
like his people, though doubtless not for so long a time, he 
desired the maintenance of peace. 

For more than one long month the Emperor persisted in 
believing peace possible. "If we have war . . . .," he 
wrote again on April 30th to Davout, from whom he had 
nothing to conceal. Nevertheless, whatever might be the 
tenacity of his illusions, he none the less prepared to defend 
himself. He had called out the reserves, mobilized the Na- 
tional Guards, and given orders for the reorganization of the 
materiel. But it was only about the middle of May, when he 
had almost lost all hope of avoiding war, that he decided upon 
his plan of campaign. 

II. 

The Allies had been at work upon their plan since the be- 
ginning of April. There were many plans proposed. Knese- 
beck seriously proposed to deceive Napoleon by delivering to 
him a false plan. He said: "We will lead the enemy to be- 
lieve that we intend operating by way of Bale; that he has 
nothing to fear from the English Army, which will be occupied 
with the siege of Dunkirk, or from the Prussian Army, which 
will remain on the defensive. We will thus attract Buonaparte 
between the Marne and the Upper Rhine against the Austrian, 
Bavarian, and Russian armies, whilst the English and Prussians 
advance without opposition towards Paris." 

Schwarzenberg renewed the art of war by gravely de- 
claring that the Allies should "neither divide themselves too 
much, for fear of weakening themselves, nor march in such 
large masses, for fear of not being able to subsist." He con- 
cluded by saying that it w^as necessary to march on Paris in 
three strong columns, "and to leave the details of the opera- 
tions to the knowledge and experience of the commanders." 

The plan of Gneissenau — a crushing and redoubtable plan 
—was based upon the enormous numerical superiority of the 
AUies. Gneissenau said: "Four great armies, of which the 
fourth — the Russian Army — will form the reserve, will enter 
France^ simultaneously and march straight on Paris. Regard- 
less of what may happen to one of the three armies of the first 



54 Wateeloo. 

line — whether it is beaten or not— the two others will continue 
to advance, making some detachments upon their rear to ob- 
serve the fortresses. The Russian or reserve army will be 
destined to repair the checks which ma}^ be suffered by one of 
the armies of the first line. For this, it will advance directly 
to the aid of the army that may be in retreat, or will manoeuvre 
on the flank of the enemy. Supposing that Napoleon defeats 
one of the armies of the first line, the other two, continuing 
to advance, will gain ground and thus draw nearer Paris, 
whilst the army of reserve will assist the defeated army. 
If, in place of pursuing the beaten army. Napoleon directs 
himself on the flank of another army of the first line, the re- 
serve will unite with the latter, so that the battle will turn to 
the disadvantage of the enemy. Meanwhile, the third army 
will continue to advance, and the one which will have been 
defeated will rally and then resume the offensive." 

Wellington's idea was to begin hostilities without awaiting 
the arrival of the Russian Army, and even before the three 
armies had finished their concentration. He wrote on April 
loth: "It is sufficient to direct between the Sambre and the 
Meuse 60,000 Anglo-Dutch, 60,000 Prussians, and 140,000 
Austro-Bavarians, in order to find ourselves in France with 
forces superior to those of the enemy, and to be able to ma- 
noeuvre in the direction of Paris." Greatly preoccupied with 
the interests of Louis XVIII. , Wellington judged that each new 
day of the truce affirmed the power of Napoleon; and, be- 
lieving in the importance of a Royalist uprising in the Midi, 
he deemed it necessary to second it b}'^ prompt action on the 
northern frontier. 

At Vienna the allied generals were not so eager to begin. 
They wished to make this war without risks. They desi ed, 
in each battle, to be at least three to one, and "to conquer ac- 
cording to the rules of mechanics and the laws of gravitation." 
In the council of war held on April 19th, and which was pre- 
sided over by the Czar, it was decided that, in order to give 
the different armies time to effect their concentration, the cam- 
paign should open only on June ist. This was one month 
lost according to Wellington and Bliicher; one month gained, 
according to Knesebeck and Schwarzenberg. The latter in- 
tended even to gain another month by the discussion of the 
strategical plan. It fact, June loth, at the time when Bliicher, 
who had had, however, the diversion of a revolt of the Saxons, 



The Plans of Campaign. 55 

"had become enraged" at remaining inactive, and had said to 
his soldiers that he was impatient to go to seek his pipe, which 
he had forgotten in Paris, Schwarzenberg caused to be adopted 
by the sovereigns a definite plan, the execution of which was 
to begin only between June 27th and July ist. 

According to these new dispositions, six armies would 
cross simultaneously the frontiers of France: the Army of 
the IvOw Countries (93,000 English, Hanoverians, Brunswickers, 
and Dutch-Belgians, under Wellington), between Maubeuge 
and Beaumont; the Prussian Army (117,000 men, under 
Bliicher), between Philippeville and Givet; the Russian Army 
(150,000 men, under Barclay de Tolly), by Saar-Louis and 
Saarbruck; the Army of the Upper Rhine (210,000 Austrians, 
Bavarians, Wiirtemburgers, and Hessians, under Schwarzen- 
berg; the right wing by Sarreguemines and the main body by 
Bale These four great armies would march concentrically 
on Paris — the English by Peronne, the Prussians by Laon, the 
Russians by Nancy, and the Austrians by Tangres. 

On the extreme left the Army of Upper Italy (38,000 
Austrians and 12,000 Piedmontese, under Frimont) and the 
Austrian Army of Naples (25,000 men, under Bianchi) would 
pass the Alps and direct themselves, the first on Lyons, the 
second on Provence, where the English squadron of the Med- 
iterranean would second its operations. 

HI. 

By secret reports from Vienna and Brussels and by the 
foreign journals — the press was already indiscreet — Napoleon 
was able to form a general idea of the forces and plans of the 
enemy. Two plans of campaign presented themselves to 
his mind. 

The first plan consisted in massing under Paris the ist, 
2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 6th Corps, the Guard, the reserve cavalry, and 
the Army of the Rhine (5th Corps) ; in concentrating under 
Lyons the Army of the Alps and the Corps of the Jura ; and in 
permitting the Allies to engage themselves in the net-work of 
fortresses, well provisioned and defended by nearly 150,000 
mobihzed National Guards, retired soldiers, cannoneers of the 
Line, veterans, custom-house ofiicers, gendarmes, and urban 
National Guards. The alHed armies, which were not to pass 
the frontiers until July ist, would be unable to arrive within the 



56 Wateeloo. 

radius of Lyons until the 15th or i8th and within that of Paris 
until the 25th. By this time (July 25th) the entrenchments 
of Paris would be completed; the garrison would number 
30,000 regular troops, 18,000 Federate Sharpshooters, and 
36,000 National Guards. The army concentrated under Paris 
would have 200,000 soldiers; and there would remain nearly 
80,000 men in the depots and 158,000 recruits. 

As, of the 645,000 Allies who would enter France, 75,000 
would manoeuvre in the Lyoness and Provence, and as, on ac- 
count of the multiplicity of his lines of operations, the enemy 
would be forced to leave in the rear 150,000 men to protect his 
communications and besiege or mask the fortresses, the four 
great armies would have, on arriving between the Oise and the 
Seine, but 420,000 combatants. To these 420,000 men Na- 
poleon would oppose 200,000 soldiers of the active army and 
the entrenched camp of Paris. He would recommence the 
campaign of 1814, but with 200,000 soldiers, instead of 90,000, 
and with Paris fortified, defended by 80,000 men, and having 
as Governor the skillful captain of Auerstaedt and Eckmiihl, 
the fierce defender of Hambourg, Davout. 

The second plan — bolder, more conformable to the genius 
of Napoleon, to the temperament of the French, and even to 
the principles of great war, but terribly more hazardous-^-was 
to attack the enemy before his forces were united. By June 
15th the Emperor would be able to concentrate upon the 
northern frontier an army of 125,000 men. He would enter 
Belgium, beat there one after the other the EngUsli and Prus- 
sians; then, after having received reinforcements from the 
depots, he would make his junction with the 23,000 men under 
the command of Rapp, and direct himself against the Austro- 
Russians. 

Doubtless, if the Emperor had had to look only at the 
military side of the question, he would have adopted the first 
plan, the success of which appeared certain. But he had no 
longer his liberty of action of 1805, nor even of 18 12. He 
must, though Commander-in-chief, reckon with public opinion. 
What an impression would have been produced in the country 
by the abandonment without defense of nearly one-third of 
the territory, and precisely those departments the most patri- 
otic and the most devoted to the imperial cause ! Would it 
not cause everywhere discouragement and disaffection, excite 
even to hostility the ill-will of the Chamber, extend in the West 



The Plans of Campaign, 57 

and rekindle in the Midi the fires of insurrection^ The Em- 
peror felt that, in order to raise the courage of the people and 
impose upon the malcontent and factious, it would be neces- 
sary, at the beginning of hostilities, for him to gain a brilliant 
victory. Moreover, abandoning himself to his customary il- 
lusions, he imagined this victory would be decisive enough 
to break up the coalition. The Belgians, he thought, would 
range themselves under the French flag, and the destruction 
of Wellington's army would lead to the fall of the Tory cabinet, 
which would be succeeded by one in favor of peace. If it 
should turn out otherwise, the Army, victorious over the Eng- 
lish and Prussians in Belgium, would conquer also in France 
the Russians and Austrians. At the worst^ — admitting a 
check on the Belgian frontier — the Em.peror would be able to 
withdraw under Paris, and operate according to the defensive 
plan. The Emperor, however, did not conceal from himself 
the fact that, after a defeat in Belgium, the chances in favor 
of the success of his first plan, to which it would be necessary 
to return, would be greatly diminished. He would have lost a 
great many men, weakened the morale of the Army and coun- 
try, provoked the Allies to advance by fifteen days their en- 
trance into France, and, necessarily, on account of not being 
able to do everything at the same time, neglected somewhat 
the organization of the defense. 

The Emperor meditated for a long time upon these plans. 
When he had determined in favor of the offensive, he was still 
undecided for some days upon the point where he would strike 
his first blows. For the success of his plan, which was to de- 
feat one after the other the two armies occupying Belgium, it 
was necessary to attack Wellington or Bliicher before they 
had effected their junction. In taking his line of operations 
on Brussels by Ath, and debouching from Lille or Conde 
against Wellington's right. Napoleon would drive back the 
English Army on the Prussians, and would find himself, two 
days later, before the two united armies. If, on the contrary, 
he advanced against Bliicher' s left by Givet and the valley of 
the Meuse, he would likewise hasten the junction of the two 
armies by pushing the Prussians upon the English. By one of 
his finest strategical conceptions, the Emperor resolved to ad- 
vance boldly against the very center of the enemy's canton- 
ments, upon the supposed point of concentration of the Anglo- 
Prussians. As the route from Charleroi to Brussels formed 
—5— 



58 Waterloo. 

the line of contact of the two armies, it was upon this route 
that Napoleon intended to burst, by Beaumont and Philippe- 
ville, with the rapidity of a thunderbolt. 

IV. 

The orders of concentration were given in the first days of 
June. The ist Corps advanced from Valenciennes to Avesnes; 
the 2nd, from Avesnes to Maubeuge; the 3rd, from Rocroi to 
Chimay ; the 4th, from Thionville to Rocroi ; the 6th, from 
Soissons to Avesnes; and the Imperial Guard, from Paris by 
Soissons to Avesnes. The communications with Belgium and 
the Rhenish provinces were intercepted; in the seaports an 
embargo was placed on all vessels, even on the fishing barks; 
and, in order to give no warning to the advance posts of the 
enemy, some free corps and divisions of National Guards re- 
placed upon the northern and eastern frontiers the troops 
directed upon the points of concentration. When Napoleon, 
who had quitted Paris in the night, arrived at Laon at noon on 
June nth, all the troops had effected their concentration. 
Grouchy alone, whose headquarters were precisely at Laon, 
had not yet caused his four cavalry corps to budge. Sum- 
moned to the quarters of the Emperor, he said that he had re- 
ceived no orders. In fact, it was not until the next day, June 
12th, that the Major-General thought of sending him from 
Avesnes the instructions of Napoleon ! But immediately after 
having seen the Emperor, Grouchy had sent the order to the 
four cavalry corps to repair to the frontier by forced marches ; 
himself, without losing an hour, had departed for Avesnes. 
The concentration was not delayed, since all the reserve cav- 
alry arrived beyond Avesnes on the night of the 13th; but 
many regiments had been forced to make twenty leagues 
without unbridling — a bad start for horses at the opening of a 
campaign If only this vexatious incident had called the at- 
tention of Napoleon to the negligence of his major-general ! 

On June 13th the Emperor slept at Avesnes; and on the 
evening of the 14th he advanced his headquarters to Beaumont, 
in the center of his Army. In spite of the unfavorable weather, 
all the troops bivouacked this night in order to remain well 
concentrated. At dawn there was read to them in front of 
their bivouacs the following order of the day of the Emperor : 
"... Soldiers, to-day is the anniversary of Marengo and Fried- 



The Plans of Campaign. 



59 



land, which twice settled the destiny of Europe. Then, as 
after Austerlitz and Wagram, we were too generous. To-day, 
however, leagued against us, the princes whom we have left 
upon their thrones aim at the independence and the most 
sacred rights of France. They have begun the most unjust of 
aggressions. Let us then march to encounter them. Are we 
not still the same men?" 

The Army occupied the following positions: The ist 
Corps (20,731 men, under Drouet d'Erlon), forming the ex- 
treme left, between the routes of Avesnes, at Maubeiige and 
Solre-sur-Sambre ; the 2nd Corps (25,179 men under Reille), 
between Solre-sur-Sambre and Leers; the 3rd Corps (18,105 
men under Vandamme) ; and the 6th Corps (10,821 men, under 
Lobau), between Beaumont and the frontier; the 4th corps 
(15,404 men, under Gerard), between Philippeville and Flor- 
enne; the reserve cavalry (13,144 men, under Grouchy), at 
Valcourt, Bossus, and Gayolle; the Imperial Guard (20,755 
men), in front and rear of Beaumont. This army had 370 
pieces of artillery. The ground occupied by the bivouacs did 
not exceed eight leagues in width by ten kilometers in length. 

In ten days 124,000 men, separated by distances ranging 
from twelve to seventy leagues, had united on the frontier, 
within close cannon range of the enemy's advance posts, 
without the Allies having taken a single defensive measure. 
Never had a march of concentration been better conceived, 
nor, save a few delays, which were quickly repaired, more 
successfully executed. 

While the French Army thus formed a formidable mass, 
the Anglo-Prussians were still disseminated over a front of 
more than thirty-five leagues and a medium depth of twelve. 
On June 14th Bliicher's headquarters were at Namur. The 
I. Corps (30,800 men, under Ziethen), which formed the right 
of the Prussian Army, occupied Thuin, Fontaine-Leveque, 
Marchienne, Charleroi, Moustiers, Fleurus, Sombreffe, and 
Gembloux; the II. Corps (31,000 men, under Pirch I.), Na- 
mur, Heron, and Hannut; the III. Corps (23,900 men, under 
Thielmann), Ciney, Dinant, and Huy; the IV. Corps (30,300 
men, under Biilow), Liege and Tongres. 

The cantonments of the English Army under Wellington, 
who had estabHshed his headquarters in Brussels, extended 
from the Lys and the Escault to the Httle river Haine. The 
2nd Corps (27,321 men, under Lord Hill), occupied Leuze, Ath, 



6o Waterloo. 

Audenarde, Ghent, and Alost; the ist Corps (30,246 men, under 
the Prince of Orange), Mons, Roeulx, Frasnes, Seneffe, Nivelles, 
Genappe, Soignies, Enghein, and Braine-le-Comte ; the cavalry 
corps (9,913 men, under Lord Uxbridge), cantoned along the 
Dender, between Ninove and Grammont; and the reserve 
(25,597 men, under the immediate command of Wellington), 
in Brussels and environs. 

In the positions which they occupied three days were re- 
quired for each of the two armies to concentrate on the line 
of contact and double this time to concentrate on the Enghsh 
right or Prussian left wing. This outrageous extension of the 
cantonments, so dangerous in front of an adversary like Na- 
poleon, and so favorable to the success of the bold plan that 
he had conceived, has been criticised by almost all military 
writers. Wellington has attempted to justify these disposi- 
tions by alleging the difficulty experienced in subsisting the 
troops and the necessity of guarding every point. As a matter 
of fact, it was because, while admitting the hypothesis of an 
attack by Napoleon, and though they had even come to some 
understanding regarding the method of guarding against such 
an eventuality, the Allies believed it highly improbable. On 
June 15th, at the hour when the Emperor had already his foot 
upon the Belgian soil, Wellington tranquilly stated, in a long 
letter to the Czar, how he intended to assume the offensive at 
the end of the month. Some days previous Bliicher had written 
to his wife: "We shall soon enter France. W^e might remain 
here a year, for Bonaparte will not attack us." 



CHAPTER III. 
First Combats. 

I. — Passage of the Belgian frontier (June 15th). — The desertion of 

General Bourmont. 
II. — Capture of Charleroi. 
III.— Interview between Napoleon and Ney. — Combat of Gilly on the 

right wing. 
IV. — The operations of Ney. — Combat of Gosselies. — Combat of Frasnes. 
— Quatre-Bras. 



On June 15th, at 3:30 p. m., the French advance guards 
passed the frontier at Ivcers, Cour-sur-Heure, and Thy. Ac- 
cording to the order of march despatched from the imperial 
headquarters on the evening of the day before, the Army 
marched on Charleroi in three principal columns: the left 
column (corps of Reille and d'Erlon), by Thuin and Marchienne ; 
the central column (corps of Vandamme and lyobau, Imperial 
Guard, and Grouchy's cavalry reserve), by Ham-sur.-Heure, 
Jamioulx, and Marcinelle; and the right column (Gerard's 
corps), by Florenne and Gerpinnes. 

The Emperor had combined everything from a strategical 
point of view to facilitate the rapid passage of these masses 
and to spare the men the enervating fatigue of trampling upon 
the same spot ; and he had prepared everything from a tactical 
point of view to permit of the prompt deployment and mutual 
aid of the different columns, in case the enemy should offer 
serious resistance. Thirty minutes were to elapse between 
the breaking camp of the different army corps. The troops 
nearest the frontier were to put themselves in motion at three 
o'clock in the morning, while those the most distant were not 
to move until eight. Twelve regiments of cavalry reconnoitred 
the march. The remainder of the mounted troops were or- 
dered to march on the left of the infantry. The sappers of 
each army corps were to be united and to march in each corps 
behind the first regiment of light infantry. Three companies 
of pontoniers, with fifteen pontoons and the same number of 
boats, were selected to follow immediately the corps of Van- 

61 



62 Waterloo. 

damme; the ambulances were to follow the imperial head- 
quarters. There was an order to burn every carriage that 
should slip into the columns, and, until a new order, the bag- 
gage and reserve parks were not to approach nearer than three 
leagues to the Army. The generals in command of the advance 
guards were expected to regulate their march so as to remain 
always abreast of one another; they were to reconnoitre in 
every direction ; interrogate the inhabitants upon the positions 
of the enemy ; seize the letters in the post-ofhces ; communicate 
to one another any information which they might have; and 
to address frequent reports to the Emperor, who would be in 
person with the advance of the central colunm. All the Army 
was to have passed the Sambre before noon. 

This order of march is justly regarded as a model. Never 
in the auspicious hours of Austerlitz and Friedland had Na- 
poleon dictated a disposition of march more elaborate or bet- 
ter conceived; never had his genius been more lucid; never 
had he shown better his application to detail, his broad views 
upon the ensemble, his perspicuity, and his mastery of the 
art of war. 

Unfortunately, the orders were not executed punctually. 
Drouet d'Erlon took it upon himself to postpone his movement 
until half-past four o'clock, instead of striking his camp at 
three, as had been prescribed. Vandamme, who was to have 
set out at three o'clock, awaited still at five the instructions 
from the imperial headquarters. During the night the officer 
who bore the order of march fell from his horse, broke his leg, 
and remained inert and isolated in the midst of the fields. 
Vandamme was informed of the march of the Army only by the 
arrival of Lobau's corps in the rear of his bivouacs. Finally, 
the troops of Gerard, who were also to set out at three o'clock, 
were not massed at the point of concentration, abreast of 
Florenne, until seven o'clock. 

The soldiers of the 4th Corps were in great agitation. 
They had just learned that General Bourmont, commanding 
the leading division, had passed over to the enemy. This de- 
sertion confirmed very inopportunely the fears of treason and 
the suspicions against the chiefs by which the minds of the 
soldiers had been troubled for three months. Murmurs and 
imprecations arose from the ranks. One of Bourmont's brigade 
commanders. General Hulot, "judging the moment critical," 
harangued the two regiments under his orders; he swore to 



First Combats. 63 

them solemnly, sword in hand, "to combat with them the en- 
emies of France until his last breath." Gerard, in turn, deemed 
it necessary to pass along the front of the troops and address a 
few words to them; they replied by acclamations. Gerard 
himself was greatly troubled by the desertion of his protege 
Bourmont, the particulars of which were given to him by Hulot. 

A little after five o'clock in the morning Bourmont had 
mounted his horse at Florenne with all his staff — Colonel 
Clouet, Major Villoutreys, Captains d'Andigne, de Trelan, and 
Sourda — and an escort of five chasseurs. After having passed 
the French advance posts, he gave to a corporal of chasseurs a 
letter for Gerard, which he had written at Florenne; and 
having thus dismissed the escort, he rode rapidly with his 
ofhcers in the direction of the frontier. He said in his letter 
to Gerard: ". . . . I do not wish to contribute towards 
establishing in France a bloody despotism which would ruin 
my country. ... I would have resigned and returned to 
my home if I had thought that I would have been permitted 
to do so. This not appearing probable, I have been forced to 
assure my liberty by other means. ... No one shall see 
me in the ranks of the enemy. He shall obtain from me no 
information capable of injuring the French Army, composed of 
men whom I love and for whom I shall never cease to bear 
a lively attachment." 

Two hours after having written this protestation that he 
was not a deserter and traitor, Bourmont revealed to Colonel 
von Schutter, commanding the Prussian advance posts along 
the Sambre, that the French would attack Charleroi in the 
afternoon. A Httle later he said to Colonel Reiche, Ziethen's 
aide-de-camp, that the French Army numbered 120,000 men. 
Finally, when, about three o'clock, he met Bliicher near vSom- 
breffe, he would have, no doubt, hastened to answer all the 
questions asked him. But the old soldier, disgusted at seeing 
a man wearing the uniform of a general of division deserting on 
the morning of a battle, hardly deigned to speak to him. An 
officer of the Prussian staff having remarked to the field marshal 
that he should show himself less brusque towards Bourmont, 
since the latter wore a white cockade, Bliicher, without caring 
whether he was understood by the renegade, who might un- 
derstand German, said in a loud tone: "What matters the 
cockade? A traitor will always be a traitor." 



64 Waterloo. 



n. 

The enemy had no need of information from the Count 
de Bourmont. On June 9th Ziethen and General Dornberg, 
who commanded the Hght cavalry brigade detached in front 
of Mons, were informed of great movements of troops towards 
the frontier. On the 12th General Dornberg had forwarded 
to Wellington, who had transmitted it to Bliicher, the informa- 
tion that 100,000 French were concentrating between Avesnes 
and Philippe ville. On the 13th this same Dornberg, who had 
numerous spies along the frontier, wrote direct to Bliicher that 
an attack appeared imminent. On the 14th Pirch II. an- 
nounced from Marchienne that the French would attack the 
next day. In the evening the Prussian advance posts were 
thoroughly informed of the proximity of the Imperial Army. 
It was in vain that the precaution had been taken to build the 
camp-fires in the hollows of the ground. The light from these 
innumerable braziers were reflected upon the heavens, which 
were illumined by a great white light. 

While believing that Napoleon would not take the of- 
fensive, Wellington and Bliicher, however, in an interview 
held at Tirlemont on May 3rd, had concerted together in antic- 
ipation of this eventuality. Did they decide on this day, as 
a number of historians state, upon a concentration on the line 
of Sombreflfe-Quatre-Bras? It is doubtful, for they were ig- 
norant whether the French Army would debouch by Philippe- 
ville, Maubeuge, Conde, or Lille. It is far more probable that 
the two Commanders-in-chief had agreed only upon a junction 
in front of Brussels without fixing the precise point — circum- 
stances would dictate this point. Two days after the con- 
ference of Tirlemont, Bliicher, always zealous for the cause of 
the Allies, had prescribed to his troops, in order to bring them 
nearer to the English Army, a general movement on his right. 
The I. Corps concentrated at Fleurus and the II. at Namur; 
the III. Corps marched from Treves on Arlon, then on Dinant 
and Huy ; the IV. came from Coblentz to Malmedy and a little 
later to Liege. Bliicher moved his headquarters from Liege 
to Namur. Ziethen, commanding the I. Army Corps, the 
nearest one to the English cantonments, received the order to 
remain in close touch with Wellington's army. Bliicher wrote 
to Ziethen on May 5th : "In case of an attack, you will await 



First Combats. 65 

at Fleurus the development of the enemy's manoeuvres, and 
you will inform the Duke of Wellington as well as myself of 
all that takes place as early as possible." If not Wellington, 
who, upon Bliicher's promise at Tirelemont to cover the left 
flank of the English Army, had echeloned his forces in such a 
manner as to protect especially the routes of Ath, Mons, and 
Nivelles, at least Bliicher was preparerd to meet an attack 
from the side of Charleroi. Before noon on June 14th the Field 
Marshal, informed by the reports of Pirch II. and Dornberg, 
began to prepare for the concentration of his entire army 
at Fleurus. 

The advance posts of Pirch II., who covered the front of 
Ziethen's corps, expected, on the night of the 14th, to be at- 
tacked at break, of day. They received the French skirmishers 
with musket-shots; then, in danger of being outflanked, they 
retired foot by foot, from position to position, as far as the 
Sambre. In these different engagements, at Thuin, Ham, in 
the wood of Montigny, and at the farm of La Tombe, the 
Prussians lost nearly 500 men killed, wounded and prisoners. 
Continuing to push the enemy in front of them, the French 
heads of column arrived between nine and ten o'clock on the 
bank of the Sambre: Bachelu's division of Reille's corps be- 
fore Marchienne, and Pajol's cavalry in front of Charleroi. 
The bridges were barricaded and defended by infantry and 
cannon. The attack of Marchienne — in preparing which a 
great deal of time was lost — consumed two hours. It was 
only a little while before noon that the 2nd Light captured the 
bridge at the point of the bayonet. Reille at once ordered the 
2nd Corps to debouch, but, the bridge being narrow, the four 
divisions and the cavalry did not finish their movement until 
the middle of the afternoon. The ist Corps, which followed 
that of Reille, did not begin to cross the Sambre until 4 :30 p. m. 

Pajol was also detained quite a while before the bridge of 
Charleroi. Between nine and ten o'clock the ist Hussars at- 
tempted a hurrah, which failed under the sustained fire of 
sharpshooters concealed in the houses and behind the barricade. 
It required infantry to force the barricade. Pajol resigned 
himself to await the arrival of Vandamme's corps, which he 
supposed was following him at a short distance. As we know, 
this army corps had struck camp four hours late. About eleven 
o'clock Pajol saw arriving not Vandamme, but the Emperor 
in person with the sappers of the Guard and the Young Guard 



66 Waterloo. 

of Duhesme. Informed of Vandamme's delay, Napoleon had 
ordered Duhesme' s division to quit its place in the central 
column and to advance at a rapid pace towards Charleroi by a 
cross-road. Sappers and marines hurled themselves on the 
bridge, swept the barricade, and opened the way for Pajol's 
squadrons. The Prussians having retired, the horsemen, 
climbing at a rapid trot the steep and winding street which 
traverses Charleroi from north to south, pursued them along 
the route of Charleroi. 

Not far from Charleroi the road branches off in two direc- 
tions — the one to the left leads to Brussels, while the other 
goes to Fleurus. Pajol despatched the ist Hussars along the 
Brussels route, and with the main body of his cavalry he ad- 
vanced along the Fleurus route, by which the Prussians, who 
had been dislodged from Charleroi, were retreating. 

III. 

It was a little past noon. The Emperor, acclaimed by 
the inhabitants, traversed Charleroi. He halted at the foot 
of the crumbling glacis at some hundred yards on this side of 
the spot where the routes of Fleurus and Brussels branch, near 
a little tavern called Belle-Vue, from which all the valley of 
the vSambre may be seen. He dismounted from his horse, or- 
dered a chair to be brought from Belle-Vue, and seated himself 
on the side of the road. The troops defiled. On perceiving 
him, cavalry and infantry uttered cheers which drowned the 
roll of drums and the blare of trumpets. The enthusiasm bor- 
dered on frenzy; some of the soldiers issued from the ranks 
"in order to embrace the horse of their Emperor." According 
to an eye-witness. Napoleon soon sank into a deep slumber, 
from which the noise of the acclamations was insufhcient to 
awaken him. This fact will not appear improbable if we re- 
call to mind that in Paris, in the months of April and May, 
1 8 15, the Emperor was often afflicted with these sudden fits of 
drowsiness, and if we remember that on this day at noon he 
had already remained seven or eight hours on horseback. 

Gourgaud, who had accompanied the ist Hussars along 
the route of Brussels, returned about two o'clock to announce 
that the Prussians showed themselves in force at Gosselies. 
The Emperor sent him immediately to Marchienne, with the 
order for Reille to March on Gosselies. Anxious, however, for 



First Combats. 67 

his left until the execution of this movement, he ordered one 
of Duhesme's regiments of the Young Guard and a battery of 
horse artillery to take position on the Brussels route at two 
kilometers from Charleroi. Soon after he ordered Lefebvre- 
Desnoettes to push forward to the support of the ist Hussars 
with the light cavalry of the Guard (lancers and chasseurs) ; 
and he dictated to Soult a letter for d'Erlon, enjoining the 
latter to march on Gosselies in order to second Reille. This 
letter had just been despatched — it was a little after three 
o'clock — when Marshal Ney arrived. 

Having arrived by post at Avesnes on June 14th without 
his horses and with a single aide-de-camp, Ney had found the 
next day nothing but a peasant's cart to carry him to Beau- 
mont. There, on the morning of the 15th, he had purchased 
two horses from Marshal Mortier, ill from an attack of sciatica, 
and had ridden rapidly towards Charleroi, skirting the columns 
on the march. The soldiers recognized him; they appeared 
glad to see him again. "Everything is all right now!" they 
cried; "here is Red-head." 

The Emperor, who also wished that "everything should 
be all right," said to the Marshal: "Good-day, Ney. I am 
glad to see you. You will take command of the ist and 2d 
Army Corps I give you also the Hght cavalry of the Guard, 
but you must not use it. To-morrow you will be joined by the 
cuirassiers of Kellermann. Go, push the enemy on the Brus- 
sels route, and take position at Quatre-Bras." 

On the ground, and in presence of the enemy, the fine 
strategical plan conceived in Paris by the Emperor takes form 
and develops itself. He intended only, on this first day, to 
advance on the presumed point of junction of the twp allied 
armies, so as to forestall them on this point. Now, since his 
adversaries leave him the time, he will extend his field of action 
and render it impossible for them to unite. The main body 
of the English coming from Brussels and that of the Prus- 
sians from Namur, the two armies must necessarily effect their 
junction by the highway leading from Namur to Nivelles, 
which passes through Sonibreff e and crosses at Quatre-Bras the 
route from Charleroi to Brussels. The Emperor wishes then 
to push his left wing to Quatre-Bras and his right wing to Som- 
breffe. He will establish himself at Fleurus, the summit of the 
triangle formed by these three points, ready to burst the next 
day with his reserve upon th?t one of tha hostile armies which 



68 " Waterloo. 

will approach first. If both of them retreat, he will gain 
Brussels without firing a cannon. 

Grouchy arrived as the Emperor finished giving his in- 
structions to Marshal Ney, who set out immediately to put 
them in execution. Grouchy had arrived an hour previous, 
with Exelmans' dragoons, at the bridge of Charleroi, over which 
the Young Guard was still defiling; impatient to rejoin his ist 
Corps of cavalry, which he supposed was engaged with the 
enemy, he had outstripped the column, and had pushed on to 
Gilly at a gallop. After having reconnoitred this position, he 
had returned to obtain the Emperor's orders. The latter, 
wishing to see for himself, immediately mounted his horse. 
It was then after three o'clock. The dragoons of Exelmans 
had finished debouching behind the Guard, and the advance of 
Vandamme's corps had entered Charleroi. 

General Pirch II. had estabhshed his division in the rear of 
Gilly, its front covered by the boggy stream of Grand-Rieux. 
Four battaHons and a battery were stationed upon the accliv- 
ities of the wooded heights which command the valley from 
the Abbey of Soleillemont to Chatelineau; three other bat- 
talions were in reserve near Lambusart; and a regiment of 
dragoons observed the Sambre from Chatelet to Farciennes. 
Deceived by the extension of this Hne of battle — extension 
precisely intended to impose upon the French — Grouchy 
valued the forces of the enemy at 20,000 men. The Emperor 
judged at first glance that there were no more than 10,000. 
He settled with Grouchy, who had been verbally invested 
with the command of the right wing, the dispositions for at- 
tack. One of Vandamme's divisions, seconded by Pajol's 
cavalry, would attack the enemy in front, whilst Grouchy, 
with Exelmans' dragoons, would ford the stream near the mill 
of Delhatte and take them in flank. Then the Prussians were 
to be pursued as far as Sombreffe, where the French would 
take position. 

After giving these orders, the Emperor returned to Char- 
leroi in order to hasten the march of Vandamme's corps. It 
would have been better had he remained at Gilly. In his ab- 
sence, Vandamme and Grouchy consumed two hours in com- 
bining their attack. About 5 130 p. m. the Emperor, surprised 
at not hearing the cannon, returned upon the ground and 
ordered Vandamme to plunge headlong against the enemy. 



First Combats. 69 

After a short cannonade, which silenced Pirch's guns, 
three columns, of two battalions each, rushed forward with 
fixed bayonets. The Prussians posted in the first line did not 
await the shock. In accordance with Ziethen's order, Pirch 
put them immediately in retreat. Irritated at seeing these 
battalions retiring without loss, the Emperor ordered one of 
his aides-de-camp, General Letort, "to charge and crush the 
Prussian infantry" with the squadrons on duty or serving 
about his person. 

IvCtort does not take time to unite the four squadrons. 
He starts with the dragoons alone ; the others will follow when 
they are ready! He crosses the stream to the north of the 
route, where it is not so deeply embanked ; recrosses the route 
of Sart-Allet in front of Vandamme's columns, and bursts upon 
the retreating Prussians. Of the four battalions of the enemy 
two succeed in gaining the wood of Soleillemont ; the other 
two, formed in squares, are overthrown and sabred; the few 
survivors flee into the woods, the skirts of which are occupied 
by the first regiment of western Prussia. In pursuing them 
lyCtort is struck by a ball in the belly and falls, mortally wound- 
ed, from his horse. The soldiers adored this gentle and in- 
trepid chief, and they avenged his death by massacring every 
Prussian who came within reach of their long swords. 

During this combat the dragoons of Exelmans, with the 
brigades of Burthe and Vincent leading, debouched above 
Chatelineau, overthrew the dragoon regiment of Colonel Moisky, 
chased a battalion from the wood of Pironchamp, and threw 
it back on Eambusart. All the troops of Pirch had rallied 
there, and the enemy showed a disposition to defend himself. 
Attacked simultaneously by the dragoons of Exelmans and 
the light cavalry of Pajol, who had outstripped the columns 
of Vandamme, he withdrew beyond Fleurus. Grouchy had 
conducted in person the attack on the right. Although the 
day was declining, he wished to take possession of Fleurus, 
occupied only by two battalions, and to push the Prussians 
as far as Sombreffe, in accordance with the orders of the Em- 
peror. But Vandamme, who had already commenced to estab- 
lish his bivouacs between Winage and the wood of Soleille- 
mont, refused positively to go further, saying that his troops 
were too fatigued, and that, moreover, "he had no orders to 
receive from the commander of the cavalry." Grouchy, not 
being able to attack Fleurus without infantry, halted at the 



70 Waterloo. 

distance of two cannon-shots from this village. The corps of 
Exelmans and Pajol bivouacked in the first line, covering the 
infantry of Vandamme, between Lambusart and Campinaire. 

IV. 

The left wing also did not advance as far as Napoleon 
would have wished. The ist Hussars, sent from Charleroi 
along the route of Brussels, had encountered, about half -past 
one o'clock, beyond Jumet, the cavalry of Lutzow and the 
skirmishers of the 29th Regiment, which covered the concen- 
tration at Gosselies of the division of vSteinmetz. Both parties 
observed each other for some time, then the two cavalries en- 
gaged. The uhlans drove back briskly the hussars, when they 
were charged and repulsed in turn by the lancers of Pire, who 
formed the advance of Reille's corps. Reille hastened the 
march of his infantry, arrived about three o'clock within 
cannon-range of Gosselies, and opened fire against this village. 
At the moment when the columns of attack began their move- 
ment Marshal Ney arrived with the light cavalry of the Guard, 
which he had overtaken en route. Gosselies, defended by the 
29th Prussian Regiment, was occupied after a slight combat. 
However, the affair was not ended. The larger portion of, 
the division of Steinmetz was still on the march to the west 
of Gosselies; by the occupation of this village the direct 
route to Heppignies and Fleurus was intercepted. Without 
hesitating, Steinmetz pushed several battalions against the 
French, who had started to debouch from Gosselies, thrust 
them back, and, under the protection of a strong detachment 
holding the houses on the northern side of the town, he con- 
tinued his retreat on Heppignies. 

The route of Brussels was open, and there were yet four 
hours of daylight. But Marshal Ney no doubt thought that, 
in spite of the formal order of the Emperor to push the enemy, 
he was already too far advanced with respect to the right wing 
of the Army. Instead of continuing his march with all his 
troops, he established the divisions of Girard, Foy, and Jerome 
around Gossehes, directed on Mellet the division of Bachelu 
and the light cavalry of Pire, and only detached towards 
Quatre-Bras the lancers and chasseurs of the Guard. 

Arrived, about half-past five o'clock, in sight of Frasnes, 
the lancers of the Guard were received with cannon-shots. 



First Combats. 71 

The village was occupied by a battalion of Nassau troops and 
a horse battery, commanded by Major Normann. This offi- 
cer, left without instructions, but hearing the cannonade at 
Gosselies, had at once prepared to defend bravely his post. 
Tefebvre-Desnoettes immediately demanded some infantry. 
A battalion of the 2nd Light, forming the advance of Bachelu's 
division, and which had arrived abreast of Mellet, continued 
its route towards P'rasnes in accelerating its pace. The 
skirmishers opened fire on the Nassau troops. Pending the 
arrival of this reinforcement, Lefebvre-Desnoettes had directed 
a part of the lancers to the right of Frasnes, so as to turn the 
enemy. The Squadron of the Isle of Elba (Poles), commanded 
by General Edouard de Colbert in person, pushed as far as 
Quatre-Bras, which was unoccupied. But Colbert found him- 
self there without support, and very far from the main body 
of his division ; he returned near Frasnes. Meanwhile the bat- 
talion of Major Normann had withdrawn along the route, al- 
ways keeping the French within close cannon-range. It took 
position upon the skirts of the wood of Bossu, at two kilo- 
meters in front of Ouatre-Bras, where at this moment Prince 
Bernard of Saxe-Weimar arrived with four battalions of Nassau 
troops. Informed fortuitously at Genappe of the passage of 
the Sambre by the French, this young Prince had, on his own 
authority, put his troops on the march to occupy that important 
strategical point. 

On hearing the cannonade. Marshal Ney rejoined his 
advance guard. He reconnoitred the position. Although the 
Nassau troops numbered only 4,500 with six guns, they were 
sufficient to defend Quatre-Bras against the 1,700 lancers and 
chasseurs of Lefebvre-Desnoettes, supported by a single bat- 
talion. Ney contented himself with ordering a few rather 
feeble charges against the Nassau infantry, in position in 
front of Quatre-Bras, and directing to the east of this point, 
on the side of Sart Dame Aveline, a reconnoissance, which 
did not even approach within musket-range of the enemy's 
outposts. Then, a little before eight o'clock, he rejoined at 
Frasnes, where it had estabhshed itself, the division of Lefebvre- 
Desnoettes, and returned to GosseHes to pass the night. 

Colonel Heymes, Ney's aide-de-camp during this cam- 
paign, has said, in explanation of the Marshal's conduct, "that 
there was not one chance in ten " of taking possession of Quatre- 
Bras. As a matter of fact, when Ney arrived within sight of 



72 AVaterloo. 

Quatre-Bras, not at ten in the evening, as Heymes pretends, 
but at seven at the latest, as we have just seen, he could hardly 
think of carrying this position with two regiments of cavalry 
and one battalion of infantry; but if at five in the afternoon, 
being then at Gosselies, he had put on the march along the 
Brussels route only one-fourth of the troops that had been en- 
trusted to him by the Emperor — that is, two divisions of cav- 
alry, two of infantry, and four batteries— before nine o'clock 
he would have exterminated in Ouatre-Bras with these 14,000 
men the 4,500 infantry of Prince Bernard of Saxe-Weimar, 
the greater part of whom had but ten cartridges. In halting 
Reille's corps around Gosselies, Ney, for the first time in his 
life, had yielded to prudence. He had renounced occupying 
Quatre-Bras, if not by a cavalry post, in case this point should 
. not be defended. He had judged that it would be compro- 
mising his army corps to place it en fleche, at four leagues from 
the right wing, in a position where it might be attacked by all 
of Wellington's forces. Some strategists have declared that 
Ney acted according to the true principles of the art of war. 
This may be possible. But if Prince Bernard of Saxe-Weimar 
had understood these principles, he would not have obeyed the 
inspiration to march on Ouatre-Bras with four battaHons, at 
the risk of being crushed there by the entire French Army. 



BOOK TWO. 

LiGNY AND QuATRE-BrAS. 



CHAPTER I. 
The Morning oif June i6th. 

I. — The plans and orders of Napoleon (from five to eight o'clock). 
II. — The departure of Napoleon for Fleurus (half-past nine). 
III. — Concentration of the Prussian Army to the north of the Ligny. — 
Inactivity of the English Army "during the day of June 15th. — 
The ball of the Duchess of Richmond (night of June I5th-i6th). 
IV.— Arrival of Wellington at Quatre-Bras (June i6th, ten o'clock). — 
Interview between Wellington and Bliicher at the mill of 
Bussy, near Ligny (one o'clock in the afternoon). 



The occupation of Quatre-Bras and Sombreffe on the 
evening of June 15th imposed itself only as a complement of 
the fine strategical operation conceived by Napoleon. The 
fact that Grouchy and Ney had not seized these two points 
was only an unfortunate incident. The essential object of the 
movement of the French Army, which was to advance on the 
first day upon the line of contact of the English and Prussians, 
was not the less attained. Almost without striking a blow, 
and in spite of delays in the march of many colunans, the Em- 
peror had passed the Sambre, made seven leagues upon the 
enemy's territory, and established his army in the very midst 
of the cantonments of the Allies. He had 124,000 men biv- 
ouacked within a triangle of three leagues. 

The enemy appeared to be in disorder. During the entire 
day not an English uniform had been seen. At no point 
had the Prussians appeared in force ; they had feebly disput- 
ed the passage of the Sambre, and their half-hearted though 
skillful and valiant defense of Gilly and Gosselies seemed rath- 

73 



74 Watekloo. 

er to have been intended to protect a retreat than to cover a 
concentration. 

When the Emperor, who had returned at night to Char- 
leroi, had taken cognizance of the reports of Grouchy and Ney, 
he imagined that the AlHes, disconcerted by his unforeseen 
aggression, were falHng back on their bases of operations — the 
Prussians towards Iviege and Maestricht, the Anglo-Belgians 
towards Ostend and Antwerp. The direction pursued by the 
Prussian advance posts in their retreat from Thuin to Mar- 
chienne, from Fontaine-Leveque and Marchienne to Gosselies, 
and from Charleroi and Gosselies to Fleurus, was of a nature 
to confirm this supposition. If the Prussians had been ma- 
noeuvring to unite at once with the English, they would have 
retired towards the north; as it were, they had retreated to- 
wards the northeast, uncovering the route of Brussels. The 
resolution which Napoleon, judging from appearances, attrib- 
uted to Bliicher and Wellington, assured him the victory. 
The farther the allied armies departed from each other the 
more easy it would be to beat them. It was one thing to at- 
tack the English when the Prussians were within one march 
of them, and another thing if Wellington and Bliicher were 
separated by fifteen or twenty leagues. 

The Emperor determines upon his plan on the morning 
of June 1 6th, probably at six o'clock, perhaps earlier. With 
Grouchy and the right wing he will advance on Sombreffe and 
Gembloux. If a Prussian corps is still found in one or the 
other of these positions, he will attack it. The ground thus 
reconnoitred or swept on the east, he will recall the reserve, 
temporarily posted at Fleurus, and will rejoin with it Ney and 
the right wing at Ouatre-Bras. Thence he will move on Brus- 
sels by a night march. He reckons that the head of column 
will arrive in Brussels on June 17th at seven in the morning. 
The orders for this double movement were despatched 
by the Major-General between seven and eight o'clock in the 
morning; the order for Kellermann to direct himself on Gosse- 
lies, in order to be at the disposal of Marshal Ney ; the order 
for Drouot to put the Guard on the march for Fleurus; the 
order for Lobau to push the 6th Corps half-way from Charleroi 
to Fleurus ; and the order for Vandamme and Gerard to march 
on Sombreffe with the 3rd and 4th Corps, and to follow hence- 
forth the instructions of Marshal Grouchy, commander of the 
right wing. Soult wrote to Ney to take position at Ouatre- 



The MorjSting of June 16th. 75 

Bras with six divisions of infantry and the cuirassiers of Kel- 
lermann, and to push his other two divisions of infantry — one 
to Genappe (five kilometers beyond Ouatre-Bras), with the 
cavahy of Pire, and the other to Marbais, with the cavalry of 
Lefebvre-Desnoettes, in order to support eventually the right 
wing. Ney, finally, was to push some reconnoissances as far 
as possible along the routes of Nivelles and Brussels. As to 
Grouchy, he received the order to establish himself at Som- 
breffe, and to send from there an advance guard to Gembloux 
and some reconnoissances in every direction. 

II. 

At the imperial headquarters these orders were being ex- 
pedited when the Emperor received a note from Grouchy, 
stating that strong columns of the enemy, who appeared to 
be debouching by the route of Namur, were directing them- 
selves towards Brye and Saint- Amand. While believing that 
the Prussians were in retreat, Napoleon had admitted the 
hypothesis of an encounter with them at Sombreffe, but he 
had been far from thinking that they would come to take po- 
sition on the outskirts of Fleurus. This movement indicated 
that, far from withdrawing his troops and separating himself 
from the English Army, as the direction followed by his 
advance posts in their retreat the day before had caused him 
to think, Bliicher was manoeuvring with the view of a battle 
for the same day in conjunction with WelHngton. Instead of 
a rear guard or an isolated corps to be dislodged from Sombreffe 
or Gembloux, Napoleon would have to fight, north of Fleurus, 
the entire Prussian Army; and, as Bliicher and Wellington 
would no doubt act in concert, the English would be met with 
in force on the route of Brussels. 

This completely overturned the plan conceived by Na- 
poleon. He could not defeat during the day the army of 
Bliicher on the right, overthrow in the evening the army of 
Wellington on the left, and march in the night on Brussels. 
Napoleon, however, was not disconcerted. With him suppo- 
sitions changed swiftly into certainties. When he had sup- 
posed a thing, this thing must be such as he had supposed it. 
Fortune had so often declared in favor of his previsions! 
On the morning of June i6th he beheved that Blucher was re- 
treating and the route of Brussels open ; then Bliicher was re- 



76 Wateeloo. 

treating and the route of Brussels was open. The movements 
reported by Grouchy could be only some demonstrations in- 
tended to be misleading. He would give a good account of 
these few Prussian regiments^ — merely a screen destined to 
mask the retreat of their main army. It seemed, moreover, 
that this was the opinion of Grouchy himself, for in the letter 
in which he reported the appearance of columns of the enemy 
in the direction of Saint-Amand he announced that he was 
uniting his troops in order to march on Sombreffe, in accordance 
with the orders of the previous day. If since five o'clock in 
the morning Grouchy had presumed that Bliicher's entire army 
was concentrating to the west of Sombreffe, he would not have 
prepared for a movement on this village, at the risk of suffering 
a disastrous flank attack. 

The Emperor then made no change in his orders. Far 
from changing anything in them, he wrote about eight o'clock 
to Ney and Grouchy in order to reiterate them and to hasten 
their execution. Knowing that his aides-de-camp were better 
mounted than the officers of the Major-General, he entrusted 
one of these letters to Flahault, the other to La Bedoyere; in 
this way he hoped that his two lieutenants would receive his 
iterative instructions before those even which had just been 
sent by Soult. In these duplicates the Emperor explained 
himself more fully upon a few details pertaining to the execu- 
tion of his orders, and he revealed, what Soult had failed 'o 
do, that the object of the double movement on Sombreffe and 
Quatre-Bras was a night march on Brussels. 

Between nine and ten o'clock in the morning, as Napoleon 
was on the point of setting out for Fleurus, an officer of lancers 
arrived from the left wing; he said "the enemy presented 
some masses on the side of Ouatre-Bras." Fearing that the 
presence of these pretended masses might, as the day before, 
cause Ney to hesitate to march forward, the Emperor deemed 
it necessary to reassure him and to renew once more his orders. 
He at once had the Major-General to write to him as follows: 
"Bliicher being yesterday at Namur, it is not probable that 
he has any troops at Ouatre-Bras. Hence you will have an 
affair only with what comes from Brussels. Unite the corps 
of Counts Reille and d'Erlon and that of the Count de Valmy; 
with these forces you should be able to beat and destroy any 
force that may present itself." However, in order to be 
prepared for every emergency, the Emperor ordered Lobau 



The Morning of June 16th. 77 

to remain temporarily at Charleroi, so that he could march, 
if necessary, with the 6th Corps to the assistance of Ney. 
In accordance with his orders, Adjutant-Commandant Janin, 
Lobau's assistant chief of staff, was sent to Frasnes in order 
to judge of the state of affairs. 

The Emperor arrived at Fleurus a little before eleven 
o'clock. He there found Grouchy — not without some aston- 
ishment, for he supposed him already on the march for Som- 
breffe. The Marshal had no difiiculty in making him under- 
stand that in the presence of the hostile masses, which were 
taking position to the north of Fleurus, he had been forced to 
limit himself to the occupation of that village, evacuated at 
daylight by the Prussians. Napoleon traversed the line of 
advance posts. In the midst of the plain of Fleurus there 
rises a mill in the shape of a tower, which dominates all the 
plain. The Emperor ordered some sappers to prepare, by 
means of a breach in the roof, a sort of loggia, in which he 
mounted in order to observe the positions of the enemy. 

III. 

Bliicher, who had hastened from Namur at the first alarm, 
had arrived at Sombreffe at four o'clock in the afternoon of 
June 15th. He flattered himself that he would have, at an 
early hour on the i6th, his four army corps behind the stream 
of Ligny, a position which had been recommended to him two 
months before by Major von Groben, and upon which he had 
then resolved to deliver battle if the French passed the Sambre 
at Charleroi. He was full of ardor and believed himself in- 
vincible. "With my 120,000 Prussians," he had written to 
his wife, "I would charge myself with the capture of Tripoli, 
Tunis, and Algiers, could we but cross the sea." But on ac- 
count of the excessive extension of his cantonments the Marshal 
was to meet with great disappointments. On the i6th, at 
eleven o'clock in the morning, he had in line only Ziethen's 
corps, which had been reduced to 28,000 men by the losses of 
the day before. The corps of Pirch I. (31,000 men) arrived 
at Sombreffe only at noon, followed at some distance by the 
corps of Thielmann (24,000 men). As for the IV. Corps, there 
had been received at headquarters during the night a letter 
from Bulow, announcing that it would not be assembled at 
Hannut (forty- two kilometers from Sombreffe) till the middle 



78 Watekloo. 

of the day. Thus Bliicher was about to find hiniseh short of 
30,000 bayonets. However, he was determined to accept 
battle, counting on the more or less prompt, more or less active 
cooperation of the Anglo-Dutch Army. Had not the two 
Commanders-in-chief agreed on May 3rd, at Tirelemont, to 
support mutually each other, if Napoleon took the offensive? 
And had not Wellington just said (evening of June 13th) to 
Bliicher's envoy, Colonel Pfiiell, "My army will be concen- 
trated at Nivelles or Ouatre-Bras, according to circumstances, 
twenty-two hours after the first cannon-shot"? 

There was a little diplomacy in the promises of Wellington. 
Bliicher's retreat on Liege would have left the English Army 
alone before Napoleon, and it would have been forced to 
choose between the alternative of accepting battle with a great 
inferiority of forces and that of falling back on its base of op- 
erations, and thus uncover Brussels. It was then necessary 
that Bliicher should remain in position, and for this Wellington 
deemed it essential to promise his support. He hoped, more- 
over, to be able to give him this support — but, like a true 
Englishman, at his own time and pleasure, and without run- 
ning the risk of compromising the safety of his army, even 
though it would be for the good of the common cause. Now, 
was not the offensive movement of the French towards Char- 
leroi a simple demonstration, intended to attract on this side 
the Anglo -Prussian masses? Was not the Emperor at this 
very moment advancing on Brussels with the main body of 
his army, either by Maubeuge, Mons, and Hal, or by I/ille, 
Tournay, and Ath? Wellington feared that such was the 
case, and fearing to be drawn into a false manoeuvre, he was 
unwilling to move a man or cannon before being absolutely 
certain of the precise point upon which Napoleon would 
direct his principal attack. 

It was in vain that on June 12th, 13th, and 14th numerous 
reports of the concentration of the French Army upon the 
frontier had arrived at his headquarters in Brussels; it was in 
vain that at eight o'clock on the morning of June i5tli Wel- 
lington had learned by a letter from Ziethen that the Prussian 
advance posts had been attacked at dawn. On this very 
da)^ he had yet given no order. Muffling, the Prussian com- 
missioner at the English headquarters, having received a 
personal letter from Ziethen confirming the first reports, has- 
tened to communicate its contents to the Duke. "If every- 



The Morning or June 16th. 79 

thing is as Ziethen believes," said Wellington to him, "I shall 
concentrate on my left wing, so as to act in concert with the 
Prussian Army; but if a part of the enemy's forces march on 
Mons, I shall be obliged to concentrate on my center. I must 
then await, before coming to a decision, some news from my 
advance-posts at Mons. However, as the destination of my 
troops remains uncertain, and as their departure is certain, I 
shall issue orders in order that they may be ready to march." 

According to these orders, despatched only on June 15th, 
between six and seven o'clock in the evening, the troops were 
simply to assemble by divisions at Ninove, Ath, Grammont, 
Brussels, Braine-le-Comte, and Nivelles, and to be ready to 
march next day at dawn. Thus, at the time when the French 
left wing had passed Gosselies and the right wing had arrived 
within sight of Fleurus, Wellington, in place of directing his 
troops upon the threatened point, contented himself with 
uniting them in isolated divisions within a parallelogram of ten 
leagues by nine. In truth, he must have been deluded and 
paralyzed by the vision of Napoleon attacking in person 
upon all points at the same time. 

At noon Bliicher had written to Muffling in order to an- 
nounce to him the withdrawal of Pirch's division upon the left 
bank of the Sambre, and that he was about to concentrate his 
army at Sombreffe, where he intended to accept battle. "I 
expect," he added, "prompt news of the concentration of 
Wellington's forces." This letter, which arrived about seven 
o'clock in the evening, and which was immediately shown to 
Wellington, influenced him no more than had the letters of 
Ziethen. "The dispositions of the Field Marshal are very 
good," said he, "but I can not decide upon anything before 
knowing what is passing on the side of Mons." He was, 
finally, to acquire the certainty that everything was tranquil 
there^ A letter from General Dornberg, which he received be- 
tween nine and ten o'clock, informed him in this regard. He 
then determined, not, as his apologists pretend, on a move- 
ment with all his army on Quatre-Bras, but on a partial 
concentration towards Nivelles. 

After having given these orders, which, by reason of the 
advanced hour and the extent of the cantonments, could not 
be put in execution before dawn, WelHngton said to Muffling: 
"My troops are about to put themselves on the march. But 
here the partisans of Napoleon begin to raise their heads. We 



8o Waterloo. 

must reassure our friends. I^et us go to the ball of the Duchess 
of Richmond, and we will mount on horseback at five in the 
morning." 

In Brussels, where, however, there had been festivals every 
evening, this ball, announced for some time, was discussed 
almost as much as the early entrance into campaign. It was 
known that the Duchess of Richmond had made great prep- 
arations; that she had turned into a sumptuous hall a vast 
shed contiguous to her villa; that a military band would 
furnish the music; and that there had been invited to the 
soiree the elite of the English Staff and of the cosmopolite 
society of Brussels, Russian and German diplomats, English 
peers, and French emigres. Applications, prayers, and in- 
trigues were multiplied in order to obtain invitations. The 
Duchess of Richmond received the guests assisted by her eldest 
daughter, later Eady Ross, at that time seventeen years old. 
There were hardly more than two hundred guests — the Prince 
of Orange, Prince Frederick of the Tow Countries, the Duke of 
Brunswick, the Prince of Nassau, Lord Wellington, the Burgo- 
master of Brussels, Princes Auguste and Pierre d'Arenberg, the 
Duke and Duchess de Beaufort and their daughter, the Duke 
and Duchess d'Ursel, the Count and Countess de Mercy- 
Argentau; Count de La Tour-Dupin, French minister to The 
Hague, and the Countess de La Tour-Dupin; the Marquis and 
Marchioness d'Assche, Count de La Rochefoucauld, the dow- 
ager Countess d'Oultremont and the Misses d'Oultremont, 
Lady Fitz-Roy Somerset, Count du Cayla (without his wife). 
Sir Charles Stewart, Lord and Lady Seymour and their 
daughter; Count Pozzo di Borgo and JBaron de Vincent, am- 
bassadors of Russia and Austria to His Majesty the King of 
France at Ghent; General Alva, Spanish commissioner, at- 
tached to Wellington's staff; General Muffling; Lord Uxbridge, 
Commander - in - chief of the British cavalry ; Lord Saltoun, 
colonel of the Foot Guards ; Lord Somerset, commanding the 
brigade of Horse Guards ; Lord Hill, commanding the 2d Eng- 
lish Corps; Generals Clinton, Ponsonby, Picton, Vivian, Byng, 
Pack, Cooke, Kempt, Maitland, and a great number of colonels, 
majors, and young captains, lieutenants, and ensigns. When 
Wellington, about midnight, entered the home of the Duchess 
of Richmond, the ball was at its height. Full of life and gaiety, 
the beautiful young women and handsome officers were intox- 



The Mokning of June 16th. 8i 

icated with the noise and movement. But, as in the funereal 
dances of the old frescoes, Death led the round. 

The passage of the Sambre by the French Army was still 
unknown. Wellington informed the Duke of Brunswick that 
Bonaparte had entered Belgium, and that in all probability 
there would be a battle during the day. Brunswick, by a sort 
of presentiment, felt the chilliness of death. He turned pale 
and arose with a bound, by this sudden movement letting 
the little Prince de Ligne, whom he had upon his knees, fall 
to the floor. Wellington took to one side all the general officers 
and gave them verbally the orders of march which had just 
been sent to them in writing. They were not long in quitting 
the ball. Informed about one o'clock, in the middle of the 
festivities, by a despatch from Constant Rebecque, that the 
French had shown themselves at Ouatre-Bras, the Prince of 
Orange set out for Genappe. By degrees the rumor spread 
that the Army was about to move. But the young officers 
could not tear themselves from this night of pleasure, "upon 
which," said Lord Byron, "was soon to rise so bloody a dawn." 
It was only when they heard the trumpets and bugles sounding 
the assembly that they ran, in silk stockings and buckle shoes, 
to rejoin their companies. The Duchess of Richmond, deeply 
moved, would have wished to arrest the bah, but the young 
ladies and the few young men who did not belong to the Army 
continued to dance until daylight. 

Wellington did not leave until three o'clock, after having 
supped. The Duchess awakened her youngest daughter, a 
true baby Reynolds, who came with her rosy little hands to 
buckle on the sword of the Commander-in-chief. 

.IV. 

Muffling says that during the ball Welhngton was very 
gay. There certainly was no reason for this gaiety! During 
the entire day he had persisted in leaving his troops dispersed 
in their cantonments at four, eight, ten, and fifteen leagues 
from one another; and the orders of the evening, by which he 
flattered himself to repair victoriously his great error, were 
pitiful. His last dispositions tended to nothing less than to 
uncover the route leading from Charleroi to Brussels in order 
to protect that of Mons, which was not threatened. If the 
orders of Wellington had been executed, a gap four leagues 



82 Waterloo. 

wide would have been opened between Nivelles and the Lower 
Dyle; a gap through which Ney would have been able to ad- 
vance half-way to Brussels without firing a shot, or, better 
still, as Gneissenau has said, "to turn back on the rear of the 
Prussian Army and cause its utter destruction." 

Fortunately for the Allies, man}^ of Wellington's sub- 
ordinates had taken it on themselves to act without awaiting 
his orders, and others had intelligently disobeyed those which, 
after so much time lost, he had decided to give. On the day 
before, Major Normann had defended Frasnes, the Prince of 
Saxe-Weimar had advanced from Genappe to Quatre-Bras 
with his brigade, and General Chasse had concentrated his 
division at Foy. A little later Constant Rebecque, the Prince 
of Orange's chief of staff, directed, in the absence of the Prince, 
General Collaert to assemble his cavalry behind the Haine, and 
General Perponcher to prepare to march on Quatre-Bras. 
Finally, at eleven o'clock in the evening, this same Rebecque, 
not being able to avoid transmitting to the generals of division 
Wellington's order to concentrate all the Netherland troops 
at Nivelles — or, in other words, to uncover the route of Brus- 
sels — gave them verbal instructions which left them free not 
to conform to this order. "It is impossible to know at Brus- 
sels," he said, "the exact state of affairs." Perponcher did 
not hesitate. In place of maintaining at Nivelles the Bylandt 
brigade and of recalling that of Saxe-Weimar, as directed by 
Wellington, he marched with Bylandt on Quatre-Bras to 
support Prince Bernard. 

Ah, if Napoleon had had as chief of staff a simple Constant 
Rebecque and as lieutenants some Perponchers and Bernards 
of Saxe-Weimar! And what a fine occasion, on the other 
hand, for professors of strategy like Charras to denounce the 
fatal indecision, the torpor of mind, and the moral weakness 
of the Emperor if, on the eve of a battle. Napoleon had re- 
mained ten hours without concentrating his troops, had then 
prescribed a movement in a direction opposite to that of the 
enemy, and had, finally, passed the night in parading himself 
at a ball! 

But in war, as in play, nothing can prevail against Fortune. 
When Wellington, who had left Brussels at six in the morning, 
arrived about ten at Quatre-Bras, he found there the division 
of Perponcher, when he should have found the advance guard 



The Mornixg of June 16th. 83 

of Marshal Ney. His Grace, appearing to forget the fact that 
one had acted contrary to his orders, deigned to congratulate 
General Perponcher and also the Prince of Orange — who had 
had nothing to do with it — upon the position taken. Then, 
after having advanced close enough to Frasnes to observe well 
the French advance posts, he despatched the order to the di- 
vision of Picton and the corps of Brunswick, which had been 
halted at Waterloo, to resume their march, and wrote to Bliicher 
that Ouatre-Bras was occupied by a division of the Prince of 
Orange and that the English Army was directing itself on that 
point. The letter closed as follows: "I do not see a very 
large force of the enemy in front of us, and I await some news 
from your excellency before deciding upon my course." 

Wellington was not long in changing his mind. Believing, 
rightly or wrongly, that it would be many hours before he was 
attacked at Ouatre-Bras, he decided that in place of awaiting 
some news, which he would be unable to verify, it would be 
better to go to see things for himself and to concert verbally 
with Bliicher. About one o'clock he joined the Field Marshal 
upon the heights of Brye. They ascended upon the roof of 
the mill of Bussy, situated in front of that village ; from there 
the}^ were able to view all the ground, much better than from 
the mill of Fleurus, where Napoleon had established his ob- 
servatory. They saw the French columns debouching; and 
with their glasses they recognized the Emperor, surrounded 
by his staff. It seemed evident that they would soon have to 
combat the entire Imperial Army, the detachment which oc- 
cupied Frasnes being but a negligible fraction. 

"What do you desire me to do?" brusquely said Welling- 
ton in French. (He was ignorant of the German language.) 
Gneissenau proposed that the Duke should direct without 
delay all his troops in the rear of Brye to act as a reserve 
for the Prussian Army. This plan, based upon a false appre- 
ciation of the distribution of Napoleon's forces, was combated 
by Muffling. He said in substance that the EngHsh should 
manoeuvre so as to outflank the French left. "You are right, " 
cried Wellington. "I will overthrow what I have in front of 
me at Frasnes, and I will march on Gossehes." Gneissenau 
objected that this movement would be eccentric and of doubtful 
result, whilst the concentration at Brye would procure a certain 
and decisive success. The discussion being prolonged, Well- 



Waterloo. 



ington said, in order to end it: "Well, I will come if I am 
not attacked myself." With these words, which could not be 
construed into a formal engagement, the Duke departed from 
Quatre-Bras, whilst Bliicher took his last tactical dispositions. 



CHAPTER II. 

Battle of IvIgny. 

I. — The field of battle.— Dispositions of Bliicher and Napoleon. 
II.— -From three o'clock nntil four: Attacks of Saint-Amand by- 
Van damme and of Ligny by Gerard. 

III. — From four o'clock until half-past seven: Counter-attack of 
Bliicher. — Appearance of a supposed column of the enemy up- 
on the flank of the French Army. — Demonstration of Grouchy 
against the Prussian left. — Stubborn fight in Saint-Amand 
and Ligny. 

IV. — From half-past seven o'clock tmtil half- past nine: Final assault. 
— Capture of Ligny. — Combats on the hills. — Retreat of the 
Prussians. 

T. 

In front of the hill of Fleurus there rises at a gentle incline, 
beyond an undulating plain, a line of low heights, upon which 
are situated on the west the village of Brye, on the east that 
of Tongrinne, and in the center and somewhat remote the 
market-town of Sombreffe. These positions in themselves 
are easily accessible; but at their feet the stream of Ligny, 
four or five yards wide, deeply embanked and lined with wil- 
lows, alders, and brambles, pursues its tortuous way through 
the lowlands. This stream and the rough ground by which 
one descends to it form a deep trench, which is flanked on the 
right by the villages of Wagnelee and Saint-Amand and the 
hamlets of La Haye and Petit Saint-Amand; on the left by 
the hamlets of Potriaux and Tongrinelle and the villages of 
Tongrinne, Boignee, and Balatre. In the center there is the 
village of Ligny, with its two large farms, its old chateau, and 
its church, situated in the midst of a cemetery, surrounded by 
breast-high walls. The front of the position was thus con- 
stituted by a continuous fosse and ten bastions, some in front 
of this fosse, as Petit Saint-Amand, La Haye, Grand vSaint- 
Amand, Tongrinelle, Boignee, and Balatre, and others in the 
rear, as Potriaux and Tongrinne. The ninth and most im- 
portant, Ligny, is traversed in its entire length by the stream 
of that name. 



«5 



86 Waterloo. 

From the mill of Fleurus, where Napoleon had established 
his observatory, the Prussian positions appeared less strong 
than they were in reality. The Emperor was unable to form 
an exact idea of the lay of the land in the valley. The bottoms, 
which were cut up with gullies, and through which flows the 
lyigny, escaped his sight. He seemed to have before him a 
vast plain covered with grain, shelving slightly downwards in 
the center, then rising gently to meet the extreme horizon — a 
true landscape of Beauce. He ordered brought to him the 
surveyor of the village, a certain Simon, who informed him 
as best he could. 

At noon the four divisions of Ziethen with the cavalry of 
Roder were the only forces in line; the corps of Pirch 1. and 
that of Thielmann had just commenced to mass themselves 
behind Sombreffe and Tongrinne. The Emperor correctly es- 
timated the force in front of him at one army corps. How- 
ever, he was not deceived as to the intention of Bliicher. "The 
old fox does not take to the open," said he. He conjectured 
that the Field Marshal had taken up a waiting position, in 
which he hoped to impose long enough upon the French to 
give to his other army corps and, according to all probability, 
the army of Wellington, the time to rejoin. As a matter of 
fact, if Bliicher had had the intention of defending with his 
sole forces his lines of communication, he would have taken 
position perpendicular to the route of Fleurus. The extension 
of his right towards Wagnelee revealed the project of a re- 
union with the English Army on the march from Brussels. 

Resolved to attack immediately, the Emperor was very 
much disconcerted to learn that the corps of Gerard was not 
even in sight. He awaited its arrival. Doubtless he then be- 
lieved that only a single corps of the enemy was opposed to 
him, and he had at hand the corps of Vandamme, the ist and 
the 2nd Corps of cavalry, and, in the second line behind Fleurus, 
the Imperial Guard. But he apprehended, not without reason, 
that, in the midst of the action, the mass of the Prussian Army, 
which in all probability was on the march towards Sombreffe, 
would put in its appearance. 

Soon after noon Gerard, who had outstripped his army 
corps, arrived upon the line of advance posts with a small 
escort. In seeking the Emperor, he approached within carbine 
range of a post of the enemy's cavalry. The Prussians charged. 
Gerard, thrown from his horse, was in great danger of being 



Battle of Lignt. 87 

captured; he was saved by one of his aides-de-camp. Having 
rejoined the Emperor at the mill, he thought it necessary to 
say a few words concerning the desertion of Bourmont, who 
had obtained a command only upon his pressing solicitations. 
Napoleon interrupted him by saying: "I have often told you, 
General, that the blue are always blue and the white always 
white." 

It was not until one o'clock that Gerard's column de- 
bouched. The order of movement had been sent before eight 
o'clock; and the distance from Chatelet to Fleurus is but ten 
kilometers. But in consequence of the non-execution, in the 
afternoon of the day before, of the Emperor's instructions 
prescribing the estabhshment of the 4th Corps upon the left 
bank of the Sambre, Gerard had been forced in the morning 
to pass this river over a single bridge with the larger portion 
of his troops. Hence this long delay in the march of the 
4th Corps. 

It seems that the Emperor had at first thought of attacking 
by Wagnelee and Saint-Amand in order to throw back the 
Prussians on Sombreffe. But the exposed position of their 
right wing suggested the idea of enveloping them in place of 
driving them back. For this he modified his anterior orders 
to Ney. According to the instructions sent in the morning, 
the Marshal was to estabHsh himself at and beyond Quatre- 
Bras, pending the order to march on Brussels. At two o'clock 
he ordered Soult to write to Ney: "The Emperor desires me 
to inform 3^ou that the enemy has united an army corps between 
Sombreffe and Brye, and that at half -past two Marshal Grouchy 
with the 3rd and 4th Corps will attack him. His Majesty's 
intention is that you will attack also what is before you, and 
after having pressed them vigorously, you will turn back in 
order to cooperate with us in enveloping the corps of which I 
have just spoken." 

The corps of Vandamme, that of Gerard, and the cavalry 
of Grouchy were deployed in front of Fleurus, perpendicular 
to the highway. The Emperor ordered a change of front with 
the right in advance. Bv this manoeuvre Vandamme ap- 
proached Saint-Amand; Girard advanced within nearly i,ooo 
yards of Ugnv, parallel with the highway ; and Grouchy drew 
up his troops in the form of a square in front of Boignee. The 
Guard and the cuirassiers of Milhaud, left untiltwo o'clock 
behind Fleurus, ranged themselves in the second hne. 



88 Waterloo. 

From the mill of Bussy, where he was still at two o'clock 
with Wellington, Bliicher had seen this movement taking shape. 
He hastened to complete his order of battle. The corps of Zie- 
then, of which only a few battalions had until then occupied 
the front of defense, took position as follows: four battalions of 
the division of Steinmetz at I^a Haye and lyC Hameau (or 
Petit Saint- Amand) , the other six in support ; three battaHons 
of the division of Jagow in Saint- Amand, the other seven under 
the mill of Bussy ; the division of Henckel m Lign}^ with two 
battalions somewhat in the rear; the division of Pirch II. was 
drawn up in echelons between Brye and the mill of Bussy. 
Roder's cavalry massed itself in a hollow of the ground on the 
north of the road leading from Ligny to Sombreffe, with the 
exception of the ist Silesian Hussars, which was detached with 
a light battery on the extreme right upon the old Roman road 
to reconnoitre the flank of the army. The artillery was estab- 
lished between the villages, upon the lower slopes of the hills. 
Saint-Amand, La Haye, and Ligny had been hastily fortified; 
but none of the bridges spanning the Ligny had been cut, as 
Bliicher wished to preserve these debouches in case he should 
pass to the offensive. 

Behind this first hne the corps of Pirch I. (divisions of 
Tippelskirch, Krafft, Brause, and Langen, and the cavalry of 
Jurgass) was in reserve to the north of Brye, along the route 
of Nivelles. The corps of Thielmann, which formed the Prus- 
sian left, had the divisions of Luck and Kempher at Potriaux, 
Tongrinne, Tongrinelle, and Balatre, and the divisions of 
Borcke and Stulpnagel with the cavalry of Hobe in reserve at 
Sombreffe and behind Tongrinne. 

This vast deployment had not escaped the vigilant eye of 
Napoleon. Until past two o'clock — so long as his own ma- 
noeuvres had not forced Bliicher to unmask all his forces — the 
Emperor had believed that he would have to deal with but 
30,000 men. The extension of the enemy's front, and the 
masses which he saw in motion, revealed to him the presence 
of an army! The battle would no doubt be murderous, but 
he was about to finish with Bliicher in a single day. He held 
him in the hollow of his hand ! For in a few hours Ney, taking 
in reverse the position of Brye, would sound with cannon-shot 
the death-knell of the Prussian Army." It may be that in 
three hours the fate of the war will be decided," said the Em- 
peror to Gerard. "If Ney executes his orders, not one can- 



Bx^TTLE OP LiGNY. 89 

non of this army will escape!" At a quarter-past three a 
second order — more urgent, more imperative than the pre- 
ceding—was sent to Ney: "I wrote you one hour ago,'' said 
Soult, "that the Emperor intended to attack the enemy mthe 
position which he has taken between the villages of Samt- 
Amand and Brye. His Majesty desires me to say to you that 
you must manoeuvre immediately so as to envelop the right 
wing of the enemy and to fall with might and mam upon his 
rear The Prussian Army is lost, if you act vigorously. The 
fate of France is in vour hands. So do not hesitate a moment 
in making the movement which the Emperor orders, and direct 
yourself upon the heights of Saint- Amand and Brye." 

At the moment when Soult despatched this order Napoleon 
received a letter from Lobau, informing him that, according 
to the report of Colonel Janin, Ney had before him at Quatre- 
Bras nearlv 20,000 enemies. The Emperor reflected that these 
20 000 men might make a defense sufficiently tenacious to pre- 
vent the Prince of the Moskowa from effecting m time the 
movement against the Prussian Army. His fine tactical com- 
bination was in danger of miscarrying. He did not flatter 
himself, as he has been wrongfully accused, with gaming two 
battles in one day. The important thing for him was not to 
gain a half -victory over Blucher and a half -victory over Wel- 
lington; it was to contain the English and to exterminate the 
Prussians. The Emperor thought that Ney with the single 
corps of Reille would suffice to contain the English, and that 
the single corps of d'Erlon would be sufficient to turn the right 
of Blucher. He decided to entrust to this general the execu- 
tion of the movement previously assigned to Ney and from 
which he expected such decisive results. There was not an 
instant to be lost. He sent directly to Count d'Erlon the order 
to advance with his army corps in the rear of the Prussian 
right wing. Colonel Forbin-Janson, charged with transmit- 
tincr to him this order, was also to communicate it to Ney 

° At the same time the Emperor, desiring to have all his 
forces well in hand, wrote Lobau, who had been detained tem- 
porarily at Charleroi, to march on Fleurus. 

II. 
Battle was joined. About three o'clock three cannon- 
shots, fired at equal intervals by a battery of the Guard, had 
given the signal for the assault. 



go Wateeloo. 

Without deigning to prepare the way with his artillery, 
Vandamme launched against Saint- Am and the division of 
Lefol. With the band of the 23rd Regiment playing the air 
"La Victoire en chantant," the division advanced, formed in 
three columns, each column preceded by a swarm of skirm- 
ishers. Before the enemy's front the ground, entirely bare of 
trees or hedges, formed a sea of ripening grain, already four 
or five feet high. The march through it was slow and labori- 
ous, and if the corn almost concealed the skirmishers, the col- 
umns were perfectly visible. The batteries opened a heavy 
fire on them, and as many as eight men were cut down by one 
ball. The Prussians were sheltered in the houses and behind 
the embankments and quickset hedges which surrounded the 
orchards. At fifty yards from the village the soldiers of Lefol 
leaped over the enclosures. The point-blank discharges did 
not arrest their elan; and in less than fifteen minutes of furious 
combat the enemy was driven from the orchards, the houses, 
the cemetery, and the church. But the Prussians of Jagow 
rallied upon the left bank of the stream, and soon, supported 
by four battalions of Steinmetz, they prepared for a counter- 
attack. The division batter}^ of Steinmetz turned its fire 
against Saint-Amand, starting many fires, and the 24th Prus- 
sian regiment passed the stream at La Haye in order to take 
the French in fiank. ; Vandamme deployed the division of 
Berthezene on the left of Lefol; and, in accordance with the 
anterior instructions of the Emperor, he ordered the division 
of Girard, in position to the north of Wangenies, to attack 
Le Hameau and La Haye. 

Whilst Lefol was engaged in the attack of Saint-Amand, 
Pecheux's division of Gerard's corp attacked Ligny in three 
columns under the fire of the Prussian batteries. The left and 
center columns carried the hedges and enclosures on the out- 
skirts of the village, but, decimated by the heavy and rapid 
fire of musketry which came from the old chateau and the first 
houses, they fell back. The 30th of the Line, composing the 
column on the right, pushed farther. It entered the hollow 
road, crowned by the farm of La Tour, a building with walls 
like a fortress, and from which the bullets rained in a perfect 
hail; it penetrated even as far as the church square. There 
the regiment, completely surrounded by the enemy concealed 
in the houses, in the cemetery, and behind the willows along 
the stream, found itself in the center of a quadrilateral of fire 



Battle of Lignt. 91 

In an instant the entire head of the column was swept away; 
twenty officers and nearly live hundred men fell dead or 
wounded. The survivors retired in disorder and went to rally 
in their first positions. 

Two new attacks succeeded no better. Some batteries of 
twelve-pounders reinforced the artillery of Gerard, which un- 
til then had only replied to that of the enemy. They opened 
fire on Ligny. The balls demolished the houses and ricocheted 
in the streets ; the roofs of the cottages caught fire and fell in, 
starting a conflagration upon ten different points. For the 
fourth time the division of Pecheux, seconded by a brigade 
of Vichery's division, marched against the Prussians. In an 
ardent combat, a succession of assaults against each house, the 
French obtained possession of most of the upper village. 

Ligny is composed of two streets running parallel with 
the Ivigny and separated by this stream — the rue d'En-Bas on 
the north and the rue d'En-Haut on the south. Between the 
two streets are a few scattered cottages, the church square, and 
a vast commimal meadow, which shelves downwards hke a 
glacis to the Ligny. Dislodged from the farm of La Tour and 
the rue d'En-Haut, the Prussians resumed their positions in 
the cemetery, in the church, and in the houses surrounding 
the square. The soldiers of Pecheux advanced vaHantly under 
a murderous cross-fire; some broke into the houses, while 
others escaladed the wall of the cemetery. At this moment a 
large force of the enemy, which had ralhed behind the church, 
charged the French, who had become disorganized by these 
numerous assaults. Upon this little square, too narrow for 
the number of combatants, French and Prussians engaged in a 
terrible and murderous hand-to-hand struggle, in which, after 
having discharged their muskets, they used their bayonets, 
the butt-ends of their muskets, and even their fists. The 
carnage was abominable. "The men massacred one another," 
says a Prussian officer, "as if they had been animated with a 
personal hatred. It seemed as if each man saw in his opponent 
a mortal enemy, and that he rejoiced at finding the opportu- 
nity to wreak his vengeance. No one thought of fleeing 
or of asking quarter." 

The Prussians finallv fell back. They abandoned the 
houses, the church, the cemeterv, and retired in disorder over 
the two bridges of the Ligny. The French pursued them with 
the bavonet. More than one Prussian was hurled into the 



92 Watekloo. 

boggy bed of the stream. Upon the left bank, however, the 
enemy, reinforced by the two remaining battaHons of Henckel's 
division, re-formed and renewed the fight. vSome of the Prus- 
sians opened fire from the hedges and clumps of willows which 
lined the bank of the stream, whilst others fired, over the heads 
of their comrades, from the houses of the rue d'En-Bas and 
from loopholes made in the walls of the large farm on the left 
bank. In spite of this terrible fire in tiers, some soldiers of the 
30th and 96th Regiments crossed the bridges and drove back 
the Prussian sharpshooters against the houses. But Jagow 
brought four battalions to the support of Henckel. The Prus- 
sians threw back the assailants upon the right bank ; they even 
attempted to recross the two bridges. It was the turn of the 
French to defend the stream. French and Prussians fired at 
each other from one bank to the other — a distance of four 
yards^ — through the smoke. The weather was tempestuous, 
and the suffocating heat was still further increased by the 
musketry and fires started by the shells. Amidst the noises 
of the combat were heard the horrible cries of the wounded 
who were being roasted alive under the burning ruins. 

Grouchy, on his side, had commenced his attack against 
the Prussian left. His cavalry had driven from Boignee the 
enemy's posts, and Hulot's division of Gerard's corps, which 
had passed under his immediate command, threatened Ton- 
grinelle and skirmished before Potriaux with the Prussians 
of Luck. 

Upon all points new batteries entered into action, and the 
fusillade increased in violence. From La Haye to Tongrinelle, 
the battle raged upon both banks of the Ligny, from which 
arose, as from an infernal river, a curtain of fire and smoke. 

III. 

About four o'clock the action had extended still further 
west. Girard had launched his division against Le Hameau 
and La Haye. The assault was so prompt, so resolute,, so 
ardent, that the Prussians were terrified and gave ground 
almost without firing a shot. Bliicher, solid in his center, 
intact on his left, saw his right outflanked. He wished to dis- 
engage it by a vigorous counter-attack. It was necessary for 
him at any price to give himself air on this side, for it was 
from here that he intended to debouch later with the English, 



Battle of Ligny. 93 

* 

whose cooperation he still expected. The Field Marshal un- 
hesitatingly drew upon his reserve. The division of Pirch II., 
the only one of Ziethen's corps which had not been under fire.' 
would march from Brye against La Haye and Saint- Am and, 
whilst the cavalry of Jurgass, of the corps of Pirch I., and the 
division of Tippelskirch, of the same corps — in all, forty-seven 
squadrons and nine battalions — would advance on Wagnelee, 
from whence they would burst on the flank of the French. 

Formed in columns of battalions, the infantry of Pirch II. 
attacked with the bayonet the soldiers of Girard, who had 
already debouched from La Haye in order to turn Saint-Amand, 
where the Prussians of Steinmetz had returned in force and oc- 
cupied man}^ points. The division of Girard fell back under 
the attack of the fresh troops, retired into La Haye, and, after 
a stubborn fight, abandoned half of this hamlet. But with a 
chief like Girard it was only for a short time. He re-formed 
in the streets, swept by balls and bullets, his decimated bat- 
talions, and hurled them again against the enemy. He led 
them in person, sword in hand. He fell mortally wounded, 
but he saw his soldiers throw back for the second time the 
Prussians out of La Haye upon the left bank of the stream. 

The flank movement attempted by Jagow and Tippels- 
kirch was less successful than the counter-attack of Pirch II. 
Habert's division and Domon's cavalry, which Vandamme 
had until then held in reserve, were deployed in front of Wag- 
nelee with two battalions as skirmishers in the corn. The 
head of Tippelskirch' s column, which advanced in order of 
march and without reconnoitring, was surprised by the heavy 
and well-directed fire which issued from the corn. It fell back 
in disorder, spreading confusion among the battalions which 
it preceded, and in which there were a great many recruits. 
Without hesitating, Habert ordered a bayonet charge against 
these disunited troops and drove them back into Wagnelee. 
Stupidly dispersed and intimidated by the evolutions of Gen- 
eral Domon's horse chasseurs, Jurgass' cavalry took scarcely 
any part in the action. 

During these combats Bliicher had descended from the 
mill of Bussy in order to direct in person the execution of the 
manoeuvre from which he promised himself such immense re- 
sults. He arrived within close cannon-range of La Haye, just 
at the moment when the division of Pirch II. was driven from 
this village by the mortal effort of the intrepid Girard. 



94 Waterloo. 

Without giving the men time to recover their breath, Blucher 
ordered Pirch II. to lead them back into the fire and to re- 
occupy La Haye, regardless of the cost. Reanimated by the 
presence of old Vorwiirtz, the soldiers cheered, crossed the 
stream, and penetrated into La Haye with fixed bayonets. 
Girard's division, reduced from 5,000 to 2,500 men, its chief 
mortally wounded and its two brigadiers hors de combat — it 
was Colonel Matis, of the 82nd of the Line, who had taken the 
command — resisted desperately. Forced to yield to numbers, 
it retired from house to house, from orchard to orchard, and 
from hedge to hedge, as far as Le Hameau, where it massed 
itself and awaited the asssault. The enemy was about to leave 
it some respite, for the French had thrust back Tippelskirch 
into Wagnelee, they held firm in Saint- Amand and they oc- 
cupied half of Ligny. Bliichcr was compelled to relieve be- 
fore Saint- Amand the division of Steinmetz, which had lost 
half of its effective, to send a reinforcement to Henckel in 
Ligny, to give Tippelskirch time to rally in Wagnelee, and, in 
view of the new manoeuvre which he meditated, to send to 
the south of Brye the corps of Pirch I. 

The Emperor also makes his preparations for the great 
movement which he has had in view since the beginning of 
the battle. It is half-past five; he had written to Ney at two 
o'clock; at six he will hear the cannon of the Marshal thun- 
dering in the rear of the Prussian Army; then he will launch 
his reserves, still intact, against the center of the enemy, will 
overthrow it, cut off its retreat towards Sombreffe, and push 
it under the steel and fire of Vandamme and Ney. Of the 
60,000 Prussians of Ziethen and Pirch, not one will escape. 

The Imperial Guard, horse and foot, and the cuirassiers 
of Milhaud had already commenced to form for the attack, 
when there arrived an aide-de-camp from Vandamme with 
the intelligence that a hostile column of 30,000 men was re- 
ported at the distance of a league upon the left, and appeared 
to be directing itself on Fleurus with the purpose of turn- 
ing the army. Vandamme added that the troops of Girard, 
having discovered this supposed hostile column, had aban- 
doned La Haye, and that he himself would be forced to evacu- 
ate Saint-Amand and to retreat unless the reserve arrived in 
time to arrest this column. 

Napoleon was amazed at this intelligence. He at first 
had an idea, as Vandamme also had had for a moment, that 



Battle of Lignt. 95 

the column was the French division which, in accordance with 
his orders of eight o'clock in the morning, should have been 
sent b}^ Ney to Marbais. But a division has not 20,000 or 
30,000 men, and troops who show themselves to the south 
of Villers-Perwin cannot debouch from Marbais. Was it then 
Ney who arrived with all his forces, according to the new 
instructions sent at two o'clock and renewed at three? Or 
was it d'Erlon who arrived with the ist Corps, in conformity 
with the despatch of half -past three? But d'Erlon, Hke Ney, 
had orders to turn back by the heights of Saint-Amand on 
the rear of the enemy and not to come to Fleurus. To march 
on Fleurus was to cause the plan of the Emperor to miscarry. 
Neither Marshal Ney nor Count d'Erlon could be guilty of 
such an error ! Then it must be either an English corps, which 
had turned Ney's right, or a Prussian corps, which had op- 
erated by the old Roman road a vast turning movement. 
The Emperor hastened to send one of his aides-dcTcamp to 
ascertain the strength and intentions of the hostile column. 
Meanwhile he suspended the movement of the Guard against 
Ivigny and caused it to resume its first position in front of the 
mill of Fleurus with its regiments deployed. Duhesme's di- 
vision of the Young Guard and the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Foot Chas- 
seurs of the Old Guard, detached from the reserve, advanced 
at an increased pace to the support of Vandamme. 

These reinforcements did not arrive any too soon. Hardly 
recovered from a panic caused by the approach of the hostile 
column — panic which General Lefol had been able to arrest 
only by turning his guns against the fugitives— the corps of 
Vandamme was about to suffer the combined attack of the 
greater part of the Prussian right wing. A little before six 
o'clock the reserve batteries of the enemy entered into ac- 
tion and prepared the way for the assault. Tippelskirch de- 
bouched from Wagnelee upon he Hameau, his right supported 
by the numerous squadrons of Jurgass. The skirmishers of 
the ist Pomeranian Regiment opened so brisk and sustained a 
fire that in a few minutes they had emptied their cartridge- 
boxes; the hussars who flanked them brought them their own 
cartridges. The division of Pirch II., seconded by the fresh 
troops of the division of Brause and a part of the division 
of Krafft, assailed Saint-Amand on three sides. The French 
withdrew. The debris of Girard's division abandoned Le 
Hameau; Lefol and Berthezene yielded all the northern part 



96 Waterloo. 

of Saint-Amand ; and Habert recoiled as far as his first posi- 
tion on the left of this village. From the mill of Bussy, where 
he had returned, Bliicher witnessed the success of his troops. 
He already believed himself master of the road of Fleurus 
and soon free to go to attack in flank the French reserve, a 
manoeuvre which he had had in view for a long time. 

But the Young Guard of Duhesme advances at the charg- 
ing step. It passes the division of Habert and attacks with su- 
perb ardor the Prussians of Tippelskirch. The latter, roughly- 
handled, retire, partly into Wagnelee and partly into Le 
Hameau. Held in check by the chasseurs of Domon and the 
lancers of Alphonse de Colbert, whom the Emperor had just 
sent from the right to the left of the battle-field, the cavalry 
of Jurgass can only protect the retreat of Tippelskirch without 
attempting anything aainst the Young Guard. The indefat- 
igable division of Girard, whose four intrepid regiments, the 
I ith and 12th Ivight and the 4th and 82nd of the Line, well de- 
serve to be named, bursts again upon Le Hameau, from whence 
it drives the Prussians for the third time. Lefol and Berthe- 
zene force Pirch II. out of Saint-Amand. The French are 
once more masters of all the ground as far as the first houses 
of L-a Haye. "What soldiers!" writes a Royalist emigre pres- 
ent in the battle. "They were no longer the feeble debris 
of Arcis-sur-Aube. They were, according to the point of view, 
a legion of heroes or demons." 

On the right wing the cavalry of Grouchy occupied Ton- 
grinelle, and the infantry of Hulot vigorously attacked Po- 
triaux. In the furnace of Ligny the battalions of heroes 
melted like gold in the crucible. Gerard had thrown himself 
into this village with his last reserve, the second brigade of 
Vichery. Bliicher had relieved there the division of Henckel 
by the larger part of the division of Krafft. Both sides fought 
with the same rage — Prussians and French passing and re- 
passing in turn the stream — for the possession of the church, 
the cemetery, the farm d'En-Bas, and the castle of the Counts 
de Tooz, in which, in spite of the flames which surrounded 
them, two companies of Silesian sharpshooters intrepidly held 
out. Many soldiers fell from exhaustion. Krafft no longer 
hoped to maintain his position much longer. He informed 
Gneissenau that he and Jagow were on the point of being sur- 
rounded in Ligny. "Hold out for a half -hour longer," replied 
Gneissenau. "The English Army is approaching." Illusion 



Battle of Ligny. 97 

or lie ! for Bliicher was soon to or had already received a des- 
patch from Muffling, informing him that Wellington, fighting 
with an entire army corps, would not even be able to send 
him a single squadron. 

Nothing discouraged the intrepid soul of Bliicher. If 
Muffling's letter contained "disagreeable news," according to 
the moderate expression of Grolemann, it at least informed him 
that Napoleon had not all his army with him, as he had thought, 
and gave him the assurance that he would not be attacked 
in reverse, since Wellington would contain the French corps 
detached upon the route of Brussels. He received simul- 
taneously a report from Pirch II. and one from Thielmann an- 
nouncing that the attack of the French seemed to slacken to- 
wards La Haye and Potriaux. After having begun its ad- 
vance, the Old Guard had returned to its first position. This 
counter-march, which had been seen from the mill of Bussy, 
seemed to indicate some hesitancy on the part of Napoleon. 
It was the moment to act, if one did not wish to permit the 
victory to escape. Bliicher still possessed confidence. He 
clung to the idea of gaining the battle all alone by throwing 
back the French left upon its center. For this it would suffice 
that his lieutenants hold Ligny. He would charge himself 
with the rest. He ordered his last reserves to advance, save 
two battalions, which he posted in Brye and near the mill. 
He sent to Ligny to reinforce Jagow and Krafft a part of the 
division of Langen, and also summoned Thielmann to send 
there the division of Stulpnagel. Then, taking with him the 
last battalions of Langen and the debris of the division of 
Steinmetz, which had retired into the second line about five 
o'clock in the evening, the ardent old man — he was seventy- 
three years old — led them towards Saint- Amand. 

On his way he ralHes all the men whom he meets returning 
from the fight — there a company, here a section, farther on a 
group of fugitives. With these seven or eight battalions he 
rejoins the exhausted divisions of Brause, Pirch II., and Tip- 
pelskirch, and orders a new attack. "My men have burned 
all their cartridges and emptied the cartridge-boxes of the 
dead," said Pirch to him; "they have no longer a single shot 
to fire." "Have at them with the bayonet!" cries Blucher. 
And brandishing his sabre, spurring forward his magnificent 
white horse, a gift of the Prince Regent of England, he leads 
on his electrified soldiers. Supreme effort of brave men at 



98 Waterloo. 

the end of their strength ! They retake Le Hameau, but theu 
wave breaks against the steel dike of the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Chas- 
seurs of the Guard, deployed by regiments on the left of Saint- 
Amand. 

The Prussians had returned in confusion into La Haye. 
Bliicher at least hoped to sleep on his positions. He thought 
the battle ended, for night had come. It was not night. At 
half -past seven, during the June solstice, the sun still shines on 
the horizon. It was a tempest. Great black clouds swept up 
from the edge of the horizon and accumulated overhead, cov- 
ering with a dark pall the entire field of battle. The rain began 
to fall in large drops. It thundered violently, peal on peal ; 
but the rumbHng of the thunder was soon drowned by the 
noise of the frightful cannonade which burst forth suddenly 
towards Ligny. 

IV. 

About half -past six o'clock the aide-de-camp sent to ascer- 
tain the strength of the hostile column which had debouched 
from the wood of Villers-Perwin on the flank of Vandamme had 
reported to the Emperor that this pretended Enghsh column 
was the corps of d'Erlon. Napoleon should have surmised 
as much. A false manoeuvre, a confusion of orders, an ec- 
centric march, are things not so rare in war that he could not 
admit of their possibility. Greatly disconcerted by the threat- 
ening march of this column, he had not thought of the corps 
of d'Erlon, which, however, he himself had just called upon 
the battle-field. If his habitual presence of mind had not 
failed him, the abortive movement would have yet been feasible. 
It would have sufficed to send by the aide-de-camp charged 
with reconnoitring the column the pressing order to d'Erlon 
to manoeuvre so as to turn the Prussian right. Napoleon had 
not thought of this. And when the aide-de-camp returned, 
he rightly judged that the movement could no longer be made 
in opportune time. In order to operate this enveloping march, 
two hours would have been required. Besides, the Emperor 
had probably been informed by the aide-de-camp that the ist 
Corps was disappearing. Had Ney, in peril, recalled it, or had 
d'Erlon, having discovered that he had taken a wrong direc- 
tion, moved to the west of Wagnelee to manoeuvre in the rear 
of the Prussian lines, in accordance with the. order borjie by 
Forbin- Janson ? 



I Battle op Ligny. 99 

The Emperor quickly made up his mind. If, in conse- 
quence of orders badly understood or poorly executed, it ap- 
peared that he could no longer count on the cooperation of a 
part of his left wing, at least he was freed from the uneasiness 
occasioned by the presence of the supposed hostile column on 
his flank. He was free once more to act. He could no longer 
gain the decisive victory of which he had dreamed since the 
afternoon, but he could yet win the battle and throw back 
Bliicher far from Wellington. He issued his orders for the 
final assault. 

The reserve batteries open fire against the hills which 
dominate Ligny; the Old Guard deploys in columns of divis- 
ions; the squadrons of the Emperor's escort, the 2nd cavalry 
division of the Guard and the cuirassiers of Milhaud, form for 
the attack ; whilst the corps of Lobau debouches from Fleurus. 
The cannonade ceases, the charge beats, and all this mass 
moves under the warm rain with cries of ' ' Long live the Em- 
peror ! " The first column of the Guard (2nd, 3rd, and 4th Gren- 
adiers) penetrates to the west of Tigny; the second (ist Chas- 
seurs and ist Grenadiers) attacks the vihage on the east. Led 
by Gerard, the soldiers of Pecheux and Vichery cross the stream 
of Ligny, and finally wrest from the Prussians the farm d'En- 
Bas and all the houses on the left bank. The debris of the 
divisions of Jagow and Krafft and the battalions of Langen en- 
deavor to re-form upon the first acclivities, above the ravine. 
But Pecheux rushes from the midst of ligny, followed by 
Vichery and the first column of the Guard; from the right of 
the village debouch the ist Grenadiers and the ist Chasseurs, 
followed by the cuirassiers of Milhaud ; from the left, with the 
Emperor, advance the squadrons of his escort and the heavy 
cavalrv of the Guard. The Prussians yield on all points. In 
order to describe the rapidity and the impression of this irre- 
sistible attack, Soult wrote to Davout: "It was like the 
transformation scene at the theatre." 

Blucher arrived from La Haye at full speed. The rain 
had ceased and the wind had dispersed the clouds. By the last 
rays of the sun, which reappeared for an instant above the 
hills of Brye, he saw his troops in full retreat, and, in the wide 
breach made in his front of battle, the bear-skin caps of the 
Old Guard, the horse grenadiers, tall as towers, the dragoons 

L. of 0» 



loo Waterloo. 

manoeuvring to charge, and, in a scintillation, the 3,000 cuiras- 
siers of Milhaud. 

Old Bliicher, according to the words of Major von Grole- 
mann, "never regarded himself as defeated so long as he could 
continue the combat." To check the French, he counted on 
the cavalry of Roder, in reserve between Brye and Sombreffe ; 
on the debris of the division of Henckel, which, at six o'clock, 
had been relieved in Ligny ; and on the divisions of Stulpnagel 
and Borcke, which Thielmann had detached from his corps. 
But, on account of orders badly interpreted, Henckel was 
already near Sombreffe, and Stulpnagel still far from Ligny. 
As for the troops of Borcke, Thielmann could not deprive 
himself of this last reserve; he was pressed too vigorously on 
his front by Grouchy — the division of Hulot had carried Po- 
triaux and threatened Sombreffe, and the dragoons of Exel- 
mans (brigade of Burthe) had overthrown the cavalry of 
Tottum, captured its guns, and were advancing towards the 
route of Namur. The thirty-two squadrons of Roder alone 
remained available. Bliicher hastened to them and ordered 
the charge. IvUtzow, the celebrated partisan chief of the War 
of 1 8 13, fell with the 6th Uhlans upon a square which he be- 
lieved was composed of mobilized National Guards, on account 
of the dissimilarity of their uniforms. It proved to be the 4th 
Grenadiers of the Guard. The uhlans were received by a file- 
fire at close range, which stretched upon the ground eighty- 
three men. Tutzow, overturned with his horse, was made 
prisoner. A charge of the i st Dragoons and of the 2nd Landwehr 
of Courmache, another of the uhlans of Brandenburg and the 
Dragoons of the Queen, and a fourth of all the squadrons to- 
gether, succeeded no better. Some were repulsed by the Old 
Guard, which had relieved in the first line the divisions of 
Gerard, and the others were roughly handled by the dragoons 
of the Guard and the cuirassiers of Milhaud. Until nightfall 
Prussian and French squadrons gyrated and clashed together 
upon the acclivities of the hills, in front of the squares of the 
Guard, which advanced slowly but surely towards the mill 
of Bussy. 

Struck by a ball, the horse of Bliicher sank under his rider. 
The aide-de-camp Nostiz, who charged by the side of the Field 
Marshal, saw him fall and dismounted to assist him. They 
found themselves in the midst of the cuirassiers of the 9th 



Battle op Ligny. ioi 

Regiment, who had just overthrown the Prussians, and who, 
in the darkness, passed without perceiving these two officers. 
A few minutes later the cuirassiers, being driven back, in 
turn repassed near them — almost over them — still without 
seeing them. Nostiz hailed the Prussian dragoons. Bliicher 
was disengaged, all bruised, and in a half-swoon, from be- 
neath his horse, placed upon the horse of a subaltern, and 
led far from the field of battle in the midst of the torrent of 
fugitives. They were innumerable. On the next day 8,000 
of them were stopped at Liege and Aix-la-Chapelle. 

The Prussian center was overthrown and broken. Save 
a few battalions, which withdrew in good order and resisted 
intrepidly the cuirassiers of Delort, who unfortunately were 
not supported by the second division of Milhaud's corps, 
all the infantry fled in confusion. Thanks to the desperate 
charges of Roder's cavalry, which delayed the march of the 
French, Krafft, Langen, and Jagow saved a part of their ar- 
tillery, and were able to rally the debris of their divisions be- 
tween Sombreffe and the Roman road. But if Bliicher's center 
had been pierced, he still held his positions on the wings. Zie- 
then and Thielmann had begun to retreat only when they had 
learned of the abandonment of Ligny. The Prussians massed 
around La Haye gained slowly the last summits of the hills, 
arresting by offensive returns the infantry of Vandamme 
when it pressed them too closely ; their rear guard maintained 
itself in Brye until dawn. Thielmann withdrew his corps in 
the rear of Sombreffe, which he continued to occupy during 
the night by a strong detachment. At half -past nine there 
was still skirmishing along the line of Brye-Sombreffe. 

The Emperor returned about eleven o'clock to Fleurus, 
whither the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Chasseurs of the Guard were re- 
called from Saint- Am and. Save these regiments and the re- 
serve batteries, all the Army bivouacked upon the left bank of 
the stream — the corps of Lobau, which had taken no part in 
the action, in the first Hue, near the mill of Bussy; the corps of 
Vandamme in front of La Haye; the corps of Gerard, the Old 
Guard and the cavalry of the Guard, before Ligny ; the cuiras- 
siers of Milhaud to the right of this village; the division of 
Hulot and the cavalry of Grouchy between Tongrinne, Pot- 
riaux, and Sombreffe. In front of Brye and Sombreffe the 
French outposts were within close musket-range of those of 



I02 Watekloo. 

the Prussians. The French felt themselves so near the enemy 
that, although they were in the second line, the grenadiers of 
the Guard bivouacked without fire, in battalion squares. 

During the night the wounded were cared for, but the 
ambulances, too few in number and badly organized, were not 
sufficient for the task; 12,000 Prussians and 8,500 French lay 
dead or wounded on the plain and in the villages, which had 
been transformed into charnel-houses. 



CHAPTER III. 
The Battle o^ Quatre-Bras. 

I. — Inaction of Marshal Ney during the morning of June i6th. — 

Reiterated orders of the Emperor. 
II. — Attack of Quatre-Bras by the corps of Reille (two o'clock in the 
afternoon). — Return of Wellington to Quatre-Bras and arrival 
of the first English reinforcements (three o'clock) . — Death of 
the Duke of Brunswick (half-past four o'clock). 

III. — False movement of Count d'Erlon. 

IV. — The. charge of Kellermann's cuirassiers (six o'clock). — Offensive 
movement of Wellington (seven o'clock). — The French driven 
back into their first positions (from eight to nine o'clock). 

I. 

In the course of this day the Emperor had sent nine des- 
patches to Marshal Ney. But, as he said at St. Helena, "Ney 
was no longer the same man." The most ardent of the Em- 
peror's lieutenants, he who in so many battles — notably at 
Jena and Craonne — had attacked the enemy before the ap- 
appointed hour, had become circumspect and temporizing, 
even to inertia. 

On the day before, assailed by strategical scruples, the 
Marshal had directed towards Quatre-Bras only a detachment, 
which was too weak to carry that position. On the morning 
of June 1 6th he did nothing to make up for the time lost. 
Admitting that he was right in awaiting new instructions from 
the Emperor before attacking, he should at least have prepared 
everything to act on the receipt of the first order. His troops 
were echeloned from Frasnes to Thuin, over a line of seven 
leagues. At daybreak he ought to have massed at Frasnes 
the divisions of Bachelu, Jerome Bonaparte, and Foy, and all 
the cavalry, and summoned to GosseHes the corps of d'Erlon. 
This movement could have been completed before nine o'clock 
in the morning, save the division of AlHx, which would have re- 
joined only two hours later. Thus by nine o'clock Ney would 
have found himself in position to attack Quatre-Bras, at the 
first order, with 19,000 bayonets, 3,500 sabres, 64 guns, and a 
reserve of 20,500 men. But the Marshal took no preparatory 

103 



I04 Waterloo. 

measures. He left bis divisisons dispersed, his soldiers in 
bivouac, and awaited, inert, tbe orders of the Emperor. 

About half-past six o'clock the Marshal received a first 
letter from Soult. It was not, indeed, an order of march, but 
it was a warning that his troops would soon have to put them- 
selves in motion. Soult announced to him the early arrival 
at Gosselies of Kellermann's cuirassiers, and asked him if the 
ist Corps had operated its movement in that direction. It 
was then still a question of Ney pushing straight ahead along 
the route of Brussels. If the Emperor had wished to recall 
the Marshal on his left, apparently he would not have sent him 
a reinforcement of eight regiments of heavy cavalry. Ney, 
however, did not issue from his apathy. He contented himself 
with addressing to Soult the information demanded. Then, 
about seven o'clock, he set out for Frasnes without even di- 
recting Reille to cause his troops to take up arms. He con- 
fined himself to saying to him : "If there arrives an order from 
the Emperor during my absence, you will execute it at once 
and communicate it to Count d'Erlon." 

At Frasnes Ney remained inactive and careless, as at 
Gosselies. He did not think to examine closely the positions of 
the enemy, and to push towards Ouatre-Bras an offensive re- 
connoissance, which would have caused his adversary to un- 
mask his forces. We might even say that he neglected to 
interrogate his generals and the commanders of his advance 
posts, or that he did not listen to what they reported to him. 
Ivcfebvre-Desnoettes, or Colbert, certainly informed him that 
the Nether] anders appeared to have received reinforcements; 
that since morning they had extended and advanced their 
front; and that at six o'clock their skirmishers had driven back 
the French advance posts upon the edge of the wood of La 
Hutte. After this skirmish, it is true, the combat had degen- 
erated into a desultory firing, but the ensemble of the enemy's 
dispositions led to the presumption that his intention was to 
make a stand at Ouatre-Bras. Ney believed nothing of the 
kind. They were only vain demonstrations, intended to im- 
pose upon the French and prepare for a retreat. At most, "we 
will have an affair with that handful of Germans who were 
sabred yesterday." 

The Marshal was so convinced of this that about elev- 
en o'clock, when Flahault delivered to him the letter of the 
Emperor which directed him to take position at and in front 



The Battle of Quatke-Bras. 105 

of Quatre-Bras, he dictated without hesitating the following 
order : "The 2nd Corps will put itself on the march at once to 
take the following positions : The 5th Division in the rear of 
Genappe upon the heights ; the 9th Division in the second line, 
to the right and left of Bauterlez; and the 6th and 7th Di- 
visions at Quatre-Bras itself. The three first divisions of Count 
d'Brlon will take position at Frasnes. The right division will 
estabUsh itself at Marbais with the 2nd Division of cavalry. 
The ist Division of cavalry will cover our march and recon- 
noitre in the direction of Brussels and on our flanks. The two 
divisions of the Count de Valmy will establish themselves at 
Frasnes and Liberchies. The cavalry division of the Guard 
will remain in its present position at Frasnes." This was not 
a disposition for battle; it was a simple order of march. The 
mind of Ney is clearly revealed therein. He counted on oc- 
cupying Quatre-Bras without striking a blow; at the worst,, 
after a very short resistance. His instructions were merely 
a transcription of the Emperor's orders. Like Napoleon, he 
imagined that the route of Brussels was free. But he was 
on the spot ! 

To make matters worse, Ney, who had served the Emperor 
badly, was served in Hke manner by Reille. He enjoined this 
general to execute immediately any orders which he might re- 
ceive from the Emperor. Now, when Flahault passed through 
Gossehes at ten o'clock and communicated to Reille the in- 
structions of which he was the bearer, the latter, troubled by a 
report from General Girard, deemed it advisable to await a 
positive order from Ney before putting his troops on the march.. 
"General Flahault," he wrote to the Marshal, "has commu- 
nicated to me the orders which he has for you. I would have 
commenced my movement on Frasnes as soon as my divisions 
would have been under arms, but, according to a despatch from 
General Girard, which reports two bodies of the enemy, of six 
battaHons each, coming by the route of Namur, and whose 
advance guard is at Saint-Amand, I shall hold my troops in 
readiness to march pending your orders. As, no doubt, they 
will reach me in a short time, there will be only a short delay." 
This "short delay" was one of two hours. Reille did not 
move his troops until the receipt of Ney's order— that is to say, 
about noon. His head' of column hardly reached Frasnes be- 
fore half-past one o'clock. In vain, during this interval of 
time, Ney had received another letter from the Major-General 
—8— 



1 06 Waterloo. 

reiterating the first instructions. With a single battalion and 
the chasseurs and lancers of the Guard, he was constrained to 
await the infantry of Reille before beginning the attack. Be- 
sides, he thought that he had plenty of time to establish him- 
self at Quatre-Bras, for he still labored under the impression 
that the enemy, being few in number, would offer no great 
resistance. 

The Prince of Orange, it is true, had at hand only the di- 
vision of Perponcher — 7, 800 men and 14 guns. But, impressed 
with the strategical importance of Quatre-Bras, he was de- 
termined to hold this position at any cost until the arrival 
■of the EngHsh. 

The position was favorable to the defense. The hamlet 
■^of Quatre-Bras, consisting of a group of three large farms and 
of two houses, situated at the crossing of the roads leading 
from Charleroi to Brussels and from Namur to Nivelles, com- 
mands on all sides the multiple undulations of the ground. 
On the east, the route of Namur, raised above the level of the 
ground, forms a natural entrenchment, in front of which arises, 
like a redoubt, the farm of Piraumont. On the southwest 
access to Quatre-Bras is protected by the farm of Pierrepont 
and the coppice of Bossu, which extends for the space of 2,000 
yards, on the left of the route of Charleroi. Finally, in a sort 
of valley, at the distance of half a league to the south of the 
hamlet, the large farm of Gemioncourt, constructed near the 
route, constitutes another advance work. 

Although a division numbering less than 8,000 men was 
insufficient to line this front of more than three kilometers and 
occupy solidly all its positions, Perponcher, in order to impose 
on the French and delay as long as possible the attack of 
Quatre-Bras, feared not to scatter his force. Two battalions 
with three guns remained in reserve at Quatre-Bras and along 
the route of Namur; the others were distributed as follows: 
on the left, one battalion with five guns in front of Gemion- 
court and another occupying this farm; on the right, four 
battalions and the horse battery upon the eastern skirt of 
the wood of Bossu and in front of Pierrepont. 

II. 

About half -past one o'clock Reille, who marched with the 
advance guard of Bachelu's division, rejoined Ney. "There is 
only a very small force in the wood of Bossu," said the Mar- 



The Battle of Quatee-Bras. 107 

sbal. "It is necessary to carry this position at once." Reille, 
on this day, was not in a ver}^ enterprising humor ; he repHed : 
"This may be a Spanish battle, in which the EngHsh will show 
themselves only when it is time. It would be prudent, before 
attacking, to wait until all our troops are massed here." Ney, 
impatient, replied : ' ' Nonsense ! Two com^panies of voltigeurs 
will suffice for this work!" Nevertheless, Reille's remarks 
had caused him to reflect; he delayed the attack until the 
arrival of Bachelu's second brigade and of Foy's division. 

At two o'clock these troops, debouching from Frasnes, 
formed in columns of battalions — Bachelu on the right of the 
route and Foy upon and to the left of it ; the chasseurs of Pire 
flanked the right of Bachelu's division, and the lancers re- 
mained in the rear of the interval between the two divisions. 
In the second line were the cavalry of the Guard, in column 
upon the highway, and the first brigade of Kellermann's 
cuirassiers deployed on the left. The division of Jerome Bo- 
naparte was still on the march between Gosselies and Frasnes, 
and the three other brigades of Kellermann had taken position 
at Liberchies, in accordance with Ney's orders. 

The Marshal did not wish to delay longer his attack; but, 
troubled by the words of Reille, he judged that the troops 
whom he had in hand would not be sufficient to attack the 
position in front. He resolved to direct his efforts against the 
left of the enemy. (He hoped that the defenders of Pierrepont 
would fall back as soon as they saw themselves outflanked, but 
Prince Bernard, having a line of retreat on Hautain-le-Val, 
had no fears of being cut off from Quatre-Bras.) After a short 
cannonade, the Marshal launched in the direction of Piraumont 
the division of Bachelu, the cavalry of Pire, and the brigade of 
Jamin of Foy's division. The second brigade of Foy (General 
Gauthier) remained temporarily in reserve. The division of 
Bachelu and the cavalry of Pire advanced between the wood 
of La Hutte and the highway towards Piraumont. The Neth- 
erlanders posted in the second line were not in sufficient force 
to meet this attack. Bachelu drove back without difficulty 
the 27th Chasseurs as far as Piraumont. Arrived abreast of 
the farm of Tairalle, Jamin's brigade, led by Foy, took the lead 
on the left, drove back the 2d Battalion of Nassau, and dis- 
lodged from Gemioncourt the 5th Battalion of militia, whose 
debris re-formed on the west of the route, and fell back towards 
the wood of Bossu. Ney then ordered them to be charged by 



io8 Watekloo. 

the lancers of Pire, who overthrew them. The Prince of Orange, 
closely pressed, owed his safety only to the swiftness of his 
horse; one of his aides-de-camp was wounded and captured. 
Save on the right, where the four battalions of Prince Bernard 
of Saxe-Weimar had not yet been molested, the French were 
masters of the advanced positions of the enemy. 

It was nearly three o'clock. Wellington, who had re- 
turned from the mill of Bussy, judged the situation critical, 
almost desperate. In a very short time he would be forced in 
Quatre-Bras by Foy, already on the march to attack this 
hamlet on the south, and by Bachelu, who would soon be in 
position to attack it on the east. But just at this moment 
reinforcements arrived — the brigade of Van Merlen (Dutch 
hussars and Belgian dragoons), by the route of Nivelles; and 
the division of Picton (eight English and four Hanoverian 
battalions), by the route of Brussels. Wellington was espe- 
cially uneasy for the right of his line — almost disgarnished and 
threatened by Bachelu, in possession of the farm of Pirau- 
niont and its dependencies. The division of Picton, by a 
prompt movement "towards the left, in line of battle," ad- 
vanced upon the route of Namur; the brigades of Kempt 
and Pack in the first line, kneeling in the wheat ; the Han- 
overian brigade, in the second line, sheltered behind the talus 
of the highway. 

During the deployment of the English the Prince of Orange 
launched in succession his hussars and dragoons against the 
column of Foy, whose sharpshooters had approached Ouatre- 
Bras. Before reaching this infantry the enemy's squadrons 
were broken by the lancers of Pire and driven back at a quick 
pace beyond the cross-roads. Wellington was jostled and 
drawn in the rout as far as the Brussels highway. In turning 
back by a wheel to the right towards Gemioncourt, the lancers 
of Pire overthrew a battalion of militia and captured eight 
cannon. 

The action had opened also to the south of the wood of 
Bossu. At three o'clock the division of Prince Jerome had 
debouched from Frasnes, and Ney had at once directed it 
against the farm of Pierrepont, whilst the brigade of Gauthier 
rejoined General Foy. Dislodged from Pierrepont, the enemy 
withdrew into the wood, whither the skirmishers penetrated 
behind them. They advanced there very slowly; besides 
this wood being well defended, the undergrowth was so thick 



The Battle of Quatke-Bras. 109 

that in certain spots it became necessary to cut a passage 
with the sabre. 

At this stage of the ^^aioat, a httle before four o'clock, 
the Marshal received vSouiu's letter, written at two, ordering 
him to push the enemy vigorously and to turn back upon the 
Prussian corps in position at Brye, so as to envelop it. En- 
lightened henceforth as to the projects of the Emperor and 
the importance of the occupation of Quatre-Bras, Ney ordered 
a general advance. Bachelu moved from Piraumont towards 
the enemy's left; Eoy marched from the lowlands of Gemion- 
court towards Quatre-Bras, with one column on the highway 
and the other to the right of it; Jerome threw the brigade of 
Soye into the wood of Bossu and advanced with the brigade 
of Bauduin between the highway and the wood, to meet the 
corps of Brunswick — a new reinforcement which had reached 
Wellington. Under this combined and vigorous attack the 
AlHes gave ground on their right and center. The brigade of 
Soye rendered itseh master of most of the wood of Bossu and 
threw back its defenders on Hautain-le-Val, with the exception 
of one battahon, which maintained itseh in the northern cor- 
ner near Ouatre-Bras. Foy's division and Baudum's brigade, 
which matched on its left, drove back the black battahons of 
Brunswick. A charge of Brunswick cavalry, led by the Duke 
of Brunswick in person, broke itseh on the bayonets of the ist 
Light Frederick Wilham was struck by a ball m the behy ; 
transported into a house of Quatre-Bras, he died there during 
the evening. His father, the author of the manifesto of 1 792, 
had been mortahy wounded at Auerstaedt. They were both 
ardent enemies of France. , , , ■, ^1 

On the right the column of Bachelu had traversed the 
Httle valley which separates the heights of Gemioncourt from 
those which crown the route of Namur; it had just scaled this 
slope when it received, almost at point-blank range, the hre 
of Picton's first line, concealed in the wheat. The column 
halted, wavered. Picton, seeing the hesitation of the French 
caused them to be charged with the bayonet by the brigade of 
Kempt which drove them back rapidly, near Piraumont 
There, however, riddled with grape from the batteries ot 
Baclielu and scourged by the musketry of the io8th of the Line, 
which had been left in reserve, the English were arrested m 
turn and forced to regain their first positions. In their retreat 
they were subjected to the charges of the ist and the 6th 



no Waterloo. 

Chasseurs (Pire's division.) The skirmishers were sabred, but 
the battaHons, rapidly formed in squares, remained unbroken. 
The square of the 28th, attacked on two sides, seemed on the 
point of breaking, when Picton, in order to reanimate his sol- 
diers, cried: "Twenty-eighth, remember Egypt!" 

The 42nd (Highlanders) and 44th Regiments, which formed 
the right of Pack, were less fortunate. The lancers of Pire, 
galloping in pursuit of the Brunswickers, discovered the Red- 
coats in line of battle at the angle of the two routes; they 
rushed straight on them and broke without, however, over- 
throwing them. A furious melee of bayonets against lances 
took place ; the flag of the 44th was taken and retaken. Colo- 
nel de Galbois with the 6th Lancers pierced as far as the route 
of Namur, where he cut to pieces a Hanoverian battalion. 

III. 

To second his attack, Ney counted on the 20,000 men of 
Count d'Erlon, who were soon expected to debouch from 
Frasnes. But — by a concatenation of fatalities, or, rather, by 
the logical consequences of delays in the preparatory disposi- 
tions, of orders badly understood and executed, and of inop- 
portune counter-orders — this corps was about to fail him, as it 
had failed Napoleon. 

In the morning d'Erlon had concentrated his five divisions 
at Jumet (a half -league in the rear of Gosselies), where he was 
in person since the evening of the day before with the divisions 
of Durutte and Donzelot. Reille's corps, upon which he was 
to close up, not having budged from Gosselies, he awaited in- 
structions. A little before eleven o'clock he received notice 
from Reille to prepare to follow the movement of the 2nd Corps. 
Reille also informed him that he himself would remain in his 
oosition until a new order. D'Erlon could only do as much. 
About a quarter-past twelve the order from Ney to advance 
to Frasnes was transmitted to him, either directly or through 
the intermediary of Reille ; but, before putting himself on the 
march, he was compelled to await the movement of the entire.2nd 
Corps, which preceded his. Jerome's division having scarcely 
quitted its bivouacs, to the south of the wood of Lambuc, be- 
fore one o'clock, the advance guard of the ist Corps did not 
reach Gosselies till between half-past one and two o'clock. 
There d'Erlon halted his troops until the return of a strong 



The Battle of Quatre-Beas. m 



reconnoissance which he had sent from Jumet Awards Chp^ie 
Hprlavmont where the presence of an Anglo-Belgian corps, 
Sreaferng hilleft, had been falsely reported to him by some 
r)easants In spite of Ney's order of eleven o clock written 
according to the instructions of the Emperor of eight o^lock, 
he neSed sending to Marbais one of his divisions He in- 
tended probablv, to detach this division towards this village 
as soon as he attained Frasnes. He did not resume his march 



until three o'clock. 



""' Between four and a quarter-past four o'clock half of the 
column had passed the Roman road, when d'Erlon was over- 
Sken by Colonel de Forbin-Janson, of the Imperial Staff 
ForSn-Janson had left Fleurus a quarter of an hoiir a^ter the 
officer charged with Soult's message; but, by cutting across 
?he country bv way of Mellet, he had gained nearly an hour 
^pon tfe laVer. He bore an order from the Emperor ord^mg 
Count d'Erlon to direct the ist Corps upon the heights ot bamt 
Amnnd in order to burst on Ligny. . 

InXus to second the views of the Hmperor, General 
d'Erlon at once ordered his column to turn to the right. Un- 
fortunately he had read wrong this order, scrawled m pericil 
wSch F^rlin-Janson, an officer who owed h- position so^e^ 
to favor, and without any knowledge^ of the com^ma^^^^^^^ 

instead of taking the direction of Brye and Ligny, m oraer lo 
attack the Pmslans in reverse, he directed himself on Saint- 

ening position on h'^ j^' ^ank ha^ not th .^g ^^^ ^^^ ^^_ 
:rw"l'asT:nd"n.!r Sd\\./n this column for a Prnss.an 

zss^^^si^ rirsps ritot 



112 Waterloo. 

no service. In 1815 the Emperor introduced him into the 
Army with the rank of colonel and attached him to his staff. 
He had no knowledge whatever of the duties of an aide-de- 
camp. Not only was he unable to explain to d'Erlon the pre- 
scribed movement, but when he had transmitted to him the 
order, either that he had badly understood or had forgotten 
the subsidiary recommendation of the Kmperor, or for some 
other cause, instead of going to communicate this order to 
Marshal Ney, he rejoined at a rapid pace the Imperial Staff. 
Count Forbin-Janson, at least, deserves credit for having lost 
no time in going and returning. 

The Prince of the Moskowa learned of d'Erlon's movement 
only from General Delcambre. chief of staff of the ist Corps. 
Whilst on the march along the Roman road with his troops, 
d'Erlon, filled with misgivings, had sent this officer to inform 
the Marshal of his march towards the other battle-field. Ney 
flew into a great passion. His rage was still further increased 
a few minutes later when the officer arrived bearing Soult's 
order, dated a quarter-past three o'clock: "You must ma- 
noeuvre immediately so as to envelop the right of the enemy 
and to fall with might and main upon his rear. This army 
(the Prussian) is lost if you act vigorously. The fate of France 
is in your hands. So do not lose an instant in making the 
movement ordered by the Emperor, and direct yourself upon 
the heights of Saint-Amand and Brye." Seeing the masses of 
the enemy increasing — the advance of Alten's division had 
just debouched from Ouatre-Bras — Ney understood more fully 
that it would be necessary to oppose to them all his forces. 
Besides, at the very moment when the Emperor's letter sug- 
gested to him the fine manaaivre by which the Prussian 
Army could be exterminated, he recognized the impossibility 
of executing it. Ney was exposed to the fire of a batterv; 
the balls struck the ground and ricochetted around him. He 
was heard to exclaim: "Would that these English cannon- 
balls would strike me dead!" 

Exasperated and blinded by rage, Ney did not stop to 
reflect that the ist Corps would no longer be able to arrive in 
useful time at Frasnes, and that in recalling it there he crossed 
the plans of Napoleon and acted in direct contravention with 
his will. He sent back General Delcambre with the imperative 
order for d'Erlon to bring back his troops to the right wing. 



The Battle of Quatee-Beas. 113 



IV. 



And yet these words of Napoleon's letter, "The fate of 
France is in your hands," troubled and fascinated the Marshal. 
This movement, which he had directed d'Erlon to interrupt, 
he had not entirely abandoned the idea of executing himself. 
Perhaps by a desperate effort he might yet, in spite of the dis- 
proportion of forces, throw back the English beyond Quatre- 
Bras, and once master of this point, operate against the Prus- 
sian Army, with the aid of d'Erlon, the manoeuvre awaited by 
Napoleon. All the troops had been engaged, with the excep- 
tion of the cuirassiers of Kellermann and the cavalry of the 
Guard. Pie summoned Kellermann. "My dear general," said 
he to him in an excited tone, "it is a question of the safety 
of France. An extraordinary effort is necessary. Take your 
cavalry and throw yourself in the midst of the Enghsh. Crush 
them, ride them down !" 

The intrepid Kellermann had never discussed an order 
to charge. However, he thought it his duty to say to Ney 
that the Anglo-Dutch were thought to number m.ore than 
20,000 men, and that he had with him but one brigade of cui- 
rassiers, his three other brigades having remained in the rear, 
in accordance with the order of the Marshal. 

' ' What does that matter ! ' ' cried Ney. ' ' Charge with what 
you have ! Ride them down ! I will cause you to be supported 
by all the cavalry here present. . . . Go! . .. ." 

Kellermann could do nothing else but obey. He rejoined 
Guiton's brigade (8th and nth Cuirassiers), formed it m col- 
umns of squadrons, each squadron separated by a distance 
double that of its front, and led it at a rapid trot as far as the 
summit of the hill which rises between Gemioncourt and Ouatre- 
Bras. There he gave the command, repeated at once from 
front to rear of the column: "Prepare to charge! . . • 
Gallop I . Forward! . . . Charge!" "I hastened, 

savs he in his report to Ney, "in order not to give to my men 
the time to recognize the full extent of the danger." 

The trumpets sound the charge. In an irradiation of steel 
and a rain of pebbles thrown up by the feet of the horses the 
cuirassiers descend the slope Hke an avalanche. At each stride 
the pace increases. The ground trembles and a cloud of dust 
arises. The men in the first rank, bending forward over the 
necks of their horses, hold their blades straight before them; 



114 Waterloo. 

the others brandish their gHttering swords. Kellermann, 
sword in hand, charges twenty steps in front of the leading 
squadron. 

In the valley the four battalions of Colin Halkett's fresh 
brigade are drawn up in line or formed in squares. Motionless^ 
resolute, and calm, the English, reserving their fire, await the 
cuirassiers. The 69th Regiment, posted in the first line, be- 
tween the wood of Bossu and the highway, delivers its fire at 
thirty yards. The cuirassiers pass through the balls and smoke 
like a flash of lightning through the clouds. They attack the 
69th, overthrow and crush it and, take its flag. They then 
charge the square of the 30th and overthrow the 33rd. Then,, 
without giving their horses timie to blow, they scale the oppo- 
site slope, sabre in passing the ca'nnoneers of a battery, break 
a square of Brunswick, and penetrate as far as Ouatre-Bras. 

The first and second lines of the enemy were pierced, and a 
bloody breach was opened. Unfortunately, the cuirassiers 
were not supported. Offended by Ney, who seemed to doubt 
his resolution, Kellermann had delivered his charge too soon. 
His mind still unbalanced by his rage against d'Erlon, the 
Marshal had badly coordinated this supreme effort, had de- 
layed to issue orders, and had forgotten the cavalry of the 
Guard in reserve near Frasnes. The columns of infantry and 
the lancers and chassseurs of Pire had just begun to move,, 
whilst the two regiments of cuirassiers, reduced to 500 men, 
disunited by the very impetuosity of the charge, and their 
horses blown, found themselves alone in the midst of Wel- 
lington's army. They were at the apex Of a triangle of fire^ 
fusilladed from the wood of Bossu by the Dutch, from the 
embankment of the route of Namur by the English, from the 
houses of Ouatre-Bras by the sharpshooters of Brunswick, and 
cannonaded from the route of Brussels by the batteries of 
Major Kulmann. Count de Valmy fell under his dead horse. 
This was the signal for flight. It was in vain that he arose 
and attempted to re-form his squadrons; the cuirassiers no 
longer listened to his commands. They wheeled about, buried 
their spurs in the flanks of their horses, and, in small groups, 
in disorder, but still with threatening point, re-traversed under 
a hail of balls the two lines of the enemy, bearing off as a trophy 
the flag of the 69th English. 

These horsemen, panic-stricken and retreating at head- 
long speed, jostled and drew with them in their flight many 



The Battle of Quatee-Bras. ii5 

battalions of Fov's division and the brigade of Bauduin. 
Bachelu, who had just begun his advance from Piraumont, 
saw at a distance the rout and also arrested his movement. 
Alone, the cavalry of Pire continued its charge against the 
enemy. At a rapid gallop it hurled itseh upon the battalions 
of Kempt. The Enghsh squares, opposing their bayonets and 
flanking fire to this cavalry, rendered unavaiHng its multiphed 
charges. 

At this moment Commandant Baudus, who had been sent by 
the Emperor, joined Marshal Ney, who, having had two horses 
killed under him, was standing on foot "at the most exposed 
point." Baudus transmitted to him the words of Napoleon: 
" It is absolutely necessary that the order given to Count d'Erlon 
should be executed, regardless of the situation in which Marshal 
Ney may find himseh. I attach no great importance to what 
is passing to-day where he is. The important affair is here, 
where I am, because I wish to finish with the Prussian Army. 
As for the Prince of the Moskowa, he must, if he can do no 
better, confine himself to holding in check the Enghsh Army. 
Ney, wild with rage, his face purple with passion, brandished 
his sword like a madman. He hardly Hstened to the words of 
Baudus, and cried that he had just sent to d'Erlon the order 
to return to Frasnes. Baudus vainly attempted to get him 
to rescind this order. The Marshal quitted him abruptly to 
throw himseh in the midst of his routed infantry. He quickly 
ralHed it and led it against the brigade of Pack, which was 
advancing offensively. . , 

From six until seven o'clock Wellington had received new 
reinforcements— namely, the artillery of Brunswick the brig- 
ades of Enghsh Guards of Maitland and Byng, and the Nas- 
sauers of Kruse. It was his turn to attack-to attack safely, 
as he loved to do. Maitland and Byng entered the woodof 
Bossu; Halkett and Pack, supported by the corps of Brunswick 
and Nassau, marched on the right and left of the highway m the 
direction of Gemioncourt; and the Enghsh and Hanoverians 
of Kielmansegge converged on Piraumont. The I\^ench yielded 
the conquered ground only foot by foot and under reiterated 
attacks More than an hour was necessary to d"ve Jerome 
from the wood of Bossu. Foy, driven from position to posi- 
don as far as Gemioncourt, held out for a long time around 
this farm. Bachelu abandoned Piraumont only after a herce 
fight Past eight o'clock a battahon of Maitland having de 



ii6 Waterloo. 

bouched from the southwest corner of the wood in order to 
retake Pierrepont, the division battery of Foy stopped it 
short by its fire ; then the indefatigable lancers of Pire charged 
it, threw it in disorder, and pursued it as far as Gemioncourt; 
it escaped by re-entering the wood. At the same time the cuir- 
assiers overthrew the 7th Belgian Battalion to the northwest 
of Pierrepont. Everywhere the piles of dead and wounded — 
4,300 French and 4,700 Anglo -Netherlanders — testified to the 
fury of the fight. 

At nine o'clock, when the battle was lost, or rather had 
terminated without result, for both armies had resumed the 
positions which they had occupied in the morning, the ist 
Corps debouched from Frasnes. , 

Having been rejoined about six o'clock, at the distance of 
a long cannon-shot from Saint- Amand, by General Delcambre, 
d'Erlon had hesitated between the first instructions of the Em- 
peror and the imperative order of Ney. In spite of the advice 
of Generals de Salle and Garbe, and to the intense indignation 
of the soldiers, who saw the Prussians and burned to attack 
them, he had finally determined upon a counter-march. "I 
judged," said he, "that to recall me in spite of the will of Na- 
poleon the Marshal was in extreme peril." But d'Erlon did 
not stop to think that, being within three kilometers of Fleurus 
and at three leagues from Ouatre-Bras, he would be able to 
aid the Emperor very eflicaciously, whilst he would be unable 
to arrive in time to support Ney. As a matter of fact, when 
he reached Frasnes, when it was quite dark, with his troops, 
"indignant and humiliated at having done nothing on this 
day," the Marshal no longer had need of them. 

Count d'Erlon brought back but three divisions. The idea 
having occurred to him at the beginning of the counter-march 
that it was necessary to fill the gap existing between the right 
and left wings, he had left Durutte in sight of Wagnelee with 
the 4th Division of infantry and the cavalr}?- of Jacquinot. 
Durutte not having been able to obtain any definite instructions 
from d'Erlon, save the recommendation to "act with extreme 
prudence," advanced slowly between Villers-Perwin and Wag- 
nelee. To the northwest of this last point Jacquinot had a 
slight engagement about eight o'clock with the cavalrj^ of 
General Marwitz, which covered the right of Bliicher. A little 
later Durutte turned back on Wagnelee, which he occupied 
after having dislodged a feeble rear guard. These feints against 



' The Battle of Quatre-Bras. 117 

the flank of the Prussians were not made in time nor were they 
pushed far enough to annoy in any way whatsoever the re- 
treat of the vanquished army. At Wagnelee, ho w^ ever, Du- 
rutte had plainly seen the Prussians retiring from Le Hameau 
and lya Haye on the heights of Brye. Impassive, he had per- 
mitted them to defile within range of his guns. He was par- 
alyzed by the instructions of d'Erlon, who had recommended 
him to act with extreme prudence. One of Durutte's briga- 
diers, General Brue, exasperated by this forced inaction, ex- 
claimed: "It is something unheard of for one to witness with 
grounded arms the retreat of a beaten army, when everything 
indicates that it would only be necessary to attack in order 
to destroy it." "It is very fortunate," replied Durutte, "that 
you are not responsible." "Would to God that I were!" an- 
swered Brue. "We would already be fighting." 



CHAPTER IV. 

The Rktreat of the Prussian Army. 

I. — The first plans of Napoleon for the day of June 17th. 
IT. — The orders of the Emperor to Grouchy (between eleven and half- 
past eleven o'clock). 
HI. — Retreat of the Prussian Army on AVavre. 

IV. — Movements of Pajol and Exelmans towards Namur and Gembloux 
in pursuit of the Prussian columns, 
v.— March of the army of Grouchy. — Bivouac at Gembloux. — Letter 
of Grouchy to the Emperor (ten o'clock in the evening). 

I. 

On the evening of the battle of Tigny the Emperor had 
not deemed it prudent to pursue the enemy farther than the 
line of Brye-Sombreffe. The Prussian Army, whose right and 
left wings had retired in rather good order, and which con- 
tinued to occupy these two villages with detachment':, still 
seemed capable of offering a serious resistance. It was also 
to be feared that a reserve corps debouching by the route of 
Namur would arrive upon the scene. Finally Napoleon was 
without news of his left wing. During the entire day the 
Prince of the Moskowa had not written him a single despatch. 
The Emperor had learned in an indirect way that there had 
been a battle at Quatre-Bras. But had Marshal Ney been 
victorious? The presumptions were rather that he had been 
held in check, if not repulsed, since the orders prescribing a 
movement in the rear of the Prussian Army had not been ex- 
ecuted. There were many reasons for not risking the chances 
of a night pursuit. 

The Emperor then contented himself with directing 
Grouchy, who, in accordance with his instructions, had come 
about eleven o'clock to Fleurus for orders, to cause the enemy 
to be followed at early dawn by the cavalry corps of Pajol 
and Exelmans. 

About seven o'clock on the morning of June 17th Flahault 
returned from Frasnes and informed the Emperor, who was 
lunching, of the battle of Quatre-Bras. Almost at the same 
time there was received at headquarters a despatch from Pajol, 

Z18 



Eetreat oe the Prussian Army. 119 

dated Balatre, at four o'clock in the morning, stating that he 
was pursuing the enemy, who was in full retreat towards Liege 
and Namur. Pajol added that he had ahready made many 

prisoners. 

Thus, between seven and eight o'clock at the latest, the 
Emperor was informed regarding the movements of the Prus- 
sians as well as the Enghsh. The first were retreating towards 
Liege and Namur; the second still held their positions at 
Ouatre-Bras. But was this information sufficiently complete 
and exact? Was it the main body of the Prussian Army, or an 
isolated corps, that was retreating towards Namur? Was it a 
rear guard that occupied Ouatre-Bras, or was it the entire army 
of Wellington ? Napoleon did not judge that he was well enough 
informed to come to a decision. Grouchy had come for orders ; 
he told him to remain in order to accompany him upon the 
battle-field of Lignv, whither he was preparing to go to visit 
his troops At the same time he caused Soult to write to Ney 
as follows: ". . . The Emperor is going to the m.ill of 
Brye bv which passes the main highway leading from Namur 
to Ouatre-Bras. It is then hardly possible that the Enghsh 
Army will do anything in front of you, for if it attempted to 
do anvthing, the Emperor would march against it by the route 
of Ouatre-Bras, whilst you would attack it m front, and this 
arni^ (Enghsh) would be instantly destroyed. So inform His 
Maiestv of- what is passing in front of you. . . . His Maj- 
esty's intention is that you will take position at Quatre-Bras; 
but if this is impossible, vou will inform him at once of every- 
thing in detail, and the Emperor will go there, as I have told 
vou If on the contrary, there is only a rear guard there, you 
will"attack it and take up position there. To-day is needed to 
terminate this operation and to supply ammunition, rally the 
stragglers, and call in the detachments." 

From this we see that the plans of the Emperc)r for the 
day of the 17th were confined to the occupation of Quatre- 
Bras by Ney and the revictualhng of the Army._ Doubtless, if 
Wellington should remain in his exposed position at Quatre- 
Bras, he would profit by this fortunate chance to march against 
the English and exterminate them; but he doubted very much 
if his cautious adversary would commit such a fault Ney 
would dislodge without difficulty from Quatre-Bras the rear 
Tard, which still remained in that position, and the French 
Army would remain inactive in its bivouacs during the en- 
tire day. 



1 20 Waterloo. 

There were better ways in which to employ the day after 
a victory. So Napoleon did not long persist in the idea of 
giving so much rest to his troops and such a respite to the 
enemy. This was his intention at 8 o'clock, as is shown by 
the letter uf Soult to Marshal Ney; but at half -past eight, be- 
fore entering his carriage, he meditated other projects. He 
sent to Lobau the order to send to the assistance of Pajol en 
the route of Namur the infantry division of Teste with its bat- 
tery, and he caused to be directed on Quatre-Bras a cavaly 
reconnoissance, to ascertain if the English still occupied in 
force that position. He then quitted the Chateau of Fleurus, 
thoroughly determined to return there no more. Already, in 
the imperial entourage, it was said that the Prussians were to 
be followed towards Namur and the English towards Brussels. 
The Emperor, in fact, had conceived this double manoeuvre, 
but he had not as yet determined upon its mode of execution. 
He wished to obtain further information; he went to await it 
upon the battle-field of the day before, in the midst of his 
soldiers, to whom he knew that he could never show himself 
too often. 

A little before nine o'clock the Emperor entered his car- 
riage; but, unable to bear the severe jolting of his heavy berlin 
over the furrows, he left it, ' 'fatigued as he was," says Grouchy, 
and mounted his horse. He traversed Ligny, Saint-Amand, 
and the outskirts of Ea Haye. A great number of wounded 
Prussians were still lying upon the ground pell-mell with the 
dead. The Emperor spoke to them, ordered brandy and 
money to be distributed to them, and gave the most positive 
orders for them to be picked up at once and shown the same 
attention as the French. A Prussian officer of rank lay, horribly 
mutilated, on the very spot where he had fallen the day before. 
The Emperor called a peasant who was standing at some steps 
from him and said to him in a serious tone : ' ' Do you believe 
in hell?" The Belgian, terribly frightened, answered in the 
affirmative. "Well, if you do not wish to go to hell, take care 
of this wounded man whom I entrust to you; otherwise, God 
will cause you to burn; He desires us to be charitable." "This 
recommendation," concludes an eye-witness of this scene, "was 
not useless, for the Belgians showed as much eagerness in 
caring for our wounded as they manifested aversion in suc- 
coring the Prussians, who had rendered themselves obnoxious." 



Ketreat of the Prussian- Army. 121 

Arrived on a line with the mill of Bussy, the Emperor 
passed along the front of the troops drawn up before their 
bivouacs. He halted to congratulate the chiefs of the corps, 
the officers, and soldiers. At sight of him these last broke 
forth in resounding cheers that were heard at a distance of 
more than three kilometers by General von Groben, in obser- 
vation before Tilly. This tour finished, the Emperor dis- 
mounted from his "horse and conversed for quite a while with 
Grouchy and many generals on the state of opinion in Paris, 
the Legislative Corps, Fouche, and the Jacobins. Some of his 
auditors admired the freedom of mind which he preserved in 
such critical circumstances; others were a Httle uneasy at 
seeing him lose time in talking poHtics and bewildering his 
mind with subjects foreign to those which it seemed should 
occupy him exclusively. Grouchy, however, dared not sound 
the Emperor upon the operations planned for the day. Al- 
ready, on his departure from Fleurus, he had demanded some 
orders of him, and Napoleon had sharply repHed : "I will give 
them to you when the time comes." 

II. 

The Emperor was not so absorbed with the plots of the 
Liberals of the Chamber that he forgot the enemy. He had 
received new information. It was at first a letter from Ney, 
stating that the English, in position in front of Quatre-Bras, 
held the wood of Bossu, Gemioncourt, Piraumont, and showed 
eight regiments of infantry and two thousand horse. The 
Emperor could not doubt that these masses were the first 
line of Wellington, present with his anny, and not a rear 
guard. Soon after, between ten and eleven o'clock, the officer 
commanding the reconnoissance sent towards Ouatre-Bras re- 
ported that the English still occupied that point, their left 
covered by the cavalry with which he had had an engagement. 
There also arrived some information regarding the retreat of 
the Prussians. A despatch from Pajol stated that he had cap- 
tured in front of Mazy, upon the route of Namur, eight guns and 
numerous wagons; and a message from Exelmans made known 
that he was marching with his two divisions of dragoons and 
his horse batteries on Gembloux, "where the enemy had 

massed his forces." ^ ^ ^ n 4. 1 

It was nearlv eleven o'clock. The Emperor finally took 
his last dispositions. He ordered Lobau to send the 6th Corps 
—9— 



122 Waterloo. 

to Marbais, in order to second the atttack of Marshal Ney 
upon Quatre-Bras by out-flankmg the EngHsh left. Drouot re- 
ceived an order to follow this movement with all the Guard. 

The Emperor then said to Marshal Grouchy: "While I am 
marching against the English you will put yourself in pursuit 
of the Prussians. You will have under your orders the corps 
of Vandamme and Gerard, the division of Teste, and the cavalry 
corps of Pajol, Exelmans, and Milhaud." 

From the very first Grouchy felt the responsibility rather 
than the honor of this mission. In the course of his long career 
he had never exercised a great command. It was as a general 
of cavalry that he had accomplished his fine feats of arms and 
won his renown. He had the coup d'oeil of the battle-field, the 
lucid and prompt vision of weak points, the conception of 
sudden and decisive movements; but he was the man of a 
single hour, a single manoeuvre, a single effort; he was a tac- 
tician, but a tactician momentary, local and special, and not 
made for the conduct and the responsibilities of strategical 
operations. To make matters worse, he was conscious of his 
inferiority as commander of an army acting independently. 
This sentiment was soon to paralyze him. Besides, he knew 
or suspected that Gerard and Vandamme especially, with 
whose intractable character he was acquainted, were displeased 
at being put under his orders. What authority could he have 
over some lieutenants who lacked confidence in him ? But, as 
a marshal of France, Grouchy could not, nor even did he wish, 
through respect for himself, to decline the mission from which 
he augured already nothing but difficulty and danger. A 
refusal was at the bottom of his mind ; he dared not formulate it. 

If, as he ~pretends, he observed to the Emperor that it 
would be very difficult to discover in what direction the Prus- 
sians had gone and to baffle their designs, since they had begun 
their retreat in the night or at break of day. Napoleon could 
not have failed to reply to him something like the following: 
"Pajol has been in pursuit of the enemy since three o'clock; 
he has taken from him, on the Namur route, since five o'clock, 
men, baggage, and guns. Exelmans, who has followed a 
Prussian corps now massed at Gembloux, has certainly, by this 
time, regained contact with the enemy. Then, if Bliicher's 
heads of columns have eight or ten hours the start of you, your 
cavalry is in close pursuit of his rear guard." It is even pos- 
sible that the Emperor may have added, as Grouchy affirms: 



Eetreat of the Peussian Aemy. 123 

"All the probabilities lead me to believe that it is upon the 
Meuse that Bliicher is effecting his retreat. So you will direct 
yourself on that side." The reports from Pajol and Kxelmans 
seemed, in fact, to confirm the assumption that, in accord- 
ance with the principles of strategy, the Prussians were with- 
drawing upon their base of operations. 

Grouchy having departed in order to issue his orders, the 
Emperor decided that it would be better to have more cavalry 
with the principal fraction of the army. He determined to 
retake from his Heutenant Domon's division of Vandamme's 
corps and Milhaud's corps of cuirassiers. In the absence of 
the Major-General, still at Fleurus, he dictated to Bertrand an 
order for Grouchy, enjoining the latter to direct without delay 
on Marbais these three divisions of cavalry.. 

A few minutes after (probably between 11:30 and 11:45 
A. M.) the Emperor thought it best to develop and explain 
more fully in writing the verbal instructions which he had 
just given to Marshal Grouchy. Soult had not yet arrived. 
Bertrand again took the pen and wrote under the Emperor's 
dictation : 

"Go to Gembloux with the cavalry corps of Pajol and 
Exelmans, the Hght cavalrv of the 4th Corps, the division 
of Teste, and the 3rd and 4tli Corps of infantry. You will re- 
connoitre in the direction of Namur and Maestricht, and you 
will pursue the enemy. Explore his march and inform me of 
his movements, in order that I may be able to penetrate what 
he intends doing." 

"I am carrying my headquarters to Quatre-Bras, where 
the EngHsh still were this morning. Our communications 
then will be direct by the paved route of Namur. If the enemy 
has evacuated Namur, you will write to the general com- 
manding the 2d MiHtary Division at Charlemont to cause that 
town to be occupied by some battaHons of the National Guard." 

" It is important to discover what Bliicher and WelHngton 
are intending to do ; whether they propose to unite their armies 
in order to cover Brussels and Liege, in trying the fate of 
another battle. In all cases keep constantly your two corps 
of infantry united in a league of ground, having many avenues 
of retreat. Post intermediate detachments of cavalry, so as 
to be able to communicate with headquarters." 

According to this letter, Marshal Grouchy was, first, to 
concentrate all his forces at Gembloux, an intermediate point 



124 Waterloo 

between Namur, Liege, and Wavre; second, to explore all the 
country in the direction of Namur and Maestricht, directions 
which it was probable, but not certain, that the enemy was fol- 
lowing in his retreat ; third, to put himself on the traces of the 
Prussians and penetrate their designs in pursuing them; and 
fourth, to know whether Bliicher's object was to unite with the 
English. Doubtless the Kmperor did not trace for his lieu- 
tenant, as he might have done, the conduct to be followed under 
all circumstances; but he could not doubt that Grouchy, who 
by his very position upon the flank of the Army, was man- 
ifestly destined to cover it against an offensive return of the 
enemy, would manoeuvre so as to interpose himself between 
the Army and the Prussians. 

Napoleon had provided for Bliicher. There remained 
Wellington. He ordered vSoult, who had just rejoined the 
Imperial Staff, to write to Ney that he must attack the English 
at once and that he (Napoleon) would second him. It was 
noon. By this time the heads of columns had no doubt reached 
Marbais. The Emperor mounted his horse and took the road 
to Quatre-Bras, whither the soldiers of Lobau, all the Guard, 
the divisions of Domon and Subervic, and the cuirassiers of 
Milhaud were on the march, eager for the fray. 

III. 

Napoleon, Soult, Grouchy, and all the staff thought the 
Prussians were retreating towards the Meuse; it was in the 
direction of the Dyle that they were falHng back. On the day 
before, at night, whilst their troops were rallying between the 
route of Namur and the Roman road, Ziethen, Pirch I., and 
other generals, no longer receiving any orders, hastened to 
Brye, where they expected to find Bliicher. At this moment 
the dragoons, who had picked up Bliicher from the battle-field, 
bore him all bruised from his fall and in a half-swoon into a 
cottage of Mellery. His staff was without news of him ; it was 
ignorant if he were a prisoner or free, dead or living. Con- 
sternation reigned supreme; every eye was fixed with expec- 
tancy on Gneissenau, to whom, in Bliicher's absence, belonged 
the command by reason of his seniority of rank. What course 
would he take? Would he abandon his lines of communication 
with Namur to try once more to unite with the English by a 
parallel march, or, in order to fall back on his base of operations, 



Eetreat of tiie Prussian xIemy. 125 

would he leave Wellington alone against the French Army 
and overturn the plan of campaign decided upon for two 
months? Gneissenau sat his horse in the middle of the road 
which joins to the north of Brye the route of Namur; by the 
Hght of the moon he consulted with difficulty his map. After 
a short examination, he cried : ' ' Retreat on Tilly and Wavre. " 
Some days later WelHngton wrote emphatically to the 
King of the Low Countries : "It was the decisive moment of 
the century." likewise the German mihtary historians have 
exalted the retreat on Wavre as the equal of the finest strate- 
gical conceptions. We think this is putting it a httle extrav- 
agantly, to say the least. This determination marks in Gneis- 
senau firmness in reverses and an understanding of the neces- 
sities of war; but when he ordered this movement, he certainly 
did not foresee the immense consequences that were to result 
from it. At that time he had no intention of rejoining the 
EngHsh Army in order to cover Brussels. If he thought that 
at Wavre the Prussians would again find themselves in the 
same sphere of operations with the EngHsh, he had no assurance 
that such would be the case, as it was dependent upon the line 
of retreat that would be chosen by WelUngton and upon other 
eventuaUties. At all events, he did not count on resuming 
the offensive thirty-six hours after his defeat. It was especially 
as a temporarv position, as a point of concentration, that he 
indicated Wavre, whose defense was rendered easy on account 
of the River Dyle. The movement was not as audacious as 
the Germans have pretended. If Gneissenau abandoned his 
lines of communication with Namur and Uege, it was to open 
new ones, by way of Tirlemont and Louvain, with Maes- 
tricht, Cologne, Wesel, Munster, and Aix-la-Chapehe. On the 
morning of June 17th couriers had been sent to these places . 
to collect munitions, and the order had been sent to Liege to 
direct the siege park on Maestricht. Gneissenau had then not 
"broken the bridges behind him," as General von Chech says, 
or rather, he had broken them, but with the certainty of estab- 
Hshing others the next day. 

The corps of Ziethen and Pirch I. bivouacked between 
Tilly, Mellery, and Gentinnes; three battahons of Jagow re- 
mained at Brve as an outpost under the command of Quarter- 
master-General Grolemann. Notice of the retreat on Wavre 
was sent to Thielmann, who had withdrawn his troops to the 
north of Sombreffe, though continuing to occupy this position 



1 26 Waterloo. 

by a strong detachment, and to Bulow, who, knowing akeady 
that the battle was lost, had halted his army corps upon the 
Roman road with his advance guard at Baudeset. On arriving 
at Mellery, Gneissenau had there found Bliicher. He was 
stretched upon some straw in a remote cottage, taking from 
time to time a few swallows of milk. 

At dawn on the 17th all the army decamped. The corps 
of Ziethen and Pirch, which had just rallied the three battalions 
of the outpost at Brye, marched on Wavre by way of Gentinnes, 
Villeroux, and Mont Saint-Guibert ; Colonel Sohr was left tem- 
porarily behind Tilly with two regiments of cavalry. Having 
arrived before Wavre between eleven o'clock and noon, Ziethen 
passed with his troops upon the left bank of the Dyle and estab- 
lished them in Bierges and environs. Pirch halted his corps 
upon the right bank; it bivouacked between Aisemont and 
Saint- Anne. 

From Sombreffe, Thielmann had at first advanced to 
Gembloux; judging his troops to be very much fatigued, he 
took position a little beyond this village and, very imprudently, 
remained motionless from seven in the morning until two in 
the afternoon. He finally resumed his march, passed through 
Corbaix, crossed only at eight o'clock the bridge of Wavre, and 
camped at La Bavette (a half -league to the north of Wavre). 
The cavalry of Lottuni and the division of Borcke, which 
formed the rear guard of this corps, did not even arrive in 
sight of Wavre until long past midnight; they were forced to 
bivouac upon the right bank of the Dyle. 

Bulow, whose troops were in column upon the Roman 
road, had orders to establish himself at Dion-le-Mont (a league 
to the southwest of Wavre). He marched so slowly that at 
ten in the evening his movement was unfinished. 

IV. 

The retreat of the Prussian outpost established at Brye, 
and consequently those of the corps of Pirch and Ziethen, 
escaped absolutely the notice of the French videttes in posi- 
tion in front of the mill of Bussy. During the entire morning 
the cavalry posts made no movement, not a reconnoissance, 
not a patrol. On the French right, towards Tongrinne, the 
hussars of Pajol showed more vigilance. At half-past two in 
the morning they warned their general that the enemy was 



EETREA.T OF THE PRUSSIAN ArMY. 12/ 

abandoning his positions. Pajol at once ordered to mount 
the two regiments which he had under his immediate com- 
mand, and launched himself in pursuit of the Prussians along 
the route of Namur. Unfortunately, this was a false direction. 
He beUeved himself to be on the traces of Thielmann's corps, 
when it was only a few stragglers, a convoy, and a stray battery 
that he was following. Beyond Mazy, about five or six o'clock 
in the morning, he overtook this column, sabred a squadron of 
the 7th Uhlans which had joined it, and captured the guns and 
wagons. He pushed no farther than Les Isnes on" the route 
of Namur, no longer seeing anything in front of him. Very 
uncertain as to what he ought to do, he sent reconnoissances 
in different directions, and halted in person at the point where 
the road of Saint-Denis crosses the main highway. At twelve 
o'clock, informed by false reports that the enemy was not re- 
treating on Namur, but on Saint-Denis and Liege— or, in other 
words, on Louvain — he directed himself on that side. Thanks 
to the arrival of the ist Hussars, which had rejoined about nine 
o'clock, and the division of Teste, which had just been sent 
him by the Emperor, his forces then amounted to three regi- 
ments of cavalry, four of infantry, and two batteries. 

Berton's brigade of dragoons of Exelmans' corps had put 
itself in motion soon after the rear guard of Thielmann had 
evacuated Sombreffe. But instead of entering this village- 
and taking the route of Gembloux, Berton followed Pajol 
along the route of Namur. However, he did not cross the 
stream of Omeau, as some peasants had informed him that 
the Prussian Army was retreating by way of- Gembloux and 
that there were still a great many troops in that village. 
Berton hastened to transmit this information to General Exel- 
mans, and awaited further instructions. He ought to have 
also communicated it to Pajol, who was fifteen hundred yards 
in front of him. The order to advance on Gembloux soon 
reached Berton. He resumed his march, and arrived in front 
of the village at nine o'clock. Some Prussian videttes were 
posted on the left bank of the Orneau ; and beyond Gembloux 
masses of the enemy were discovered taking their rest. 

Exelmans soon rejoined Berton, bringing ^vith hnn his 
three other brigades of cavalry. He rather judiciously esti- 
mated at 20,000 men the Prussians bivouacked behind Gem- 
bloux. Exelmans had 3,000 dragoons and two horse batteries ; 
and Pajol was six kilometers to the right with 1,400 hussars, 



128 Watekloo. 

3,000 infantry, and two batteries. Exelmans did not think to 
inform him that the Prussians occupied Gembloux — informa- 
tion which would have saved his comrade an eccentric march 
of twenty kilometers (going and returning) in the direction of 
Leuze. He made no demonstration to compel the Prussians 
to unmask their designs. He did not fire a cannon-shot at 
these masses, not even a musket-shot at the videttes. He 
limited himself to observing the enemy — very heedlessly, as we 
shall see farther on. Finally, with a neghgence truly unpar- 
donable, he neglected to inform at once Grouchy or the Em- 
peror that he was in touch with one of Blucher's corps. 

In spite of these faults, affairs were not seriously com- 
promised. At noon, at the moment when the Emperor re- 
iterated in writing to Grouchy the order to pursue the Prus- 
sians, their army was divided. The corps of Ziethen and Pirch 
were concentrated at Wavre, the corps of Bulow on the march 
from Baudeset had not yet passed Walhain, and the corps of 
Thielmann had halted near Gembloux, within cannon-range 
of Exelmans. The negligence of the French videttes, the 
carelessness of the officers commanding the outposts, the time 
lost in the morning, and the false indications of the Prussian 
line of retreat, all could have yet been repaired if Exelmans 
had been vigilant and active and if Grouchy had thoroughly 
understood his mission. 

V. 

On quitting the Emperor, about half-past eleven o'clock, 
near the mill of Bussy, Grouchy sent by Colonel de Blocque- 
ville the order to General Vandamme, at Saint-Amand, to ad- 
vance quickly with the 3rd Corps to Point du Jour, at the inter- 
section of the roads of Namur and Gembloux. At the same 
time he despatched to Exelmans, towards Gembloux, another 
aide-de-camp, Captain Bella, to obtain information. He then 
went to Ligny, wishing to give in person his instructions to 
Gerard. On his way there he met Marshal Soult, who was on 
his way to rejoin the Imperial Staff. He had with Soult a short 
interview, which bore only upon the divisions of cavalry which, 
according to the first order of Bertrand, which he had just re- 
ceived, he was to detach from his army and direct on Marbais. 
When he had departed, Soult said to one of his aides-de-camp : 
"It is a fault to divert so large a force from the army which 
is marching against the English. In the state in which their 



Eetreat of the Prussiaist Akmy 129 

defeat has put the Prussians, a feeble corps of infantry, with the 
cavalry of Pajol and Exelmans, would suffice to follow and 
observe them." Soult, who, moreover, was deceived as to the 
disorder of the Prussian Army, blamed the too great strength 
of the detachment placed under the orders of Grouchy, but he 
did not criticise the direction given to the pursuit of the enemy. 

At Ivigny, Grouchy found Gerard in a bad humor. He 
Avas, it appears, greatly vexed at not receiving the Marshal's 
baton after the battle, and doubtless, somewhat dissatisfied at 
seeing himself detached under the orders of Grouchy. In con- 
formity with the second despatch of Bertrand, which had 
reached him, the Marshal ordered Gerard to follow the 3rd Corps 
to Gembloux. It does not appear, whatever Grouchy may say, 
that the irritation of Gerard had led the latter to defer with a 
bad intention the movement prescribed. Before he could put 
his troops on the march, he was forced to wait until the entire 
corps of Vandamme had finished defiling. Now, the defile of 
an army corps of three divisions of infantry, with artillery, 
engineers, and train, lasted at least an hour at this time, when 
the distance between the divers elements of the column was 
less, however, than it is to-day. If there was any delay in the 
departure of the 4th Corps, the fault must be attributed to 
Grouchy himself. As the 3rd and 4th Corps were to follow the 
same route, and as the corps of Vandamme was at Saint- 
Amand, 2,000 yards, as the crow flies, to the left of Ligny, 
where the corps of Gerard was stationed, it was Gerard, and not 
Vandamme, that Grouchy should have first put on the march. 
In this way more than an hour would have been gained. It 
has been said that Grouchy wished to spare the self-love 
of Vandamme, whose ill-nature he feared. A fine reason! 
Grouchy must have, indeed, felt himself invested with but 
little authority! On the day before and the one previous to 
that, on the left wing, the 2nd Corps had formed the head of 
column instead of the ist Corps; and in the Guard it was cus- 
tomary to march with the left in advance, without the gren- 
adiers feeling humiliated. 

The corps of Vandamme marched with incredible slow- 
ness. From Saint-Amand to Point du Jour, by way of Ligny 
and Sombreffe, it is nearly four miles. Now the advance of the 
3rd Corps, which had decamped from Saint-Amand before noon, 
did not reach Point de Jour until three o'clock. It had then 
marched at the rate of two kilometers per hour. 



1 30 Wateeloo. 

Grouchy arrived at Point du Jour almost at the same time 
as the advance of Vandanime. What he had done since quit- 
ting Gerard at Ligny, scarcely a league distant from Point du 
Jour, can not be explained. At all events, he had not thought 
to send a few squadrons on a reconnoissance in the direction of 
Gentinnes. Yet the Emperor had said to him : "It is for you 
to discover the direction taken by the enemy." 

The aide-de-camp Bella, on returning from his mission 
to Bxelmans, rejoined Grouchy either at Point du Jour or 
Sombreffe. Exelmans had given him at Gembloux, between 
one and two oclock, a letter for the Marshal, stating that he was 
in touch with the enemy's army, massed upon the left bank of 
the Orneau, and that he would follow the Prussians as soon as 
they would put themselves on the march. It was necessary to 
hasten to profit by this important information. Grouchy, 
who was an excellent handler of cavalry, ought to have hastened 
at full speed to Gembloux, to see with his own eyes what was 
going on and to direct in person the movements of the four 
brigades of dragoons. He contented himself with proceeding 
there at a snail's pace with the entire corps of Vandamme, 
which was followed by that of Gerard. The troops continued 
to march very slowly. It is seven kilometers from Point du 
Jour to Gembloux. Vandamme did not arrive there till seven 
o'clock, and Gerard at nine. Notwithstanding the dilatory 
march of these corps, they would have been able to reach Gem- 
bloux two hours earlier and simultaneously if Grouchy had 
ordered them to move on this village in two columns. Gerard 
would have taken the road to Point du Jour and Vandamme 
would have gained the Roman road above Sombreffe. 

The corps of Thielmann had been gone for some time, and 
Exelmans, whose videttes were separated from those of the 
enemy only by the stream of the Orneau, had permitted the 
Prussians to march away on his left without discovering their 
retreat in time. Thielmann had struck camp to the north of 
Gembloux at eight o'clock; Exelmans did not enter the village 
with the dragoons until three. The Prussians were still close 
by, and he might have yet discovered their traces lost by his 
fault. But he knew not how to repair his very culpable lack 
of vigilance. Instead of pushing some parties in every direc- 
tion and of following with the main body of his cavalry the one 
which would have again found the traces of the enemy, he went 
simply to take position at Sauvenierre, a short league to the 



Eeteeat of the Pkusstan Aemy. 131 

north of Gembloux, satisfied with having captured near there 
a park of four hundred beeves. 

During this afternoon Grouchy had shown Httle activity. 
He put off until the next day the pursuit of the Prussians. 
The corps of Vandamme had made only thirteen kilometers 
and that of Gerard hardly ten. Now, although there were still 
nearly two hours of daylight, Grouchy halted his troops. He 
ordered the infantry of Vandamme to bivouac around Gem- 
bloux and that of Gerard in the rear of that village. The 
Marshal has alleged as an excuse the bad condition of the roads 
and the rain, which fell in torrents. But on the side of Wavre 
and Dion-le-Mont the roads were no better, and the Prussians 
marched under the beating rain. 

Exelmans, however, had determined about six o'clock to 
send the brigade of Bonnemains on a reconnoissance to Sart-^- 
Walhain and the 15 th Dragoons to Perwez. Bonnemains went 
beyond Sart-a-Walhain, and threw out some detachments to- 
wards Nil Saint-Vincent and Tourinnes. This last village was 
still occupied by a Prussian rear guard. After having ob- 
served for nearly an hour this infantry, which made no movcT 
ment, the dragoons fell back and estabUshed themselves in 
bivouac at Ernagev There, about ten o'clock, a peasant in- 
formed Bonnemains that the enemy had evacuated Tourinnes, 
and was marching in the direction of Wavre. Bonnemains 
reported this information. On returning from Perwez, the 
colonel of the 15th Dragoons also reported that the Prussian 
troops were retreating on Wavre. 

These reports did not reach Grouchy until late at night. 
But since six o'clock he knew by a letter from Pajol that the 
hostile column, which at first seemed to be directing itself on 
Namur, had marched towards Louvain; and between seven 
and eight o'clock he had himself gathered at Gembloux im- 
portant information. If these reports did not all agree— if, 
according to some, the Prussians were marching by Perwez on 
Liege and Maestricht— according to the greater part, they were 
directing themselves on Wavre, in order to unite with Welhng- 
ton towards Brussels. 

From the despatch of Pajol, together with the information 
given by the inhabitants of Gembloux, it was evident that, 
in the first place, the enemv was not retreating on Naniur, as 
had been beHeved in the morning; in the second place, that he 
was marching either on Louvain, Maestricht, or Liege, or on 



132 Waterloo. 

Wavre, but far more probabl}^ on this last point, with the 
design of uniting with the Enghsh Army. 

Under these circumstances, it was necessary, by all means, 
to proceed towards Wavre, for if the Prussians were falling 
back towards Liege, Maestricht, or Louvain, they would put 
themselves outside of the sphere of operations for at least 
two days ; whilst, if they rallied at Wavre with the view of a 
junction with Wellington's army, there was imminent danger 
for the Emperor. Then Grouchy ought to and could have, 
since eight o'clock in the evening, sent the cavalry of Exelmans 
to Walhain and Sart-a-Walhain, the corps of Vandamme to 
Ernage, and that of Gerard to Saint-Gery. Not only by this 
movement would he have established his army on the same 
evening at a league nearer Wavre, but by immediately causing 
the 4th Corps to double upon the 3rd in order to send it to 
Saint-Gery, he would have given himself the faculty of march- 
ing the next day, without loss of time, in two parallel columns. 
Besides, at Saint-Gery the 4th Corps would have found itself 
well placed to gain rapidly Mont Saint-Guibert and the bridges 
of Mousty and Ottignies, if Grouchy at sunrise had believed 
it necessary to move on Wavre by the left bank of the Dyle. 

Grouchy did not understand that Wavre was his imme- 
diate objective, and that he ought to sacrifice the doubtful 
hope of overtaking the Prussians, if they were retreating to- 
wards Liege, to the necessity of covering the flank of the Im- 
perial Army, if they manoeuvred to unite with the English. 
At ten in the evening he wrote to the Emperor: ". . . It 
appears, according to all the reports, that, having arrived at 
Sauvenierre, the Prussians have divided themselves into two 
columns; one has taken the route to Wavre, and the other 
appears to be directing itself on Perwez. One may perhaps 
infer from this that a portion are going to join Wellington, and 
that the center, which is Bliicher's army, is retiring on Liege, 
while another column with artillery is making its retreat on 
Namur. General Exelmans has orders to push this evening 
six squadrons on Sart-a-Walhain and three squadrons on 
Perwez. According to their reports, if the main body of the 
Prussians is retiring on Wavre, I shall pursue them in that 
direction, in order that they may not be able to reach Brussels, 
and to separate them from W^ellington. If, on the contrary, 
my information proves that the principal Prussian force has 



TJetbeat of the Pkussian Army. 133 

marched on Perwez, I shall direct myself by way of that town 
in pursuit of the enemy." 

Although Grouchy says in this letter that he was preparing, 
according to the news of the night, to march either on Wavre 
or towards Liege, he took no measure in view of the first of 
these movements. His orders for the next day — orders to 
Exelmans and Vandamme to march on Sart-a-Walhain ; order 
to Pajol to direct himself from Mazy on Grand Leez ; order to 
Gerard to follow the 3rd Corps to Sart-a-Walhain and to send 
his cavalry to Grand Leez, "the enemy retiring on Perwez" — 
testify that, forgetting WelHngton and neglecting Wavre, it 
was in the direction of Liege that he persisted in seeking the 
cnemv 



CHAPTER V. 
The; Retreat of the English Army. 

I. — Exchange of despatches between Bliicher and Wellington (morning 

of June 17th). — Retreat of the English Army (ten o'clock), 
li — Arrival of Napoleon at Quatre-Bras, still occupied by the English 

cavalry (two o'clock). 
II f. — V^igorous pursuit of the English rear guard by Napoleon in person 

— Combat of Genappe.— Cannonade of Mont Saint- Jean (seven 

o'clock). 
IV. — -The night bivouac. 
V. — Uncertainties of Napoleon. — Letter from Bliicher to Wellington. 

— Orders of Napoleon (night of June 1 7th- 1 8th). 

I. 

On the side of Ouatre-Bras, French and English remained 
motionless in their positions during the morning of June 17th. 
Ney did not learn the result of the battle of Ligny till after 
nine o'clock. As for Welhngton, he had remained all night 
without hearing from his ahies. The last message which he 
had received from Blucher, on the day before, stated that the 
Field Marshal had resumed the offensive and "that all was 
well." A little later Gneissenau had, indeed, despatched an 
officer to inform him of the retreat; but this officer, severely 
wounded en rotite by French sharpshooters, had not been able 
to carry out his mission. Wellington thought that the battle, 
which had been indecisive, would be renewed the next day 
all along the hue. Therefore he ordered his troops to bivouac 
at Quatre-Bras and summoned there reinforcements. The 
cavalry of Lord Uxbridge arrived in the evening and during 
the night; and on the morning of the 17th the brigade of 
Ompteda, the divisions of CHnton and Colville, and the reserve 
artillery put themselves on the march to rejoin. Welhngton, 
who had gone to Genappe to sleep, returned early in the 
morning to Quatre-Bras. Anxious to hear from Blucher, for it 
had been reported at Genappe that the Prussians had met with 
defeat, he sent towards his left his aide-camp, Colonel Gordon, 
with a detachment of the loth Hussars. Gordon, avoiding 
the French videttes at Marbais, pushed as far as Tilly, where 

13^ 



Eetreat of the English Aioiy. 135 

he had the good fortune to find still General Ziethen with the 
rear guard of the ist Corps. He learned from the General that 
the Prussian Army was retreating on Wavre. On returning to 
Quatre-Bras at half -past seven o'clock, he transmitted this in- 
formation to Wellington, who, in order to deceive his impa- 
tience, was walking with long strides along the road of Char- 
leroi in front of Ouatre-Bras. 

Affairs assumed a different aspect. Wellington could no 
longer remain at Ouatre-Bras, exposed to a combined attack 
from Ney in front and from Napoleon on his left. At first, 
somewhat troubled, he thought of retreating at once. "Old 

Bliicher," said he, "has received a d d good mauling, and 

has fallen back eighteen miles in the rear. As he has fallen 
back, we must fall back also. I suppose they will say in Eng- 
land that we have been thrashed " Mufifling ob- 
served to him that the situation did not appear so serious. 
"The Prussian Army," said he, "having marched on Wavre, 
you can easily put yourself again in the same sphere of opera- 
tions with it. You can fall back on some point on a line with 
Wavre; there you will obtain news of the Field Marshal, in- 
formation regarding the state of his troops, and you will be 
able to come to a decision as to what is best to be done under 
the circumstances." 

Wellington determined to go to occupy the plateau of 
Mont Saint-Jean, a strong defensive position, which he had 
reconnoitred the preceding year at the time of his passage 
through Brussels. But should he decamp at once, or should 
he wait until his troops had breakfasted, at the risk of having 
a warm rear-guard affair? There was from time to time some 
firing at the advance posts, but the troops of Ney made no 
movement. "I know the French," said Mufifling. "They will 
not attack before having made their soup." Wellington de- 
cided that the retreat should commence only at ten o'clock. 
He sent to Tord Hill the order to fall back to Waterloo with 
the divisions on the march for Quatre-Bras. Then, after 
having read his paper, which had just been brought him from 
Brussels, he enveloped himself in his cloak and stretched him- 
self upon the ground to sleep. On awakening, about nine 
o'clock, he threw a glance at the French positions. vSeeing that 
Ney made no preparations for an attack, he said: "Are the 
French retiring? It is not at all improbable." 



136 Waterloo. 

At this moment a Prussian officer, Lieutenant Massow, 
arrived from Mellery. He had been sent by Gneissenau to 
inform WelHngton of the proposed concentration of all the 
Prussian Army at Wavre, and to ask him what he intended 
to do. The Duke replied in presence of Muffling: "I am 
going to establish myself at Mont Saint-Jean. I shall await 
Napoleon there in order to deliver battle to him, if I have the 
assurance of being supported, even by a single Prussian corps. 
But if this support can not be rendered me, I shall be forced to 
sacrifice Brussels and take up a position behind the Escault." 
Massow left immediately to return to the Prussian head- 
quarters. 

The English began their movement. The divisions of 
Cook and Picton, the Dutch-Belgians of Perponcher, the di- 
vision of Alten, and finally the corps of Brunswick, marched 
successively by the route of Brussels. The numerous squad- 
rons of IvOrd Uxbridge were deployed in the second line, so as 
to mask and then to cover this retreat. At one o'clock this 
corps of cavalry alone remained in position. Ney giving Lord 
Uxbridge plenty of leisure, the latter seated himself with his 
aide-de-camp upon the edge of the road. Uxbridge having 
remarked that the French would soon attack, the aide-de-camp 
replied, laughing: "They are eating." A short time after 
this Uxbridge was informed that large masses of troops were to 
be seen on the march towards the left. The imperial advance 
guard was approaching by the route of Namur. 

11. 

From the mill of Bussy, near Ligny, the Emperor, with 
the light cavalry of Domon and the cuirassiers of Milhaud, 
had repaired to Marbais, whither he had previously directed 
the corps of Lobau, the cavalry division of Subervic, and the 
Guard. Having arrived there a little before one, he halted a 
short time, awaiting news from Ney, or the noise of cannon. 
Impatient, he determined to march in person on Quatre-Bras, 
At nearly a league from this point the scouts of the 7th Hus- 
sars, who reconnoitred the Army, fell back before the English 
videttes. The Emperor arrayed his troops in line of battle, 
with the artillery in the center, the infantry in the second line, 
the cuirassiers on the right, and the light cavalry of Domon, 
Subervic, and Jacquinot on the left. At the fame time he de- 



Eetreat of the English Aemy. 137 

tached towards Frasnes, in order to communicate with Ney, 
the 7th Hussars, who, mistaking for the English the red lancers 
of the Guard, posted on the extreme right of the Marshal's 
position, opened fire upon them. 

The scouts had made prisoner an English vivandiere. On 
being brought before the Emperor, she told him that the 
only troops at Ouatre-Bras were the cavalry of Lord Ux- 
bridge, charged with the duty of covering the retreat of 
the EngUsh Army. As for the French who had fought the day 
before, she knew nothing of them ; she beHeved that they had 
passed the Sambre. Greatly vexed that Wellington should 
escape from his clutches, the Emperor wished at least to give 
a good account of the fine EngHsh cavalry. The cuirassiers, 
the chasseurs, the lancers, and the horse-batteries moved for- 
ward at a rapid trot. The Emperor, in his impatient haste, 
outstripped them with the squadrons of his eJ:cort. 

Lord Uxbridge, at first notice of the approach of the 
French, had hastened to the route of Namur. He there found 
Wellington. The French were still a great way off, and only 
the reflection of the sun upon burnished steel could be seen. 
"They are bavonets," said Wellington. But, having taken 
General Vivian's field-glass, he recognized the cuirassiers. 
After having exchanged a few words with Lord Uxbridge, he 
decided to retreat. He charged Uxbridge with the command 
of the rear guard and departed. Whilst the brigades of Eng- 
lish dragoons followed by the route of Brussels, the hussars of 
Vivian and Grant deployed perpendicular to the route of 
Namur, with the horse batteries in position along their front. 
It was a Httle more than two o'clock. Great black clouds, 
driven by a furious wind, accumulated overhead. The tempest 
coming from the northwest, Quatre-Bras was already shrouded 
in darkness, whilst on the side of Marbais the weather re- 
mained clear. Lord Uxbridge was on horseback near the light 
battery of Captain Mercer, whose guns enfiladed the route of 
Namur. Suddenlv there was seen, issuing from a fold of the 
ground, a horseman, followed by a small escort. His face, 
body, and horse, lighted up in reverse, appeared black as night 
—a statue of bronze, standing out from a luminous background, 
through which pierced the rays of the sun. Erom the sil- 
houette Lord Uxbridge recognized Napoleon. 'Fire! cried 
he "and aim well." The cannon roared. The Emperor or- 
dered a horse battery of the Guard to advance. The English, 
—10— 



138 Waterloo. 

judging the danger too great in continuing this duel of artillery, 
limbered up their pieces. The horsemen of Jacquinot and 
Subervic rushed forward. English hussars and " cannoneers 
fled in confusion in the midst of blinding flashes and under 
the torrential rain which had commenced to fall. "It seemed," 
said Mercer, "that the first cannon-shots had rent asunder 
the clouds." 

Marshal Ney had given no sign of life. The Emperor sent 
some orders direct to the commanders of the army corps in 
position in front of Frasnes. D'Erlon appeared finally with 
the advance guard of his infantry. To the reproaches that 
were addressed to him by the Emperor for having arrested the 
day before his mov-ement against the Prussian right, he replied 
that, being under the direct command of Marshal Ney, he had 
been forced *o obey the orders of his immediate chief. The 
Emperor judged that time was too valuable to be lost in dis- 
cussion; he ordered Count d'Erlon, with the ist Corps, to fol- 
low the cavalry immediately along the route of Brussels. 
Soon after this Ney arrived. In his letter of eight o'clock 
Napoleon had already expressed his dissatisfaction that he 
had, on the day before, manoeuvred so unskillfully. He did 
not return again to this subject; but he manifested very 
plainly his surprise at the non-execution of the orders that 
he had sent him the same morning, touching the occupation of 
Ouatre-Bras. Ney excused himself by saying that he still 
believed that he had in front of him the entire army of Wel- 
lington. At least the Marshal ought to have assured himself 
if such were the case by a vigorous offensive reconnoissance. 
Now, he had not even pushed a single squadron beyond his 
lines. He had shown himself as negligent, as careless, and as 
apathetic as on the morning of the i6th and evening of the 17th. 

Marshal Ney, in truth, had remained all night, through 
the carelessness of the Major-General, in ignorance of the 
victory of Ligny. He would have been able to take the of- 
fensive only after having received the order of eight o'clock. 
Furthermore, this order was conditional. Had Ne}^ even at- 
tacked then, it is probable that the English would have none 
the less effected their retreat without disorder, thanks to their 
numerous cavalry. They would have only put themselves m 
motion an hour earlier, and Ney would have occupied Quatre- 
Bras at noon — a sterile result. However, there would have 
been a chance that Wellington, vigorously assailed, would 



Eetreat of the English Aemy. 139 

have determined to fight upon his positions. But Marshal 
Ney had done nothing to provoke this combat. The Emperor 
blamed him for this. Furthermore, he no doubt reproached 
himself ior not having sent, at seven in the morning, from 
Ivigny to Ouatre-Bras, the Guard and Lobau's corps. He had 
thus permitted to escape the opportunity of exterminating the 
English Army. WelHngton, most of whose troops were in po- 
sition, his hne of retreat on Genappe compromised, and at- 
tacked in front by Ney, would have been forced to accept a 
battle, virtuallv lost in advance. 

While speaking to Ney at Quatre-Bras, the Emperor had a 
vision of this lost victory. He wished to re-seize it. He im- 
agined that, by hastening his march, he might yet overtake 
WelHngton and compel him to fight. He ordered Reille, then 
Lobau, and finally the Guard, to follow rapidly the ist Corps 
and the Hght cavalry along the route of Brussels; they would 
be flanked on the right by the chasseurs of Domon and the 
cuirassiers. Himseh, with the squadrons of his escort, and a 
hose battery of the Guard, gained at a gallop the head of the 
column, in order to render the pursuit more impetuous. 

III. 

"This pursuit," says Captain Mercer, "was conducted 
with the speed of a fox-chase." The EngHih rear guard fled 
in the greatest disorder — hussars and cannoneers galloped pell- 
mell, going Hke mad, blinded by the Hghtning-flashes and 
lashed by the rain, which fell in such torrents that it was im- 
possible to distinguish the color of the uniforms. Lord Ux- 
bridge performed the duties of a cornet of horse. He hastened 
along the column, crying to his men: "Faster! Faster, for 
God's sake ! Gallop, or you will all be captured." The lancers 
of Alphonse de Colbert clung sometimes so closely to the Eng- 
lish hussars that, amidst the noise of the horses and the thunder, 
their peals of laughter and insults reached the fugitives. 

Some of the English passed the Dyle over the bridge of 
Genappe, others over a bridge above this village, and a few at a 
ford To the north of Genapppe there rises at a gentle incline 
a range of hills. In order to delay a Httle the impetuosity of 
the pursuit, Lord Uxbridge estabhshed half-way up the ascent, 
in two fines, the greater part of his cavalry and two batteries. 
When the ist Lancers debouched from the village, in pursuit 



140 



Watep.loo. 



of Vivian's brigade, it was saluted by a volley of grape, then 
charged by turns by the 7th English Hussars and the ist Reg- 
iment of Life Guards. The lancers broke without difficulty 
the hussars; but they were driven back in^o Genappe by the 
Guards, who penetrated into the village with them. Uxbridge 
led this charge in person. In the narrow and winding street 
which formed at that time almost all of the village there took 
place a body-to-body combat, in which the lancers lost all the 
advantage of their long weapons. In the midst of Genappe, 
the 2nd Lancers, debouching in companies of fours from a 
transversal street, fell upon the Guards and threw them back 
far beyond the first houses. On the route of Brussels, the 
English were again charged by the hussars of Marbot, who had 
turned the village by the right. Thrown into disorder, they 
regained the heights under the protection of their artillery. 

At this moment the Emperor issued from Genappe with 
the squadrons of his escort and a horse battery. Mounted upon 
"Desiree," a very swift white mare, he had galloped from 
Ouatre-Bras to rejoin the advance guard. His gray surtout, 
made of very thin material — a sort of duster — was penetrated 
by the rain. The water streamed over his boots. The clasps 
of his hat were broken by the violence of the rain and the cor- 
ners had fallen down in front and behind — he found himself 
coifed like Basil in the ' ' Barber of vSeville." He superintended 
in person the placing of the guns in battery, crying to the 
gunners in accents of rage and hatred: "Fire! They are 
English ! ' ' 

In the street of Genappe, Colonel Sourd, of the 2nd Lancers, 
was surrounded by many Life Guards, and had his right arm 
hacked so as to render its amputation necessary. Larrey am- 
putated it at once. During the operation Sourd dictated the 
following letter to the Emperor, who had just promoted him 
to be a general: ". . . The greatest favor that you can 
render me is to leave me colonel of my regiment of lancers, 
which I hope to conduct again to victory. I refuse the rank 
of general. Let the great Napoleon pardon me! The rank of 
colonel is everything to me." Then, before the bandage had 
hardly been placed upon his bloody stump, he remounted his 
horse and galloped along the column to rejoin his dear regi- 
ment. The armies of the Republic and Empire had many men 
of this stamp. 



Eetbeat of the English Army. 141 

Past Genappe, the march became extremely slow. The 
EngHsh did not show less haste, nor the French leis ardor; but 
under the continuous action of this great rain the ground be- 
came more and more difficult. Along the road, reserved for 
the artillery and infantry, the water ran Hke a mill-race ; in the 
ploughed lands, the horses sank up to their knees. 

Towards half -past six Napoleon attained with the head of 
column the heights of La 'Belle Ahiance. The infantry of 
Brunswick, in the greatest disorder, and the rear guard of the 
English cavalrv traversed the valley which separates these 
heights from the plateau of Mont Saint- Jean. The hussars of 
Marbot followed them. They began to skirmish, when from 
the edge of the plateau an enemy's battery opened fire upon 
the main body of the cavalry, which had halted near La Belle 
AlHance. The rain had ceased, but the atmosphere was still 
saturated with water. Through this curtain of fog the Em- 
peror indistinctlv perceived masses of cavalry and infantry. 
Was it all of Wellington's army ready to deliver battle, or only 
a strong rear guard, which had taken position to protect the 
retreat? The Emperor washed to ascertain the truth. By his 
orders, four light batteries opened fire, whilst the cuirassiers 
of Milhaud deployed as if to charge. The enemy's cannon 
thundered loudly; the Enghsh unmasked themselves. All 
their army was there. 

IV. 

Night approached, and most of the infantry were still far 
in the rear. The Emperor ordered the fire to cease. Dunng 
the cannonade he had remained near La BeUe AlHance, exposed 
to the cannon-balls which Captain Mercer, who had recognized 
him, directed upon the staff. Napoleon pointed out to the 
troops the positions for their bivouacs. The corps of d'Erlon 
(^ave the division oi Durutte, which did not rejom until next 
morning^, estabhshed itself between Plancenoit and the farm 
of Montplaisir, its front and right flank covered by the cavalry 
of Tacquinot. The cuirassiers of Milhaud, the hght cavalry of 
Domon and Subervic, and the cavalry of the Guard bivouacked 
in the second line, abreast of Rossomme. The corps of Reille 
and Lobau and the cuirassiers of Kellermann halted m Genappe 
and environs. After having traversed this village at dark, the 
Foot Guard left the main highwav, which was encumbered with 
the artillerv and baggage train, and attempted to gam the 



142 Waterloo. 

imperial quarters. Only two or three regiments arrived near 
there, at the village of Glabais, between eleven and twelve 
o'clock at night. The others having lost their way, the men 
disbanded and wandered in search of the farms and isolated 
country houses. They did not rejoin their colors until the 
next morning. 

It was indeed a villainous night of bivouac! The troops 
arrived in the darkness, broken with fatigue, streaming with 
water, and "each man dragging two or three pounds of mud 
with his shoes." A great many of the soldiers marched bare- 
footed, having lost their shoes in the heavy ploughed lands. 
They were compelled to stretch themselves out in the midst of 
the rye, which was more than three feet high and drenched 
with water. "It was like entering a bath." The men could 
not think of erecting shelters; the wood cut in the copses of 
Vardre, Chantelet, and Caillou served to make fires, which 
were lighted with great difficulty, were continually going out, 
and produced more smoke than heat. The rain ceased only 
at rare intervals. In order to receive less water and regain a 
little warmth, ten or twelve of the soldiers would group them- 
selves together and sleep standing, closely pressed one against 
the other. The most stoical, or the most fatigued, extended 
themselves in the mud. There are times in war when one 
would sleep upon bayonets. After having picketed their 
horses, a number of horsemen moimted again in the saddle and, 
enveloped in their long mantles, slept bent over their horses' 
necks. Of the four days' bread carried in the haversacks, all 
w^as consumed. The men suffered greatly from hunger. In 
most of the regiments the distributions were made only at 
midnight and even in the morning. We can imagine the dis- 
satisfaction of the troops, as well as the frenzied marauding 
of which the Belgian peasants were the victims. 

The Guard, which during a part of the night had wandered 
through the fields and along the country roads, was especially 
furious. Never had the grumblers grumbled so much. With 
the murmurs and oaths were mingled imprecations against 
the generals; the men accused them of having purposely led 
them astray in these unknown roads. And, remembering 1814, 
these old soldiers said: "This smells of treason." But in the 
Guard, as well as in the Tine, there was neither demoralization, 
nor even discouragement ; the men preserved in their hearts 
the hope of vengeance and faith in victory. In spite of and 



Eetreat of the English Arjncy. 143 

before everything, it was the English, the Red-coats, the "God- 
dams," whom they blamed for this night under the rain, with- 
out bread and without fire. And they promised themselves to 
make them pay dear for it the next day. 

The English were not much better off upon the plateau 
of Mont Saint-Jean. Nevertheless, the infantry, having com- 
menced its retreat at ten o'clock, had reached its positions 
before night. The leading divisions had even arrived before 
the storm. The soldiers established themselves upon ground 
still dry, made for themselves comfortable beds of straw by 
bending down the rye, and kindled fires ; finally, the service of 
food being well assured, they tranquilly prepared their supper. 
Alone, the cavalry of Lord Uxbridge, which had bivouacked 
after night, suffered severely from the inclemency of the 
weather. 



The Emperor returned to spend the night at the pretty 
little farm of Caillou, situated on the edge of the road, at 2,700 
yards from La Belle Alliance. The farmer Boucqueau and 
his family had fled in order to escape the pranks of the Bruns- 
wickers, who, in their retreat, had fired some shots through the 
windows, burst in the door, and finally pillaged the house. 
The Emperor ordered a great fire to be kindled ; and, pending 
the arrival of his baggage, he dried himself as best he could in 
front of the chimney. 

About nine o'clock General Milhaud informed him verbally 
that, in his march from Marbais to Quatre-Bras, his right 
flankers had discovered a column of Prussian cavalry which, 
from Tilly, had withdrawn in the direction of Wavre. It is 
possible that the Emperor immediately wrote to Grouchy, 
from whom he had as yet received no message, to inform him 
of the direction of this column and to enjoin him to advance 
on Wavre so as to draw near the Imperial Army. But if the 
order was sent, it never reached its destination. The officer 
who bore it did not overtake the Marshal, either because he 
had been captured or killed en route by the Prussian scouts, 
or for some other cause. 

Besides, it does not appear that the Emperor was alarmed 
by Milhaud's report. Since noon he had manoeuvred with the 
idea that Bliicher's army was retreating on Namur or Maes- 
tricht, or w^as falling back to the north, in order to unite v ith 



144 Waterloo. 

the English Army in front of Brussels. The march of a Prus- 
sian column on Wavre only confirmed one of his previsions. 
Furthermore, this column might be only a stray corps, cut off 
from its line of retreat. But at the worst, if all the Prussian 
corps should seek to concentrate at Wavre, Grouchy would 
overtake them in time to combat them. If they marched im- 
mediately towards Brussels by the route from Wavre to that 
city, they would not be immediately dangerous. As to sup- 
posing that Bliicher, thirty-six hours after a defeat and having 
33,000 French on his traces, would risk a flank march, from 
Wavre to Plancenoit or Ohain, in order to resume the offensive, 
such a hypothesis never entered the mind of the Emperor. 

On the evening of June 1 7th Napoleon was less preoccupied 
with the movements of the Prussians than with the plans of 
the English. He feared that Wellington had only made a 
simple halt at Mont Saint- Jean, and that he would slip away 
during the night to go to take up a position in front of Brussels, 
where he would be joined by the Prussians. If such was the 
object of the enemy, the Emperor regarded the game as greatly 
compromised, for though he was certain of exterminating the 
English at Mont Saint-Jean, he regarded it as ver}'^ hazardous 
to debouch from the Forest of Soignes before the two united 
armies. However, all this was only a matter of conjecture 
with the Emperor, for he still doubted if the main body of the 
Prussians was falling back towards Brussels or Liege. And 
among the crowd of contradictor}^ thoughts that struggled 
with one another in his brain, there survived the hope that 
even should Bliicher manoeuvre to approach Wellington, the 
Prussian Army, defeated, cut in twain, and demoralized by the 
battle of Ligny, would be in no condition to enter again into 
line before many days. 

The uncertainties of the Emperor touching the plans of 
Wellington were, indeed, justifiable, for, even far into the 
night, the Duke himself did not know what course he would 
take. This depended on Bliicher. As he had said in the morn- 
ing to the orderly officer of Gneissenau, Lieutenant Massow, he 
would accept battle at Mont Saint- Jean, if he had the assurance 
of being supported by at least one of the four Prussian corps ; 
otherwise, he would continue his retreat. 

Now, since eleven o'clock Wellington had remained with- 
out news from the Prussian headquarters. Bliicher had, in- 
deed, been informed by Massow, on the latter's return, of the 



Eetreat of the English Aelmy. 145 

eventual plan of the English general, and he burned to co- 
operate therein. But before formally pledging himself to second 
Wellington the next day, Bliicher was forced to wait until his 
army was concentrated and revictualled. Things did not pro- 
ceed' with the rapidity that he would have wished. In the 
afternoon of June 17th the I. and II. Corps alone were massed 
at Wavre; and, besides, they were lacking in munitions and 
.food. The great park had been directed by way of Gembloux 
on Wavre; but would it avoid the French cavalry? For the 

III. and IV. Corps, they might be followed so closely by the 
French that it would be necessary to halt and deliver battle. 

About five o'clock, as the noise of the cannonade of Ge- 
nappe diminished in violence, the great park arrived. Three 
hours later the III. Corps passed through Wavre on the way to 
Iva Bavette. Finally, at eleven o'clock, a report from Biilow 
announced that he was at I)ion-le-Mont with the head of the 

IV. Corps. Bliicher received at the same moment a despatch 
from Muffling confirming the information that WelHngton 
had taken eventually at Mont Saint-Jean some positions for 
battle. Gneisseneau still hesitated. "If the English are de- 
feated," he objected, not without reason, "we run the risk of 
being completely destroyed." Bliicher finally succeeded in 
convincing his all-powerful chief of staff. "Gneissenau has 
yielded!" said he, with a triumphant air, to Colonel Hardinge, 
the English militarv attache. "We are going to rejoin the 
Duke." He wrote to Wellington: "The corps of Biijow will 
put itself on the march to-morrow at dawn in your direction. 
It will be followed immediately by the corps of Pirch. The I. 
and III. Corps also will hold themselves in readiness to advance 
towards you. The exhaustion of the troops, a part of whom 
have not yet arrived, will not permit me to begin my movement 
earlier." 

This letter reached Wellington about two in the morning 
at his headquarters at Waterloo, a village situated a league in 
the rear of the first English lines. Assured, henceforth, of the 
cooperation of the Prussians, Wellington determined to accept 
battle. Fortune declared once more in his favor; but he had 
none the less remained too long in expectation. The want of 
news from Bliicher should have caused him to think that the 
Prussians would be unable to second his army, and, though he 
wished to fight only with their support, he had yet m.ade, at 
one in the morning, no preparations for retreat. 



146 Waterloo. 

At the very moment when Wellington reached his con- 
clusions Napoleon penetrated them. The Emperor had re- 
tired rather late at Caillou. Before retiring he had dicated an 
order of battle, based upon the hypothesis of a great battle, for 
the next day. He had also caused to be read to him the jour- 
nals which had arrived from Paris, and had dictated many 
letters, "necessitated," says Davout, "by the ennui and em- 
barrassment occasioned by the intrigues of the Chamber of 
Representatives." Awakened after a short nap, the Emperor 
arose about one in the morning in order to make the entire 
round of his advance posts. He was accompanied only by 
General Bertrand. The rain had set in again; it fell in tor- 
rents. When Napoleon had attained the crests of La Belle 
Alliance, the English bivouacs appeared before him at the dis- 
tance of a short cannon-shot. Silence reigned in the camps 
of the enemy, and the Allied Army seem.ed buried in sleep. 
On the horizon, the Forest of vSoignes, upon which were re- 
flected, through a veil of rain and smoke, the innumerable fires 
lighted by the soldiers, looked like an immense conflagration. 
The Emperor judged that the English would stand on their 
positions. If they had been intending to retreat during the 
night or even at sunrise, as he had feared, there would have 
been already some preparatory movements in their camp. 
The Emperor returned to Caillou as the day dawned. 

He there found the letter that Grouchy had written from 
Gembloux, on the day before, at ten in the evening. The courier 
had arrived at Caillou about two o'clock. This despatch stated 
that the Prussians seemed to be falling back in two columns — 
one in the direction of Liege and the other towards Wavre — 
and that, if the march of the Prussian columns on Wavre was 
confirmed by the reports of the night, Grouchy "would follow 
them in order to separate them from Wellington." Confiding 
in the promise of his lieutenant, the Emperor did not deem it 
necessary to send him, just then, new instructions. It is not 
for us to say if he acted wisely. 

Soon after some spies, then some officers sent on recon- 
noissances, and Belgian deserters, came by their reports to 
confirm the previsions of the Emperor. The PyUglish did not 
budge. The battle would take place at Mont Saint-Jean. 

The Emperor felt sure of victory. The wan sun that ap- 
peared through the clouds "would witness the destruction of 
the English Army." Napoleon, however, was troubled by his 



Retreat of the English Army. 147 

inability to attack as early as he would have liked, and as was 
necessary. On the evening of the day before, m the doubtful 
hope that Wellington would await him at Mont Saint- Jean, he 
had indicated the positions to be occupied by the different 
army corps, so as to be able to begin the action at an early 
hour. Unfortunately, the rain had soaked the ground to such 
an extent that, in the opinion of the artillery generals, it would 
be impossible to manoeuvre the guns. It is true the rain had 
ceased; but many hours would be required to dry and harden 
the ground. About five o'clock the Emperor, judging, no 
doubt, that it would no longer be necessary to occupy so early 
the position of battle, and that it would be better to give the 
troops time to rally, clean their arms, and prepare their soup, 
determined to wait until nine o'clock to begin the attack. 
He dictated to Soult this order, which modified that of the 
day before: "The Emperor orders that the Army be ready to 
attack at nine in the morning. The corps commanders will 
rally their troops, cause them to clean their arms, and permit 
the soldiers to prepare their soup. They will also cause the 
soldiers to eat in order that at nine o'clock sharp each corps 
may be ready and in line of battle, with its artillery and am- 
bulances, in the position of battle which the Emperor has 
indicated in his order of yesterday evening." 



BOOK THREE. 

Waterloo. 



CHAPTER I. 
Blucher and Grouchy. 

I. — Dispositions and movements of the Prussian Army on the morning 
of June 1 8th. — Departure from Wavre of Field Marshal Bliicher 
(eleven o'clock). 
II. — Dispositions of Grouchy. 
III. — Discussion between Gerard and Grouchy at Walhain (noon). 

I. 

In accordance with his promise, Blucher had made ready 
to second vigorously his allies. Some orders despatched dur- 
ing the night enjoined Bulow to march at dawn on Chapelle 
Saint-Ivambert, distant from Mont Saint- Jean some seven kil- 
ometers, as the crow flies, and Pirch to follow the movement 
of Bulow's corps. At Chapelle Saint-Iyambert these generals 
were to act according to circumstances. If the action did not 
appear to be seriously engaged, they were to remain in that 
position and to conceal their presence; in the contrary case, 
they were to attack the right flank of the French Army. As 
for the corps of Ziethen and Thielmann, thej^ were to remain 
until a new order in their cantonments on the left bank of the 
Dyle. Blucher intended to lead them also to the support of 
the English; but before doing this it was necessary that he 
await the morning reports. He could not completely dis- 
garnish the line of the Dyle without having positive information 
regarding the march and strength of the French corps which 
had been reported at Gembloux. 

Well conceived as was this disposition, it had one initial 
fault. As Bulow's corps had not been engaged at Ligny, 

1-19 



I50 Watekloo. 

Bliicher wished to engage it first. He sacrificed to this pre- 
occupation, which, moreover, was legitimate, rapidity of move- 
ment. The corps of Ziethen and Thielmann were bivouacked 
at Bierges and La Bavette (eight and nine kilometers, respect- 
ively, from Chapelle Saint-Lambert) ; the corps of Pirch and 
Bulow were at Aisemont and Dion-le-Mont (ten and fourteen 
kilometers from Chapelle Saint-Lambert.) Manifestly, the 
troops nearest the field of battle should have been sent there 
first, whilst those farthest away should have come to occupy 
temporarily the line of the Dyle. At all events, the Prussian 
staff ought to have foreseen that Pirch's corps must remain 
motionless under arms during the defile of Bulow's corps. 
It was then Pirch who ought to have made the head of column. 
If one had acted in this mariner, half of the Prussian Army 
would have found itself concentrated at Chapelle Saint-Lambert 
long before noon. 

As it was, things were very different. The division of 
Losthin, Bulow's advance guard, did not arrive in front of 
Wavre till seven in the morning. It lost a great deal of time 
in crossing the bridge and climbing the main street of the village, 
which was narrow and very steep. When it had debouched, a 
violent conflagration, entirely fortuitous, broke out in this 
street and barred its access. The bulk of Bulov/'s corps was 
forced to await until the fire was extinguished. The march of 
the 4th Corps thus suffered a delay of more than two hours; 
the rear guard division did not reach until near three o'clock 
the environs of Chapelle Saint-Lambert. The II. Corps (Pirch) 
had taken up arms at five o'clock. But, as it was necessary 
to permit the IV. Corps to defile, the troops remained motion- 
less in front of their bivouacs at Aisemont till past noon. At 
two o'clock half of Pirch's corps was still upon this side (right 
bank) of the Dyle. 

Between seven and eight o'clock in the morning Count 
Groben, on returning from the advance posts, had reported 
that the French, in position at Gembloux, had yet made no 
movement, and that he estimated their strength at 15,000 men. 
"I can not affirm," he had added, "whether the French are 
not more numerous, but even should they number 30,000 
men, a single one of our army corps will suffice to guard the 
line of the Dyle. It is at Mont Saint-Jean that the fate of the 
campaign is to be decided. It is necessary to send there every 
man possible." This was, indeed, the opinion of Bliicher; 



Bluchek and Grouchy. 151 

but Gneissenau and Grolemann still hesitated to disgarnish ■ 
the. line of the Dyle. "This question," said Grolemann, with 
the formal assent of Gneissenau, "will be resolved at noon; if, 
from now until then, the enemy does not appear before Wavre 
in too great strength, the I. Corps will follow the II. and IV., 
and perhaps the III. will march also." Meanwhile Blucher 
wrote to Muffling: "I pray you to say in my name to the 
Duke of Wellington that, sick as I am, I shall put myself at 
the head of my troops to fall upon the right wing of the enemy 
as soon as Napoleon will have engaged battle. If the day 
passes without an attack from the French, I am of the opinion 
that we should both attack them to-morrow." 

Before forwarding this letter which Bliicher had dictated 
to him, the aide-de-camp Nostitz communicated its contents 
to Gneissenau. On the day before and the morning of the battle 
of Ligny the latter had somewhat mistrusted the promises of 
Wellington, whom he regarded as "a great knave." The day 
of June 1 6th, during which the Duke had sent to Brye neither 
a man nor a cannon, had confirmed and increased the prejudices 
of Gneissenau. He feared that the English would fall back 
without combat on Brussels. In this event the Prussian Army 
would be exposed to a disaster, taken en flagrant delit of march, 
and attacked in front by Napoleon and in flank or reverse by 
the corps of Grouchy. Gneissenau caused this postscript to be 
added to Blucher 's letter: "General Gneissenau is in perfect 
accord with the Field Marshal ; but he prays your excellency 
to penetrate the secret thoughts of the Duke of Wellington 
and to learn if he is fully determined to fight in his present 
position, or if it is only a mere demonstration, which might 
greatly endanger our army." 

Time passed; the ardent Bliicher wished to be present 
at the opening of the battle. Leaving Gneissenau free to 
control the movements of the other army corps, he quitted 
Wavre at eleven o'clock to rejoin Bulow towards Chapelle 
Saint-Lambert. "In spite of all that which I suffered from 
my fall," said he later, "I would have had myseh tied on my 
horse rather than to have missed the battle." 

II. 
If Grouchy, on the evening of June 17th, was still doubtful 
as to the concentration of the Prussian Army at Wavre, the 
information that reached him during the night ought to have 



152 " Wateeloo. 

dissipated this doubt. Between eleven and twelve o'clock at 
night he received a report from General Bonnemains and an- 
other from the colonel of the 15th Dragoons, both announcing 
the march of the Prussians on Wavre. Towards three in the 
morning there was transmitted to him from Walhain, or Sart- 
a-Walhain, notice that there had been seen passing on the day 
before three army corps which were directing themselves on 
Wavre, and that, according to the words of the officers and 
soldiers, these troops were going to concentrate near Brussels 
in order to deliver battle. 

All this information, which confirmed that of the pre- 
ceding evening, only half convinced Grouchy. He no longer 
doubted that the enemy was directing himself on Wavre ; but, 
taking to the letter, without reflecting, the words of the Prus- 
sians, he imagined that their army had made there not a strate- 
gical concentration, but a simple halt, and that it would march 
from there towards Brussels by the main highway. He knew 
that the Emperor had foreseen a battle with the English in 
front of the Forest of Soignes, and he never stopped to think 
that instead of gaining Brussels, the Prussians might, from 
Wavre, join directly their allies by a short lateral march. He 
did not see that, in order to prevent this junction, it was not 
necessary to follow the Prussians by way of Walhain and 
Corbaix, but to make a flank pursuit by way of Saint Gery 
and Mousty. There was every advantage and no danger in 
passing the Dyle at the nearest point and in manoeuvring by 
the left bank of this little river. If the Prussians remained at 
Wavre, which is situated on the left bank of the Dyle, that 
position could be attacked more easily from the left bank than 
by the right. If they directed themselves towards Brussels, 
the French could follow them after having reached Wavre. 
If they marched directly to join the English, the appearance 
of 33,000 French on their flank would arrest, or at least retard, 
their movement. Finally, if they had already effected their 
junction with the English and threatened to crush the Imperial 
Army under their united masses, the French would be, at 
least, upon the left bank of the Dyle, and near enough to the 
Emperor to be able to assist him in the midst of the battle. 

Grouchy had no idea of all this. He made no change in 
his orders of the day before. He even permitted, although he 
had at that time decided to march on Wavre, the corps of Pajol 
and the cavalry of Vallin to operate the eccentric movement 



Blucher and Grouchy. 153 

on Grand Leez which he had ordered. He wrote to the Em- 
peror that, as all the information confirmed the march of the 
Prussians by way of Wavre on Brussels, "in order to concen- 
trate there or to deliver battle after having united with Wel- 
lington," he was starting for Wavre. 

Grouchy had under his hand 33,000 soldiers and 116 guns. 
In attaching himself servilely to the traces of the Prussian 
rear guard, instead of manoeuvring, on the morning of June 
1 8th, by the left bank of the Dyle, he committed a gross strate- 
gical error. In leaving, under circumstances so pressing and 
so grave, his troops in bivouac a part of the morning, he was 
guilty of an irremediable fault. On June i8th day dawns at 
half -past two; at three it is Hght enough to march. Now, 
Grouchy had directed Vandamme and Gerard to put them- 
selves on the march at six and eight o'clock, respectively. 
Unfortunate man I 

In consequence of the delay in the distribution of food, 
the troops did not even set out at the hour prescribed. The 
dragoons of Exelmans, who had passed the night at Sauvenierre 
and were to form the advance, did not mount until six o'clock. 
The corps of Vandamme did not put itself en route from Gem- 
bloux until between seven and eight, and the corps of Gerard 
did not quit its bivouacs on the right bank of the Orneau until 
the same hour. Another cause of the delay was that all these 
troops followed the same route. By marching in two columns 
— one by Sauvenierre and Walhain, and the other by Ernage 
and Nil Pierreux — the two army corps would have been massed 
at the same time at Corbaix. 

Grouchy, it appears, did not leave Gembloux before eight 
or nine o'clock. He proceeded slowly and rejoined the advance 
of the 3rd Corps a little on this side of Walhain. Having 
reached' about ten o'clock the outskirts of this village, he al- 
lowed the columns of infantry to file by, and entered the house 
of • the notarv Hollert, in order to write to the Emperor. It 
appears that his aide-de-camp, Pontbellanger, who had been 
sent upon a reconnoissance upon the banks of the Dyle, to- 
wards Moustv, had reported to him that no hostile troops had 
been discovered in that region ; and an inhabitant of Walhain, 
who claimed to have formerly served in the French Army in the 
capacity of an officer, had given him new and important in- 
formation. He assured the Marshal that the main body of the 
Prussians, who had passed through Wavre, was camped m the 
— U— 



1 54 Waterloo. 

plain of La Chyse, near the road leading from Namur to 
Louvain (three leagues, as the crow flies, -to the northeast 
of Wavre). 

This fake information, which the old officer "declared 
was positive," was most satisfactory to Grouchy. Not only 
was the army of Bliicher not seeking to effect its junction with 
Wellington by a flank march, but, instead of advancing directly 
on Brussels, it had commenced by making a long detour in 
order to concentrate first in the direction of Louvain. Thus 
the enemy had put himself for the time being outside of the 
sphere of operations. Grouchy could congratulate himself 
upon having manoeuvred so skillfully. If he had not overtaken 
the Prussians, he was on their traces and had driven them away 
from the English, which was the principal object of his move- 
ment. By evening all his troops would be massed at Wavre,' 
in position between the two hostile armies; and on the next 
day he would be free either to go to combat the Prussians in 
the plain of La Chyse, or to attack them in their flank march 
if they directed themselves towards Brussels, or to advance to- 
wards this city in order to unite with Napoleon's forces. The 
Marshal hastened to write to Napoleon, in order to transmit to 
him this new inform.ation. He closed this letter by saying: 
". . . This evening I expect to be concentrated at Wavre, 
and thus find myself between Wellington, whom I presume to 
be in retreat before Your Majesty, and the Prussian Army. I 
have need of ulterior instructions in order that I may know 
what Your Majesty wishes me to do. The country between 
Wavre and the plain of La Chyse is very difficult, intersected 
with ravines, and partly rrarshy. I can easily reach Brussels 
before the Prussian force, which has halted at La Chyse. 
. . . Vouchsafe, Sire, to send me your orders; I can re- 
ceive them before beginning m^;^ movement to-morrow." 

"To-morrow!" It was indeed a question of to-morrow! 

Grouchy gave this letter to Major La Fresnaye, a former 
page of Napoleon, who set out at once. As to the Marshal, 
free henceforth from anxiet)^ and thinking that he had an 
entire day before him in which to reach a determination, he 
seated himself tranquilly at dinner. 



LllcilEK and GitouciLY. 155 



III. 



Grouchy was eating some strawberries (to eat strawber- 
ries is not, moreover, a hanging matter, even on a morning of 
battle), when Gerard, who had outstripped by two or three 
kilometers the vanguard of the 4th Corps, entered the room 
where he was dining. Soon after Colonel Simon Loriere, 
Gerard's chief of staff, was introduced. While walking in the 
garden of the notary Hollert, he had heard the cannon growl- 
ing in the distance; he hastened to inform his chiefs of this 
fact. It was a little more than half-past eleven. Grouchy 
and Gerard descended into the garden. General Baltus, 
commanding the artiller}^ of the 4th Corps, General Valaze, . 
commanding the engineers, and Inspector of Reviews Denniee 
were there with numerous officers of the staff — all very at- 
tentive to the noise of the cannonade. Many of them were 
kneeling, with ear to the ground, in order to ascertain the 
direction of the sound. 

Gerard listened for some minutes, and said: "I think that 
we should march to the sound of the cannon." 

Grouchy objected that it was probably only a rear-guard 
affair. But the fire increased in violence. "The earth trem- 
bled," relates Simon Loriere. It could no longer be doubted 
that two armies were fighting. Towards the west clouds of 
smoke arose above the horizon. 

"The battle is at Mont Saint-Jean," said a peasant whom 
Valaze had taken as a guide. "We could reach there in four 
or five hours' march." 

The notary Hohert, summoned by Gerard, confirmed the 
words of the guide "It is in front of the Forest of Soignes," 
said he. "The distance from here there is nearly three and a 
half leagues." 

"We should march to the sound of the cannon," repeated 
Gerard. 

"We should march to the sound of the cannon," said in 
turn General Valaze. 

Grouchy has admitted that he was "vexed" at hearing 
his subordinates publicly giving him advice. This is one reason 
why he did not heed it. There was another— the fear of re- 
sponsibility. Rather than to follow the dangerous advice of 
his generals, would it not be better to follow blindly the in- 



156 Waterloo. 

structions of the Emperor, which would cover him, whatever 
might happen? HeFaid: "The Emperor told me yesterday 
that his intention was to attack the English Army, if Welling- 
ton accepted battle. So I am not at all surprised at the en- 
gagement which is taking place at this moment. If the Em- 
peror wanted me to take part in it, he would not have sent 
me away from him at the very time when he was advancing 
against the English. Besides, on account of the condition of 
the roads, drenched by the rain of yesterday and of this morn- 
ing, I would not be able to arrive in useful time upon the bat- 
tle-field." 

General Baltus coincided with the views of Grouchy. 
He said : ' 'The roads are in very bad condition and the artillery 
would be unable to pass over them." 

"With mv three companies of sappers," replied General 
Valaze, "I pledge myself to remove every diflficulty." 

"1 would arrive with the ammunition -chests !" cried 
Gerard 

Valaze, having again consulted his guide, who affirmed 
that the march would be an easy thing, resumed : "The sappers 
can open many passages." 

Gerard became more and more animated. "Monsieur le 
Marechal," said he, "it is your duty to march to the sound of 
the cannon." 

Offended at Gerard for permitting himself to read him a 
lesson, and that in a loud voice in the presence of a score of 
officers. Grouchy- replied in a severe tone, so as to close the 
discussion: "My duty is to execute the orders of the Emperor, 
which direct me to follow the Prussians; to follow your advice 
would be an infringement of his instructions." 

At this moment there arrived an aide-de-camp of Exel- 
mans. Commandant d'Estourmel; he announced that a strong 
Prussian rear guard was in position in front of Wavre. This 
officer was also directed to say that, according to every indica- 
tion, the enemy's army had passed the bridge of Wavre during 
the night and morning in order to draw near the English Army, 
and consequently General Exelmans thought of advancing by 
way of Ottignies upon the left bank of the Dyle. This new 
information and the advice expressed by Exelmans were so 
many reasons in support of Gerard's counsel. But for Grouchy, 
still persuaded that the Prussians had gained Wavre in view 
of a retreat towards La Chyse, the presence of their rear guard 



BlUCHER A.ND GrROUOHY. 1 57 

in that town confirmed this supposition. He congratulated 
himself on having resisted Gerard, since the orders of the 
Emperor were to follow the Prussian Army, and since he 
was finally on the point of overtaking this unseizable army. 
Having said to d'Estourniel that he would give his orders to 
Exelmans in person, the Marshal called for his horse. 

As Grouchy was preparing to mount, Gerard risked a last 
attempt: "If you do not wish to advance towards the Forest 
of Soignes with all the troops, at least permit me to make this 
movement with my army corps and the cavalry of General 
Vallin. I am confident that I can reach the battle-field in 
time to be of assistance to the Emperor." 

"No," replied Grouchy; "it would be committing an un- 
pardonable military fault to divide my troops and cause them 
to operate upon both banks of the Dyle. I would expose both 
of these bodies, which would be unaijle to support each other, 
to the danger of being crushed b}^ forces two or three times 
more num^ous." 

He set his horse at a gallop. Those officers of his staff who 
had witnessed the discussion from a distance and who heard 
the cannon believed that he was about to manoeuvre in order 
to draw near the Imperial Army. 



CHAPTER II. 

The Battle of Waterloo. 

Morning. 

I. — Topography of the field of V)attle. 
II. — Positions of the Anglo-Dutch Army. 
III.— Luncheon of Napoleon at Caillou. — Letter to G.ouchy. 
IV. — -The last review (ten o'clock). — Order of battle of the French 
Army. — Disposition of Napoleon for the attack (eleven o'clock) . 

1. 

The plateau of La Belle Alliance and Mont Saint-Jean, 
each of an average altitude of 396 feet, extend almost parallel 
with each other in an easterly and westerly direction. They 
are separated by tw^o twin valleys, which are crossed perpen- 
dicularly, from south to north, by the great highway from 
Charleroi to Brussels. These two valleys are narrow and of 
slight depth; from the inn of La Belle Alliance to the crests 
of Mont Saint-Jean the distance is 1,300 yards, as the crow 
flies, and the depth of the lowest valley is about 330 feet. 
East of the great highway there is the valley of Smohain, which, 
very rough, gradually contracts itself, becomes a ravine, and 
finishes by confounding itself with the bed of the stream of 
Ohain; on the west there is the valley of Braine I'Alleud, which 
also presents multiple undulations, and through which passes 
diagonally the route of Nivelles. This route runs in an S.S.W. 
and N.N.E. direction. After having reached the plateau of 
Mont Saint-Jean, it joins, at the hamlet of the same name, thus 
forming an acute angle, the main highway, which traverses, at 
nearly a league beyond this point, the village of Waterloo, 
built in a hollow in the Forest of Soignes, and continues to- 
wards Brussels through the forest. 

As seen from La Belle Alliance, the great highway of Brus- 
sels, which ascends and descends in a straight line, apppears 
verv steep. This, however, is an illusion of the perspective. 
In reality the slope has not so great an inclination. A hors em^an 
can climb the hill at a sustained gallop without urging or 
blowing his horse. But on the right and left of the highway 

158 



The Battle of Waterloo. 159 

the very uneven ground falls abruptly in many spots. It is 
an infinite succession of hills and vaheys, swales and hum- 
mocks, furrows and ridges. Nevertheless, in looking from 
the heights, the double valley presents the appearance of a 
plain extending without marked depressions between two hills 
of slight elevation. It is necessary to pass through the fields 
in order to see these incessant and undulating movements of 
the ground, similar to the waves of the sea. 

The road from Chain to Braine I'Alleud, which skirts the 
crest of the plateau of Mont Saint-Jean, and there intersects at 
right angles the route of Brussels, covers with a line of natu- 
ral obstacles almost all of the English position. East of the 
great highway, this road is even with the ground ; but a double 
row of quickset hedges, tall and stiff, renders it impassable to 
cavalry. On the west side, on account of a sudden rise of the 
ground, the road of Ohain extends between two banks from 
five to seven feet high ; it thus forms, for the space of 400 yards, 
a redoubtable shelter-trench ; then it rises again to the surface 
and continues its course without presenting other obstacles 
than a few scattered hedges. In the rear of the crest which 
forms the screen the ground slopes downward towards the 
north, rendering the position very favorable to the defense. 
The troops of the second line and the reserves are concealed 
from the enemy and partly protected from his fire. 

Spread over a radius of 3,500 yards, half-way up the hill 
and in the vallevs, the Chateau of Hougoumont, with its 
chapel its vast commons, its park enclosed with walls, its 
orchard surrounded by hedges, and the coppices which defends 
its southern approach; the farm of La Haye Samte, a massive 
stone building, flanked by an orchard bordered by hedges and 
a terraced garden; a mound surmounting the excavation of a 
sand-pit and protected by a hedge; finally, the hamlet ot 
Smohain— form so many bastions, galleries, and redoubts m 
front of the position. 

The horizon is limited on the north by the green masses 
of the Forest of Soignes, against which the steeples of Mont 
Saint-Jean and Braine I'Alleud stand out m bold relief^ On 
the northeast extend the woods of Ohain and Pans, and far- 
ther on the wood of Chapelle Saint-Lambert. On the east the 
woods of Vardre and Hubermont line the tops of the hills 
which crown the ravine of Lasne, which has its source near the 
village of Plancenoit. All the rest of the ground is open. 



i6o Watekloo. 

The summits of the plateaux, the hillsides, and the valleys, were 
everywhere covered with tall rye, which had begun to ripen. 
In short, a vast rampart (the plateau of Mont Saint-Jean), 
rising above the valleys of Smohain and Braine I'Alleud; two 
rows of hedges, then a double wall like a parapet (the road of 
Ohain), from whence all points of approach are commanded 
by a plunging fire ; six advanced works (Hougoumont, I^a Haye 
Sainte, the sand-pit, Papelotte, La Haye, and Smohain) ; 
some debouches suitable for counter-attacks; and in the rear 
of the parapet a sloping ground, hidden from view of the enemy, 
crossed by two great highways, favoring the rapid movements 
of supports and of artillery reserves — such was the position 
chosen by Wellington. 

II. 

The English had bivouacked in some disorder over all the 
extent of the plateau. Awakened at dawn, they beg*in to 
kindle the fires, to prepare their breakfast, and to clean their 
arms and uniforms. Instead of drawing the charges from the 
guns, the greater number of the soldiers discharged them in 
the air. There was a continual fusillade, giving the illusion of 
a combat. The outposts of Napoleon were either lacking in 
vigilance or well inured to war, for no French relation mentions 
the false alarm caused by this fusillade. About six o'clock, 
to the discordant summons of trumpets, pibrochs, and drums, 
sounding and beating on all sides at the same time, the troops 
assembled. The inspection over, battalions, squadrons, and 
batteries, guided by staff officers, marched to occupy their 
positions of combat. 

The English brigades of Maitland and Byng (Guards) and 
Colin Halkett, the Hanoverian brigade of Kielmansegge, and 
the Anglo-German brigade of Ompteda, established them- 
selves in the first line along the road of Ohain — the right 
(Byng), near the route of Nivelles; and the left (Ompteda), 
resting on the route of Brussels. liast of this route, and also 
along the road of Ohain, were stationed the English brigades 
of Kempt and Pack (Picton's division), the Dutch-Belgian 
brigade of Bylandt, and the Hanoverian brigade of Best. 

These nine brigades formed the center or, more correctly 
speaking, almost the entire front of the Allied Army; for, in 
Wellington's order of battle, there was, properly speaking, no 
center. There were a right and left center, separated by the 



The Battlk of Waterloo. i6i 

route of Brussels, and the two wings. The right wing, com- 
posed of the English brigades of Adam and Mitchell, of the 
Hanoverian brigade of William Halkett, and the Anglo- 
German brigade of Duplat, was en potencc between the route 
of Nivelles and Merbe Braine ; on the extreme right the Dutch- 
Belgian division of Chasse occupied the ground in front of 
Braine I'Alleud. The left consisted only of the Nassauer 
brigade of the Prince of Saxe-Weimar and the Hanoverian 
brigade of Wincke; these troops were stationed above Pape- 
lotte, La Haye, and Smohain, with detachments in these posi- 
tions. On the extreme left the English cavalry brigades of 
Vandeleur and Vivian flanked the army in the direction of 
Ohain. 

The reserve formed upon the plateau in two lines, the 
second line near the farm of Mont Saint -Jean. It comprised, 
behind the right center, the Nassauer brigade of Kruse, the 
entire corps of Brunswick (infantry and cavalry), the Anglo- 
German cavalry brigades of Grant, Dornberg, and Arenschild, 
the Horse Guard brigade of Somerset, the brigades of Trip and 
Van Merlen (Dutch -Belgian carbineers and hussars) ; and be- 
hind the left center, the English brigade of Lambert, the Eng- 
lish brigade of dragoons of Poneonby, and the Dutch-Belgian 
brigade of dragoons of Ghigny. 

The artillery was disposed as follows: four batteries 
along the front of the right center; the same number at the 
center of the line of battle, at the intersection of the route of 
Brussels and the road of Ohain; four along the front of the left 
center; two on the right wing; two on the extreme left with 
Chasse ; two foot and seven horse batteries in the second line, 
behind the right center; and three batteries in reserve, near 
the farm of Mont Saint-Jean. 

Against the impetuous onslaught of the French columns 
WelHngton had employed in Spain and Portugal a very peculiar 
kind of tactics. He placed his first line of infantry in the rear 
of the crests, so as to conceal it from the view and from the 
blows of the enemy during the preparatory period of the as- 
sault and even during the assault itself. It was only when 
the assailants, disunited by the ascension under the fire of 
the chains of sharpshooters and of the batteries established 
upon the crests, that the EngUsh battalions, which until then 
had not suffered, unmasked themselves, delivered a point 
blank discharge, and charged with the bayonet. The ground 



1 62 Waterloo. 

of Mont Saint-Jean favored this kind of tactics. "Form in 
the usual manner," said Wellington to the general officers. 
Thus, with the exception of the Belgian brigade of Bylandt 
and a chain of sharpshooters which were posted on the slopes 
— so to speak, in the advance line — all the infantry took 
position at 20, 100, and 200 yards behind the road of Ohain. 
These troops were completely masked, some by the banks and 
quickset hedges of the road, and others by reason of the in- 
terior declivity of the plateau. This declivity also favored 
the reserves by preventing them from being seen from the op- 
posite height. The batteries were established along the front, 
in front of and behind the road of Ohain, according to the 
nature of the ground and the extent of the field of fire. Em- 
brasures had been opened for the guns in the banks and hedges. 

The farms and the unevenness of the ground, forming ad- 
vanced works, had been put in a state of defense. A barricade 
had been erected across the route of Brussels on a line with 
ha, Haye Sainte; and an abattis closed the route of Nivelles. 
Hougoumont was occupied by seven companies of the ist and 
2nd (Coldstreams) and 3rd Regiments of English Guards, a com- 
pany of Hanoverians, and a battalion of Nassauers; La Haye 
Sainte, by five companies of the German Legion; the sand-pit 
and its approaches, by a battalion of the 95th; and Papelotte, 
La Haye, and the first houses of vSmohain, by detachments of 
the Prince of vSaxe-Weimar. 

Wellington had confidence only in his English troops. 
This is why the troops of his nationality alternated along the 
line of battle with the different allied contingents. He desired 
the latter to be everywhere soldily encircled. 

After deducting the losses suffered on June i6th and 17th, 
the Duke had in line 67,700 men and 184 pieces of artillery. 
He would have been able to concentrate at Mont Saint-Jean a 
greater number of combatants; but, still uneasy for his lines 
of communication with the sea, and fearing that a French corps 
would turn his right, he had left inactive between Hal and 
Enghien — four leagues, as the crow flies, from Mont Saint- 
Jean — ^nearly 17,000 men and 30 guns, under Prince Frederick 
of the Low Countries. What a capital fault was this detach- 
ment on the eve of a battle, to guard against a chimerical 
danger! As General Brialmont has very aptly said, "One has 
never been able to explain how Wellington could have at- 
tributed to his adversary a plan of operations which must 



The Battle of Watekloo, 163 

hasten the junction of the allied armies, when, from the be- 
ginning of the campaign, Napoleon had evidently manoeuvred 
to prevent this junction." 

Whilst the troops were taking up their positions, Welling- 
ton, accompanied by Muffling and a few officers, traversed 
the line of battle. He examined carefully all the positions 
and descended as far as Hougoumont. Often he leveled 
his glass upon the heights occupied by the French. He was 
mounted upon his favorite horse, "Copenhagen," a superb 
pure-blooded bay, that had been trained at Vittoria and Tou- 
louse. Wellington wore his ordinary field uniform — pantaloons 
of white buckskin, boots with tassels, dark blue coat, and short 
cloak of the same color, white cravat, small hat without plumes, 
orhamented with the black cockade of England and three 
others, of smaller size, of the colors of Portugal, Spain, and the 
Low Countries. He was very calm. His face reflected the 
confidence inspired by the assured cooperation of the Prussian 
Army 

illl. 

The orders of the Emperor prescribed that all the army 
corps should be by nine o'clock sharp upon their positions of 
battle, ready to attack. But the troops who had passed the 
night at Genappe, Glabais, and in the scattered farms of the 
neighborhood were a long time in rallying, cleaning their arms 
and making soup. Besides, they had only the great highway 
of Brussels by which to debouch. The corps of Reille did not 
arrive on a line with Caillou until nine o'clock. The Foot 
Guard, the cuirassiers of Kellermann, the corps of Lobau, and 
the division of Durutte were far in the rear. T'o begin the 
action, the Emperor wished rightly or wrongly to have all his 
force under his hand, and besides, it does not appear that the 
condition of the ground yet permitted of the manoeuvring 
of the artillery. At least, this was the opinion of Napoleon 
and Drouot. 

About eight o'clock the Emperor had breakfasted at the 
farm of Caillou with Soult, the Duke of Bassano, Drouot, and 
many general officers. After the repast, which had been served 
in vessels of silver bearing the imperial arms, the maps of Fer- 
rari and Capitaine had been unfolded upon the table. The 
Emperor said: "The enemy's army is superior to ours by 
more than a quarter. We have, none the less, ninety chances 



164 Wateeloo. 

out of a hundred in our favor." Ney, who entered at this 
moment, heard these words. He had just come from the ad- 
vance posts, and had taken some movement of the English for 
the beginning of a retreat; he exclaimed: "No doubt, sire, if 
Wellington were simple enough to wait for you. But I come 
to announce to you that his retreat is pronounced, and that, 
if you do not hasten to attack, the enemy will escape you." 
"You have seen wrong," replied the Emperor; "the time is 
gone for that. Wellington would expose himself to certain 
destruction. He has thrown the dice, and they are for us." 

Soult was anxious. He apprehended the arrival of the 
Prussians upon the battle-field no more than did the Emperor — 
he judged that the French were rid of them for many days. 
But he regretted that Marshal Grouchy with 33,000 men had 
been detached to pursue Bliicher, when a single corps of in- 
fantry and a few thousand cavalry would have sufficed. Half 
of the troops of the right wing, he thought, would be far more 
useful in the great battle which was to be fought with the 
English Army, so firm, so stubborn, and so formidable. As 
Lefebvre's chief of staff, Soult had carried by assault, July 9, 
1794, this same plateau of Mont Saint- Jean, and had thrown 
back from the Forest of Soignes the Imperialists into Brussels. 
But he knew that the English infantry was far more tenacious 
than the Austrian ; so, on the previous evening, he had advised 
the Emperor to recall a part of the troops put under the orders 
of Grouch3^ During the morning he had reiterated his advice. 
Napoleon, impatient, brutally replied: "Because you have 
been beaten by Wellington you regard him as a great general. 
I tell you that Wellington is a bad general, that the English are 
bad troops, and that this will be a very small affair." ' 'I hope 
it may," said Soult. 

Soon after, Reille and J6r6me entered. The Emperor 
asked Reille his opinion of the English Army, which this gen- 
eral must well know, from having so often fought it in Spain. 
Reille replied: "Well posted, as Wellington knows how to do, 
and attacked in front, I regard the English infantry as invin- 
cible on account of its calm tenacity and the superiority of its 
fire. Before attacking it with the bayonet, it may be expected 
that half of the assailants will be struck down. But the Eng- 
lish Army is less agile, less supple, and less skillful than our army. 
If it cannot be defeated by a frontal attack, it may be done 
by manoeuvring." For Napoleon, who had never fought a 



The Battle op Wateuloo. 165 

pitched battle with the English, the advice of a vet^an of the 
Spanish wars was worthy of consideration. But, irritated, 
perhaps, because Reille had spoken so frankly, at the risk of 
discouraging the generals who listened, he appeared to attach 
no importance to it. He broke off the interview by an ex- 
clamation of incredulity. 

The weather had cleared up and the sun shone; a rather 
stiff wind — a drying wind, as one says in venery— began to 
blow. vSome of the artillery officers reported that they had 
gone over the ground, and that the guns would be able to 
manoeuvre. Napoleon called for his horses. Before starting 
he received with kindness the farmer Boucqueau, who with his 
family had returned from Plancenoit on learning that the Em- 
peror was at Caillou. The old man complained of having been 
pillaged the day before by the enemy's stragglers. Napoleon, 
who appeared to be deeply absorbed, seemed to be thinking 
of something more important than these grievances. He fin- 
ished by saying: "Be tranquil; you shall have a safe-guard." 
This did not appear superfluous, for the imperial quarters were 
to quit Caillou during the day. It was said that the Army 
would sleep in Brussels. 

The Emperor, skirting at a rapid trot the flank of the col- 
umns which were still debouching from Genappe, advanced in 
front of La Belle Alliance, upon the very line of sharpshooters, 
to observe the enemy's positions. A Fleming named Decoster 
was his guide. This man kept a small inn on the side of the road 
between Rossomme and La Belle Alliance ; he had been taken 
from his house at five in the morning and brought to the Em- 
peror, who had called for someone who knew the country. 
As the maps which Napoleon used in his campaigns only indi- 
cated in a general and summary manner the undulations of the 
ground, he nearly always took a guide. Decoster had been 
watched closely, for he seemed anxious to escape; and on 
leaving Caillou he had been lifted and boimd upon a troop- 
horse whose saddle was attached by a halter to the saddle-bow 
of a chasseur of the escort. During the battle he cut, naturahy 
a poor figure amidst the bullets and cannon-balls. He twisted 
in his saddle, turned his head, and leaned over the shoulders of 
his horse At one time the Emperor said to him : "My friend, 
do not fidget so. A bullet can kill you as well from behind as 
in front and will make an uglier wound." According to local 
traditions, Decoster, either through imbecility or ill-will, gave 



1 66 Waterloo. 

during the entire day false information. Another guide had 
been brought to the Emperor — a certain Joseph Bourgeois — 
from the hamlet of Odeghien. He stammered from fear and 
kept his eyes fixed obstinately upon the ground. Napoleon 
dismissed him. When asked how the Emperor looked, he 
said: "Had his face been the dial of a watch, one would not 
have dared to look for the hour." 

The Emperor remained for some time in front of La Belle 
Alliance. After having ordered General Haxo to ascertain 
whether the P^nglish had constructed any entrenchments, he 
went to post himself, at nearly 1,500 yards in the rear, upon a 
hillock, which rises near the farm of Rossomme. There were 
brought from the farm-house a chair and a small table, upon 
which were unfolded his maps. About two o'clock, when the 
action was seriously engaged, the Emperor established him- 
self upon another eminence, nearer the line of battle, at some 
distance from the inn of Decoster. General Foy, who had 
recognized him from a distance by his gray great-coat, saw 
him walking to and fro, his hands crossed behind his back, 
halting, leaning over the table, and then resuming his walk. 

At Caillou, Jerome had acquainted his brother with the 
words heard the day before at Genappe in the inn of the Roi 
d'Espagne. The waiter who had served him with supper, 
after having served Wellington with dinner, related that an 
aide-de-camp of the Duke had spoken of a junction concerted 
between the English and Prussian armies in front of the Forest 
of Soignes. This Belgian, who appeared to be well informed, 
had even added that the Prussians would arrive by way of 
Wavre. The Emperor treated these words with incredulity. 
"After a battle Hke that of Fleurus," said he, " the junction of 
the English and Prussians is impossible before two days; be- 
sides, the Prussians have Grouchy on their traces." Grouchy, 
always Grouchy! The Emperor had too much confidence in 
the information as well as the promise of his lieutenant. Ac- 
cording to the letter of the Marshal, written from Gembloux 
at ten in the evening, and which had arrived at Caillou about 
two in the morning, the Prussian Army, reduced to nearly 
30,000 men, had divided itself into two columns, one of which 
seemed to be directing itself towards Liege and the other on 
Wavre, perhaps to join Wellington. Grouchy had added that 
if the reports of his cavalry apprised him that the main body 
of the Prussians was withdrawing on Wavre, he would follow it, 



The Battle of Watekloo. 167 

"in order to separate it from Wellington." All this was well 
calculated to reassure the Emperor. But had the Prussians 
but 30,000 men? had they not divided themselves to march? 
and would they not concentrate to fight? Would Grouchy, of 
whom the}^ were greatly in advance, overtake them in time? 
Either Napoleon did not ask himself all these questions or he 
answered them in the manner most conformable with his de- 
sires. Bhnded like Grouchy, he beheved that the Prussians 
would halt at Wavre, or that, at all events, they would advance 
on Brussels, and not on Mont Saint-Jean. From Rossomme 
the Emperor contented himself with writing to Grouchy to in- 
form him that a Prussian column had passed through Saint- 
Gery, directing itself on Wavre, and to order him to march as 
swiftly as possible on that point, pushing the enemy in front 
of him. 

A few minutes later the Emperor ordered Colonel Marbot 
to take position behind Frichermont with the 7th Hussars and 
to send detachments to Lasne, Couture, and the bridges of 
Mousty and Ottignies. vShould we infer from this that Na- 
poleon had suddenly an intuition of the movement that was 
about to be proposed to Grouchy by Gerard, and that he 
thought that before receiving his despatch the Marshal, instead 
of following the Prussians to Wavre, would pass the Dyle at 
Mousty to advance on their left flank? Or should we believe 
that, in the mind of the Emperor, these detachments were 
merely intended to reconnoitre the right of the Army and to 
connect the communications with Grouchy's corps by assuring 
the passage of the couriers? 

IV. 

The troops began to take their positions for battle. Na- 
poleon, on horseback, passed them in review as they formed 
on the ground. The entire plateau was furrowed with troops 
on the march. The corps of d'Erlon closed up on its right, in 
order to permit that of Reille to establish itself on its left. 
On the flanks and in the rear of these first lines of infantry- 
infantry of the Line, with blue coats, white pantaloons, and 
gaiters,' light infantry clothed entirely in blue and gaitered in 
black— eight divisions of cavalry began to deploy, sabres and 
cuirasses glittering in the sun, and lance pennons fluttering m 
the wind. It was a chatovment of bright colors and metallic 



i68 Waterloo. 

flashes. The chasseurs, wearing a dark green jacket with 
purple, gold-colored, and scarlet trimmings, were succeeded 
by the hussars, whose dolmans, pelisses, Hungarian pantaloons, 
and plumes varied in color in each regiment — maroon and blue, 
red and sky-blue, gray and blue, green and scarlet. Then 
passed the dragoons, wearing copper helmets and tiger-skin 
turbans, white straps crossing over a green coat with red 
or yellow trimmings, and musketoon at saddle-bow^ striking 
against the rigid boot; the lancers, green like the chasseurs 
and having like them the sheep-skin schabrack, but distin- 
guished from them by the crested helmet, the cut and color of 
the plastron ; the cuirassiers, who wore the short imperial blue 
coat with collar, facings, and sleeve-trimmings of red or yellow, 
according to the regiment, white pantaloons, tall boots, cuirass 
and helmet of steel, with copper crest and floating criniere; 
the carbineers, giants of six feet, clothed in white, wearing 
golden cuirasses and coifed, like antique heroes, with great 
helmets with red crests. The Horse Guard deployed in the 
second line : dragoons with green coats with white facings and 
helmets with red plumes ; grenadiers wdth blue coats and scar- 
let trimmings, leather pantaloons, oranee-colored epaulets and 
shoulder-knots, and great bear-skin caps with plume and four- 
ragere; lancers, who wore a red kurka with blue plastron, 
white and yell)W epaulets and shoulder-knots, red pantaloons 
with a blue stripe, red shapska ornaments with ;i copper plate 
with the crowned N and surmounted by a snow-white plume 
eighteen inches high ; finally, the chasseurs with green dolmans 
trimmed in orange-colored braid, red pelisses edged with fur, 
kolbachs with scarlet pendant and a great green and red plume. 
The epaulets, braid, stripes, and brandenburgs of the officers 
scintillated with gold and silver. 

Other troops debouched by the Brussels route. There ar- 
rived men and horses and cannon as far as the eye could reach; 
the numerous battalions of Lobau, the chasseurs of Domon, the 
lancers of Subervic ; the foot artillery, in its simple dark blue 
uniform relieved by red ; the horse artillery, the front of the 
dolman covered with scarlet brandenburgs ; the Young Guard, 
tirailleurs with red epaulets, voltigeurs with green ones; the 
foot cannoneers of the Guard, wearing great bear-skin caps 
and marching near those redoubtable 12-pounders, which the 
Emperor called his "most beautiful daughters." Far in the 
rear advanced the sombre columns of the Old Guard. Chas- 



Thjc Battlp: of Waterloo. 169 

seur-j and grenadiers wore their campaign uniform — blue pant- 
aloons, long blue coat with a row of buttons down the front, 
and bear-skin caps without plume or cordon. Their parade 
uniform for the triumphal entrance into Brussels was in their 
haversacks, which made for them, with their ecjuipment and 
their fifty cartridges, a load of Lixty-live pounds. The gren- 
adiers were di tinguished from the chasseurs only by their 
greater stature, the copper plate upon their bear-skin caps, 
and their epaulets, which were blood-red, while those of their 
comrades were green with red fringes. The one and the other 
wore their hair done up in a queue and powdered, and massive 
gold rings in their ears. 

The drums beat, the trumpets sounded, and the bands 
played "Let us watch over the safety of the Empire." In 
pacsing before the Emperor, the standard-bearers inclined the 
flag — the flags of the Champ du Mai, the new flags, but bap- 
tized alreadv at Eigny in fire and blood — the horsemen bran- 
di hed their sabres^ and the infantry waved their shakos on the 
point of their bayonets. The acclamations dominated and 
drowned the roll of the drums and the blare of the trumpets. 
Cheer J of "Long live the Emperor!" followed one another with 
such vehemence and such rapidity that they prevented the 
commands from being heard. "Never," says an officer of the 
ist Corps, "had one cried 'Long live the Emperor!' with more 
enthusiasm; it bordered on frenzy. And that which rendered 
this scene more solemn and impressive was that in front of us, 
at a thousand steps, perhaps, the sombre red line of the English 
Army was seen." 

The infantry of d'Erlon and Reille deployed in the first 
line, abreast of La Belle Alliance— the four divisions of d'Erlon, 
in two ranks, the right facing Papelotte and the left supported 
on the route of Brussels; the three divisions of Reille, in the 
same formation, the right resting on this route and the left not 
far from that of Nivelles. The light cavalry of Jacquinot and 
Pire, in line of battle in three ranks, flanked the right of d'Erlon 
and the left of Reille. In the second line, the infantry of Lobau 
established itself in double columns of divisions on the left of 
the route of Brussels, and the cavalry of Domon and Subervic 
placed itself in serried columns of squadrons along and to the 
right of this highway. Prolonging the second line, the cuir- 
assiers of Milhaud and Kellermann were in line of battle in 
two ranks, the former on the right, the latter on the left. The 
—12— 



I70 



WVILRU.O. 



Imperial Guard remained in reserve near Rossomme — the in- 
fantry (Young Guard, Middle Guard, and Old Guard), in six 
lines, each of four battalions, deployed on both sides of the 
route of Brussels; the light cavalry of Lefebvre-Desnoettes 
(lancers and chasseur.), in two lines, a hundred paces behind 
the cuirassiers of Milhaud; the reserve cavalry of Guyot 
(dragoons aud grenadiers), likewsi- in two lines, the same dis- 
tance behind the cuirassiers of Kellermann. 

The artillery of d'Erlon was in the intervals between the 
brigades, that of Reille in front of his line of battle, and that of 
Lobau on the leii flank. Each divi' ion of cavalry had near it 
its horse battery. The batteries of the Guard were entirely 
in the rear, between Rossomme and the Maison du Roi. The 
route of Brussels and the roads which cross it, left free inten- 
tionally, permitted the reinforcements of artillery to move 
rapidly on all points. 

There were in position nearly 74,000 men and 246 guns. 
On the other side of the valley, at 1,300 3^ards, as the crow 
flies, were massed 67,000 Anglo-Dutch. Never in the wars of 
the Revolution and Empire had so great a number of combat- 
ants occupied so restricted a field. The distance from the farm 
of Mont Saint-Jean, position occupied by the .last reserves of 
Wellington, to the farm of Caillou, where were the imperial 
treasure and the baggage under the protection of a battalion 
of chasseurs of the Old Guard, is 4,500 yards, and the front of 
each of the two armies was hardly more than three-quarters of 
a league in extent. On account of the serrated ridges of the 
plateau, the two armies, although in parallel order, were not 
square. The English right wing overlapped the center and 
the left was refused. The French Army, having the right in 
advance, the left center in the rear, and the extremity of the 
left wing en fieche, formed a concave and enveloping line. 

It was nearly eleven o'clock, and ah the troops had not 
yet reached the po.itions assigned them. The Emperor even 
thought that he would not be able to begin the attack before 
one in the afternoon. He returned to his observatory at Ros- 
somme, where he dictated to Soult the following order : " As soon 
as all the Army will have formed in line of battle, probably by 
one in the afternoon, the Emperor will give the order to Manhal 
Ney, and the attack will begin in order to obtain possession 
of the village of Mont Saint-Jean, at the intersection of the 
routes. For this purspose. the batteries of 12-pounderp of tl e 



The Battle or Watekloo. 171 

2nd and 6th Corps will unite with those of the ist. These 
twenty-four pieces of ordnance will fire on the troops at Mont 
Saint-Jean, and Count d'Erlon will begin the attack with his 
left division supporting it, according to circun^. stances, with 
the other divi ions of the i st Corps. The 2nd Corps will advance 
in such a manner as to keep abreast of Count d'Erlon. The 
companies of sappers belonging to the ist Corps will hold them- 
selves in readiness to barricade themselves immediately in 
Mont Saint-Jean." 

This order leaves no doubt as to the intention of the Em- 
peror. His object was to pierce the center of the EngHsh 
Army and to throw it back beyond Mont Saint- Jean. Once 
master of this poiition, which commands the plateau, he would 
act according to circumstances against the broken enemy — 
already he would have virtually gained the victory. Thus 
Napoleon forgot or scorned the advice of Reille, that, by reason 
of the precision of fire and of the solidity of the English in- 
fantry, one could hope to conquer it only by manoeuvres. He 
disdained to manoeuvre. 

No doubt an attack against Wellington's right, very 
numerous, covered by the village of Braine I'Alleud and the 
farm of Hougoumont, and having the village of Merbe Braine 
for reduit, would have exacted much time and great efforts; 
but the extremity of the enemy's left wing was very weak, 
entirely in the air, badly protected and easy to outflank. It 
was by Papelotte and ha Haye Sainte that one should have 
operated at first. It appears that for a moment the Emperor 
had an idea of doing so. But what a fine result, for Napoleon, 
to inflict a half-defeat upon the English and to throw them 
back on Hal and Enghien! He desired the battle to be de- 
cisive. As at Ligny, he sought to pierce the enemy's army in 
the center in order to dislocate and exterminate it. He would 
employ his usual tactics — the parallel order, the direct attack, 
the assault by masses at the strongest point of the English 
front, without other preparation than a deluge of cannon-balls. 

The Emperor, it is true, could not well estimate the number 
of the English nor the strength of their position. More than 
half of the Allied Army was masked by the undulations of the 
ground, and General Haxo, charged with ascertaining if there 
were any entrenchments in front of the enemy's poition, had 
reported that he had discovered no trace of any fortifications. 
Haxo's sight or judgment was at fault, for the sunken road of 



172 Waterloo. 

Ohain, the sand-pit, the barricade across the route of Brussels^ 
the abattis closing the route of Nivelles, and the farms of 
Hougoumont, La Have Sainte, and Papelotte, could well be 
classed as formidable entrenchments. 



CHAPTER III. 

The Battle of Waterloo. 

From Half-past Eleven to Three o'Cloc . 

I. — Attack of Hougoumont by Jerome Bonaparte's division of Reille's 
corps. 
II. — Appearance of Bulow's corps upon the heights of Chapelle Saint- 
Lambert. — New despatch of Napoleon to Grouchy. 
III. — Attack of La Haye Sainte and of the plateau of Mont Saint- Jean 

by the corps of Count d'Erlon. 
IV. — Counter-attack of the English of Picton. — Charge of the Horse 
Guards of Somerset. — Mishap of the cuirassiers in the hollow 
road. 
V. — Charge of the dragoons of Ponsonbv. — Rout of d'Erlon's infantry 
— Counter- charge of the lancers of Jacquinot and the cuirassiers 
of Farine. — Burning of Hougoumont. 

I. 

A few minutes after having dictated the order of attack, 
the Kmperor thought of preparing for the assault of Mont Saint- 
Jean b}" a demonstration on the side of Hougoumont. By 
threatening Wellington's right he might cause him to weaken 
his center. Appreciating, finally, the value of time, Napoleon 
resolved to make this movement without waiting until all his 
troops had reached their positions of battle. About a quarter- 
past eleven o'clock Reille received the order to occupy the 
approaches of Hougoumont. 

Reille charged with this minor operation Prince Jerome, 
whose four regiments formed his left. In order to protect the 
movement, a division battery of the 2d Corps opened firen 
against the positions of the enemy. Three English batteries, 
established upon the edge of the plateau, to the east of the 
route of Nivelles, replied. At the first cannon-shot some Eng- 
lish ofiicers looked at their watches. It was thirty-five minutes 
past eleven. 

During this artillery duel, in which soon took part other 
batteries of the English right, a part of Reille's artillery and 
the horse batteries of Kellermann (the latter by command of 
the Emperor), Bauduin's brigade of Jerome's division, preceded 

i7,S 



1 74 Waterloo. 

by its skirmishers, descended into the valley in columns of 
echelons. At the same time the lancers of Pire made a dem- 
onstration along the route of Nivelles. The ist Light, having 
at its head Jerome and General Bauduin, the latter of whom 
was killed at the beginning of the combat, attacked the wood 
with the bayonet. In spite of the obstinate defense of the ist 
Nassau Battalion and of a company of Hanoverian carbineers, 
the French succeeded in establishing themselves on the out- 
skirts of the wood. There still remained three hundred yards 
of very thick undergrowth to be conquered. The 3rd of the Line 
entered the wood behind the lit Light. The enemy retired 
step bv step, concealing himself behind each cluster of trees, 
delivering his fire at almost point-blank range, and incersantly 
resuming the offensive. One hour was required to clear the 
wood of the Nassauers and the companies of English Guards 
who had come to reinforce them. 

On debouching from the wood, the French found them- 
selves at thirty steps from the Chateau of Hougoumont, a vast 
stone building, and from the park wall, six feet in height. It 
was simply a question of Jerome "remaining in the valley be- 
hind the wood and throwing out towards the front a strong 
line of skirmishers." But, either because the order had been 
badly understood or expressed, or because the brother of the 
Emperor was unwilling to limit himself to this passive role, or 
because the soldiers, who were very much animated, advanced 
spontaneously, the French rushed to the assault. Wall and 
ramparts were pierced with loopholes, through which the Eng- 
lish opened a sustained fire. Sheltered behind the walls, they 
aimed carefuhy ; fired at point-blank range, every bullet found 
its billet. The soldiers of Jerome wasted their shots at an in- 
visible enemy. vSome attempted to break down the great gate 
with the butt-ends of their muskets; but the gate being built 
in a reentering angle, they were exposed to a fire in front and 
flank. Others, who endeavored to scale the wall by climbing 
upon each other's shoulders, Avere spitted on the bayonets of 
the English. The dead and wounded accumulated in heaps 
at the foot of Hougoumont. The assailants sought shelter 
in the wood. 

General Guilleminot, Jerome's chief of staff, advised him 
to confine himself to this first attack, to break off the combat, 
and to simply occupy the wood. Reille, according to his rela- 
tion of the battle, sent analogous orders. But Jerome re- 



The Battle of Waterloo. 175 

mained deaf to all entreaty. He was bent on c£.rrying the posi- 
tion. He summoned his second brigade (General Soye) to re- 
lieve in the wood Bauduin's brigade, and with* the survivors of 
this brigade he turned Hougoumont by the west. His column, 
which was no longer covered, marched under the fire of the 
English batteries, firing at a range of dx hundred yards. It 
reached, however, the northern facade of Hougoumont and 
delivered the assault. 

Whilst Colonel de Cubieres falls, severely wounded, from 
his horse, a giant, surnamed The Crusher, Lieutenant Legros, 
seizes the axe of a sapper and breaks a panel of the gate. A 
handful of soldiers throw themselves with him into the court. 
Surrounded on all sides by the English, they are all shot, ex- 
terminated — not one escapes. At this moment the Frerch 
column is assailed by four companies of Coldstreams, sole re- 
inforcement which Wellington, who watches from a distance 
the combat, but who is not deceived as to the importance of 
the attack of Hougoumont, has judged necessary to send there. 
Taken between two fires, the decimated battalions of Jerom.e 
withdraw, part into the wood and part towards the route of 
Nivelles. 

II. 

During this combat the Emperor prepared for his great 
attack. He reinforced with the 8-pounders of the at Corps 
and three batteries of the Guard the twenty -four 12-pounders 
which at first had been thought sufficient to cannonade the 
center of the enemy's position. Thus there was formed, in 
front of and to the right of La Belle Alliance, a formidable 
battery of eighty guns. It was nearly one o'clock. Ney sent 
one of his aides-de-camp to Rossonmie to inform the Emperor 
that everything was ready and that he awaited the order to 
attack. Before the smoke from all these guns had interposed 
a screen between the hills. Napoleon wished to take a last look 
at the field of battle. 

At nearly two leagues to the northeast he saw, as it were, a 
dark cloud which seemed to issue from the wood of Chapelle 
Saint Lambert. Although his experienced eye left no doubt 
in his mind, he at first hesitated to admit that it was troops. 
He consulted his entourage. All the field-glasses of the staff 
were directed upon that point. As often happens in such cases, 
there was a difference of opinion. vSome of the ofl^.cers in isted 



176 Watei;[,oo. 

that it was not troops, but a cluster of trees, or the shadow of a 
passing cloud ; others saw a column on the march, and even 
claimed to be able to distinguish French and Prussian uniforms. 
Soult said that he recognized plainly a numerous corps stacking 
arms. 

One was not long in being fully informed. As a detach- 
ment of cavalry started at a gallop to reconnoitre these troops, 
a subaltern of the ist Silesian Hussars, whom the hussars of 
Colonel Marbot had just captured near Lasne, was brought to 
the Emperor. He was the bearer of a letter fmm Bulow to 
Wellington, announcing the arrival of the IV. Corps at Chapelle 
Saint-Lambert. This hussar, who spoke French, showed no 
hesitancy in telling all he knew. "The troops in the distance," 
said he, "are the advance guard of General Bulow. All our 
army passed the night around Wavre. We have seen no 
French troops, and supposed that they were on the march 
towards Plancenoit." 

The presence of a Prussian corps at Chapelle Saint-Lam- 
bert, which would have perplexed the Emperor some minutes 
earlier, at the time when he treated as "chimerical" the words 
of Jerome concerning the projected junction of the two Allied 
Armies, now occasioned very little surprise, for he had received 
in the meantime this letter from Grouchy, dated at Gembloux, 
at six in the morning: "vSire, all my reports and information 
confirm the supposition that the enemy is retiring towards 
Brussels in order to concentrate there or to deliver battle 
after having united with Wellington. The ist and 2nd Corps of 
Bliicher's army appear to be directing themselves, the ist on 
Corbaix and the 2nd on Chaumont. These troops, no doubt, 
started from Tourinnes yesterday at half -past eight in the 
evening, and have marched all night ; fortunately, the weather 
has been so unfavorable that they can not have made much 
progress. I am just starting for Sart-a-Walhain, from whence 
I shall proceed to Corbaix and Wavre." This despatch was 
less reassuring than that of the day before. Instead of the 
two Prussian corps retreating in two columns, one on Wavre 
and the other on Liege, Grouchy announced that these two 
columns were marching concentrically towards Brussels, with 
the probable de?ign of uniting with Wellington. He no longer 
spoke of preventing their junction; and, if it might be con- 
jectured that he would manoeuvre to this effect by advancing 
on Wavre, he seemed to be in no hurry, since at six in the 



The Battle of Waterloo. 177 

morning he had not yet left Gembloux. Doubtless the Emperor 
had a right to hope that the Prussians would march straight 
on Brussels; but it was also very possible that they would 
join the English by a flank march. 

In order to ward off this possible danger, the Emperor 
decided very late to send new instructions to Grouchy. It is 
almost certain that Grouchy's letter had reached the imperial 
headquarters between ten and eleven o'clock. It was only at 
one, a few minutes before discovering the Prussian masses 
upon the heights of Chapelle Saint-Lambert, that the Emperor 
caused Soult to write to Grouchy: "Your movement on 
Corbaix and Wavre is in conformity with the dispositions of 
His Majesty. Nevertheless, the Emperor orders me to say to 
you that you should continue to manoeuvre in our direction 
and seek to draw near the Army (French), in order that you 
may be able to join us before any hostile corps can interpose 
itself between us. I do not indicate the direction for you to 
follow. It is for you to see the point where we are, in order 
that you may regulate your movements accordingly and con- 
nect our communications, as well as be always in position to 
fall upon any troops of the enemy who may seek to threaten 
our right and crush them." 

This despatch had not been forwarded when the Prussian 
columns appeared in the distance. A few minutes after, the 
Emperor, having interrogated the captive hussar, caused this 
postscript to be added: "A letter which has just been inter- 
cepted declares that General Bulow is to attack our right 
flank. We believe that we see now this corps upon the heights 
of Saint-Lambert. So you will not lose an instant in ap- 
proaching and joining us^ in order that you may crush Bulow, 
whom vou will take in the verv act." 

The Emperor then was not greatly alarmed. Though 
judging that the situation was seriously modified, he did not 
regard it as compromised. The reinforcement on its wayto 
join Wellington consisted, after all, of only a single Prussian 
corps, for the prisoner had not said that all the army was 
following Bulow. This armv was probably yet at Wavre. 
Either Grouchy would overtake and attack it there and, con- 
sequently, prevent it from joining Bulow; or, renouncmg the 
pursuit of Bliicher, he was already on the march towards 
Plancenoit bv wav of Moustv, as the hussar supposed, and was 
bringing to 'the principal French Armv a reinforcem:ent ot 



1 78 Waterloo. 

33,000 bayonets. The Emperor, who deceived himseh easily, 
and who wished especially to deceive others, said to Soult! 
"We had this morning ninety chances out of a himdred in our 
favor. We still have sixty against forty. And if Grouchy 
repairs the horrible fault which he has committed in amudng 
himself at Gembloux and marches with rapidity, the victory 
will be more decisive, for the corps of Bulow will be entirely 
destroyed." 

Nevertheless, as Grouchy might be late in arriving, and as 
the advance guard of Bulow was in sight, the Emperor took 
incontinent^ some measures to protect the flank of the army. 
The light cavalry divisions of Domon and Subervic were de- 
tached upon the right, in order to observe the enemy, oc- 
cupy all the debouches, and connect with the heads of col- 
umns of Marshal Grouchy as soon as they should appear. 
Count Lobau received the order to establish the 6th Corps be- 
hind this cavalry, in a good intermediate position, where it 
could hold in check the Prussians. 

III. 

It was nearly half-past one. The Emperor sent to Ney 
the order to attack. The battery of eighty guns opened with 
the noise of thunder a rapid fire, to which the English artihery 
replied. After a half-hour's cannonade the great battery sus- 
pended for an instant its lire, in order to permit the infantry of 
d'Erlon to pass. The four divisions m.arched in echelons, the 
left in advance, with an interval of four hundred yards between 
each echelon. The division of Allix formed the first echelon, 
that of Donzelot the second, that of Marcognet "the third, and 
that of Durutte the fourth. Ney and d'Erlon conducted the 
assault. 

Instead of forming these troops in columns of attack — - 
that is to say, in columns of battalions, with regular intervals 
between each battalion; a tactical formation favorable to 
rapid deployments as well as formation in squares — each 
echelon was made up of a succession of deployed battalions, 
each following the other, at short intervals between. The di- 
visions of Allix, Donzelot, and Marcognet (Durutte had taken 
it on himself not to conform to this disposition) thus presented 
three compact phalanxes, with fronts varying from 160 to 200 
files and a depth of 80 men. Who had prescribed such a forma- 



The Battle of Watekloo. 179 

tioti, perilous under all circumstances, and doubly £o upon 
this difficult ground? Ney, or rather d'Erlon, commanding 
the army corps. At all events, it was not the Emperor, for in 
his general order of eleven o'clock nothing similar had been 
specified; nothing had even been said of an attack in echelons. 
Upon the battle-field Napoleon rightly left all initiative per- 
taining to the execution to his lieutenants. 

Irritated at not having fought the day before, the soldiers 
burned to grapple with the enemy. They rushed forward with 
cries of "Long live the Emperor!" and descended into the 
valley under the vault of iron formed by English and French 
cannon-balls which passed over their heads. The French 
batteries had recommenced firing as soon as the columns had 
reached the dead angle. The advance of Allix's division 
(Quiot's brigade) moved, by a slight conversion to the left, 
against the orchard of La Haye Sainte, from whence cam.e a 
heavy fire. Bourgeois' brigade, forming alone, henceforth, the 
left echelon, continued its march towards the plateau. The 
soldiers of Quiot quickly dislodged from the orchard the Ger- 
man companies and assailed the farm. But, no more than at 
Hougoumont, no one had thought of making a breach in these 
buildings with a few cannon-balls. The French vainly at- 
tempted numerous assaults against the high and solid walls, 
from behind which the Germans of Major Baring kept up a 
murderous fire. One battalion turned the farm, escaladed the 
garden wall, and dislodged the defenders, who reentered the 
buildings; but it could not demolish the walls with the butt- 
ends of their muskets. 

Wellington stood on foot under a great elm planted to 
the west of the route of Brussels, at the intersection of this 
route with the road of Ohain. During almost the entire battle 
he remained on this spot with his staff and the Allied com- 
missioners, Pozo di Borgo, who received a slight contusion; 
Baron de Vincent, who was wounded; Muffling, and Generals 
Hugel and Alava. Seeing the French completely surrounding 
La Haye Sainte, Wellington directed Ompteda to send to the 
assistance of Baring a battalion of the German Legion. The 
Germans descended to the west of the main highway, recaptured 
the garden and, passing to the west of the farm, advanced to- 
wards the orchard. At this moment they were charged by 
the cuirassiers of General Travers, whom the Emperor had de- 
tached from Milhaud's corps to second the attack of the in- 



1 80 Wateei.oo. 

fantry. The cuirassiers rode them down and, with the Fame 
elan, came to sabre on the edge of the plateau the skirmishers 
of Kielmansegge's brigade. 

To the east of the route the other columns of d'Erlon had 
climbed the ascent under the fire of the batteries, the bullets 
of the 95th English and the musketry of Bylandt's brigade, 
deployed in front of the road of Ohain. The charge beat, and 
the pace increased in spite of the tall wheat which impeded 
the march, and of the drenched and slippery ground through 
which the soldiers floundered. The cries of "Long live the 
Emperor!" drowned at intervals the noise of the detonations. 
Bourgeois' brigade (left echelon) repulsed the skirmishers, as- 
sailed the sand-pit, dislodged from it the carbineers of the 95th 
and thrust them back upon the plateau, beyond the hedges, 
which it attained in their pursuit. Donzelot's division (second 
echelon) attacked the right of Bylandt, whilst Marcognet's di- 
vision (third echelon) advanced towards the left of this brigade. 
The Dutch-Belgians fell back, repassed in disorder the hedges 
of the road of Ohain, and in their flight, broke the ranks of the 
28th English. On his side, Durutte, who commanded the 
fourth echelon, dislodged from the farm of Papelotte the light 
companies of Nassau; he was already half-way up the incline, 
threatening the Hanoverians of Best. 

In the Imperial Staff every one thought that "the affair 
was getting on admirably." In fact, if the enemy was still in 
possession of his advance posts of Hougoumont and La Haye 
Sainte, these posts were outflanked, surrounded, and the left 
center of his line of battle was seriously threatened. The cuir- 
assiers of Travers and the skirmishers of d'Erlon seemed on 
the point of crowning the plateau, followed closely by the in- 
fantry. Let these troops make yet a few more steps, let them 
maintain themselves upon these positions long enough to permit 
the reserve cavalry "to deal the coup de massue," and victory 
is certain. 

IV. 

The vicious formation of d'Erlon's columns, which had 
already delayed their march and doubled their losses in the 
ascension of the plateau, was about to lead to a disaster. 
After the skirmishers had overthrown the Dutch of Bylandt, 
Donzelot's divi ion advanced within thirty steps of the road. 
There Donzelot had halted his column to deploy it. During 



The Battle or Waterloo. i8i 

the ascension of the hill the battalions had still further con- 
tracted their intervals. They formed but one dense mass. 
The deployment, or rather the attempt to deploy — for it does 
not appear that the French succeeded in executing the ma- 
noeuvre — consumed a great deal of time. Each command in- 
creased the confusion. The enemy profited by this respite. 
When the French batteries had opened fire, Picton's division 
(brigades of Kempt and Pack) had retrograded, by order of 
Wellington, 150 yards from the road. The men were there, 
in line, but lying on the ground in order to avoid the pro- 
jectiles. Picton saw the Dutch in rout and the French skirm- 
ishers pushing through the hedges and advancing boldly 
against a battery. He ordered his men to rise, and pushed 
Kempt's brigade as far as the road. It drove back the skirm- 
ishers, passed through the hedge, and then, discovering Don- 
zelot's column, occupied in deploying, saluted this column with 
a file-fire at forty steps. Fired upon unexpectedly, and sur- 
prised in the midst of their formation, the French made 
instinctively, involuntarily, a slight retrograde movement. 
Picton, seizing the moment, cried: "Charge! Charge! Hur- 
rah!" The Fnglish passed through the second hedge and 
hurled themselves with fixed bayonets upon this disorderly 
mass, which resisted from its very weight. Though repeatedly 
repulsed, the English returned to the charge. The distance 
was so slight that the discharges set fire to the clothing of the 
combatants. During this hand-to-hand fight a French officer 
was killed in the act of capturing the flag of the 32nd English, 
and the intrepid Picton fell dead, struck by a ball in the temple. 
The column of Marcognet (third echelon) had arrived al- 
most on a line with that of Donzelot at the moment of the flight 
of the Dutch. Marcognet, not having believed it possible to 
deploy his division, had continued his march and had passed 
beyond Donzelot, who had halted. Already, with his leading 
regiment, crying victory, he had passed through the double 
hedge and was advancing against a Hanoverian battery, when, 
to the shrill sounds of the pibroch, the Scotch brigade of Pack 
advanced by battalions, deployed in four ranks. At less than 
twenty vards, the 92nd Highlanders opened fire ; soon after the 
other Scotch fired. On account of their dense formation, the 
French could only reply from the front of a single battalion. 
They delivered one volley and rushed forward with the bayonet. 
The' two lines clashed together; the first ranks were mingled 



1 82 Waterloo. 

in a furious melee. "I pushed a soldier in front of me," relates 
an officer of the 45th Regiment. "I saw him fall at my feet 
from a sabre-blow. I raised my head. It was the English 
cavalry who were riding through our ranks and cutting us 
to pieces." 

As the French were on the point of crowning the plateau, 
the cuirassiers of Travers on the west of the highway and the 
columns of d'Erlon on the east, Lord Uxbridge had ordered 
the elite of his cavalry to charge. Somerset's four regiments 
of Horse Guards (ist and 2nd Life Guards, Blues, and Dragoons 
of the King) started at a gallop in line. In a few strides of their 
horses they arrived within pistol-shot of the cuirassiers, sep- 
arated from them by the road of Ohain. West of the route of 
Brussels this road extended for the distance of 400 yards be- 
tween two steep banks, which disappeared farther on. The 
left of Travers and the right of Somerset charged each other 
at a gallop upon the level part of the road. But the right com- 
panies of the cuirassiers encountered the trench. They reso- 
lutely descended the outer slope and gave the spur to their 
horses in order to mount the opposite bank when, thirty feet 
above them, they beheld the glittering sabres of the 2nd Life 
Guards, coming at full speed. In order to avoid being com- 
pletely crushed, for time and space were lacking to deliver the 
charge, the cuirassiers threaded the hollow road in confusion, 
regained the highway near Wellington's elm, and rallied in a 
field near the sand-pit. The Life Guards, who had pursued 
them in skirting the edge of the route, charged them before 
they had re-formed ; and, after a hand-to-hand combat in which, 
said Lord Somerset, "the blows of the sabres on the cuirasses 
sounded like braziers at work," they overthrew some of the 
cuirassiers in the excavation of the sand-pit. The main body 
of Travers' brigade was broken and forced back to the bottom 
of the valley by the other regiments of Somerset, who, better 
mounted than the cuirassiers, had also the superiority of num- 
bers and the advantage of position on their side. 

V. 

At the same time Ponsonby's brigade of dragoons (Royals, 
Inniskillings, and Scots-Greys) had launched itself against the 
columns of d'Erlon. The Royals debouched from the route of 
Brussels, jostled Bourgeois' brigade, which was fighting with 



The Battle of Waterloo. 183 

the 95th, concealed behind the hedges, and repulsed it as far 
as the sand-pit. The Inniskillings crossed the road through 
the openings made in the double hedge to facilitate the artillery 
fire, and assailed the column of Donzelot. The vScots-Greys, 
thus named on account of the color of their horses, arrived in 
the rear of the battalions of Pack, which opened their ranks to 
let them pass. Highlanders and Scots-Greys saluted each 
other with the cry, "Scotland forever!" and the horsemen fell 
with impetuosity upon the division of Marcognet. Smitten in 
front by the fire' of the infantry , charged on both flanks by the 
cavalry, and paralyzed by their dense formation, the unwieldy 
French columns could offer but slight resistance. The men 
recoiled one upon the other, and the press became so great that 
they lacked the space necessary for firing at, and even for 
striking with their side-arms, the horsemen who penetrated 
their disorganized ranks. Muskets were discharged in the air, 
and the bayonet thrusts, badly directed, missed the mark. 
It was pitiful to behold the English cavalry overthrowing and 
traversing these fine divisions like miserable flocks of sheep. 
Drunk with carnage, encouraging each other to slay, the 
enemy's horsemen pierced and hewed merrily in the throng. 
The columns were broken, truncated, dispersed, and rolled to 
the bottom of the valley under the sabres of the dragoons. 
Bourgeois' brigade, which had raflied at the sand-pit, was 
thrown in disorder and drawn along helter-skelter with the 
fugitives and horsemen. Quiot's brigade abandoned the at- 
tack of La Haye Sainte. Above Papelotte, the division of 
Durutte suffered on its right flank the charges of Vandeleur's 
dragoons (nth, 12th and 13th Regiments), seconded by the 
Dutch dragoons and Belgian hussars of Ghigny. Though 
broken at first, it withdrew without serious loss and repassed 
the ravine, still surrounded by the cavalry. There no longer 
remained a single Frenchman on the slopes of Mont Saint-Jean. 

Carried away by their horses, from which, it is said, they 
had received the order to remove the curb-chains, and excited 
by the pace, noise, combat, and victory, the EngHsh traversed 
the valley at a furious pace and began to mount the opposite 
hill. In vain Lord Uxbridge sounded the retreat. His horse- 
men heard or wished to hear nothing, and climbed at a rapid 
gallop the French positions. 

They were powerless to make any impression on them. 
The Life Guards and dragoons were decimated by the fire of 



1 84 Waterloo. 

Bachelu's division, established near the hillock to the west of 
the highway. The Scots-Greys encountered half-way up the 
slope two division batteries, sabred the gunners and drivers, 
overturned the guns in a ravine, and then assailed the great 
battery. The lancers of Colonel Martigue charged them in 
flank and exterminated them, whilst those of Colonel Bro dis- 
engaged the division of Durutte from the murderous clutches 
of Vandeleur's dragoons. "Never," says Durutte, "had I 
seen so well the superiority of the lance over the sabre." It 
was in this melee that the valiant General Ponsonby met his 
death. Unhorsed by a subaltern of the 4th Lancers, named 
Urban, he had surrendered, when some of his Scots-Greys re- 
turned to rescue him.. Urban, fearing to lose his prisoner, had 
the sad courage to plunge his lance through the body of the 
General; after which he threw himself on the dragoons and 
killed three. 

The magnificent charge of the lancers was soon supported 
by General Farine's brigade of cuirassiers. The Emperor, 
seeing the Scots-Greys on the point of attacking the great 
battery, had sent the order to General Delort, one of Milhaud's 
generals of division, to launch against them two regiments. 
Lancers and cuirassiers swept the acclivities of La Belle Al- 
liance, the entire valley, and pursued the Horse Guards and 
dragoons as far as the first slopes of Mont Saint- Jean, beyond 
La Haye Sainte. The light cavalry brigades of Vivian and 
Van Merlen, which had followed the movement of Lord Ux- 
bridge at a distance, deemed it prudent to take no part in this 
engagement. 

There was a lull in the action. On both sides the soldiers 
regained their positions. The hill-sides, an instant before 
covered with combatants, were abandoned to the dead and 
wounded. "The dead," says an English officer, "were in 
many spots as thick as the overturned pawns on a chess- 
board." The ground presented that desolate appearance of a 
stricken field on the morrow of a battle, and the battle had 
just begun ! 

During this lull in the combat a cuirassier detached himself 
from his regiment, which was re-forming at La Belle Alliance, 
and, at a gallop, descended the great route. He was seen to 
traverse all that mortuary valley, in which he was the sole 
living being. The Germans posted at La Haye Sainte sup- 
posed that he was a deserter, and refrained from firing on him. 



The Battle of Wateeloo. - 185 

When he had arrived oppo ite the orchard, at the foot of the 
hedge, he raised his gigantic body straight up in his stirrups, 
waved his sabre, and cried, "Long live the Emperor!" Then, 
under a hail of bullets, he returned into the French lines in a 
few strides of his vigorous horse. 

At Hougoumont the battle had continued more and more 
ardent. Three companies of English Guards, a battalion of 
Brunswick, one of the German Legion of Duplat, and two reg- 
iments of Foy, had success ivelv reinforced defenders and as- 
sailants. The French, once more in possession of the wood 
after having lost it, captured the orchard; but the English 
Guards held fast to the garden, which was surroimded by a 
slight wall with a natural banquette, and maintained them- 
selves in the farm. By order of the Emperor, a battery of 
howitzers bombarded the buildings. A fire started in a granary 
spread and devoured the chateau, the house of the farmer, the 
cattle-sheds, and stables. The English withdrew into the 
chapel, the granges, the hou:e of the gardener, and the ad- 
jacent hollow road, and recommenced their fusillade. The 
conflagration itself was an obstacle to the French. In the 
burning cattle-sheds, from which the ambulances established 
by the English had not been removed, were heard vain appeals 
for help and cries of despair. 



-13 



CHAPTER IV. 

The Battle of Waterloo. 

From Three o' Clock until Seven. 

I. — Second attack of La Haye Sainte. — The order from Ney to Milhaud. 

II. — First and second charges of the cuirassiers of Milhaud and of the 

light cavalry of the Guard. — Order from the Emperor to the 

cuirassiers of Kellermann and to the cavalry of Guyot. 

III. — Entrance into line of Bulow's corps. — Lobau's defense. — Capture 

and recapture of Plancenoit. 
IV. — Third and fourth charges of the cuirassiers of Milhaud, supported 
by those of Kellermann, the dragoons, and horse grenadiers of 
the Guard, 
v.— General attack of the plateau by the infantry of Reille and d'Erlon 
and by the debris of the cavalry. — Capture of Ea Haye Sainte. 
— The English line shaken. — New combats at Plancenoit. 

I. 

Wellington's sole object was to hold his positions until 
the entrance into line of the Pnissian Arm^^ This movement 
was delayed longer than he expected. He had hoped that 
Bliicher would commence the attack at two o'clock; it was 
now half -past three, and the Prusdans seemed to be in no hurry 
to unmask themselves. In the English Staff it was feared that 
it would be impossible to resist a second assault. 

Napoleon had his anxieties. Major La Fresnaye had just 
delivered to him Grouchy's letter, written from Walhain, at 
half-past eleven. In this very unsatisfactory despatch two 
things especially struck the Emperor — one was that Grouchy 
had marched verv slowly, since at half -past nine o'clock he was 
still three leagues from Wavre; the other, that the Marshal 
seemed to pay very little attention to what was passing on his 
left, and demanded orders to manoeuvre the next day in the ec- 
centric direction of Ta Chyse. ' It became evident that, unless 
Grouchy had conceived the idea at noon of marching to the 
sound of the cannon, he would be unable to attack in flank 
the corps of Bulow, already in position at Chapelle Saint- 
Lambert. At most the Marshal would be able to fall on the 
rear of this corps or detain far from the field of battle, by an 

1 85 



The Battle of Waterloo. 187 

attack pressed home, the other corps of the Prussian Army. 
Should we be astonished that the Emperor did not immediately 
send back La Fresnaye with new instructions for Grouchy? 
These instructions, which would have been none other "than 
to draw near the Army, in order to fall upon the hostile column 
which should attempt to molest the right wing," had already 
been sent by Napoleon to his lieutenant at a quarter-past one. 
He could have only reiterated them, and very tardily at that! 

The presence of Bulow at Chapelle vSaint-Lambert, the 
bloody check of Count d'Erlon, and the distance of Grouchy 
were perhaps sufficient reasons to cause the Emperor to break 
off tlie combat, as at Essling, and to take up a defensive position 
upon the plateau of La Belle Alliance. It does not seem that 
this expedient, which at most would have been good only for 
the day, ever occurred to him. The next day the French 
Army, even though reinforced by Grouchy, would have had 
to deliver battle almost in the proportion of i to 2 to the 
united armies of Wellington and Blticher. The Emperor pre- 
ferred to profit by the expectancy in which Bulow appeared 
to remain, in order to overthrow the English before the entrance 
into line of the Prussians. 

As soon as d'Erlon had rallied some of his battalions, about 
half-past three, the Emperor ordered Ney to attack La Haye 
Sainte again. He intended to use that position as a base for a 
combined movement with the corps of d'Erlon, that of Reille, 
which he thought would be soon in possession of Hougou- 
mont, all the cavalry, and finally the Foot Guard. Ney led 
against La Haye Sainte Ouiot's brigade, whilst one of Donze- 
lot's brigades, deployed as skirmishers, scaled the hill to the 
east of the route of Brussels to attack in the rear the English 
concealed behind the hedges of the road of Chain. The attack 
failed. The skirmishers of Donzelot were repulsed; and the 
soldiers of Quiot, decimated by the point-blank fire of the 
Germans of Major Baring, who had just received a reinforce- 
ment of two companies, withdrew into the orchard, 

To second this assault, the great battery redoubled its fire 
against the left center of the enemy's position, whilst the bat- 
teries of Reille, reinforced by a part of the 12-pounders of the 
Guard, cannonaded incessantlv the right center. It was at 
this period of the battle that the artillery fire was m.ost intense. 
"Never," says General Alten, "had the oldest soldiers heard 
such a cannonade." Some battalions of the first English line 



1 88 Wateeloo. 

retrograded a hundred steps in order to shelter themselves be" 
hind the crest of the plateau. At the same time groups of 
wounded, convoys of prisoners, empty caissons, and crowds of 
fugitives streamed towards the Forest of Soignes. Ney, who 
saw with difficulty through the smoke, mistook these move- 
ments for the beginning of a retreat, and thought of estab- 
lishing himself upon the plateau with the cavalry. He sum- 
moned immediately a brigade of cuirassiers. 

The aide-de-camp addressed himself to General Farine, 
who put his two regiments on the march. But General Delort, 
commanding the divi ion, arrested the niovcment. "We take 
orders only from Count Milhaud," said he. Ne3^ impatient, 
hastened to Delort. The Marshal was greatly irritated at this 
disobedience. He not only reiterated the orders concerning 
Farine's brigade, but he ordered the other : ix regiments of 
Milhaud's corps to advance. Delort having again rem.on- 
strated against the imprudence of this manoeuvre upon such 
unfavorable ground, Ney invoked the instructions of the Em- 
peror. "Forward!" cried he; "it is a question of the safety 
of France." Delort obeyed. The two divisions of cuirassiers 
started at a rapid trot, and behind them moved the red lancers 
and chasseurs of the Guard. Thd these regiments follow the 
movement bv order of Lefebvre-Desnoettes, to whom Milhaud 
had said when strting, "I am going to charge; support me," 
or did thev advance spontaneously — seized, as it were, by an 
irresistible desire to charge at sight of their comrades hastening 
against the enemy, whose retreat had begun, and desirous of 
having their share of the English to sabre? 

Since the beginning of the battle Ney had thought of a 
great cavalry action, of Avhich he had spoken to the Emperor, 
who had for this purpose placed under his command the corps 
of cuirassiers and even the Horse Guard. The Prince of the 
Moskowa promised himself immense results from this charge. 
He who was classed, says Foy, among the first cavalry leaders 
of the Army, was proud of having to lead it. He talked it over 
with Drouot, assuring him that he was certain of success. 
Ney at first, who was to engage the cavalry only after having 
received the Emperor's order, had only wished to establish 
himself upon the plateau with a brigade of cuirassiers. Then 
the idea had occurred to him to hasten the retreat of the Eng- 
lish by launching against them all the cuirassiers of Milhaud. 
This is whv he had ordered these two divisions to advance. 



The Battle of Wateuloo. 189 

Perhaps, however, he would have hesitated to engage them 
without further orders from Napoleon; but when he saw de- 
scending into the valley of La Have Sainte, with this multitude 
of mailed squadrons, the horse chasseurs and red lancers of the 
Guard, he did not doubt that it was in accordance with the 
instructions of the Emperor, who had judged the hour pro- 
pitious for the grand attack. Otherwise, would the cavalry 
of the Guard have followed the cuirassiers? It appears almost 
certain, however, that Napoleon had seen nothing of this 
movement. From the low ground where the divisions of Mil- 
haud and Lefebvre-Desnoettes were in position, it was possible 
for them to reach the route of Brussels, cross it clos-e by La 
Belle Alliance, and descend into the valley without being seen 
by the Emperor, stationed near the Decoster house. But 
Marshal Ney was none the less justified in supposing that this 
glittering mass of 5,000 horsemen had not e.caped the eve of 
Napoleon. He formed in haste these magnificent squadrons 
in the valley, to the left of the route of Brussels, and, placing 
himself at their head, launched them against the English Army. 

IL 

Wellington thought so little of retreating that he had just 
reinforced his front of battle with many brigades from his 
second line and reserve. The Brunswickers advanced to the 
support of the Guards of Maitland, and the origades of Mitchell 
and Adam crossed the route of Nivelles to establish themselves 
above Hougoumont, in front of the road of Ohain. One was 
not, however, without anxiety in the Allied Army. The staff 
watched anxiously the French positions, seeking to discover 
what movement was being prepared by Napoleon, when the 
cavalry descended towards La Haye Sainte. The surprise of 
the English was great and many of their fears were dis ipated. 
"We were astonished," says Kennedy, "that one should attack 
with cavalry an infantry as yet unshaken and which, thanks 
to the undulations of the ground behind which it was lying, 
had suffered little from the cannonade." In an instant the 
men were on their feet, formed in squares. The batteries re- 
mained in front of the line of battle, on the very edge of the 
plateau. The artillery horses were sent to the rear, and the 
cannoneers received the order to fire until the last moment, 
then to abandon their guns and seek refuge in the squares. 



I90 Waterloo. 

The French cavalry advanced in columns of squadrons in 
echelons, the cuirassiers on the right and the chasseurs and 
chevau-legers on the left. The direction was slightly oblique, 
the first echelons manoeuvring to approach the level part of 
the road of Oliain, and the left eschelons making a change of 
front towards the acclivities that rise above Hougoumont. In 
this movement they presented their flank to the fire of the 
enemy's artillery. As soon as the cuirassiers began to debouch 
from the low gromids where they had formed, the French bat- 
teries ceased firing and those of the English accelerated their 
fire. The guns were double-shotted with ball and cannister, 
or chain-shot — a whirlwind of iron. Passing through the miry 
and rain-drenched bottoms, in which they sometimes sank up 
to their knees, and impeded by the tall rye which swept their 
chests, the horses mounted at a slow trot the steep slopes. By 
accelerating their fire, the batteries were able to make many 
discharges. A last salvo, at forty yards, from the batteries of 
Lloyd and Cleeves, established on the spot where- rises to-day 
the Mound of the Lion, mowed down half of the leading squad- 
rons. The survivors halted for some seconds, appearing to 
hesitate. The charge sounded more vibrant ; and with cries of 
"Long live the Emperor!" the cuirassiers hurled themselves 
on the guns. One after the other, all the batteries were taken. 
A superb feat of arms, but an illusory capture. There were no 
teams to carry off the guns and no spikes to put them out of 
service. It would have been possible to have overturned them 
in the ravine and, in default of nails, to have forced into the 
touch-holes of the cannon the ramrods of pistols. But nothing 
of the kind was thought of; not an officer even thought of 
causing the sponge-staffs to be broken. 

The cannon are silenced, but the musketry rolls and crepi- 
tates. Between the route of Nivelles and the highway of Brus- 
sels twenty English, Hanoverian, Brunswick, and German bat- 
talions form two lines of squares, arranged checker-wise. The 
bullets strike and ricochet against the cuirasses with the noise 
of hail upon a slate roof. Cuirassiers and lancers, their ranks 
already broken by the fire, the ascension of the hill, and even 
the passage of this hedge of the cannon, burst on the squares. 
But, from the edge of the plateau where they take the gallop 
to the first line of infantrv, the field is insufficient. The charge 
lacks elan and consequently vigor. -The English are in squares 
in three ranks, the first rank kneeling, the butt-ends of the 



The Battle of Waterloo. 191 

muskets supported against the ground, and the inclined bayo- 
nets forming chevaux-de-frise. In spite of their valor and rage^ 
the horsemen are unable to pierce these walls of men. They 
oblique to the right and left and, under the cross-fires, charge 
the squares in the second line. Squadron succeeds squadron, 
like the waves of the tea. The sea of cavalry inundates all the 
plateau. Cuirassiers, chasseurs, and red lancers circle round 
the squares, assail them on their four faces, strike at the angles, 
beat down the bayonets with their sabres, discharge their pistols 
at close range, and in hand-to-hand combats open some partial 
breaches, which are closed as soon as made. 

Lord Uxbridge saw this melee. Two-thirds of his cavalry 
had not been engaged. He launched against these disorgan- 
ized masses the dragoons of Dornberg, the hussars of Aren- 
s child, the black lancers of Brunswick, the Dutch carbineers of 
Trip, and the two Dutch-Belgian brigades of Van Merlen and 
Ghigny — in all, 5,000 fresh horses. The enemy had numbers 
and cohesion in his favor. The French fell back under the 
shock, repassed through the intervals between the squares, 
and escaped the sabres only to fall under the bullets. They 
abandoned the plateau. The gunners hastened to their pieces; 
and along all the crest of the plateau the English batteries re- 
sumed their fire. 

Hardly at the bottom of the valley, the valorous soldiers 
of Milhaud and Defebvre-Desnoettes resume the charge. Again 
they climb the miry slopes of Mont Saint-Jean under the iron 
hail, take possession of the guns, crown the plateau, burst on 
the infantry, and form a circle of glittering sabres around the 
squares. 

More than one Englishmjan believed the battle lost. 
Many of the reserve batteries made ready to retreat at the first 
order. Colonel Gould, of the artillery, said to Mercer : "lam 
afraid that all is ended." From La Belle Alliance the Emperor 
and his staff had seen these magnificent charges ; they saw the 
cannon abandoned, the horsemen galloping over the plateau, 
the enemy's lines pierced, and the squares surroimded; already 
the cry of victory was heard around Napoleon. Napoleon was 
surprised and vexed that his cavalry had been engaged without 
his order against infantry as yet unbroken. He said to Soult : 
"This is a premature movement, the results of which may 
prove disastrous." The Major-General inveighed against Ney, 
" He is endangering us as at Jena !" The Emperor looked long 



192 



Waterloo. 



at the field of battle, reflected a moment, and then said: "It 
is too soon by an hour ; but it is necessary to follow up what 
has alreadv been done." He sent one of his aides-de-camp, 
General Flahault, to carry to Kellermann the order to charge 
with the four brigades of cuirassiers and carbineers. 

Like the Emperor, Kellermann thought the movement of 
Milhaud premature; he also believed it imprudent to engage 
his own cavalry. He was on the point of stating his reasons 
to Flahault when General Lheritier, who commanded his first 
division (cuirassiers and dragoons), started at a rapid trot with- 
out awaiting orders. Kellermann was forced to follow with his 
second division, composed of the 2nd and 3rd Cuirassiers and the 
ist and 2nd Carbineers ; but not far from Hougoumont he halt- 
ed the brigade of carbineers in a hollow of the ground, and gave 
pozitive instructions to General Blancard not to budge from 
there unless he received an order from him. This was a wi^e 
precaution, for these 800 carbineers were henceforth the only 
cavalry reserve left to the Army. Flahault, according to the 
instructions of the Emperor, had transmitted the order to 
charge not only to Kellermann, but also to General Guyot, 
commanding the heavy cavalry of the Guard (dragoons and 
horse grenadiers). 

The Emperor has said that he had been forced to support 
the divisions of Milhaud, as he feared that a check suffered by 
the latter, in presence of the entire Army, would discourage 
the soldiers and lead to panic and rout. Did he not also hope 
to crush the English under a new mass of m^ailed cavalry? 
It was necessary to press the action, to gain at one point, to 
hold out at another, to conquer and impose by dint of audacity, 
for affairs had become terribly critical, the Emperor was 
fighting two battles at the same time, one parallel, the other 
oblique: in front, he attacked the English; on his right flank, 
he was attacked by the Prussian. 

III. 

Towards one o'clock Bliicher had rejoined, at Chapelle 
Saint-Lambert, the main body of Bulow's corps ; but, though 
he was very anxious to take part in the battle, he judged it 
imprudent to engage himself in the defiles of the Lasne before 
being assured that he would not be taken en flagrant dclit of 
march. Three-quarters of an hour later he learned from re- 



The Battle of Waterloo. 193 

connoissances that, the French being a long way off, he was in 
no danger. He at once put his troops in motion in the direction 
of Plancenoit. His object was to outflank the right of the 
Imperial Army. The march was slow and laborious. When 
one follows the rough road that descends from Chapelle Saint- 
Lambert, crosses at Lasne the stream of this name, and ascends 
the no less precipitous side of the other hill, one wonders how 
the Prussian artillery ever managed to pass this defile. All 
the energy of Bliicher was necessary to accomplish the task. 
He was everywhere, reanimating his soldiers exhausted from 
fatigue and hunger (on the march since five in the morning, they 
had not eaten since the day before), lavishing upon them en- 
couragements, appeals to duty, familiar and pleasant words. 
"Come, comrades," said he to some cannoneers, who were 
pushing at the wheels of a gun that had stuck fast in the mud, 
"you would not have me miss my word ! " 

About four o'clock his heads of column attained the wood 
of Paris (3,500 yards from Plancenoit). The division of Losthin 
and Hiller established themselves there without firing a shot; 
for instead of occupying the avenues of he wood, the cavalry 
of General Domon had confined itself to observing its debouches. 
In this new position, the Prussians found themselves under 
cover. Before unmasking himself, Bliicher would have pre- 
ferred to await the other two divisions of Bulow, which were 
still in the defiles of Lasne. But the messages from Wellington, 
urging him to take part in the battle, became more and more 
pressing; and he saw, it is said, the cuirassiers in motion upon 
the heights of La Belle Alliance. He decided to act with the 
force at hand. At half -past four the Prussians debouched: 
the infantry of Losthin on the right of the road of Plancenoit, 
the infantry of Hiller on the left, and the front covered by two 
regiments of cavalry and three light batteries. Bliicher has- 
tened to cannonade the squadrons of Domon; he wished, says 
Mufifling, to warn and encourage Wellington and at the same 
time to prevent Napoleon from crushing the English. 

Domon at first opposed offensive to offensive. He over- 
threw the Prussian hussars and fell upon the batteries. Over- 
whelmed by their fire and by the musketry of Losthin's entire 
division, he fell back slowly; then passing in reserve, he un- 
masked Lobau's infantry, which had taken position astride 
of the road of Lasne, at nearly half a league to the east of 
the route of Brussels. The divisions of Simmer and Jannin, 



1 94 Waterloo. 

deployed one behind the other, were en potence, almost per- 
pendicular to the line of battle. In order to bring them in 
line with the front, the Emperor had ordered the Foot Guard 
to advance near La Belle Alliance, to the right of the route of 
Brussels, save the ist Regiment of Grenadiers, which remained 
near Rossomme, and the ist Battalion of the i&t Chasseurs, 
posted at Caillou. He had at the same time given the order to 
Durutte to assail Papelotte and La Haye Sainte, in order to 
second the grand attack of Ney and to sever the communica- 
tions between Bulow's right and the English leit. 

Lobau, well knowing that all passive resistance is virtually 
condemned, pushed straight against the Prussians, who fell 
back. The divisions of Ryssel and Hacke debouched in turn 
from the wood. The Prussians resumed the offensive — 30,000 
against 10,000 Frenchmen. But Lobau's regiments were of 
ancient formation and as solid as rocks. The 5th of the Line, 
the first regiment to join Napoleon in the defile of Laffray, and 
the loth of the Line, the only one that had fought for the Bour- 
bons at the Bridge of Loriol, rivaled each other in enthusiasm 
and tenacity. With these fine troops, Lobau presented so 
bold a front that Bliicher, instead of persisting in his parallel 
attack, manoeuvred to outflank the right of the 6th Corps. 
The cavalry of Prince William of Prussia and the infantry of 
Hiller, supported by the division of Ryssel, advanced on 
Plancenoit. Lobau, fearing to be turned, recoiled until abreast 
of the village, which he caused to be occupied by a brigade. 
Assailed on three points, this brigade was unable to maintain 
its position. The enemy forced it out of Plancenoit, in which 
he established and entrenched himself. On his front, Bliicher 
cannonaded the other three brigades of Lobau with eight bat- 
teries, whose balls fell upon the route of Brussels, in the midst 
of the battalions of the Guard and even in the Emperor's staff. 

At the moment when his infantry attacked Plancenoit, 
Bliicher had received an aide-de-camp from Thielmann. The 
commander of the IIL Corps announced that he was attacked 
in Wavre by superior forces (they were the 30,000 men of 
Grouchy), and that he doubted his ability to resist them. 
•'Let General Thielmann do the best he can," said Gneissenau. 
' ' It matters little if he is crushed at Wavre if we are victorious 
here." 

With the enemy in possession of Plancenoit, Napoleon 
was outflanked and his line of retreat threatened. He ordered 



Ti-iE Battle of Watekloo. 195 

Duhesme, commanding the divi.'ion of the Young Guard, to 
retake the village. The eight battalions, four of voltigeurs 
and four of tirailleurs, advanced at the charging step. The 
Prussians were dislodged from the houses and from the cei-^etery 
of which they had formed a reduit. 

IV. 

The English still held out. When the heavy cavalry of 
Kellermann and Guyot debouched into the valley, between 
five and half-past five o'clock, the cuirassiers of Milhaud had 
again been forced from the plateau by the English dragoons. 
Quickly re-formed, they followed to the charge these three 
fresh divisions of Kellermann and Guyot. Cuirassiers of 
Lheritier, Delort, Wathier, and Roussel d'Hurbal, chasseurs 
and lancers of Lefebvre-Desnoettes, dragoons and horse 
grenadiers of Guyot — more than sixty squadrons — scaled the 
plateau. The enem}^ was surprised to see 8,000 or 10,000 
horsemen engaged upon a front where 1,000 at most would 
have been able to deploy. They covered the entire space be- 
tween Hougoumont and Ta Haye Sainte. Their files were so 
contracted in the rush that many horses were raised off the 
groimd by the pressure. This mass of cuirasses, helmets, and 
sabres rose and fell upon the rolling ground like billows on the 
ocean. To the Englsh it appeared as if a sea of steel were 
mounting the plateau. 

The enemy renewed the manoeuvre which twice already 
had succeeded with him. After having scourged the cavalry 
with grape, the gunners abandoned their guns and sought 
refuge in the squares. The latter opened at thirty steps a 
file-fire, which mowed down entire ranks "like the sweep of a 
scythe," and then received the debris of the squadrons upon a 
triple rank of bayonets. Charge suceeded charge without in- 
termission. Some squares suffered five, seven, ten, and even 
as many as thirteen assaults. Many were shaken and partially 
shattered, if not overthrown and broken. A quartermaster 
of the 9th Cuirassiers took an English flag. Captain Klein de 
Kleinenberg, of the chasseurs of the Guard, had his horse killed 
while capturing the flag of a battalion of the German Legion. 
But the greater part of the squares remained impervious to 
assault. At moments they seemed submerged bv the wavco 
of cavalry, then they reappeared through the smoke, bristling 



196 Wateeloo. 

with glittering hiayonets, whilst the squadrons spiead around 
them like waves of the sea that break themselves against a dike. 

The cuirassiers of Lheritier burst through a labyrinth of 
fire upon the squares of the second line, pass beyond them, and 
are overwhelmed by the reserve batteries. An entire regiment 
turns to the left, follows at a terrific pace the route of Nivelles, 
sabres the sharpshooter> of Mitchell along the road of Braine 
I'Alleud, turns Hougoumont, and comes to re-form upon the 
plateau of La Belle Alliance The dragoons of the Guard en- 
gage the light cavalry of Grant, which, occupied all the after- 
noon in observing the lancers of Pire in front of Montplaisir 
and finally recognizing in the movements of the latter mere 
demonstrations, have turned back from the right wing on the 
center. Mercer's battery, the only one whose gunners have 
remained at their guns, notwithstanding the order of Wel- 
lington, is a little in the rear, its front sheltered by an embank- 
ment of the road, and its flank protected by two squares of 
Brunswick. The horse grenadier.- — giants mounted on enor- 
mous horses and their stature still further increased by their 
tall bear -skin caps — advance at a trot in line. One would have 
said that it was a wall on the march. Under the grape of 
Mercer and the cross-fire of the squares of Brunswick this wall 
crumbles, covering the ground with its blood stained debris. 
At the second charge there is a new butchery. Colonel Jamin, 
colonel of the grenadiers, falls mortally wounded across a gun- 
carriage. In front of the battery there rises a wall of dead 
men and disemboweled horses. "You have a nice lot here," 
laughingly said Colonel Wood to Mercer. The last companies 
of grenadiers cross the hideous obstacle, pass between the guns, 
and, sabring the gunners, go to mingle their charges with those 
of the cuirassiers. 

Too numerous for the extent of the ground, all these squad- 
rons mutually hinder one another. They clash together, cross 
one another, break their charges, and mingle their ranks. 
The charges, still as ardent as ever, become less and less rapid, 
less and less vigorous, and less and less efficacious, in conse- 
quence of this confudon and the exhaustion of the horses, 
which, at each stride, sink into the heavy and rain-drenched 
soil. The atmosphere is as hot as the blast from the mouth 
of a furnace ; and the combatants breathe only with the great- 
est difficulty. Generals Donop, Delort, Lheritier, Guyot, and 
Roussel d'Hurbal are wounded. Edouard de Colbert charges 



The Battle of Waterloo. 197 

with his arm in a fling. Wounded also are Generals Blanc- 
ard, Dubois, Farino, Guiton, Picquet, Travers, and Wathier. 
Marshal Ney, his third horse killed under him, stands alone 
near an abandoned battery, wrathfully striking with the flat 
of his sword the bronze muzzle of an English cannon. The 
entire field of battle is encumbered with non-combatants, dis- 
mounted cuirassiers staggering under the weight of their 
armor in the direction of the valley, wounded men dragging 
themselves out of the shambles, and riderless horses galloping 
wildly imder the lash of the bullets which whistle by their ears. 
AA'ellington issues from the square of the 73rd, in which he had 
sought refuge during the hottest part of the action, haptens to 
his cavalry, and throws it upon these exhausted squadrons, 
disunited and broken by their very charges. For the third 
time, the French abandon the plateau. 

For the fourth time they reascended it, cr^•ing, ' ' Long live 
the Eniperor!" Ney led the charge at the head of the car- 
bineers. He had seen at a distance their golden cuirasses, had 
hastened to them, and, in spite of the observations of General 
Blancard, who opposed the formal order of Kellermann, led 
them with him in this race with death. 

The persistency of Ney and his heroic horsemen, like him 
drunk with rage, bordered on frenzy. This last charge with 
squadrons reduced to half of their effectives, with exhausted 
men and wind-broken horses, could only end in a new check. 
The ascendancy of cavalry over infantry consists solely of 
moral effect. What "moral effect could one hope to produce 
with cavalry upon an infantry which had just learned in re- 
pulsing, with fire and bayonets, numerous charges, that the 
tempest of horse was only a scare-crow, and which, in these 
two rude hours, long as days, had become assured of its in- 
vincibility? On the contrary, it was the horsemen who were 
demoralized by the failure of their attacks, the vanity of their 
efforts. They charged with the same intrepidity, but no longer 
with the same confidence. They crossed again the line of bat- 
teries; but, after having vainly pushed their harassed horses 
on the squares — or, more correctly speaking, on the ramparts 
of dead soldiers and slaughtered animals that protected the 
face of each square — they fell back of their own accord, dis- 
couraged, desperate, to the bottom of the valley, followed at a 
distance, rather than driven by the English cavalry, itself at 
the end of its strength. 



iq8 Wateeloo. 



V. 



These great charges might have succeeded, but on condi- 
tion of being supported instantly by infantry. Whilst the 
enemy's batteries, passed b^' the cuirassiers, remained silent, 
the infantry could have climbed the slopes without danger of 
loss, taken position on the edge of the plateau and attacked 
the squares. The English would have been compelled either 
to sustain in a vicious formation the fire and assaults of the 
infantry, or to deploy, which would have placed them at the 
mercy of the horsemen. Bachelu's division and Jannin's 
brigade (Foy's division) had remained for many hours at 1,300 
yards from the allied position, witnessing with grounded arms 
this furious combat. They awaited but an order to go to the 
assistance of the cavalry. Ney forgot them. It was only 
after the repulse of the fourth charge that he thought of util- 
izing these 6,000 bayonets. The six regiments marched by 
echelons in columns of divisions. It was too late. The bat- 
teries overwhelmed them, and the allied infantry, which had 
extended its front in a circle towards Hougoumont, riddled 
them with its convergent fire. "It was a very hail of death," 
says Foy. In a few minutes 1,500 men were killed, wounded, 
or dispersed. In spite of all this, the French approached within 
pistol-shot of the enemy, but the fresh brigades of Diiplat and 
William Halkett, having executed an offensive movement 
(Duplat was killed at this moment), the columns, truncated 
by the cannon-balls, retreated. It was in vain that Marshal 
Ney caused them to be supported by a few skeleton squadrons, 
notably the carbineers. In these partial charges, which suc- 
ceeded one another until the end of the battle, the h'orsemen 
pierced no more the line of English batteries. 

During all the charges of the cavalry Ney, in the fire of 
this tumultuous action, had lost sight of his first objective — 
the capture of La Haye Sainte. There, as at Hougoumont, 
but with less intensity, the fight had continued without result. 
And yet the intrepid defenders, supplied with only sixty car- 
tridges per man, began to decrease their fire. Major Baring 
had asked for more ammunition. Wellington gave him none; 
but sent a new reinforcement of two companies. 

About six o'clock, at the moment when the divisions of 
Foy and Bachelu were advancing towards the plateau, the 
Emperor traversed the line of battle under a rain of shells and 



The Battle or Waterloo. 199 

cannon-balls. General Desvaux de Saint-Maurice, commander 
in-chief of the artillery of the Guard, General Lallemand, com- 
manding the foot batteries, and Bailly de Monthyon, chief of 
the general staff, were struck down at his side. Napoleon s;ent 
the order to Ney to take possession of La Haye Sainte, regard- 
less of the cost. It was a new prey pointed out to the Marshal, 
a new occasion to meet death. 

Ney hurried to the 13th Bight (Donzelot's division) and 
threw it, with a detachment from the ist Regiment of En- 
gineers, against the farm. The bullets, fired at point-blank 
range, thinned the ranks of the assailants. Some of the soldiers 
sought to disarm the Germans by attempting to draw the 
muskets through the loop-holes. In an instant seventy French 
fell at the foot of the east wall. Their comrades mounted upon 
their bodies to climb on top of the wall, from which they fired 
upon the chasseurs of Baring in the court ; others climbed upon 
the roof of the grange. Lieutenant Vieux, of the engineers, who 
fell later, with the rank of colonel, in the breach of Constantine, 
struck with heavy blows of the. axe upon the gate. He re- 
ceived one ball in the wrist and another in the shoulder. The 
axe passed from hand to hand, the gate finally yielded, and the 
wave inundated the court. Driven back into the buildings, 
and without ammunition, the Germans defended themselves 
with their side-arms. Major Baring, with forty-two men — all 
that remained of his nine companies — broke through the mass 
of assailants, and regained Mont Saint-Jean. 

Ney immediately established a horse battery on a hillock 
near La Haye Saint, and pushed a regiment against the sand- 
pit, which was abandoned by the 95th English. From these two 
positions the cannoneers fired at a range of less than 300 yards, 
and the sharpshooters at less than 80, upon the \'ery center of 
the enemy's line. vSupported by this fire, which opened a 
breach, the debris of the divisions of Allix, Donzelot, and Mar- 
cogfiet ascended from both sides of the farm as far as the road 
of Chain. French and AlHes fired at each other through the 
hedges, over the banks, and then rushed on each other with the 
bayonet. Orapteda, withHhe 5th and 8th BattaHons of the 
German Legion, executed on the great route a counter-attack, 
which was at first successful. A ball hurled him mortally 
wounded from his horse. The 5th Battalion retired; the 8th, 
which was further advanced, was exterminated by a squadron 
of cuirassiers. Its flag was captured; its commander, Colonel 



200 Waterloo. 

Schrader, was killed; and only thirty men escaped the sabres 
of the cuirassiers. 

The enemy's left center (brigades of Kempt, Pack, Lam- 
oert, Best, and Wincke"^ stood firm; but, on the extreme left, 
the Nassauers of Prince Bernard of Saxe-AA'eimar permitted 
themselves, for the second time, to be dislodged from Papelotte 
by the division of Durutte, and at the right center the Allies 
were shaken and incapable of further resistance. The ammu- 
nition was exhausted, some of the guns dismounted, and others 
without gunners. The Prince of Orange and General Alten, 
both wounded, quitted the field of battle. Colonels Gordon 
and De Lancey Evans, aides-de-camp of Wellington, were killed. 
The cavalry brigades of Somerset and Ponsonby were reduced 
to two squadrons between the two brigades; the brigade of 
Ompteda had but a handful of men in line; that of Kielman- 
segge withdrew behind the village of Mont Saint- Jean, and that 
of Kruse recoiled. In the rear the fugitives multiplied. The 
hussar regiment of Cumberland turned bridle and scampered 
away in the direction of Brussels with its colonel at its head. 
Everywhere the ranks grew thinner. The wounded were nu- 
merous, and numerous also were the men who left the ranks 
to carry them to the ambulances. There was some disorder 
even in the intrepid brigade of Colin Halkett, in which a bat- 
talion was commanded by a simple lieutenant. The flags of 
the 30th and 73rd Regiments were prudently sent to the rear. 

"The center of the line was open," says an aide-de-camp 
of General Alten. "We were in peril. At no moment was the 
issue of the battle more doubtful." In spite of his accustomed 
assurance, Wellington became anxious. He saw, indeed, the 
black masses of Bliicher outflanking the French Army, but he 
himself remained without support. He was heard to murmur: 
"Night or Bliicher!" Already he had despatched towards 
Ohain many aides-de-camp to hasten the march of Ziethen's 
corps. But his resolution remained as firm as ever. Officers 
arrived from all sides to inform him of their desperate situation 
and to demand new orders. He coldly replied: "There is no 
other order than to hold out to the last man." 

The slight recoil of the enemy's line had not escaped the 
eye of Marshal Ney. But his soldiers were as exhausted as 
those of Wellington. He felt that a few fresh troops would 
suffice to reanimate them and overcome the resistance of the 
English. He sent Colonel Heymes to ask of the Emperor a 



Tim Battle of Waterloo. 



20I 



small force of infantry. "Troops!" cried Napoleon. "\A'here 
do you think I can get them ? Do you think T can make them ? " 

The Emperor had still eight battalions of the Old Guard 
and six of the Middle Guard. If, at this moment, he had given 
half of them to Marshal Ney, we may believe, even from the 
avowal of the best informed and most judicious English his- 
torian, that this reinforcement would have overthrown the 
enemy's center. But Napoleon, without a cavalry reser\^e, 
did not believe that he had too many men, with all his bear- skin 
caps, to maintain his own position. The moment was no less 
critical for him than for Wellington. Under a third surge of 
Bulow's entire corps, Eobau fell back, and the Young Guard, 
after an obstinate resistance, yielded Plancenoit. Once more 
the balls from the Prussian batteries labored the ground near 
La Belle Alliance. Napoleon, already outflanked, was threat- 
ened by an irruption of the Prussians in the rear of his line of 
battle. He formed eleven battalions of the Guard in as many 
squares and stationed them in front of Plancenoit, along the 
route of Brussels, from La Belle Alliance to Rossomme. The 
ist Battalion of the ist Chasseurs was maintained at Caillou. 
Generals Morand and Pelet received the order to retake Plance- 
noit with the ist Battalion of the 2nd Grenadiers and the ist of 
the 2nd Chasseurs. 

With drums beating, these old soldiers marched at the 
double-quick, in serried columns of companies. They passed 
the Young Guard, which was being rallied by Duhesme, at- 
tacked Plancenoit at two points, penetrated into the village 
without deigning to fire a shot, overturned, ground to pieces, 
and drove out the Prussians. The attack was so impetuous 
that in twenty minutes the village was cleared. The grum- 
blers, with their bayonets dripping blood, debouched at the 
backs of the fugitives, pursued them 600 yards, and drove them 
back upon the opposite hiU, even behind the batteries of Hiller, 
which were for an instant abandoned. The Young Guard 
seconded this movement; it occupied Plancenoit once more, 
and Lobau, fighting with the divisions of Losthin and Hacke, 
recovered the ground that -he had lost. 



-J. 4- 



CHAPTER V. 

The Battle of Waterloo. 

From Seven to Nine o' Clock. 

i. — Dispositions for the final attack. — Strengthening of the English 

line. — Approach of Ziethen's corps. 
II. — Assault of the plateau of Mont Saint- Jean by the Middle Guard. 
III.— "The Guard recoils!" — General advance of the English Army.— 

Irruption of the Prussians of Ziethen.— The panic. 
IV. — The squares of Christiani, Roguet, and Cambronne. 
V. — Arrival of Pirch's corps to the support of Bulow. — Butchery in 
Plancenoit. — The melee on the plateau of La Belle Alliance. — 
The last squares of the Old Guard. 

I. 

With a jingle blow of his Old Guard, Napoleon had ar- 
rested the Prussians. His right flank disengaged, he again be- 
came free to act on the front of battle. It was more than seven 
o'clock; but there still remained two hours of daylight; for 
the sky was clear and the sun shone above Braine I'Alleud. 
The cannonade of Grouchy increased in violence, drew nearer, 
and roared in the direction of Limale. It was supposed that 
the Marshal had finally overtaken the Prussian Army, was 
fighting it, and, victorious or vanquished, would detain it long 
enough to prevent its junction with the English. Bliicher, it 
seemed, had only been able to detach the single corps of Bulow, 
which lyobau, Duhesme, and two battalions of the Old Guard 
would suffice henceforth to hold in check. The Emperor lev- 
eled his glass on the side of the English. The points from 
which came the fire of artillery and musketry and the direction 
of this fire served him as landmarks. On the extreme right 
the division of Durutte, in possession of Papelotte and La Haye, 
was climbing the plateau. On the left, the fight continued 
around Hougoumont in flames ; a brigade of Jerome outflanked 
this position, and the French sharpshooters, supported by the 
lancers of Pire, had crossed the route of Nivelles. At the 
center, above La Haye Sainte, from whence the enemy had 
finally been dislodged, the soldiers of Donzelot, Allix, and Mar- 
cognet had crowned the crests, and were pressing the enemy 



The Battle of Watekloo. 203 

vigorously along the road of Ohain. In the valley, the regi- 
ments of Bachelu and Foy, as well as the debris of the cavalry, 
were rallying. The enemy's line appeared to be shaken. The 
Emperor presumed that Wellington had engaged all his troops, 
while he had still his Old Guard — his Invincibles. It was 
the hour when victory decided in favor of the most stub- 
bom. He commanded Drouot to order to advance in the form- 
ation in squares which they had previously taken nine bat- 
talions of the Guard (of the other five, two were to remain in 
Plancenoit and three upon the plateau as a last reserve). He 
put himself at the head of the first square and descended to- 
wards hsL Haye Sainte to the bottom of the furnace. 

From the testimony of the enemy, this attack might have 
succeeded a half -hour earlier, at the time when Ney had called 
for a reinforcement. The moment had passed. Whilst Morand 
had retaken Plancenoit, and even during the short time it had 
taken the Guard to form and put itself in motion, Wellington 
had strengthened his position. To reinforce his wavering and 
almost broken center he had recalled from his left the brigade 
of Wincke and from his right four battalions of Brunswick, of 
which he himself had taken the command. Seconded by these 
fresh troops, the brigades of Kempt, Pack, and Best, on the 
east side of the route of Brussels, and the brigades of Kruse and 
Halkett, to the west of this route, had made a vigorous counter- 
attack, and had driven back the infantry of Donzelot, Allix, 
and Marcognet. Whilst the soldiers were withdrawing to the 
bottom of the hill, the Anglo-Germans reoccupied the brow of 
the plateau, and their batteries, delivered from the fusillade at 
short range, silenced the fire of the guns established at La Haye 
Sainte. At the same time the Dutch-Belgian division of 
Chasse arrived from Braine I'Alleud, and the six cavalry regi- 
ments of Vandeleur and Vivian, which, informed of the im- 
minent arrival of the Prussian corps of Ziethen, had quitted 
their post as flankers above Papelotte, hastened up at a rapid 
trot. 

The Prussian reinforcements, which had become so nec- 
essary, and the first result of whose approach had been to 
render available the 2,600 fresh cavalry of Vivian and Van- 
deleur, had been on the point of failing Wellington. Starting 
from Bierges at noon, constrained to halt for more than two 
hours upon the heights northeast of the Dyle, in order to permit 
the corps of Pirch I. to defile, then retarded in his march by the 



204 Wateeloo. 

scarped paths of the wood of Rixenart, through which the men 
advanced sometimes in Indian file and forced to cut a passage 
for the guns, Ziethen had arrived at Ohain about six o'clock 
with his advance guard. He was joined there by Colonel 
Freemantle, AVellington's aide-de-camp, who explained to him 
the critical situation of the English Army, and a.'ked for a re- 
inforcement, "should it only consist of 3,000 men, but at once." 
Ziethen was unwilling to run the risk of having his army corps 
beaten in detail ; he replied that he would hasten to the support 
of the English as soon as the main body of his troops would 
have closed up on the advance guard. Meanwhile he sent a 
staff officer towards Mont Saint-Jean in order to see exactly 
the state of affairs. The latter, deceived by the great number 
of wounded and fugitives who were fleeing to the rear, returned 
to report that the English were in full retreat. Fearing to be 
drawn into a rout without any advantage for the Allied Army, 
Ziethen immediately turned the head of his column to the left^ 
in order to rally Bulow between Frichermont and the wood 
of Paris. Muffling, in observation above Papelotte, saw this 
movement. He set his horse at a gallop, overtook Ziethen, 
informed him more exactly, and entreated him to join the left 
of the English. "The battle is lost," he cried vehementty, 
"if the I. Corps does not support the Duke!" After hes- 
itating a long time, Ziethen yielded to the reasons advanced by 
Muffling, and resumed his first direction. 

Ziethen 's head of column debouched from Smohain when 
the Guard descended towards La Haye Sainte. Already some 
of the troops were falling back at sight of the Prussians. The 
Emperor hastened to them and harangued them; they re- 
sumed their advance. A new enemy's corps, making an irrup- 
tion upon the angle of the square formed by our two lines of 
battle, was the coup de grace. But it is very doubtful if the 
Emperor could have then broken off the combat. By reason 
of the disorder in which the troops already found themselves, 
of their extreme dissemination, and of the advanced position 
of Bulow's corps upon their flank, a retreat would have been 
terribly hazardous. Even if it had been effected without too 
great loss or confusion, protected by a dike formed inconti- 
nently at the summit of the plateau of La Belle Alliance with 
all the battalions of the Guard, what to-morrows it would have 
prepared for Napoleon! The Army reduced by half (for the 
corps of Grouchy, left isolated, cut off from its line of retreat,. 



The Battle of AVatekloo. 205 

appeared devoted to certain destruction); the frontier open; 
France discouraged; patrioti.m abased; the Chamber passing 
from secret hostility to open war; and everywhere intrigue, 
desertion, treason. Rather than to live again the agony of 
18 14, it were better to attempt a supreme and desperate effort 
to violate rebellious Fortune. 

II. 

The approach of the I. Prussian Corps had no other effect 
on the Emperor than to cause him to hasten his attack. Six 
battalions of the Guard had alone arrived in the lowlands of La 
Haye vSainte. The Emperor posted one of them (the 2nd of the 
3rd Grenadiers) upon a little hillock, half-wa}^ between the farm 
and Hougoumont; and, seeing Ne}^ who was always to be 
found wherever death was to be affronted, gave him the com- 
mand of the others to deliver the assault against the enemy's 
right center. At the same time he ordered the batteries to in- 
crease their fire, and d'Erlon, Reille, and the commanders of 
the cavalry corps to second on their respective fronts the move- 
ment of the Guard. It was possible that the report of the 
arrival of the Prussians by way of Chain might spread. 
The Emperor wished to prevent this alarm. He directed La 
Bedoyere and his orderly officers to traverse the line of battle, 
and to announce everywhere the arrival ol Marshal Grouchy. 
Ney has said that he was indignant at this stratagem. As if 
Napoleon had the choice of means ! It is certain that, at this 
false news, confidence returned and enthusiasm kindled up 
again. The troops re-formed their ranks crying, "Long live 
the Emperor!" Some of the wounded drew themselves up in 
order to acclaim the passage of the columns on the march. One 
soldier with three chevrons, a veteran of Marengo, seated, his 
legs broken by a cannon-ball, against the side of the road, re- 
peated in a loud and firm voice: "It is nothing, comrades; 
forward! and long live the Emperor!" 

H d Wellington, in spite of the smoke which became more 
and more thick, seen the preparatory movements for this final 
assault? At all events, he was warned of them by a traitor. 
At the moment when Drouot assembled the Guard, a captain 
of carbineers traversed the valley at full speed, defying the 
cannon-balls and a hail of bullets, and approached, sabre in its 
scabbard and right hand raised, the advanced skirmishers of the 



2o6 Wateeloo. 

52nd English. Conducted before the major of this regiment, 
who was talking with Colonel Fraser, commanding the light 
artillery, he cried, "Long live the King! Prepare yourself! 
That rascal Napoleon will be on you with the Guard before 
a half -hour." Colonel Fraser rejoined Wellington and trans- 
mitted to him this information. The Duke traversed the line 
of battle from the route of Brussels to that of Nivelles, giving 
his last orders. The brigade of Adam and the Guards of Mait- 
land, which had retreated into a hollow in order to shelter them- 
selves from the balls, resumed their positions. The Hanoverian 
brigade of William Halkett and the German brigade of Duplat 
prolonged the right of Adam, towards Hougoumont. The 
Dutch-Belgian division of Chasse established itself : the brigade 
of d'Aubreme behind the Guards of Maitland, having behind 
it the cavalry of Vivian; the brigade of Ditmer in the rear of 
the three battalions of Brunswick, posted on the left of the 
English brigade of Colin Halkett. The cavalry of Vandeleur 
deployed to the west of the route of Brussels in support of the 
decimated battalions of Ompteda and Kruse and another bat- 
talion of Brunswick. The three batteries left until then in 
reserve advanced to the front. The cannoneers were ordered 
to reply no longer to the French artillery, but to concentrate 
their fire on the assaulting columns. They were to fire until 
they had exhausted t"he last cartridges. 

It seems that Ney gave a bad formation as well as a bad 
direction to the Guard. Instead of forming a single column, 
powerful enough to pierce the enemy's line, the Marshal left 
the battalions divided. And instead of ascending from the 
lowlands of La Haye Sainte straight to the plateau by the route 
of Brussels, by which the column would have had hardly 400 
yards to traverse, and where the embankments of the road 
would have protected it from the enfilading fire of the artillery, 
it marched diagonally, by the unprotected slopes which had 
been scaled by the cuirassiers in their first charge. 

The five battalions of the Middle Guard, formed in as 
mau}^ squares, advanced in echelons, the right in advance. 
Between each echelon the horse cannoneers of the Guard con- 
ducted two 8-pounders, a total of one battery, under the orders 
of Colonel Duchand. In this oblique march, almost analogous 
to the movement "towards the left, en avant en battaile," all 
the echelons did not maintain their intervals. The fourth ap- 
proached the third. Soon the five battalions formed but 



Tele Battle of Waterloo. 207 

four: on the right, the ist BattaKon of the 3rd Grenadiers; in 
the center, the .sole battaHon of the 4th Grenadiers; further to 
the left, the ist and 2nd Battahons of the 3rd Chasseurs; and 
on the extreme left, the 4th Chasseurs, reduced to a single 
battalion. 

All the troops had received the order to second this attack. 
Already the divisions of Donzelot, Allix, and Marcognet had 
begun to climb the plateau, the first along and to the left of the 
route of Genappe, the other two to the right of this route. 
But the infantry of Reille and the debris of the cavalry had 
hardly begun to advance. Between La Haye Sainte and 
Hougoumont the five battalions of the Guard advanced alone 
against the English Army. They marched at a shoulder arms, 
aligned as if for a review at the Tuileries, superb and impassive. 
All their officers were in front, the first in the midst of the balls. 
Generals Friant and Porret de Morvan commanded the bat- 
talion of the 3rd Grenadiers; General Harlet, the battalion of 
the 4th Grenadiers; General Michel, the ist Battalion of the 
3rd Chasseurs; Colonel Mallet, a faithful of the Island of Elba, 
the 2nd Battalion; and General Henrion, the battalion of the 
4th Chasseurs. Ney rolled upon the ground with his horse, 
the fifth one killed under him. He disengaged himself, arose, 
and marched on foot, sword in hand, by the side of Friant. 
The English artillery, disposed in a semi-circle from the route 
of Brussels to the neighboring heights of Hougoumont, for 
from convex the front of the enemy's right had become con- 
cave, fired double charges of grape at a range of 200 yards. 
The Guard was battered in front and flank. Each volley rnade 
a breach. The grenadiers closed up the files, contracted the 
squares, and continued to ascend with the sam.e step, crying, 
"Long live the Emperor!" 

The 1st Battalion of the 3rd Grenadiers (right echelon) 
overthrew a corps of Brunswick, took possession of the bat- 
teries of Cleeves and Lloyd, which were abandoned by the 
cannoneers; and, by a slight conversion, directed itself to- 
wards the left of the brigade of Halkett. The 30th and 73rd 
English recoiled in disorder. Friant, wounded by a gunshot, 
quitted the field of battle, believing the victory assured. But 
the Belgian General Chasse, one of the heroes of Arcis sur 
Aube (he served then in the French ranks!), caused to advance 
on the right of the 30th and 73rd Regiments the battery of Van 
der Smissen, whose fire enfiladed the assailants. Then he de- 



2oS Watei;T;00. 

liberate]}" sent to the left of the two English regiments the 
brigade of Ditmer, 3,000 strong, launched it with fixed bay- 
onets against the feeble square, broke, dislocated, and crushed 
it under the weight of numbers, and threw back the survivors 
to the foot of the slopes. 

During this time the battalion of the 4th Grenadiers 
(second echelon) had engaged the right of Halkett's brigade. 
Under the iron hail of the two guns of Duchand and the fusil- 
lade of the grenadiers, the debris of the 33rd and 69th Regi- 
ments gave ground. General Halkett seized the flag of the 33rd 
and, by his example, succeeded in checking the disorder. 
"See the General!" cried the men. "He is between two fires! 
He can not escape!" In fact, he fell, severely wounded. But 
the English had rallied and held their ground. An old sol- 
dier said, in biting ofT his cartridge: "It is who will kill the 
longest." 

The 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 3rd Chasseurs (third 
echelon) almost attained the crest of the plateau without 
meeting with any infantry. They marched towards the road 
of dhain, distant from them hardly a pistol-shot. Suddenly, at 
twentv steps, arose a red wall. It was the 2,000 Guards of 
Maitland, drawn up in four lines. They had been waiting, 
lying down in the rye. At the command of Wellington, "Up, 
Guards, and be. ready!" they had risen as if moved by springs. 
They aimed, fired. Their first volley mowed down 300 men, 
nearly half of the two battalions already decimated by the fire 
of the artillery. General Michel fell, mortally wounded. The 
French halted; their ranks broken, their march obstructed by 
the dead. Instead of ordering them to advance instantane- 
ously with fixed bayonets, without disquieting themselves at 
the disorder in which they found themselves, the officers at- 
tempted to form them in line in order to reply to the fire of 
the enemy. The confusion increased. The deployment was 
effected with great difficulty and loss of time. For ten min- 
utes the chasseurs remained exposed to the fire of the Guards 
of Maitland and the batteries of Bolton and Ramsay, which 
enfiladed them. Wellington saw the Guard on the point of 
giving way; he ordered the charge. "Forward, my lads!" 
cried Colonel Saltoun; "now is the time!" The 2,000 English 
rushed headlong upon this handful of soldiers, overthrew them, 
and descended intermingled with them' in a furious hand-to- 
hand combat, even near the orchard of Hougoumtont. "The 



The Bat'J'le of Waterloo. 209 

combatants were so mingled," says an officer of Bolton's bat- 
tery, "that we were compelled to cease firing." 

At the sudden commands of their officers the English 
halted abruptly. The battalion of the 4th Chasseurs (left 
echelon) approached to disengage the surviors of the 3rd Chas- 
seurs, as well as those of the 4th Grenadiers, who had likewise 
begun to retreat. Without awaiting the shock, the soldiers of 
Maitland fell back in disorder and re-ascended to their positions 
as swiftly as they had descended. Chasseurs and grenadiers 
followed them up closely, scaling the hillside under the volleys 
of grape. They crossed the road of Chain, when the brigade 
of Adam (52nd, 71st, and 95th Regiments), which had quickly 
formed en potence on their left flank, raked them with a fire 
from four ranks. The guards of Maitland faced about and, 
re-forming as well as possible, recommenced to fire in concert 
with the brigade of Colin Halkett, whilst the Hanoverians of 
William Halkett debouched from the hedges of Hougoumont, 
and opened fire upon the French from the rear. From all sides 
the bullets arrived in clusters. Mallet was severely wounded. 
One battalion deployed in front of Maitland; and what re- 
mained of the other two marched by the left against the brigade 
of Adam. Colonel Colborn, whom the soldiers called in Spain 
"the fire-eater," charged with the 52nd. All the brigade followed 
with fixed bayonets. Considerably shaken already by the 
formidable fire to which they had been exposed, chasseurs and 
grenadiers yielded under the weight of numbers, and retired 
in confusion. 

HI. 

The cry, "The Guard recoils!" sounded the death-knell 
of the Grand Army. Every one felt that all was ended. The 
infantry of Reillei the cuirassiers, and the squadrons of the 
Guard, who had finahv put themselves on the march to second 
Ney's attack, halted, paralyzed. The soldiers of Donzelot and 
AH'ix, fighting upon the crests above La Haye Sainte, with the 
brigades of Kruse, Lambert, Kempt, and Pack, saw the Guard 
falling back. They also yielded the conquered ground, and 
again descended to the foot of the hill, drawing in their retreat 
the division of Marcognet, which had attacked upon the pro- 
longation of their right the positions of the enemy. The back- 
ward movement gained the entire line of battle, from left to 
right. At the same time the infantry of Durutte was attacked 



2 lo Watekloo. 

in Papelotte and La Haye by the Prussian heads of column, 
debouching by the road of Ohain. The cry, "Sauve qui petit! 
We are betrayed!" arose on all sides. This panic can be 
readily explained, if one thinks of the state of mind of the 
soldiers, troubled and possessed for three months by the fear 
of treason. Everything appeared to justify their suspicions. 
They had Sieen passing over to the enemy a general, a colonel, 
and officers of every grade. Among their cartridges they had 
found some filled with bran instead of powder. They were as- 
tonished at so many disconnected movements; they were dis- 
heartened by so many unsuccessful assaults. Finally, they 
had expected the corps of Grouchy, whose arrival had been 
announced, and it was the corps of Ziethen that arrived to 
crush them. Confusion set in, increased. The Prussians hurled 
themselves to the assault, dislodged from the farms the few 
handfuls of brave men who still held out in spite of the panic, 
and threw them into the ravines. The debris of the four 
divisions of d'Erlon ran foul of, jostled, and mutually broke 
one another. East of the great highway, in the depths of the 
valley over which crossed the English shrapnel and Prussian 
cannon-balls, there was the most lamentable confusion. 

Wellington wishes to finish this mortally wounded army. 
He urges his horse to the brow of the plateau, uncovers, and 
waves his hat in the air. His men understand this signal. All 
the troops put themselves instantaneously on the march in the 
order in which they find themselves. Without taking time to 
re-form, the battalions, batteries, and squadrons of the different 
divisions advance side by side, passing over the dead and 
crushing the wounded under the feet of the horses and the 
wheels of the cannon. There alone remain upon the positions 
the brigades of Pack, Ompteda, and Kielmansegge, and two or 
three batteries which are literally prevented from moving by 
the carcasses of horses and the bodies accumulated along their 
front. From right to left, English, Hanoverians, Belgians, 
Brunswickers, cavalry, infantry, and artillery, forty thousand 
men, descend in torrents to the sound of drums, bugles, and 
pibrochs, in the first shadows of twilight. At this sight, 
frightful even for brave men, the last echelons of infantry turn 
and reascend precipitately, with most of the cavalry, the hills 
to the west of Ta Belle Alliance; the leading battalions, more 
immediately threatened with being overwhelmed by the ava- 
lanche, disband and flee. Ta Haye Sainte, the orchard of 



The Battle op Waterloo. 211 

Hougoumont, and the wood are abandoned. The hussars of 
Vivian and the dragoons of Vandeleur, who open the way for 
the English masses, sabre the fugitives with the ferocious cry, 
"No quarter! No quarter!" 

Whilst the Middle Guard attacked the English positions, 
the 2nd Battalions of the ist Chasseurs, the 2nd Grenadiers, 
and the 2nd Chasseurs, with Generals Cambronne, Roguet, and 
Christiani, had arrived near the Emperor at the foot of La 
Haye Sainte. Napoleon occupied himself with forming them 
in column of attack, one battalion deployed and two upon the 
flanks in serried column, to lead them himself upon the plateau, 
where "all was going well," according to the words of Friant, 
who returned from there wounded, when he saw the sudden 
collapse of his line of battle. He also felt then that he was ir- 
remediably defeated. But he preserved the hope of being able 
to organize the retreat. Without losing any of his presence of 
mind, he broke the column of the Old Guard and placed the 
three battalions, in as many squares, at nearly a hundred yards 
below Ta Haye Sainte, the right square on the route of Brus- 
sels. Protected by this dike, he thought the Army would be 
able to rally and retire in good order. 

The hussars of Vivian, powerless to make any impression 
on these squares, turned them and continued to trace red fur- 
rows in the throng of fugitives. Drunk with blood, they were 
intent on slaughter. A subaltern of the i8th said to Vivian: 
"We will follow you to hell, if you will lead us." Behind the 
hussars rushed other horsemen of the enemy. The Emperor 
launched the four squadrons of his escort against this new wave 
of cavalry, which submerged them. 

Not far from the road, Ney, on foot, bare-headed, unrecog- 
nizable, his face black with powder, his uniform in rags, one 
epaulet cut in two by a sabre-stroke, and a broken sword in 
his hand, cries with rage to Count d'Erlon, who is borne along 
in an eddy of the rout: "D'Erlon, if we escape, we shall be 
hung!" The Marshal "is less hke a man than a furious beast." 
His efforts during this entire day have exceeded human energy 
and strength. Never in any battle had any chief, any soldier, 
exposed himself as much. Ney has surpassed Ney. He has 
led twice to the attack the infantry of d'Erlon ; he has charged 



212 Waterloo. 

four times upon the plateau with the cuirassiers; he has led 
the desperate assault of the grenadiers of the Guard. He 
hastens now to Brue's brigade (Durutte's division), sole troops 
of the Line retiring in good order, and which is reduced, more- 
over, to the effective of two battalions. He stops the soldiers 
and throws them once more against the enemy, crying : "Come 
and see how a marshal of France can die!" The brigade- 
quickly broken and dispersed, Ney clings to this fatal field of 
battle. Since he can not find death there, he wishes, at, least, 
to be the last to quit it. He enters into a square of the Guard 
with Major Rulliere, who has taken the eagle of the 95th from 
the dying hands of Lieutenant Puthod. Durutte, his right 
hand severed at the wrist, his forehead laid open by a sabre- 
blow, and all covered with blood, is borne along by his horse 
in a charge of the enemy's cavalry; he gallops in the midst of 
the English as far as La Belle Alliance. 

The three battalions of the Guard repulsed the cavalry 
without difficulty. But their formation in squares, which, 
however, they were forced to preserve in order to resist ne»v 
charges, put them in a state of tactical inferiority with the 
English infantry, in line in four ranks. Its more extended and 
denser fire battered the squares in front and flank. With the 
musketry was mingled the grape from the batteries of Rogers, 
Whyniates, and Gardiner, which fired at a range of sixty yards. 
The masses of the enemy increased around the grenadiers: 
the brigades of Adam and William Halkett, which were espe- 
cially persistent in their attack, and those of Kempt, Lambert, 
Kruse, Wincke, and Colin Halkett. The Emperor gave the 
order to quit this untenable position. As for himself, reflecting, 
too late perhaps, that to check a rout one should not remain 
upon the broken front of troops who are falling back, but 
should betake himself to the rear, in order to rally them in a 
new position, gained at a gallop, with a few chasseurs of his 
escort, the heights of La Belle Alliance. 

The three battalions — as well as that of the 3rd Grenadiers, 
po3ted on their left and assailed in turn by the English dragoons, 
the Black Lancers of Brunswick, the infantry of Maitland and 
Mitchell — retrograded step by step. Reduced to too few men 
to remain in squares in three ranks, they formed in .two ranks, 
in triangles and, with fixed bayonets, pierced slowly through 
the crowd of fugitives and the English. At each step men 
stumbled over the dead or dropped under the balls. Every 



The Bat'J'le of Waterloo. 213 

fifty yards it was necessary to halt to re-form the ranks and 
to repulse a new charge of cavalry or a new attack of infantry. 
In this heroic retreat, the Guard marched literally surrounded 
by enemies, like a wild boar among a pack of dogs. The dis- 
tance separating the combatants was so slight that, in spite of 
the multiple noises of the battle, one was within speaking dis- 
tance. In the midst of the musketry the English officers cried 
to these old soldiers to surrender. Cambronne was on horse- 
back in the square of the 2nd Battalion of the ist Chasseurs. 
Despair in his heart, choking with rage, and exasperated by 
the incessant summons of the enemy, he cried wrathfully: 
"M. . . . !" A few instants after, as he was on the point of 
attaining with his battalion the summits of La Belle Alliance, 
a ball full in his face overturned him bloody and inanimate. 

V. 

During the last assault of Mont Saint- Jean half of the corps 
of Pirch (divisions of Tippelskirch and Krafft and the cavalry 
of Jurgass) had rejoined Bulow, who had just met with a bloody 
repulse. Bliicher immediately ordered a general attack against 
all our right flank. In Plancenoit the Young Guard of Du- 
hesme and the two battalions of the Old Guard of Morand and 
Pelet remained inexpugnable. But on the prolongation of 
this village, the infantry of Lobau and the cavalry of Domon 
and Subervic fell back before the 15,000 men of Hacke, 
Losthin, and Prince William ; they were overthrown when the 
division of Steinmetz and the cavalry of Roder, debouching 
from Smohain in pursuit of Durutte, attacked them in flank. 
The French masses, stationed a quarter of an hour before from 
the route of Nivelles to the ravines of Papelotte and Plance- 
noit, inundated the plateau around La Belle Alliance. Behind 
them, sabring, shooting, and cheering, hastened on one side the 
English, on the other the Prussians. The two jaws of the vise 
closed upon the panic-stricken and defenseless crowd that had 
been the Imperial Army. 

In this terror-stricken mob everyone pushed and scrambled 
in order to flee more swiftly. There were cuirassiers who threw 
aside their cuirasses, drivers who cut the traces of the teams, 
and men who were trampled under foot. One stumbled among 
the dead horses, the overturned caissons, the abandoned can- 
non. The shadows of night, which began to grow thicker (it 



214 Waterloo. 

was nearly nine o'clock), added to the fright and increased 
the confusion. The 12th and i6th English Dragoons were 
charged by the ist Hussars of the German Legion. The brigade 
of Adam received the fire of a Prussian battery. The High- 
landers of the ist turned some French guns against the fleeing 
columns. The four battalions of the Guard, which had just 
regained the plateau, were the only infantry still in order. 
English and Prussians enclosed each of these squares in a 
circle of grape, sabres, and bayonets. Charged simultaneously 
by the cavalry and infantry, they were broken, demolished, 
crushed. Their debris were swallowed up in the debacle. 

Five hundred yards in the rear, near the Decoster house, 
await, formed in squares, on the left and right of the route, 
the two battalions of the ist Grenadiers, commanded by Gen- 
eral Petit. These men are the elite of the elite. Almost all of 
them wear two chevrons, and four out of six are legionaries. 
The Emperor is on horseback in the square of the ist Battalion. 
With these living redoubts, he still hopes to cover the re- 
treat. He orders to be established, upon the prolongation of 
the squares, the battery of 12-pounders which had for a long 
time cannonaded the Prussians above Plancenoit, and causes 
the grenadiere to be beaten in order to rally all the detachments 
of the Guard. A crowd of fugitives pass along the route on 
both sides of the squares, followed closely by the enemy. The 
battery of the Guard has only one shot for each piece. Its last 
discharge, at close range, overwhelms a column of cavalry. 
The gunners, henceforth, without ammunition, remain stoic- 
ally by their guns, in order to impose still upon the assail- 
ants. Other squadrons approach at a gallop. "Do not fire," 
cries a grenadier; "they are French hussars." They are Eng- 
lish hussars; they burst upon the battery and sabre the dis- 
armed cannoneers. But upon the squares these incessant 
charges break and scatter like whirlwinds of sand upon blocks 
of granite. Before each battalion of grenadiers rises a wall of 
dead men and horses. 

In Plancenoit, where the Prussian batteries had started a 
conflagration, one fought by the light of the flames. The 
Young Guard, recruited almost entirely from among the vol- 
unteers of Paris and Lyons, and the ist Battalions of the 2nd 
Chasseurs and 2nd Grenadiers, fought one against five. The 
combined attacks of the divisions of Hiller, Ryssel, and Tip- 
pelskirch failed. Gneissenau reanimated his soldiers; they 



The Battle of Waterloo. ' 215 

rushed again to the assault and penetrated into the village. 
There French and Prussians engaged in a murderous death- 
grapple, in which they killed one another with thrusts of the 
bayonet and blows of the butts of their muskets. Drum- 
Major Stubert, of the 2nd Grenadiers, a giaiit, brained the Prus- 
sians with the head of his baton. A battVdion of the Young 
Guard caused itself to be exterminated in the cemetery, which 
served as a reduit. The Prussians captured the houses one 
by one. The combatants massacred one another in the cham- 
bers, in the attics; and during these fights, in which no mercy 
was shown by either side, the thatched roofs, which the fire had 
gained, crumbled over the heads of the combatants. "It was 
necessary to annihilate the French," says Major Von Damitz, 
"in order to obtain possession of Plancenoit." On the out- 
skirts of the village the remains of these heroic battalions were 
charged and driven fighting as far as the plateau. There the 
English cavalry finished them. General Pelet found himself for 
an instant alone in the midst of the enemy, with a few men and 
the eagle-bearer of the chasseurs of the Old Guard. "Help! 
help! chasseurs!" he cried in a piercing voice. "Let us save 
the eagle or die near it!" All those who heard this desperate 
appeal turned back and cut their way through the mass of horse; 
they rallied around the eagle and formed for it an impenetrable 
rampart of bayonets. 

From Plancenoit French and Prussians debouched upon 
the route of Brussels, near the squares of the ist Grenadiers. 
The fugitives crowded around to seek a refuge within these 
squares, but they were pitilessly repulsed by steel and fire. 
The safety of the squares demanded it. General Roguet came 
near being killed by a grenadier. "We fired," said General 
Petit, "on all that which presented itself, friends as well as 
enemies, for fear of permitting to enter the one with the other. 
It was an evil for a good." The squares were outflanked on 
the right and left; the English and Prussians became more 
and more numerous, more and more compact. The grenadiers 
repulsed every charge. Two battalions against two armies! 

Finally, the Emperor ordered the position to be aban- 
doned. The grenadiers put themselves slowly in retreat, the 
ist Battalion on the left of the route and the 2rd on the route 
itself. Every few minutes they halted to dress the squares 
and to delay the pursuit of the enemy by a rolling file-fire. 



2i6 Wateeloo. 

The Emperor marched at some distance in front of the 
squares with Soult, Drouot, Bertrand, Lobau, and five or six 
horse chasseurs of the Old Guard. At the farm of Caillou he 
rejoined. the ist Battahon of the foot chasseurs of the Old 
Guard. This battalion, charged with the safety of the im- 
perial treasure and baggage, was commanded by Major 
Dimring, a Dutchman by birth. About seven in the evening, 
two Prussian columns having advanced through the wood of 
Chantelet with the manifest intention of intercepting the re- 
treat of the Army by occupying the main highway, Duuring 
had at once ordered the wagons to retire on Genappe, in ac- 
cord with General Radet, provost- general of the Army, who 
had succeeded in rallying two or three hundred dismounted 
cavalry and infantry. He had then deployed his battalion in 
front of the enemy. The Prussians (25th Regiment), received 
with a heavy fire and then charged with the bayonet, retired 
towards Maransart. The Emperor stopped for a few minutes 
to question Duuring under the last cannon-balls from the Prus- 
sian batteries of Plancenoit; he praised him for the firmness 
and spirit of initiative of which he had given proof, and or- 
dered him to follow him. "I count upon you," said he. The 
battalion having closed up in mass, the Emperor gave the reins 
to his horse and marched at a walk upon the flank of the 
column. 



CHAPTER VI. 
The Rout. 

I. — Meeting of Wellington and Bliicher in front of La Belle Alliance 

(quarter-past nine). — The rout of the French. 
II. — Attempt at resistance in Genappe (eleven o'clock). 
III. — Pursuit of the Prussian cavalry (night of June iSth-igth). 
IV. — Halt of the Emperor at Quatre-Bras. — The Army passes the Sam- 

bre at Charleroi (morning of June iQth). 
V, — Retreat on Laon. — Departure of the Emperor for Paris (June 20th) 



About a quarter-past nine, at the time when the divisions 
of Iiiller, Ryssel, and Tippelskirch wrested Plancenoit from the 
Young Guard, and the squares of the 1st Grenadiers still held 
out near the Decoster house, Bliicher and Wellington met in 
front of the inn of La Belle Alliance. Bliicher followed the 
troops of Bulow, who had driven back Tobau, and Wellington 
arrived from La Have Sainte with the last echelons of his army. 
The two generals met and, according to the words of Gneis- 
senau, "they congratulated each other tipon the victory." 
The bands of the Prussian cavalry played in passing, "God 
Save the King"; in the distance the noise of the firing de- 
creased. The infantry of Bulow, who had halted to re-form, 
their ranks, intoned the hymn of I^uther: "Lord God, we 
praise Thee! Lord God, we thank Thee!" 

Bliicher, impressed with the fact that his meeting wnth 
Wellington had taken place precisely in front of La Belle Al- 
liance, wished to give this name to the battle, in which the al- 
liance of the English and Prussians had produced such great 
results. But Wellington desired that the victory — his victor)' 
— should bear the name of the village which had had the 
honor the preceding night of serving him as headquarters. 

It was decided that in spite of the night it was necessary 
to pursue a ouirance the wrecks of the Imperial Army. The 
English were worn out with ten hours' fighting, "tired to 
death," says Wellington. The Prussians had made five leagties 
on an average over the worst kind of roads, and they had 
fought between Frischermont and Plancenoit with no less ob- 

217 
—15— 



2i8 Watekloo. 

stinacy than had the soldiers of Wellington at Mont Saint- 
Jean. Nevertheless, Bliicher proposed to charge his troops 
with the pursuit. The offer being accepted without shame, 
he called together his corps commanders and ordered them 
' ' to pursue the enemy as long as they would have a man and 
horse in condition to stand up." Gneissenau put himself at 
the head of the squadrons of Count Roder. All the Army fol- 
lowed. Towards Rossomme they caught up with a part of 
the Prussian divisions, which had debouched from Plancenoit, 
and the furthest advanced of the colunins of the English 
cavalry and infantry. 

The army of Wellington halted. The soldiers saluted with 
a triple "Hip, hip, hurrah!" the Prussians who passed them, 
and established themselves in bivouac in the midst of the 
shambles. From the plateau of Mont Saint- Jean to the heights 
of Rossouime, from Ilougoumont to Plancenoit, and even to- 
wards Smohain, the entire ground was covered with dead men 
and horses. More than 25,000 French and 20,000 English, 
Belgians, Germans, and Prussians lay upon the grotmd, here 
,'cattered like uprooted trees, there in long lines like rows of 
grain which had fallen under the reaper's scythe. The moon, 
which h d risen, lighted up distinctly their livid and bloody 
faces, their uniforms soiled with mud and spotted with blood; 
the arms which had fallen from their hands scintillated in the 
moonbeams. At times great sombre clouds, drifting across 
the sky, concealed this vi^on, from which the least sensitive 
among the oldest soldiers turned away their eyes; but it 
soon reappeared under the glacial light of the moon. Amidst 
the death-rattle of the dying and the groans of the wounded, 
one heard at short intervals a raucous cry similar to that ut- 
tered by someone being strangled by horror and fright. It was 
some officer being finished by a robber of the dead, in order to 
steal from him his purse or his cross of the Legion of Honor. 

The Prussians conducted the pursuit with vigor. The 
fugitives of the right wing (corps of Lobau and d'Erlon, Young 
Guard, and cavalry of Domon, Subervic, and Jacquinot) who, 
pursued too closely, or cut off from their line of retreat, had 
not been able to overtake and pass the squares of the ist Gren- 
adiers forming the rear guard, were sabred or made prisoners. 
On the right wing a certain number of cuirassiers, whose 
horses were still in condition to travel, and the lancers of Pire, 
who had only skirmished during the battle, gained Quatre- 



I'lIE IiOUT. 219 

Bras, without being molested, by way of Neuve-Court, Mal- 
plaquet, and Vieux-Genappe. They passed the Sambre at 
Marchienne. Five or six thousand infantry of Reille's corps, 
rallied at nightfall, directed themselves on Genappe across the 
fields, parallel with and at nearly a half-league from the 
highway. A few Prussian squadrons were sufficient to dis- 
perse them. Save three companies of the 93rd Regiment, 
which turned at bay and repulsed the charges, all this mass 
dispersed. Some of the soldiers threw away their haversacks 
and guns in order to flee more rapidly, justifying only too well 
the old adage: "Frenchmen are more than men in attack, 
and less than women in retreat." They no longer listened 
to their officers, and panic reigned supreme. - 

The Old Guard alone remained worthy of itsel . The 
chasseurs and lancers of Ivcfebvre-Desnoettes, who had quitted 
the field at walk and with so bold a front that the English 
cavalry had not dared to attack them, retired in good order on 
the west of the highway, and reached Quatre-Bras without 
suffering any new losses. On the highway itself the Prussians 
were held in check by the two squares of the ist Grenadiers, 
which were preceded by the ist Battalion of the ist Chasseurs. 
The grenadiers continued to march at the ordinary step, de- 
fying all attacks. Not being able to bite, the Prussian pack 
desisted from further attacks and confined itself to following 
out of musket-range. Half a league from Genappe, General 
Petit, no longer deeming it necessary to preserve the order of 
combat, ordered the squares to break up and to march in 
column by sections. It was at this moment that the Emperor 
separated from the ist Battahon of chasseurs to gain Genappe, 
where he hoped to check the enemy and to rally the wrecks of 
the Army. 

II. 

Genappe consisted of only one long street, steep and 
winding, which abutted upon a bridge over the Dyle. It would 
have been possible to have held for many hours this defile, al- 
though it is commanded on the north by heights upon which 
the Prussian batteries could have been established. But there 
were in this vihage so much obstruction and confusion that one 
could not think of organizing a methodical defense, especially 
with soldiers who never ceased to cry, "We are betrayed! Let 
us save ourselves!" Overturned wagons, carriages, limbers, 



220 Waterloo. 

guns, and caissons abandoned by the auxiliary drivers ob- 
structed for a considerable distance the approaches to the 
bridge, which was, in 1815, no more than seven feet wide, 
(wing to the crowding of the fugitives into the street, from 
which they could issue Onlv three or four abreast, there arose 
a frightful disorder. Mad from fear, some of the men sought 
to open a passage by striking ever^^thing in front. General 
Radet, provost-general of the Army, was terribly beaten with 
the butt-ends of muskets. Some of the cavalry used their 
sabres, and the infantry replied with bayonet-thrusts, some- 
times even with gun-shots. They killed each other without 
being able to advance, the living entangled with the dead. 
The rear of the column accunmlated at the entrance of Ge- 
nappe. The Prussians approached. The three battalions of 
the Old Guard, threatened with being crushed between the 
masses of the enemv and the crowd of fugitives, broke column 
and gained Charieroi by turning the village on the east. The 
Prussians did not pursue them, but turned upon the crowds of 
unarmed men in front of Genappe. These unfortunates were 
literally under the lances of the uhlans before they thought of 
escaping by the right and left of the village and of passing the 
Dyle by fording. This little river, which at this spot was not 
thirty feet wide, and whose depth did not attain three, was an 
obstacle only for the carriages, on account of the steepness of 
its banks. 

Genappe was still crowded with French. A handful of 
men, who alone in this panic had preserved their resolution 
and courage, attempted to arrest the enemy. They rapidly 
erected with overturned wagons a barricade from behind which 
they opened fire. A few cannon-balls gave only too quickly an 
account of this feeble work and its defenders. The horsemen 
of Roder descended the sloping street, crushing the inert mul- 
titude, and striking with sabre and lance without more risk 
than butchers in an abattoir. The Emperor, who had taken, it 
is said, more than an hour to clear for himself a passage through 
this long street, was still on the north side of the bridge. He 
had just entered his carriage, which had been found by chance 
in the midst of the abandoned train. The horses had not yet 
been hitched to it. Hearing the hurrahs, he hastily aban- 
doned it, mounted his horse, and succeeded in escaping with a 
few horsemen. The Prussians pillaged the carriage, which 
contained a dressing-case, a sword, an iron bed, and a uniform, 



The PiOUT. 221 

in the lining of which were sewed some uncut diamonds, valued 
at a million francs. 

Bliicher had pushed as far as Genappe with the corps of 
Bulow. He halted to pass the night in the inn of the Roi 
d'Espagne. Almost immediately there was brought to. the 
inn upon a stretcher General Duhesme. In the last hour of the 
battle Duhesme had fallen grievously wounded between Plance- 
noit and Rossomme ; a few devoted soldiers had picked him up 
and carried him till near Genappe, where he had been made 
prisoner by the Prussians. The Field Marshal went to visit 
him and recommended him to the surgeon of his staff. But 
the wound was mortal, and Duhesme died during the following 
night. Although worn out, Bliicher did not wish to retire be- 
fore writing to his wife: "I have kept my promise," he wrote. 
"On the 1 6th I was forced to recoil before numbers; but on 
the 1 8th, in concert with my friend Wellington, I have ex- 
terminated the Army of Napoleon." He sent also this letter 
to his old comrade Knesebeck: "My friend, the finest battle 
is fought, the most brilliant victory is won. The details ^vill 
follow. I can write no more, for I tremble in all my members. 
The effort has been too great." 

III. 

Beyond Genappe the pursuit became more rapid. As 
there was no longer an organized body of troops forming the 
rear guard, the Prussians sabred with impunity the panic- 
stricken mob. "It was a regular chase," says Gneissenau; "a 
chase by the light of the moon." The great highway, the 
country roads, the lanes and fields, as far as the eye could see, 
were covered with soldiers of every arm, dismounted cuiras- 
siers, lancers upon foundered horses, infantrymen who had 
thrown away guns and haversacks, wounded men losing their 
blood, and soldiers who had suffered amputation and had es- 
caped from the ambulances ten minutes after the operation. 
Without authority over these men and, besides, no less de- 
moralized and thinking like them only of their own safety, 
captains, colonels, and generals marched intermingled with 
the mass of fugitives. Durutte on horseback, but blinded by 
the blood that flowed from his open forehead, was guided by 
a sergeant of cuirassiers. A corporal of the Old Guard sup- 
ported Ney by the arm until the moment when Major Schmidt, 
of the red lancers, dismounted from his horse to give it to 



222 WaTEELOO. 

the Marshal. Surgeon-in-Chief Larrey, wounded by two sabre- 
blows, was struck again by the uhlans, robbed, stripped of his 
clothing, and carried, almost naked, with his hands tied, to a 
general, who oi'dered him to be shot. Just as this order was on 
the point of being carried out, a Prussian surgeon recognized 
him, threw himself in front of him, and saved him. 

Each one marched, ran, dragged himself along as best he 
could, went wherever he pleased, no one thinking to give orders,, 
which would not have been obeyed. And when the sound of 
the Prussian trumpets, the galloping of the horses, and the 
savage clamors of the pursuers drew nigh, from this terror- 
stricken mob arose the cry: "Here they are!' Here they are!: 
Let us save ourselves!" And, under the lash of fear, 
cavalry and infantry, officers and soldiers, wounded and un- 
wounded, again found strength to run. Bands of fugitives, 
who, falling from fatigue, halted in the woods, hollows of the 
ground, farm-houses, and hamlets, were quickly set running 
again by the cavalry. The Prussians broke up no less than 
nine bivouacs. Some of the wounded killed themselves to 
avoid falling alive into the hands of the enemy. An officer of 
cuirassiers, seeing himself surrounded by uhlans, cried : ' 'They 
shall have neither my horse nor myself!" And coolly he 
dropped his horse with a ball in the ear and then blew out his 
own brains with a second pistol. 

Most of Bulow's infantry having halted at Genappe and 
Ziethen and Pirch's corps having gone no further than Caillou, 
Gneissenau had with him only the dragoons and uhlans of 
General Roder, one battalion of the ist Pomeranian, and one 
of the 15th Regiment. It is truly incredible that thirty or 
forty thousand Frenchmen should have fled before four thou- 
sand Prussians ! If a few hundred soldiers had overcome their 
terror and had .re-formed to make a stand, their resistance 
would have put an end to this lamentable pursuit. The Prus- 
sians, who sabred especially the defenseless fugitives, allowed 
themselves, as it seems, to be easily imposed upon, since a 
handful of resolute men marching grouped around the eagle 
of each regiment sufficed to defend the flags. The enemy 
picked up on the battle-field and along the highway more than 
two hundred abandoned cannon and more than a thousand 
wagons; during the retreat, he d^'d not capture one flag. 

Hardened and insensible as is the soldit-r, bv habit and the 
very nature of his profession, to spectacles of death, the fugi- 



The Eout. 223 

tives in passing through Quatre-Bras were seized with horror. 
The men killed in the battle of June i6th had not been in- 
terred. Three to four thousand bodies, entirely naked, for the 
peasants had even removed their shirts, covered all the ground 
between the main road and the wood of Bossu. The fcene 
presented the aspect of an immense morgue. By turns lighted 
up by the moon and drowned in shadow by the veil of clouds, 
the dead, in the fleeting movements of the light, seemed to 
move their stiffened bodies and to contract their livid faces. 
"We thought," said a grenadier of the Guard, "to see some 
spectres who demanded burial of us." Lower down the soldiers 
quenched their thirst in the stream of Gemioncourt, which, 
swollen by the storm of the day before, was filled with floating 
bodies. 

Less and less numerous, more and more fatigued, but as 
ardent as ever, the Prussians continued the pursuit. Gneis- 
senau had knocked up en route half of his force. There alone 
marched with him a few squadrons and a small detachment of 
the 15th Infantry, whose drummer beat the charge, perched 
Upon a horse taken from the imperial carriages. They passed 
Frasnes. Gneissenau judged that the fatigue of the men and 
horses would not permit of the chase being pushed further. 
He gave the order to halt in front of an inn, which, supreme 
irony, bore the name "A I'Empereur." 

IV. 

From Genappe Napoleon had gained on horseback Quatre- 
Bras, with Soult, Drouot, Bertrand, a few officers, and ten red 
lancers and chasseurs of the Guard. He arrived there about 
one in the morning. He expected to find there the division of 
Girard, left on June 17th at Fleurus, to protect the passage of 
the convoys, and to which, during the evening of the i8th, had 
been despatched the order to advance to Quatre-Bras and to 
take position there. These instructions had not been carried 
out. Colonel Matis, who conmianded temporarily the remains 
of this division, received, indeed, the order of vSoult; but, either 
because he judged, in view of the lateness of the hour, that the 
prescribed movement could not be effected in time, or for some 
other cause, he broke camp in the night and went to pass the 
Sambre at Charleroi. 



224 Waterloo. 

Meanwhile the Emperor awaited the arrival of these 
troops at Quatre-Bras. He dismounted from his horse in a 
clearing in the wood of Bossu, near a camp-fire which had been 
started by some grenadiers of the Guard. A wounded officer, 
who was fleeing along the highway, recognized the Emperor by 
the light of the fire He stood, his arms crossed over his chest, 
motionless as a statue, eyes fixed, turned towards Waterloo. 

There was no news from Grouchy, who, it was thought, 
was in great danger. The Emperor directed Soult to send him 
a despatch o infor.n him of the retreat of the Army and to 
direct him to withdraw upon the lower Sambre. Soldiers of 
every arm passed, running along the route and through the 
fields. Commandant Baudus, who marched on horseback in 
the midst of the fugitives, discovered the little group composing 
the Imperial Staff. He approached. The Emperor a'^ked him 
if he had not met with some corps that w^as not entirely dis- 
organized. Not far from Ouatre-Bras, Baudus had passed the 
5th I.ancers, commanded by Colonel Jacquiminot, which still 
marched in order. He informed the Emperor of the fact. 
'"Go quickly," said Napoleon, "and tell him to halt at Quatre- 
Bras. It is already late, and the enemy, finding this point oc- 
cupied, will probablv halt." Baudus set out at a gallop, but, 
received with shots at the first houses of Quatre-Bras, he re- 
turned and begged the Emperor to retire, "since he was no 
longer covered by anyone." While uttering these words he 
looked closely at the Emperor. Napoleon wept silently his 
lost Army. The tears which trickled down his cheeks were the 
only sign of life upon his mournful face, pallid as with the 
look of death. 

Amidst the confusion resulting from this great overthrow 
the Emperor never lost his presence of mind. Seeing no signs 
of Girard's corps, he concluded that it had not received the 
order of the Major-General. Ignorant of the defeat, it was in 
danger of being surprised in its bivouacs and enveloped by the 
enemy. He commanded Baudus to hasten to Fleurus, to cause 
the troops to take up arms, and to lead them upon the right 
bank of the Sambre. Then, yielding to necessity, he re- 
mounted his horse, and put himself en route for Charleroi by 
way of Gosselies and Lodelinsart. 

At Charleroi, where the Emperor arrived about five in 
the morning, there was the same tumultuous mob, the fame 
disorder, as at Genappe. Since June 15th the amnnmitioii 



The Eout. 225 

wagons, the bridge equipage, and the carriages containing food 
and baggage encumbered the squares and avenues. On the 
J 7th there had been evacuated on Charleroi the wounded of 
Ligny, the prisoners, the twenty-seven pieces of artillery, and 
the baggage captured from the Prussians. Doubtless, on the 
evening of the i8th, at the moment when all the troops began 
to give way, a com.missary of war had been sent from Ros- 
somme with orders to cause all the wagons to pass the Sambre 
immediately. But arrived at Charleroi, between one and two 
in the morning, he had found the commandant of the place 
sick, say some; dead drunk, say others; incapable, at any 
rate, of being of any assistance to him. The commissary of 
war had been compelled to seek one by one the different heads 
of the departments. All employed themselves with the greatest 
zeal, but much time had been lost. Already the first convoys 
of wounded began to debouch by the route of Brussels, and 
bands of fugitives traversed the town, spreading the alarm, 
and saying that the enemy was in close pursuit. 

The sole bridge of Charleroi was 125 feet long and 25 feet 
wide. It formed a shelving ridge ; the parapets were of wood. 
Some cuirassiers, descending at full speed the sloping street 
which abuts on the bridge, charged so violently against one 
of the parapets that it broke and fell. Many horsemen were 
drowned in the Sabre. The turret of the bridge was over- 
thrown, a wagon overturned; the carriages, which were im- 
mediately in the rear, started at a rapid trot down the slant 
of the Rue de la Montagne, were unable to stop in time, and 
upset over the first obstacle. Many soldiers were crushed to 
death. Sacks of flour and rice, casks of wine and brandy, and 
hundreds of loaves of bread, rolled upon the pavement. The 
bridge thus obstructed, all the convoy halted, whilst the 
fugitives climbed over this barricade of overturned wagons 
and fallen horses. Each soldier in passing stuck his bayonet 
in a loaf of bread. The contents of the casks were still more 
tempting; some of the soldiers pierced them with bullet-holes 
and drank through the openings the wine and brandy. When 
these casks were half emptied, they pierced in the same manner 
those loaded on the wagons. All along the street red streams 
flowed towards the Sambre. The wagon containing the im- 
perial treasure, which Provost-General Radet had caused to 
set out from Caillou the day before at seven o'clock in the 
evening, was caught with its six horses in the jam at some hun- 



2 26 Waterloo. 

dred yards from the bridge. Despairing of being able to open 
a passage, the paymaster, who was responsible for this precious 
cargo, thought of opening the wagon and confiding to his em- 
ployees and the soldiers composing the escort as many sacks of 
gold as each one could carry. All these men were ordered to 
report at a certain point on the other side of the Sambre. The 
paymaster entered in p note-book the names of the depositaries 
and the number of sacks of 20,000 francs that were confided to 
them. But, precisely at the moment when he was proceeding 
with this operation, there resounded from the foot of the 
street the shots fired into the casks of wine. An alarm followed 
which degenerated into a panic, with cries of "The Prussians 
are coming!" uttered designedly by the inhabitants and even 
by some of the soldiers. These wretches hurled themselves on 
the wagon. They ripped open the sacks of gold with sabres 
and bayonets. Everything was pillaged. The stopping* of the 
head of the convoy arrested the carriages as far as the entrance 
to the upper town. The berlin containing the Portfolio re- 
mained stationary on the route in the midst of the artillery 
train. The Duke of Bassano, hearing the fusillade in the dis- 
tance, caused the most important papers to be torn up and 
scattered to the winds. 

The evacuation of Charleroi, however, might have been 
effected without disorder, for on June 19th the Prussians had 
slackened their pursuit. With the exception of a few cavalry 
reconnoissances, they did not approach the town before noon; 
it was rather late in the day when they seized the bridges 
of Marchienne, Charleroi, and Chatelet. During the evening, 
whilst Pirch, who had been sent the preceding night to- 
wards Gembloux with the II. Corps to intercept the retreat of 
Grouchy, occupied Mellery, the corps of Ziethen and Bulow 
bivouacked, their front covered by the Sambre. It was not 
until the next day that the Prussian Army passed the river in 
three columns, and directed itself on Beaumont and Avesnes, 
The English, less ardent or not as good marchers, were still 
between Nivelles and Binche. 

V. 

The Emperor had vainly attempted to organize resistance 
in the bottoms of Ea PTaye Sainte, at Rossomme, Genappe, and 
Quatre-Bras. He understood that, with an army in dissolu- 
tion and yielding obedience only to fear, the best thing to do 



The Eout. ^27 



Th 1^1^^"^^ ^' "^""i^^'^^ ^' P^'^^b^e- ^^e traversed Charleroi 
and halted m a meadow on the right bank of the Sambre He 
gave some orders, which were not obeyed, for rallying the fugi- 
tives and reassemblmg the train. At the end of an honr he 
remounted his horse and proceeded towards Philippeville 
where he arrived at nine in the morning. The- gates of the' 
place being closed, he was forced to make himself known to 
the officer of the guard. Napoleon had with him Bertrand 
Drouot, Dejean, Flahault, and Bussy. He was rejoined at 
Philippeville by the Duke of Bassano, accompanied bv Fleurv 
de Chaboulon, then by Marshal Soult. Of all his preoccupa- 
tions, the most pressing was the rallying of the Army In- 
structions were sent to the commandants of Givet Ave=nes 
Maubeuge, Beaumont, and Landrecies. They were to proVide 
lor the wants of the detachments and isolated soldiers that 
might present themselves before these places, and then to direct 
them on the points of concentration: Laon for the ist, ^nd and 
6th Infantry Corps; La Fere for the artillery; Marie Saint- 
Quentm, Rethel, Vervins, and Rheims for the cavalry and 
Soissons for the Guard. Of all the corps commanders " Reille 
alone had rejoined the Kmperor at Philippeville; he was en- 
trusted with the work of reorganizing the troops who might 
arrive upon the glacis of that fortress. A new despatch di- 
recting Marshal Grouchy to retreat towards Philippe^ ille or 
Givet, had been forwarded bv a spy named Cousin The com- 
mandants of the fortresses of the 2nd and i6th Military Di- 
visions were warned to be on the lookout for the enemy 

The Emperor had not onlv to think of his Army— there 
was pubhc opinion, the enemies in the interior, and, finally, the 
Chamber. He wrote two letters to his brother Joseph. One 
destined to be read in the Council ot Ministers, related only 
with certain reticences, the outcome of the battle ; in the other' 
entirely personal, Napoleon concealed nothing of the great dis- 
aster, and announced his immediate return to Paris. Fleurv 
de Chaboulon, to whom these letters were dictated, assures us 
that the second terminated as follows: ". . . ' All is not 
lost. By uniting my forces, the depots, and the National 
Guards, I shall have 300.000 men to oppose to the enemv. 
But it is necessary that I be assisted and not interfered with. 
• . . I believe the Deputies will reahze the fact that their 
duty is to unite with me in order to save France." 



22i 



Waterloo. 



The Emperor then set about preparing the bulletin of the 
battles of Ivigny and Mont Saint-Jean, which was to appear in 
the Moniteur. Then, leaving vSoult at Philippeville to watch 
over the rallying of the Army, he entered all alonC; as it seems, 
one of the caleches of the Major-General. Bassano, Bertrand, 
Drouot, and the aides-de-camp followed in two other carriages. 

From Philippeville to Paris, the most direct route was 
by way of Barbancon, Avesnes, La Capelle, Marie, and Laon. 
But the Emperor did not wish to run the rivSk of being captured 
by some party of Prussian cavalry which might have passed 
the Sambre at Marchienne; he took a longer route, which 
passed through Marienbourg, Rocroi, Maubert-Fontaine, La 
Capelle, Marie, and Laon. At sunset the party stopped for 
some time in sight of Rocroi. The inhabitants knew nothing 
of the great defeat; they flocked in crowds upon the ramparts 
with the hope of seeing the Emperor. Their acclamations 
awakened him from a deep sleep. Events had succeeded one 
another with such rapidity that, for a moment, he imagined 
that he had just awakened from a frightful dream. 

As it was feared that it would be impossible to find relays 
of horses at Maubert-Fontaine (a great number of horses had 
been requisitioned eight days before for the auxiliary services 
of Vandamme's corps), a detour was made as far as Mezieres. 
There also horses were lacking. One was compelled to go the 
distance of a league in search of them. From half-past ten 
\mtil midnight the caleches remained upon the Place des 
Fontaines in front of the post-house. General Dumonceau, 
Governor of Mezieres, Traulle, commandant of the place, and 
the officers of their staffs surrounded the carriages. They re- 
mained motionless, and conversed in a low tone, "as on a day 
of mourning." None of the travelers dismounted save Ber- 
trand, whom Napoleon summoned to the door of his caleche 
by a superior officer of hussars, who constituted the entire im- 
perial escort. Finally, the journey was resumed. As the 
carriages approached the Porte de Pierre the soldiers of the 
post cried, "Long live the Emperor!" and repeated this cry — 
"very poignant under the circumstances," says Commandant 
Traulle— until the last carriage had crossed the glacis. 

The imperial party did not arrived until the next day, June 
2oth, between six and seven in the evening, at the foot of the 
mountain of Laon, in the faubourg of Vaux. The Emperor 
dismounted from the caleche in the court of the post-house. 



The Eout. ' 229 

Through the great gate, which remained open, he was seen from 
the street walking to and fro, his head bowed and his arms 
folded over his chest. There was a great deal of straw scat- 
tered over the courtyard, upon which opened the granaries 
and stables. One of the spectators said in a low voice : "It is 
Job upon his dung-hill." Napoleon appeared so crushed and 
so sad, the scene was so impressive, even for rustic souls, that 
one dared not acclaim him. A few cries of "Long live the 
Emperor!" very weak, timid, and suppressed, issued, however, 
from the crowd. The Emperor stopped and raised his hat. 
The Emperor's arrival had been reported in the to-wn. A de- 
tachment of the National Guard descended to form the guard 
of honor. Soon after came General Langeron, commanding the 
department, the prefect, and some of J:he municipal councilors. 
General Radet, provost-general, and General Neigre conferred 
also with the Emperor. He ordered the prefect, with whom he 
associated his aide-de-camp Bussy, who was from that part of 
the country, to collect great supplies of provisions, as the Army 
was to concentrate under Laon. He sent Neigre to La Fere to 
organize the field batteries, Dejean to Guise to examine the 
condition of the fortifications, and Flahault to Avesnes to 
gather information upon the march of the enemy. Night 
came. The Emperor did not wait for Marshal Soult ; besides, 
he had given him his instructions at Philippeville. About ten 
or eleven o'clock he started for Paris. 

Since Philippeville, and doubtless even since the halt in 
the meadows of the Sambre, Napoleon had resolved to hasten 
to Paris. He remembered the grievous lesson of 1814- — that 
vote of deposition, which had paralyzed him at the head of his 
Army. He felt that, unless he returned in haste to his capital 
to impose on Fouche, the conspirators of all parties, and the 
hostile or deluded Deputies, it was all over with his crown and 
the last resistance of the country. From a military as well as 
from a political standpoint, his true place, for some days at least, 
was in Paris. Without soldiers and without cannon, he could 
not think of stopping the enemy on the frontier. As to rallying 
at Laon the wrecks of the Army, Soult and the generals could 
do that as well as he. There was no need of genius for that! 
During this tim.e, in Paris, the Emperor would take, in con- 
junction with Davout and Carnot, the measures necessary for 
assuring the public safety. He would allay the political crisis, 
would push forward the preparations in every branch of the 



230 Waterloo. 

service ; would direct on Laon all the available men in the 
depots, the mobilized battalions, the field batteries, and the 
convoys of arms and ammunition; would decree, in concert 
with the Chambers, new levies of soldiers and National Guards, 
and would go, after four or five days, to resume the command. 
It has been said that Napoleon "deserted" his Army, as in 
Egypt and Russia. Alas! Napoleon no longer had an army. 
Of Grouchy he knew nothing; it was presumed that he was in 
great peril with the corps of Vandamme and Gerard. Of the 
74,000 combatants at Waterloo, 40,000 had perhaps retired 
safe and sound and had re-passed the vSambre ; but more than 
three-fourths of these men were still dispersed from Cambrai to 
Jlocroi, marching along the roads singly or in small squads, 
camping in the woods and stopping at the homes of the peas- 
ants. On June 20th. at the hour when Napoleon quitted Laon 
to go to Paris, there were 2,600 soldiers assembled at Philippe- 
ville and nearly 6,000 at Avesnes. These soldiers constituted 
the entire Army. 



CHAPTER VII. 
Thk Combats of Wavre and the; Retreat of Grouchy. 

I. — March of Grouchy on Wavre. — Combat of La Baraque. — Attack 

of Wavre (afternoon of June i8th). 
II. — The second despatch of Soult. — New assaults against Wavre and 

Bierges. — Passage of the Dyle at Limale and night combat. 
III. — Renewal of the combat and defeat of Thielmann (morning of June 

19th). — News of the disaster (half- past ten in the morning). — 

Retreat of Grouchy (afternoon and evening of June 19th). 
IV. — Combats of La Falise and Boqtiet (morning of June 20th). — Defense 

of Namur (from three to nine in the evening). — Rallying at 

Givet of the army of Grouchy (June 21st). 

I. 

We have seen that, on June 18th, about noon, Marshal 
Crouchy, in the course of his discussion with Gerard at Wal- 
hain, had received an aide-de-catnp from Exelmans, who in- 
formed him of the Prussian rear guard before Wavre. 

Between nine and ten o'clock Exelmans' two divisions of 
dragoons had arrived at La Baraque, at five kilometers from 
that little town. Some scouts who had pushed beyond the 
defile of La Huzelle reported a body of Prusssian troops, con- 
sisting of cavalry, infantry, and artillery, in position upon the 
heights' of Wavre. It was the entire corps of Pirch, still on the 
right bank of the Dyle, and two cavalry regiments of the 
landwehr, composing the rear guard of Bulow. Although he 
had orders to purstie the enemy closely, Exelmans feared to 
engage these masses with only his cavalry in a region so wooded. 
He knew, moreover, from new information or indications, that 
the Prussian Army would manoeuvre to join the English. Pie 
thought that Grouchy would interrupt the march on Wavre, 
henceforth without object, in order to pass the Dyle at the 
nearest point. With the design of preparing for this move- 
ntent, he directed towards that river the brigade of Vincent; 
it took position at the farm of La Plaquerie, at the distance of 
a cannon-shot from Ottignies. Exelmans sent towards Neuf 
Sart the brigade of Berton to reconnoitre the right, left at La 
Baraque an advance guard of two squadrons, and fell back 

231 



232 Waterloo. 

with the bulk of the division of Chastel nearly a league in the 
rear, near Corbaix. It was during this halt that he sent an 
aide-de-camp to Grouchy to inform him of the presence of the 
Prussians before Wavre and of the dispositions that he had 
made. 

The corps of Vandamme was then halted at Nil Saint-Vin- 
cent, in conformity with the orders of Grouchy of the day 
before. On the evening of June 17th, the Marshal, in spite of 
all his information concerning the march of the Prussians to- 
wards Wavre, was still so undecided touching the direction to 
take that he had directed Vandammie to advance onty as far as 
Walhain. A little later, about eleven or twelve at night, he 
had written to him as follows: "I have forgotten to tell you 
to push be^^ond Walhain, in order that General Gerard ma^^ 
take position in the rear. I think we will go farther than 
Walhain; it will then be rather a halt than a definite posi- 
tion." On the morning of the iSth, on breaking camp, Grou- 
chy, fully decided from that time to march on Wavre, would 
have had plenty of time to rectify these instructions and to 
order Vandamme to follow as rapidly as possible the cavalry 
of Exelmans. He did not think of this. Vandamme, after 
having passed Walhain, halted at Nil Saint- Vincent, pending 
new orders. 

About one o'clock, Grouchy warned by Exelman's aide-de- 
camp. Commandant d'Estourmel, that the Prussian rear guard 
was in sight, arrived at Nil Saint-Vincent. He gave to Van- 
damme and sent to Exelmans the order to put the troops on 
the march. A little before two o'clock, as the advance of the 
dragoons approached La Baraque, the two squadrons that had 
been left there as an advance guard were attacked by the loth 
Prussian Hussars, debouching on their left flank. This regiment, 
with two battalions and two guns, formed the detachment of 
Colonel Ledebur, posted in observation at Mont Saint-Guilbert. 

Until one o'clock Ledebur had not budged. Badly in- 
formed by his patrols and videttes, he was completely ignorant 
of the approach of the French Arm}^, as well as the pointe 
pushed in the morning to Ta Baraque by the two divisions of 
Exelmans, and the occupation of the farm of La Plaquerie b}' 
the brigade of Vincent. Although surrounded by enemies, 
he did not know it. Warned, finally, of the presence of the 
French at Nil Saint Vincent and on the route of Wavre, I^edebur 
saw that his direct line of retreat was in danger of being inter- 



Combats of Wayee and Eetkeat of Grouchy. 233 

cepted. He pushed rapidly his hussars through the fields to La 
Baraque, whilst his two battaHons gained at a run, bv wavfof 
Bruyeres and Bloc-Ry, the wood of La Huzelle, which bordered 
the road on both sides, to the north of La Baraque, and made 
of it a kind of defile. The hussars drove back the two French 
squadrons to the east of the road, kept up for some minutes the 
combat, and then, on the approach of the bulk of the dragoons, 
they withdrew through the defile, which had just been occupied 
by the sharpshooters of Ledebur. Infantry was required to 
dislodge the latter. The dragoons made way for the head of 
Vandamme's column; it attacked without delay. Two bat- 
talions of Brause's division, which were still with Langen's di- 
vision (both belonging to Pirch's corps), on the right bank of 
the Dyle, had been sent to the support of Ledebur. The de-" 
fense was obstinate. Grouchy, unknown to Exelmans, had 
recalled from the banks of the Dyle the brigade of Vincent, 
All the dragoons were assembled. He ordered Exelmans to 
turn the position towards Dion-le-Mont with these three thou- 
sand horsemen. The manoeuvre, well conceived, but effected 
too late or two slowly, did not give the expected results. Be- 
fore the French cavalry had finished its movement, the Prus- 
sians had fallen back on Wavre. Vandamme passed the de- 
file. He had orders from Grouchy to pursue the enemy even 
upon the heights which dominate this town, and to take posi- 
tion there pending new instructions. 

In spite of the assurance with which he had spoken to 
Gerard, Grouchy was none the less troubled by the cannonade 
heard on his left. ' He advanced at a gallop towards Limelette, 
"in order," sa}/s he, "to form a better opinion as to the causes 
of this cannonade." He finally acquired the conviction that a 
great battle was being waged upon the edge of the Forest of 
Soignes. On regaining the route of Wavre, between half-past 
three and four o'clock, he received the Emperor's (or rather 
Soult's) letter, written from Caillou, at ten in the morn- 
ing. It was addressed to "Marshal Grouchy, at Gembloiix,. 
or somewhere in front of this town." The courier, Adjutant- 
Commandant Zenowicz, had been forced to pass through Gen- 
appe, Sombreffe, and Gembloux. This made a journey of ten 
leagues. Zenowicz, however, might have effected it in less 
time than it took him to do so. Besides, had this despatch,, 
which directed Grouchy to 1: arch on Wavre while connecting 
the communications with the Imperial Armv, reached him 
—16— 



234 Waterloo. 

sooner, it would have led to no change in his essential disposi- 
tions. After having read it, he even remarked to his aide-de- 
camp Bella "that he congratulated himself on having so well 
carried out the Emperor's instructions in marching on Wavre, 
instead of listening to the advice of General Gerard"; and he 
replied to Berthezene, who had sent one of his aides-de-camp 
to inform him of the march of the Prussian columns in the di- 
rection of the fire: "Let the General be tranquil; we are on 
-the right road. I have just heard from the Emperor, and he 
orders me to march on Wavre." 

The Emperor also ordered him, as subsidiary, it is true, 
to connect the communications with the main body of the 
Army. Grouchy took some tardy measures to execute these 
instructions. Pajol had just informed him, through an aide- 
de-camp, that the right column, in its march from Grand Leez 
to Tourinnes, had discovered no trace of the enemy. Grouchy 
sent back the aide-de-camp with the order for Pajol to ad- 
vance immediately with the 2nd Cavalry Corps and the divi- 
sion of Teste to Limale and to pass the Dyle by main force. 
Grouchy was ignorant of the value of time, otherwise he would 
have selected to capture the bridge of Limale, not Pajol, who, 
at Tourirmes, was distant three leagues and a half from it; 
but the cavalry of General Vallin, which was a league from the 
Dyle, and the division of Hulot, of the corps of Gerard, which 
had arrived at La Baraque. 

The despatch sent to Pajol, Grouchy galloped to\vards 
Wavre, against which he intended to direct the [attack in per- 
son. The impetuous Vandamme had not waited for him. De- 
spite the orders of the Marshal, without reconnoitring the posi- 
tion, and without preparing the way with his artillery, he had 
launched a la frangaise the entire division of Habert against 
the town in columns of assault. 

The second echelon of the corps of Ziethen (divisions of 
Brause and Langen and the cavalry of Sohr) had passed the 
Dyle after the combat at the defile of La Huzelle and had 
marched towards Chapelle Saint-Lambert. But there still re- 
mained to defend Wavre and its approaches almost all of the 
corps of Thielmann. Believing at first that the deployment of 
the cavalry of Exelmans between Sainte-Aime and Dion-le- 
Mont was only a demonstration, Thielmann had set his troops 
in motion in the direction of Coutiu'e Saint-Germain; two bat- 
talions alone were to remain to guard Wavre. Then, at sight 



Combats of Wa\-ke and Eetreat of Gkouchy. 235 

of Vandamnie, who debouched in front of the town, he had 
caused the positions which he had just evacuated to be reoc- 
cupied. The divisions of Kempher and Luck, three battaHons 
of the division of Borcke and the cavalry of Hooe, established , 
themselves in Wavre, Basse-Wavre, and upon the heights of 
the left bank of the Dyle. The division of Stulpnagel came to 
occupy Bierges; the detachment from the corps of Ziethen 
(three battalions and three squadrons, under Von Stengel), 
detached to guard the bridge of Limale, was maintained 
at that post. 

The infantry of Habert quickly dislodged the Prussians 
from the faubourg of Wavre ; but their furious charge was 
arrested at the Dyle, which separated the town from the 
faubourg. The two bridges were strongly barricaded and en- 
filaded by batteries established upon the different heights in 
the inclined streets abutting on the river; finally, more than a 
thousand sharpshooters were concealed in the houses of the 
left bank. General Habert, Colonel Dubalen, of the 64th, and 
600 men were put hors de combat in a few minutes. Powerless 
to carry the bridge, the soldiers hesitated to retire, for fear of 
being exposed to the terrible fire of the Prussian batteries, 
which swept the approaches of the faubourg and the steep ac- 
clivities of the right bank. They sheltered themselves in the 
streets parallel with the Dyle. "They were engulfed," says 
Grouchy, "in a kind of cul-de-sac." 

II. 

.-vfter having examined attentively the position. Grouchy 
resolved to second the attack on Wavre by two other attacks 
above and oelow the town. Some reinforcements entered the 
faubourg; one of Lefol's battalions was detached to pass the 
Dyle at the mill bridge of Bierges; and Exelmans advanced 
with his dragoons in front of Basse-Wavre. As the Marshal 
finished taking these dispositions, he received, about five 
o'clock, the dispatch w^hich Soult had sent him from the battle- 
field at half -past one, and which terminated as follows: "At 
this moment the battle is engaged along the line of Waterloo 
in front of the Forest of Soignes. So you will manoeuvre to 
join our right. We believe that we see now the corps of Bulow 
upon the heights of Saint- Lambert. vSo you will not lose an 



236 Waterloo. 

instant in approaching and joining us, in order that you may 
crush Bulow, whom you will take in the very act." 

The despatch, written with a pencil, was partly effaced^ 
and almost illegible. Grouchy and many officers of his staff 
read this letter as follows: '"La haUaile est gagnee" ("The 
battle is gained"), instead of "Labattaile est engagee" ("Battle 
is engaged"). They wished to interrogate the courier. But 
Grouchy pretends that this officer was too drunk to answer. 
At any rate, the Marshal had only to reflect. It was evident 
that a despatch written at one o'clock could not call gained 
an action which the noise of the cannon, miore and more 
violent, indicated only too well still lasted at five. 

However, whether the battle was engaged or gained, the 
order of the Emperor existed none the leis, formal and imper- 
ative : it was necessary to march on Saint-I^ambert in order 
to crush Bulow. Grouchy understood it; but he displayed 
neither resolution nor method in his dispositions. Two of 
Vandamme's divisions were sufficient to occupy the Prussians 
oefore Wavre. It seems then that the Marshal ought to have 
directed immediately towards Limale Vandamme's third di- 
vision as well as Exelmans' eight regiments of dragoons, whose 
diversion upon Basse- Wavre was no longer useful. But Grou- 
chy, by the strangest of strategical conceptions, wished at 
the same time to capture Wavre with half of his arm}' and 
to direct the other half on .Saint-Lambert by the bridge of 
Limale. He left then before the Prussian positions all of the 
3rd Corps and Exelmans' cavalry, and sent his aide-de-camp 
Pont-Bellanger to carry the verbal order to Pajol, who had left 
Tourinnes, to hasten his march on Limale. "Never has the 
Emperor been so great!" said Pont-Bellanger, on approachinig 
Pajol. "The battle is gained, and only the cavalry is awaited 
to finish the rout." 

At the same time that he despatched this order to Pajol,. 
Grouchy came at a gallop with Gerard to La Baraque to direct 
from thence on Liniale the 4th Corps, whose leading division 
(General Hulot) had alone arrived upon the heights of Wavre. 
Is it true, as Grouchy says, that the other two divisions of the 
4th Corps (Vichery and Pecheux) had not yet attained La 
Baraque at six in the evening; that, tired of waiting for them, 
the Marshal returned in front of Wavre, leaving the order for 
these two divisions to march directly on Limale; finally, that, 
this order having been oadly interpreted, Vichery and Pecheux 



Combats of Wa\t;e and Retreat of Grouchy. 237 

continued their movement on Wavre? Or should we rather 
believe that Grouchy found these divisions at I,a Baraque; 
that he gave them the order to march on Limale, but that the 
head of column got lost en route for want of a guide, and resumed 
its march towards Wavre? It appears impossible to get at 
the truth in the midst of the contradictory testimonies of 
Gerard, General Hulot, and of Grouchy himself, whose own 
assertions do not agree with each other. It is certain, how- 
ever, that Grouchy went to La Baraque and then returned 
to Wavre. 

The combat continued to rage fiercely on both sides of 
the Dyle. The attack on the bridge of Bierges by the battalion 
of Lefol had been repulsed. Grouchy, bent on passing the 
Dyle at this point, ordered Gerard to renew the attack with a 
battalion of Hulot's division. Gerard having remarked to 
him that it would be better to cause the detachment of Lefol 
to be supported by other troops of the same corps, he received 
badly this very apposite observation. Gerard then transmitted 
the order to Hulot, who conducted in person to the assault a 
battalion of the 9th Light. To reach the bridge, it had to 
cross some very marshy ground intersected parallel with the 
Dyle by ditches, very deep and wide. Hulot directed the men 
to throw themselves into these ditches, if they could not leap 
them. They found themselves in water from four to six feet 
in depth, and the skirmishers were on the point of being 
drowned; the assistance of their comrades was necessary to 
extricate them from their dangerous position. During this 
time the bullets fell as thick as hail. Rebuffed, the soldiers 
fell back. Grouchy and Gerard, the latter at the head of 
another battalion, arrived about this time on the edge of the 
meadow. Gerard, little accustomed to spare himself, exposed 
himself all the more, as he had reasons to be in a very bad 
humor. He was shot through the body and carried to the 
rear. Grouchy then ordered General Baltus, commanding 
the artillery, to replace Gerard at the head of the assault- 
ing column. The latter having positively refused to do so, 
Grouchy leaped from his horse, crying: "If onS can no longer 
command the obedience of his subordinates, he should at least 
know how to die." This third assault failed, like the preceding 
ones. Grouchy left the division of Hulot before Bierges, as 
if he had wished, says Hulot, to make new dispositions for 
attacking the mill; then, suddenly changing his mind, he 



238 Waterloo. 

rejoined the other two divisions of Gerard and advanced with 
them towards Liniale. 

During these vain assaults, one continued to skirmish in 
front of Basse-Wavre, and at Wavre the fight was pursued 
with terrible ferocity. Vandamme made as many as thirteen 
attacks without being able to wrest from the Prussians this 
little town, which had been transformed into a veritable foit- 
ress. At eleven in the evening the combat still raged. 

When Marshal Grouchy arrived at Limale, at nightfall, 
the bridge over the Dyle was free. Renewing the audacious 
manoeuvre of the preceding year at Montereau, Pajol had 
launched at full speed the hussars of General Vallin upon this 
bridge, which, however, was accessible to only four horses ar- 
riving abreast, and which was defended by an entire battalion. 
The Prussians overthrown and sabred, the infantry of Teste 
and the rest of the cavalry passed the bridge behind the hus- 
sars and took position on the left bank. Von Stengel yielded 
Limale, after a combat of some duration, and took up a position 
on the height which dominates this village. In spite of the 
gathering darkness, the assault was vigorously conducted b}^ 
Teste, when Grouchy debouched by the bridge of Limale with 
the divisions of Vichery and Pecheux. These reinforcements 
were necessary, for Thielmann, hearing the cannonade, had 
sent to the support of Stengel, by the left bank of the Dyle, 
the division of Stulpnagel and the cavalry of Hobe. The 
combat continued until eleven in the evening for the possession 
of the crest of the plateau, which, finally, remained in posses- 
sion of the French. The road to Mont Saint-Jean was open; 
but for a long tim^e the cannon of the Emperor had been 
silent. 

IIL 

The French bivouacked in squares, alm.ost intermingled 
with the enemy, who occupied the wood of Rixensart. The 
advance posts were so close to each other that the bullets ex- 
changed throughout the night fell in the rear of the first lines. 
At half -past eleven in the evening Grouchy wrote to Vandammie 
to rejoin him at once at Limale with the 3rd Corps. He in- 
tended to recommence the combat early in the morning, in 
order to join the Imperial Army at Brussels, for the report 
was circulated — we know not upon what grounds — that the 
Emperor had defeated the English. 



Combats or Wavre and Retreat of Grouchy. 239 

The Prus:ian Staff was better informed. An officer of 
Marwitz's cavalry, sent on a reconnoissance, had reported that 
the French Army was in flight. Thenceforth reassured, Thiel- 
mann directed most of his troops upon the plateau of Limale, 
in order to resume the offensive at dawn. At three in the 
morning the cavalry of Hobe debouched from the wood of 
Rixensart with two horse batteries, which, in a few minutes, 
riddled with balls the French bivouacs. Grouchy, hastening 
upon the firing-line, ordered his batteries to reply; then, 
having formed all his force in line of battle, the cavalry of 
Pajol on the extreme left, the diviiions of Pecheux and Vichery 
in the center and in reserve, and the division of Teste on the 
right, he marched against the enemy. After a stubborn de- 
fense, the Prussians yielded the wood of Rixensart. It was 
nearly eight o'clock. Thielmann received from Pirch positive 
information of the defeat of the French. The despatch added 
that the II. Corps was about to manoeuvre to intercept the 
retreat of Marshal Grouchy. The news of this great victory, 
which was immediately announced to the troops, reanimated 
them. Thielmann, pivoting upon his left wing, which still oc- 
cupied the wood of Bierges, executed a change of front. By 
this movement the Prussian right found itself deployed par- 
allel with the route from Wavre to Brussels. 

The combat was resumed, not without advantage for the 
Prussians, till the division of Teste had carried the village and 
the mill of Bierges. In this assault General Penne, one of 
Teste's origadiers, who was woimded himself, had his head 
carried away by a cannon-ball. Berthezene, posted on the 
right bank of the Dyle, had seconded the attack of Teste ; the 
two divisions united. Thielmann, seeing his left outflanked 
and his right on the point of being turned by the cavalry of 
Pajol, which was manoeuvring towards Rosieren in order to get 
possession of the route of Brussels, put himself in retreat in the 
direction of Louvain. The four battalions left in Wavre 
evacuated that position, and proceeded at first to Ta Bavette, 
from whence they were quickly dislodged by the advance guard 
of Vandamme. Notwithstanding the order of Grouchy to 
come to rejoin him at Limale with the 3rd Corps, Vandamme 
had remained all the morning before Wavre. He had only 
sent to the Marshal the dragoons of Exelmans and the division 
of Hulot, which he had caused to be relieved in front of Bierges 
by the division of Berthezene. 



240 Waterloo. 

Master of the field of battle, upon which the Prussians had 
abandoned five pieces of artillery and numerous wounded, 
Grouchy had his right at La Bavette and his left beyond 
Rosieren. He w^as making his preparations to march on Brus- 
sels when, about half-past ten, an officer of the Major-General 
arrived. His haggard face, his eyes big with fright, and his 
enfeeoled body appearing, like his horse, broken by fatigue, he 
seemed the living image of defeat. Hardly able to collect his 
ideas and to find his speech, he related in so incoherent a 
manner the disaster of Mont Saint-Jean that the Marshal 
thought at first that he had an affair with a fool or a drunken 
man. To the questions asked him by Grouchy — if he was 
the bearer of an order; upon what point the retreat was to 
be effected ; and if the Army had repassed the Sambre — the 
officer, instead of replying, recommenced the confused re- 
cital of the battle. Some precise details, seized in the midst 
of divagations, finally convinced Grouchy. It was not the 
moment to yield to grief; it was necessary to save what 
remained of the Army. 

Grouchy united his general officers in a sort of council 
of war. He announced to them the terrible news. While 
speaking he had, it has been said, tears in his eyes. The officers 
knew of the discussion that he had had the day before with 
Gerard at Walhain. The Marshal thought that the circum- 
stances made it necessary for him to justify himself for not 
having listened to the counsel of his lieutenant. "My honor," 
said he, "demands that I explain my dispositions of yesterda^^ 
The instructions which I had received from the Emperor for- 
bade me to manoeuvre in any other direction than Wavre. I 
have been forced to reject the advice that Count Gerard be- 
lieved he had a right to give me. I render justice to the talents 
and the brilliant valor of General Gerard; but, no doubt, you 
were as much astonished as myself that a general officer, ig- 
norant of the Emperor's orders and of the information upon 
which the Marshal of France under whom he was placed act- 
ed, should permit himself to trace publicly for him his con- 
duct. The advanced hour of the day, the distance at which 
we were from, the point where the cannon was heard, and the 
state of the roads, rendered it impossible to arrive in time to 
take part in the action that was being fought. Besides, what- 
ever may be the events that have taken place, the orders of the 



Combats of Wa-\tre and Eetreat of Geouchy. 241 

Emperor, of which I have just communicated to you the con- 
tents, did not permit of my acting otherwise than I have done."' 

After having pronounced these words, which were merely 
an apology for his conduct, the Marshal unfolded his plan of 
retreat. He had at first thought of advancing upon the rear 
of the Anglo-Prussians, in order to delay by this diversion their 
pursuit of the Imperial Army; but he quickly renounced this 
idea, whose sole result would have been the total destruction 
of his 30,000 men submerged, crushed by 150,000. For the 
same reason he wisely rejected the bold project of Vandamme, 
which consisted in marching on Brussels, where they would 
set free numerous prisoners, and in regaining the frontier 
towards Valenciennes or I.ille by way of Enghien and Ath. 
Vandamme supposed that on this side only a few detachments 
of the Allied Arm}^ would be encountered. Grouchy rightly 
preferred to take his line of retreat on Namur, Dinant, and 
Givet. It was necessary to make haste, for it was not only to 
be feared that the Army would be harassed by Thielmann, 
who, no doubt, would resume the offensive at the first retro- 
grade movement of the French, but that it would be attacked 
in flank by one of Bliicher's army corps. Perhaps this detach- 
ment would even arrive in time to take position at Gembloux 
and bar the retreat. This was, in fact, the object of the Prus- 
sians ; and at eleven o'clock, when Grouchy still had his army 
beyond the Dyle, its front bet wen Rosieren and La Bavette, 
Pirch, who had been detached from Rossomme in the night 
with the II. Corps, already occupied Mellery. Fie had nearly 
two hours the start of Grouchy, for the distance from Mellery 
to Gembloux is ten kilometers, as the crow flies, and from Fa 
Bavette to Gembloux, twenty. 

The retreat began between eleven o'clock and noon. 
The dragoons of Exe'mans, with the exception of the 20th 
Regiment placed under the orders of Vandamme, advanced 
very rapidly on Namur to seize the bridges over the vSambre; 
their advance guard reached there about four o'clock. The 
4th Corps and the cavalry of Vallin repassed the Dyle at Fimale 
and took the direct route to Gembloux; they bivouacked at 
night at two leagues be^^ond that village on the road leading 
from Nivelles to Namur, between Le Mazy and Temploux. 
Grouchy, who marched with this echelon of the army, estab- 
ished his headquarters in Temploux. From La Bavette the 
corps of Vandamme withdrew o Wavre, remained in position 



242 Waterloo. 

there until late, and then marched by way of Dion-le-Mont, 
Tourinnes, and Grand Leez. It halted about eleven in the 
evening on the road from Gembloux to Naniur, on a line 
with Temploux. Pajol, charged with forming the rear guard 
with the cavalry of General Soult and the indefatigable divi- 
sion of Teste, imposed on Thielmann by following him even 
near Saint- Achtenrode, where the latter took position. Then, 
when the entire corps of Vandamme had repassed the bridges 
of Wavre, Pajol put himself in retreat, gained Gembloux by 
way of Sauvenierre, and there established himself in bivouac 
in the night. 

This hazardous retreat was not effected without some 
disorder; but not a shot was fired. Thielmann, whose corps 
was reduced 'to 12,500 men by the losses of the day before and 
of the morning, did not learn until very late of the retreat 
of the French. As to the IT. Prussian Corps, though it had 
reached Mellery at noon, it had arrived there in the worst state 
of fatigue, for it had, so to speak, been on the march for twenty- 
four hours without intermission. Besides, it seems that Pirch 
did not feel strong enough to act alone. He was without news 
of Thielmann, whose cooperation he expected. He^was un- 
willing or did not think it possible to lead further on this day 
his harassed soldiers. 

IV. 

-The next day, June 20th, Pajol and Teste quitted Gem- 
bloux early in the morning, in accordance with the orders of 
Grouchy, and marched by way of Saint- Denis and Saint-Marc 
on Namur. About nine o'clock Grouchy likewise directed on 
Namur the 4th Corps, which convoyed all the wounded and 
the reserve park. The Marshal intended to traverse the town 
with this army corps, whilst that of Vandamme remained in 
position across the route of Gembloux until past noon to cover 
the movement. But things did not pass exactly as the Marshal 
had planned. At the moment when the advance of the 4th 
Corps quitted Temploux a brisk cannonade was heard in front 
towards the left. Instead of bivouacking in the midst of his 
troops, Vandamme had gone to pass the night in Namur. 
He had not received the order, sent by Grouchy, to hold the 
position; and in the morning Generals Lefol, Berthezene, and 
Habert, left without instructions, had put themselves on the 
march for Namur and, by this movement, imcovered the 



Combats op Wavee and Eetreat of Grouchy. 243 

flank of the 4th Corps. They were attacked near La Fahse by 
more than thirty squadrons of Hobe, which Thielmann had 
caused to set out from Saint-x\chtenrode at five in the morning 
with a horse battery, and which had made ten leagues in pur- 
suit of the French. At the same time Grouchy was informed 
that a considerable body of the enemy was debouching from 
Mazy. It was the advance guard of Pirch on the march from 
Mellery. 

Grouchy found himself in grave peril, for if the infantry 
of Vandamme should withdraw too quickly beyond the Sam- 
bre, Ilobe would bar to him the route of Namur while he 
was fighting Pirch. The troops, also understanding the danger, 
showed some uneasiness; the numerous wounded who had 
been brought from Limale and Wavre expressed by murmurs, 
groans, and cries of rage their fear of falling alive into the 
hands of the Prussians. Grouchy rode among the wagons 
with General Vichery. He said in a loud voice : "Be tranquil ! 
We swear not to abandon you. But I am confident that our 
dispositions will save us." Then, with the cavalry of General 
Vallin, he charged the Prussian squadrons which, having 
turned the divisions of Vandamme, flanked his line of retreat, 
and drove them back on the left. Continuing his march, he 
went to the support of Vandamme. In the meantime the 4th 
Corps, which thenceforth found the road free, gained Namur 
with the wounded and the park; the rear guard, commanded 
by Vichery in person, arrested for some time at Boquet the 
Prussians of Pirch; it then withdrew, disputing the ground 
foot by foot. 

Surprised by the sudden attack of the Prussian cavalry, 
the 3rd Corps found itself in a critical situation. A square of 
Lefol was broken; the men escaped the lances of the uhlans 
only by seeking refuge in the woods. Two pieces of artillery 
were lost. The arrival of Grouchy arrested the enemy. The 
cavalry of Vallin charged at a gallop. Colonel Briquevifle, 
who charged at the head of the 20th Dragoons, overthrew the 
furthest advanced of the Prussian squadrons, retook the two 
guns, and even captured a cannon. All of Kobe's cavalry fell 
back upon Pirch's corps, which debouched from Temploux. 

On bearing the noise of the combat, Vandamme had 
hastened from Namur. Grouchy reiterated to him the order 
to cover the retreat of the 4th Corps. Vandamme re-formed 
his battalions, took position in front of the faubourgs, and 



244 Waterloo. 

succeeded in checking the Prussians. The cavalry, the 4th 
Corps, and the convoys entered Namur, where the Prussians 
were detested. The French brought with them the terrible 
hazards of war. They were none the less received as friends. 
The municipality distributed 100,000 rations of bread and the 
same number of brandy. The brave Namurois loaned their 
boats for the transportation of the wounded by the Meuse, 
and themselves aided in embarking them. The women brought, 
even under the cannon-balls of the enemy, food to the soldiers 
and assistance to the wounded. 

The Army passed through Namur without halting. First 
Grouchy, with the 4th Corps, and then Vandamme, wounded 
slightly, with the 3rd, passed the Sambre and plunged into the 
long defile formed by the Meuse and the Forest of Morlagne. 
The division of Teste was ordered to hold the town until night. 
To defend Namur, whose dilapidated fortifications were not 
proof against an escalade, Teste had eight field-pieces and 2,000 
men at most. He distributed them upon the ramparts and at 
the three eastern gates — -lyouvain. Iron, and Saint-Nicholas. 
Hardly were his men in position when Pirch launched his col- 
umns to the assault. Received by a discharge of grape and a 
rolling fire of musketry, the Prussians retreated, leaving upon 
the glacis a pile of dead and wounded. A second attack, in 
which Colonels Zastrow and Bismarck were mortally wounded, 
failed like the preceding. On account of the scarcity of car- 
tridges, each Frenchman aimed carefully and brought down 
his Prussian. It was eight in the evening. Pirch, having lost 
1,500 men, and despairing of capturing the place b}" main 
force, broke off the combat. But General Teste, almost out of 
ammunition, had already oegun his retreat. The Prussians, 
having discovered this, penetrated into the town through the 
windows and door of the custom-house, and pushed rapidly 
as far as the bridge of the Sambre. There, a detachment of 
engineers, posted in some houses which the sappers had had 
time to pierce with loopholes, checked them a long time by a 
sustained and well-aimed fire. This rear guard then withdrew 
by the gate of France, where a great quantity of fascines, 
bundles of straw, and pieces of wood soaked in tar had been 
accumulated. The sappers set fire to the pile. The gate and 
neighboring houses burst into flames, closing the street to the 
Prussians. 



Combats of Wavre and Eetreat of Grouchy. 245 

During this combat the bulk of Grouchy's army had at- 
tained Dinant. On the next day, June 21st, all the army was 
assembled under the cannon of Givet. 

If this march from Wavre to the frontier is not "one of the 
most astonishing retreats of modern military history, " for the 
carelessness of Thielmann and the timidity of Pirch singularly 
facilitated it, it, nevertheless, does great honor to Grouchy. 
He did not despair when all hope seemed lost. He knew how 
to act with precision and rapidity. By the direction which he 
chose and by the dispositions which he took, he saved his army. 
We may ask ourselves. What would have happened if the un- 
fortunate Marshal had shown on June 17th and i8th as much 
resolution, activity, military talent, and the same understand- 
ing of the exigencies of the situation? 



CHAPTER VII. 

The Campaign of 1815. 

I. — The operations of June 15th. — The battles of Ligny and Quatre- 

Bras. 
II. — The error of Napoleon. 
III. — Marshal Grouchy. 
IV.— Waterloo. 

I. 

The initial plan of the Campaign of 1815, and even the 
movements requisite for its development, are among the finest 
strategical conceptions of Napoleon. All failed from errors of 
execution, of which some are attributable to the Emperor, a 
great number to his lieutenants, 

On the first day Drouet d'Erlon put himself on the march 
an hour and a half too late; Gerard interpreted for his great- 
er convenience the instructions of the Emperor; Vandamme 
broke camp three hours after the time specified, halted his 
troops before the end of the combat, and refused to second 
Grouchy ; and Ney, become suddenly circumspect even to tim- 
idity, dared not execute the manoeuvre with which he was 
charged. The service of the staff was poor; the transmission 
of orders was slow and uncertain. The chiefs were irresolute, 
apathetic, without zeal, initiative, or enthusiasm. It seemed 
that they no longer had faith in the Napoleonic Fortune ; that 
they wished to advance very slowly beyond the frontier; and 
that they felt already the inevitable embrace of the two great 
Allied Armies. The powerful machine of war constructed by 
Napoleon appeared to be worn out or out of gear. 

Thus the day of June 15th did not give the results that 
Napoleon had a right to expect. Had the orders of the Em- 
peror been carried out, before noon all the Army would have 
been across the Sambre; at three o'clock the Prussians of Pirch 
II. would have been driven from Gilly; and in the evening 
Grouchy would have occupied Sombreffe and Ney Qutre-Bras. 
The next day Bliicher and Wellington, separated by this doub e 
manoeuvre, and neither the one nor the other wishing to risk 
alone a combat against the entire French Army, would have 

24.6 



The Campaign or 1815. 247 

fallen back upon their respective base of operations, the first 
to the northeast of Sombreffe and the second to the west of 
Brussels. This divergent retreat would have separated the 
English from the Prussians twenty leagues, as the crow flies. 
Many days would have been required for them to concert to- 
gether and effect a new junction. In the meantime Napoleon 
would have occupied Brussels without firing a shot, and com- 
bined some overwhelming movement against one or the other 
of the two Allied Armies. 

On the morning of June 16th, however, in spite of the fault 
of Ney and the delays at the right wing, nothing was yet com- 
promised. The Emperor even thought that the English and 
the Prussians were in full retreat, and that he would be able 
to reach Brussels without meeting with any resistance. The 
probabilities led him to reason thus; for, according to the re- 
mark of Kennedy, Bliicher and Wellington committed a grave 
fault, in view of the dispersion of their troops and the separa- 
tion of their armies, in delivering battle on June i6th. The 
Emperor then gave his orders for a march on Brussels, and at 
nine o'clock left Chaileroi. The criticism, that he lost time in 
the morning, does not appedr to be justified. The Emperor 
not expecting a battle on this day, which, in fact, was very 
improbable, he thought this day would be sufficient for his 
diversion on Gembloux and the night march on Brussels. At 
six in the morning he dictated his orders, in view of a concen- 
tration of all the right wing at Fleurus. He can not be held 
responsible for the delay of Gerard, who did not arrive until 
after one o'clock. If the Emperor did not reiterate early in the 
morning to Ney the order to take position at Quatre-Bras, it 
was because, deceived by the report of the latter, he believed 
this post feebly occupied, or even evacuated, and judged that 
the left wing would be able to establish itself there without 
difficulty. In fact, the Prince of Orange having received rein- 
forcements only at three o'clock, it would have been as easy 
for Ney to have dislodged from Quatre-Bras the division of 
Perponcher at eleven — the moment when the instructions of 
the Er peror reached him — as in the first hours of the morning. 

In the meantime Fortune intervenes in favor of Napoleon. 
Blucher knows that the French number 120,000 men; he has, 
on account of Bulow's delay, but 80,000 soldiers. But faithful 
to his promise to protect the English left, impatient to fight, 
and confiding, moreover, in the very uncertain support of Wei- 



248 Waterloo. 

lington, be rashly offers battle to Napoleon in the position of 
lyigny. When the Emperor sees the deployment of the Prus- 
sian Army, he congratulates himself that it places itself within 
reach of his sword. This battle which he has not foreseen 
gives him the opportunity to close in a single day with a 
thunderbolt the campaign commenced the day before. He is 
on the point of exterminating the Prussian Aml3^ He at once 
decides upon his plan, marshals his troops, and sends some 
orders to Ney. While he will attack, the Marshal will advance 
upon the rear of the Prussians, and at the end of the battle, 
when the final assault is deliA^ered, the army of Bliicher, over- 
thrown at the center, outflanked on the right, and assailed in 
reverse, will be caught almost entirely in a net of steel and fire. 

Muffling, Rogniat, and others pretend that Napoleon 
ought to have confined himself to mere demonstrations to- 
wards Ligny and directed all his efforts against Saint- Amand, 
where the Prussian right, which was in an exposed position, 
would have made only a feeble resistance. This is ignoring 
one of the finest tactical inspirations of Napoleon. Most as- 
suredly the attack by Saint- Amand would have brought about 
in less time and with less loss the retreat of the Prussians. 
But, on June i6th, the Bniperor had in view a more decisive 
object than that of separating Bliicher from Wellington by 
throwing back the former towards the Meuse— he aimed at the 
destruction of the Prussian Army. For this it was necessary 
to pierce its center and envelop its right wing. Only the left 
wing would escape a disaster. 

We have seen by what concatenation of faults and mis- 
takes this well-conceived plan miscarried, and how each con- 
tributed to this result. Flahault, the bearer of the first in- 
structions of the Emperor, took two hours to go four leagues. 
Reille delayed a movement which he had been ordered to 
make, under pretense that a little lost time would be of no 
importance; he judged, according to the strange explanation 
of Jomini, that it was better "to obey the laws of la grande 
tactique" than the orders of the General-in-chief . Forbin-Janson 
did not understand a word of the despatch entrusted to him; 
he was unable to explain it, and, after having transmitted 
it to General d'Erlon, he omitted to communicate it to Marshal 
Ney. D'Erlon engaged himself in a false direction; he had no 
inspiration to rectify it; he determined, after having made 
three-fourths of the way, to retrace his steps in obedience to 



The Campaign of 1815. 249 

the injunction of Ney, who rtcalled l.im, notvvithEtanding the 
formal order of Napoleon; and he did not htop to think that, 
by this counter-march, he would deprive the Emperor of a very 
efficacious support, and would not reach Ney in time to take 
part in the action. In short, during this entire afternoon 
d'Erlon neutralized his troops, promenading them with shoul- 
dered arms from the left wing to the right and then back again, 
without seconding either the one or the other. Vandamme, 
who first discovered the corps of d'Erlon, caused it to be im- 
perfectly reconnoitred and reported it to the Emperor as being 
an enemy. Napoleon, perplexed oy the information of Van- 
damme and the direction of this column, lost his presence of 
mind. He did not think nor could he admit that the column 
which threatened his flank might be the ist Corps, which, 
however, he had himself called upon the field of battle; he 
neglected to prescribe eventually to the officer whom he had 
sent to reconnoitre again the supposed hostile column to 
direct it on Brye if, contrary to his expectations, it proved to 
be the corps of d'Erlon. 

Marshal Ney, finally, must bear the principal responsi- 
bility for the incomplete results of the day. In recalling 
d'Erlon in spite of the formal order of the Emperor, he com- 
mitted an act of disobedience which rendered him liable to a 
council of war, and which can be explained only by the spirit 
of indiscipline that existed at that time throughout the entire 
Army. But this act of desperation had no influence on the 
results of the day; for already Count d'Erlon, by taking Saint- 
Amand instead of Brye for his objective, had compromised the 
fine manoeuvre conceived and ordered by the Emperor. That 
for which Ney should be especially held accountable is the 
initial fault that led to all the delays, all the mistakes, all the 
false movements, and all the contretemps of this double action 
Had he acted as both the circumstances and the principles of 
war dictated, by eight or nine o'clock he would have had the 
2nd Corps massed at Frasnes and the ist concentrated at Gos 
selies. Thus, at eleven o'clock, on receipt of the order borne 
by Elahault, he would have attacked Quatre-Bras with the four 
divisions of Reille and the cavalry of Lefebvre-Desnoettes, 
and he would have summoned to Frasnes the four divisions of 
d'Erlon and the four brigades of cuirassiers of Kellermann. 
Long before two o'clock he would have wrested the position 
from the 7,500 Dutch, vvho alone occupied it at that time. At 
—17— 



250 Waterloo. 

three, with his 43,000 men, he would have driven back without 
difficuhy upon the route of Brus.'^els — admitting that Wel- 
lington would have dared to take the offensive — the 7,500 
English of Picton and the 6,000 Brunswickers of Duke Fred- 
erick William. At four — at the moment when the despatch 
of the Emperor directing him to turn back on Brye arrived — 
he would have been able to detach, by the Roman way, more 
than half of his forces upon the rear of the Prussian Army to 
change into disaster the defeat of Bliicher. 

Jomini admits that the battle of L'igny would have pro- 
duced decisive results if Ney had sent to Brye a part of his 
troops. But he objects that the Marshal would not have been 
able to effect this movement, even if he had had in hand the 
corps of Reille and that of d'Erlon, for he would have found 
himself engaged with the 40,000 Anglo-Dutch of Wellington. 
This reasoning is based upon a material error. At four o'clock 
Wellington had as yet only the division of Perponcher, the 
cavalry of Van Merlen, the corps of Brunswick, and the di- 
vision of Picton, or 21,000 men. Furthermore, upon the hy- 
pothesis of the capture of Ouatre-Bras by Ney, between noon 
and two o'clock, the 7,500 soldiers of Perponcher, who would 
have been crushed, would have been almiost incapable of 
further resistance on the arrival of the English reinforcements. 
The division of Alten (4,000 muskets) did not debouch until 
half-past five, and the divisions of Cooke and Kruse (7,000 
men) until seven. Now, either Wellington would have at- 
tacked at three with Perponcher, Picton, and Van Merlen, in 
which case these 15,000 men fighting against 43,000 would 
have been exterminated; or rather, not wishing to expose his 
divisions to being destroyed in detail, he would have awaited, 
to take the offensive, not only Brunswick, but Alten, and con- 
sequently he would have engaged battle only about six o'clock. 
At this hour half of Ney's troops would have been already in 
the rear of the Prussians, and there would have remained 
20,000 men with the Marshal to resist until night, in a good po- 
sition, first 28,000 and then 30,000 assailants. Had he even 
been forced to withdraw to Frasnes, this retreat, in the gath- 
ering darkness, would have been without strategical import- 
ance. It is very probable, however, that if Welllington, on 
his return from the mill of Bussy, about three o'clock, had 
found Ouatre-Bras occupied in force by the French, he would 
have prudently concentrated| his troops at Genappe, pending 



The Campaign of 1815. 251 

the issue of the battle then being fought in front of Ligny. 
At least this is what may be inferred from his customary pru- 
dence and his Britannic egotism. 

Clausewitz, after having argued long and confusedly, 
concludes that "10,000 men in the rear of the Prussian Army 
would have only rendered the battle more doubtful by oblig- 
ing Bliicher to withdraw sooner." The proof of the weak- 
ness of his case is that he wittingly gives us false figures. 
Clausewitz knew very well that it would not have been 10,000, 
but 20,000, horse and foot, that would have attacked the Prus- 
sians in reverse. Now, if this attack could have no other effect 
than to hasten the retreat of Bliicher, by what miracle, two 
days later at Waterloo, had the attack of Bulow been able to 
produce an entirely different result? According to Clausewitz, 
one would believe in truth that an army is free to quit a battle- 
field like a field of manoeuvres, and that a sudden retreat in 
the midst of an action can be effected without disorder and 
without peril. Charras has a wholly personal way of looking 
at things. "The generals," he cries, "were admirable. They 
did not fail the General-in-chief ; the General-in-chief failed 
them." He extols the conduct of Ney, "who accomplished 
the impossible in arresting Wellington with 20,000 men." 
Charras seems to ignore the fact that Wellington, until the ar- 
rival of the divisions of Cooke and Kruse (at half-past six) 
had scarcely 26,000 men to oppose to the French, who num- 
bered more than 23,000. And he voluntarily forgets to say 
that if Ney had but one army corps to oppose to the English, 
it was because he had neglected in the morning to concentrate 
the 2nd and ist Corps between Gossehes and Frasnes. This 
was — we can not too often repeat it — the initial fault from 
which all the others proceeded — those of Ney, those of Reille, 
those of d'Erlon, and those of the Emperor. 

The facts and written orders, the hours and figures, con- 
tradict the conclusions of Clausewitz and Charras. There is 
also the testimony of Kellermann: "Napoleon did not attain 
his object through the fault of Marshal Ney;" of Reille: "A 
far greater success would have been obtained by taking in 
reverse the right of the Prussian Army;" of General Delort: 
"Ney could have, with 44,000 men, contained the English 
and turned the armv of Blucher." There is the judgment of 
Ropes: "If Ney had executed the orders of the Emperor, 
the issue of the campaign would have been modified." There 



252 Wateeloo. 

is the judgment of Marshal Wolseley: "If everything had 
passed as Napoleon had planned, we are justified in saying that 
the corps of Ziethen and Pirch would have been annihihated, 
and that, according to all probabilities, Bliicher and Gneissenau 
would have been made prisoners." There is finally — and it is 
worth all the rest — the admission of Gneissenau, chief of staff 
of the Prussian Army, who wrote, June 12, 1817, to the King of 
Prussia: "If General Perponcher had not made so vigorous a 
resistance, Marshal Ney, arriving at Quatre-Bras, would have 
been able to turn to the right and fall upon the rear of the 
army that was fighting at Ligny and cause its total destruction." 

II. 

The battle to be gained- — to be gained even to the crushing 
and annihilation of the enemy — was the battle of Ligny. A 
complete victory gained on June i6th over the Prussian Army 
could have closed at a single blow the Campaign of the Low 
Countries. Through the fault of Ney. the battle was inde- 
cisive. On the next day another occasion of terminating the 
campaign by destroying the English Army presented itself. 
This occasion was allowed to escape through the fault of 
Napoleon. 

The Emperor had separated Bliicher from Wellington, and, 
in spite of the lull in the action and the beginning of a panic 
caused by the approach of d'Erlon's corps, he had beaten in 
six hours 87,000 Prussians with 65,000 Frenchmen, thus dem- 
onstrating, as he had so often done, the inanity of his axiom, 
that victory is always on the side of the heaviest battalions. 
There remained the English Army in position at Ouatre-Bras, 
where it had resisted with advantage Marshal Ney. On June 
17th the Emperor was free to exterminate it. This battle, 
decisive and gained in advance, and of which he had the intui- 
tion in useful time, he, unfortunately, did not prepare to de- 
liver till after having lost four long hours in inaction and ir- 
resolution. This was leaving too much respite to the enemy. 
Wellington decamped. 

Doubtless at daybreak the Emperor was ignorant of the 
Prussian line of retreat and the result of the battle of Quatre- 
Bras. But, between seven and eight o'clock, he was informed 
by a despatch from Pajol that Bliicher's army was retiring 
towards the Meuse, and by the verbal report of Flahault that 
the English were still at Quatre-Bras. If he had taken at that 



The Campaign of 1815. 253 

time the course upon which he resolved only between eleven 
o'clock and noon — that is to say, if he had marched towards 
Quatre-Bras with Lobau's corps, the Guard, and^Milhaud's 
cuirassiers, these troops would have debouched between ten 
and half-past ten on the flank of the Englisn Army, precisely 
at the moment when it was preparing to break cam.p. Wel- 
lington's forces, after deducting the losses of the day oefore, 
and adding the five brigades of Uxbridge's cavalry, which had 
arrived during the night and in the morning, amounted at 
most to 35,000 muskets and sabres. Caught in the act of 
marching, and attacked at the same time on its left by the 
30,000 soldiers of Napoleon and in front by the 40,000 soldiers 
of Ney, the English Army, which would have either made head 
against this attack, or would have attempted a very haz- 
ardous retreat on Genappe or Nivelles, would have been unable 
to avoid a disaster. 

Instead of this, Napoleon purposed at first to leave his 
Army in bivouac during this entire day. Then he changed 
his mind, matured a new plan, despatched his orders, and put 
himself on the march. It was too late. The Emperor did not 
reach Quatre-Bras till two o'clock. The Anglo-Dutch divisions 
had repassed the Dyle at Genappe. He could only give chase 
to the cavalry of Lord Uxbridge. When he overtook the Eng- 
lish Army _n position at Mont Saint-Jean, night approached. 
"Would that T had the power of Joshua," said he, "to retard 
the course of the sun!" But for fourteen hours the sun had 
lighted up the earth and Napoleon bad not profited by it. 

We may add that the information received by Napoleon 
at seven in the morning did not appear to be either precise or 
definite enough to determine him to act immediately. Was it, 
indeed, towards the Meuse that the Prussians were retiring, 
and could he engage himself in their pursuit without being as- 
sured of the direction that they had taken? On the other 
hand, could he, in this uncertainty, march with his army to- 
wards Brussels without exposing himself to an offensive re- 
turn of Bliicher, either against his right flank, or upon his 
lines of communication? As for Wellington, was it possible 
that, informed of the defeat of the Prussians, he had not al- 
ready evacuated his position at Quatre-Bras? In that which 
regarded the retreat of the Prussians and the march on Brus- 
sels, the hesitation of the Emperor is perfectly explicable. 
But he had not as good reasons for deferring the movement 



254 Waterloo. 

against Wellington This movement was pregnant with such 
immense results that it was necessary to undertake it at the 
earliest possible moment with the corps of I^obau and the 
Guard, even at the risk of a useless march. Either Wellington 
would have still been at Quatre-Bras, and Napoleon would 
have attacked him, in concert with Ney, under the most fa- 
vorable conditions; or the English would have already de- 
camped, in which event the Guard and the 6th Corps would 
have effected their jiinction with the corps of Reille and 
d'Erlon. At any rate, the march on Quatre-Bras, which might 
have led to • the extermination of the English Army, would 
have compromised nothing, for, in view of the short distance 
from that point to Brye, it would have caused the Emperor 
no more inconvenience to have concentrated his reserve on 
his left wing than to have left it with his right. 

One has further alleged the necessity of giving repose to 
the troops and of re-supplying them in munitions. Repose? 
The horsemen of Exelmans and Pajol, who had combated the 
da}' before until nightfall, marched none the less at sunrise. 
With greater reason, the Guard, which had been engaged only a 
short time, and the 6th Corps, which had fired hardly a shot^ 
would have been able to set out at seven in the morning. 
Munitions? The corps of Gerard and Vandamme alone had 
need of being re-supplied, and this operation was certainly 
completed before noon. As for the 30,000 men of the Guard 
and the 6th Corps who would have marched on Quatre-Bras,. 
their cartridge-boxes and ammunition-chests were still well 
supplied. 

There were then other reasons for the inaction of the Em- 
peror on the morning of June 17th. Charras, General Ber- 
thaut. Ropes, and Marshal Wolseley attribute it to the state of 
his health. (Neither Wolsele}^ nor Ropes state the malady 
from which he suffered ; Charras assures us that he was afflicted 
with all the ills that flesh is heir to.) It is possible, in fact,, 
that Napoleon did suffer, in the night following the battle of 
Ligny, one of those attacks of ischury to which he had been 
subject for three years, and which had become rather fre- 
quent in April and May, 18 15. Grouchy relates incidentally 
that the Emperor was fatigued on quitting the Chateau of 
Fleurus on the morning of the 17th. According to_ General Le 
Senecal and Colonel de Blocqueville, chief of staff and first 
aide-de-camp, respectively, of Grouchy, Napoleon had been ill 



Ti£E Campaign of 1815. 255 

during the night. We repeat, it is possible. But, as Thiers 
has said, "Whatever may have been the state of Napoleon's 
health in 1815, his activity was not affected by it." 

Let us review these memorable days during which, if 
Marshal Wolseley is to be believed. Napoleon was "under a 
veil of lethargy." On June 15th the Emperor rises at three 
o'clock, goes as far as Jamignon, remounts his horse, captures 
Charleroi, prescribes the movement of the left wing, directs at 
the right wing the combat of Gilly, and returns to Charleroi 
at ten in the evening. On the i6th we find him busy sending 
off aides-de-camp and writing orders at four in the morning. 
At nine he goes on horseback to the mill of Fleurus, delivers 
tne battle of lyigny, and, in the final assault at twilight, he ad- 
vances in person with the Guard beyond the first Prussian 
lines. If he is ill during the night, we find him none the less 
the next day, at ten in the morning, at Brye, passing his troops 
in review and superintending the removal of the wounded. 
Then he marches on Quatre-Bras at the head of the troops, 
whom he outstrips in his impatience. He attacks the English 
cavalry and pursues it with the advance guard for three leagues 
at the pace of a steeple-chase and under a torrential fain. At 
Caillou, where, all streaming with water and as wet as if he had 
just issued from a bath, he takes his quarters for the night 
after sunset, dictates some orders for the Army, and becomes 
absorbed in the reading of letters from Paris. He throws him- 
self upon his bed for a few minutes ; then, at one in the morning, 
he rises again, and makes on foot, under the rain which con- 
tinues to fall, the entire round of his advance posts. Returned 
about three, he listens to the reports of the reconnoissances 
and spies, and dictates new orders. From nine he is upon the 
battle-field; he quits it only after dark, with the last squares 
of the Guard; and, still on horseback, he goes to pass the 
Sambre at Charleroi, at eight leagues from La Belle Alliance. 
Out of ninety-six hours, this man, who is represented as being 
prostrated and depressed by sickness, without energy, without 
resistance to sleep, and incapable of remaining on horseback, 
takes scarcely twenty hours' rest; and, supposing that he re- 
mains on the ground three-fourths of the time of the two great 
battles, he is in the saddle thirty-seven hours. 

In 18 15 Napoleon's health was still such as to support the 
fatigues of war, and his brain had lost nothing of its puissance. 
But in him his moral nature no longer equaled his genius. 



256 Watekloo. 

While in his dictations at Saint Helena he attempts to dem- 
ontrate that he had committed no fault in the course of his last 
campaign, in his familiar conversations he permits the secret 
of these faults to escape him: "I no longer had in me the 
sentiment of final success. It was no longer my first confi- 
dence. ... I felt Fortune abandoning me. I no longer 
obtained an advantage that was not followed by a reverse. 
. . . None of these blows surprised me, for I had a pre- 
sentiment that the result would be unfavorable." This state 
of mind explains the hours lost by the Emperor during the 
campaign, his sometimes troubled views, the respite left the 
enemy. He no longer believes in success; and his boldness 
declines with his confidence. He no longer dares to seize, to 
seek the occasion. While his faith in his destiny lasted, he 
had always been an audacious player. Now that he feels 
Fortune deserting him, he becomes a timid one. He hesitates 
to begin the game, no longer yields to inspiration, temporizes, 
weighs the chances, sees the pros and cons, and wishes to take 
no risks. 

in. 

In order to be able to act freely against the English, it was 
necessary that the Emperor should be protected against an 
offensive return of Bliicher. Where were the Prussians? in 
retreat towards the Meuse, or on the march to unite with 
Wellington to the south of Brussels? The Emperor ordered 
Grouchy to discover their traces and to pursue them. It has 
been said that, in the uncertainty in which he found himself 
concerning the direction taken by the Prussians in their retreat, 
Napoleon ought, by all means, at ten or eleven o'clock on June 
17th, to have ordered Grouchy to march laterally by the left 
bank of the Dyle. The Emperor himself has refuted this 
criticism: "If Grouchy," says he, "had marched at noon on 
the 17th by the left bank of the Dyle, without knowing in what 
direction the Prussians were retiring, he would have assuredly 
covered the flank of the principal column, but he would have 
also left without protection our lines of communication." In 
fact, the Prussians, if they had retired on Namur, would have 
been able to return tow^ards Charleroi to cut the Imperial Army 
from its base of operations. 

It has also been said that in detaching upon his right only 
two corps of cavalry, a few guns, and a division of infantry — 



The Campaig^^ of 1815. 257 

forces sufficient to observe the Prussians — the Emperor would 
have kept with him 20,000 men more, who would have 
been very useful to him at Waterloo. Doubtless, in 18 14, 
after Arcis-sur-Aube, Winzingerode, with 10,000 horse, had im- 
posed for two days upon the French Army. There are, how- 
ever, some objections to this criticism. In spite of the ab- 
sence of the corps of Vandamme and Gerard, and the cavalry 
of Pajol and Exelmans, the French at Waterloo were superior 
in numbers to the English ; and, if a part of the Army had not 
been paralyzed by the approach 01 the Prussians, it is very 
probable that the plateau of Mont Saint-Jean would have been 
carried towards five o'clock. Now Napoleon had detached 
35,000 men with Grouchy precisely to contain the Prussians. 
It was far more important to keep Bliicher from the field of 
battle than to have thei"e 20,000 men more. 

This division of the Army into two masses, so much 
blamed by the historians of the Campaign of 18 15, was the 
usual tactics of Napoleon. It was thus he manoeuvred at 
Marengo, Jena, Friedland, and in all the Campaign of France, 
which has been so justly admired. When one has to fight two 
armies, it is necessary to contain one whilst one directs all his 
effort upon the other. 

But was it possible for Grouchy to oppose the movements 
of the Prussians, and, at first, were the orders of the Emperor 
precise and explicit enough in order that he might make no 
mistake and know that the principal thing was to guard against 
an offensive return of Bliicher upon the flank or the rear of the 
Army? It is presumable that in his verbal instructions Na- 
poleon had explained them to the Marshal ; but upon the words 
of the Emperor the testimony is so interested and contradictory 
that it is necessary, as a good critic, to confine oneself solely to 
the written order. I have given this order integrally. I will 
recall only its essential dispositions: "Go to Gembloux; re- 
connoitre in the direction of Namur and Maestricht; pursue 
the enemy. It is important to find out if Bliicher wishes to 
unite with Wellington in order to deliver battle in front of 
Brussels." 

If, indeed, the Emperor, in this letter does not explicitly 
direct Grouchy to cover the Army, it appears to me that he 
implicitly does so. "To find out if Bliicher wishes to unite 
with Welhngton" — this is the important thing Now, as 
Grouchy had with him not a few squadrons sufficient to recon- 



258 Waterloo. 

noitre the enemy, but an army capable of serious resistance, 
his manifest duty was not only to keep the Emperor posted, 
but also to protect him against an offensive return by ma- 
noeuvring so as to interpose himself between the Prussians and 
the Imperial Army. A man who had made war for twenty 
years could not mistake the object of the operation with which 
he was charged. And, in fact, these words of Grouchy's letter, 
written on the evening of June 17th, ". . . I shall follow 
the Prussians in the direction of Wavre, in order to separate 
them from Wellington," prove that he thoroughly understood 
the implicit instructions of the Emperor. 

Unfortunately, Grouchy did not know how to manoeuvre 
with sufficient rapidity, intelligence, or resolution. On June 
17th his troops marched with incredible slowness. At the time 
when Napoleon reached T,a Belle Alliance at seven in the 
evening, after having made nearly six leagues fighting, Giduchy 
only arrived at the same hour at Gembloux, fourteen kilometers 
from Saint-Amand. And, though in these long days it was 
still possible to march two hours longer, he ordered his army 
to bivouac. On the next day it was yet possible for him to 
regain the time lost. Informed as he was, there was no doubt 
for him— the . Prussians were marching to join Wellington. 
Though the Emperor, being ignorant of the direction of 
Bliicher's retreat, had not prescribed the march by the left 
bank of the Dyle, Grouchy, who was henceforth acquainted 
with this direction, ought not to have hesitated to undertake it. 
He risked nothing at all events in doing so ; for either the Prus- 
sians would still be at Wavre and he would turn them by the 
left bank — a more advantageous manoeuvre than to attack 
them by the right bank ; or they would be already on the march 
either for Brussels or for Mont Saint-Jean, in which event he 
would make a flank pursuit, or would come to prolong the 
right of the Emperor. Grouchy ought then, on June i8th, to 
have marched on Wavre, not at seven in the morning, in a 
single column and by way of Walhain and Corbaix. as he did, 
but at sunrise, in two columns, and by way of Vilroux, Mont 
Saint-Guioert, and Ottignies. En route at four in the morning, 
the two columns would have arrived upon the banks of the 
Dyle, at the bridges of Mousty and Ottignies (seventeen and 
eighteen kilometers, respectively, from Gembloux), between 
nine and ten o'clock. Allowing an hour and a half for the 



The Campaign of 1815, ^ 259 

passage of the two bridges, Grouchy would have found himself 
at eleven upon the left bank of the Dyle with all his army. 

Doubtless before this time (about eight o'clock) Colonel 
Ledebur, in observation at Mont Saint-Guibert with the loth 
Hussars and two battalions, would have discovered Grouchv's 
heads of columns. His detachment being too weak to offer 
any resistance, he would have first sent a courier to Gneissenau 
to inform him of the approach of the French. The despatch 
would have arrived at Wavre about nine o'clock, at the time 
when the single corps of Bulow was on the march. It is pre- 
sumable that Blucher, or rather Gneisseneau, who was invest- 
ed with all the authority, would not have modified the or- 
ders directing Bulow and Pirch I. to march on Chapelle Saint- 
Lambert, but that he would have taken some measures to de- 
fend the approach to Wavre with the corps of Ziethen and 
Thielmann. Pending the development of the manoeuvre of 
the French, would he have confined himself to leaving these 
two corps in position at Bierges and Wavre? or, informed that 
Grouchy had passed the left bank of the Dyle, would he have 
ordered Ziethen and Thielmann to advance to encounter the 
French Army by way of Bierges and Limelette? Upon the 
first hypothesis, it would have been easy for Grouchy, hearing 
the cannon of the Emperor, to march by his left on Ayviers 
or Maransart, a movement which would have brought him near 
the battle-field at half-past two, or two long hours before 
Blucher took the offensive. Upon the second hypothesis — 
the most probable, I admit — Grouchy, in a good position upon 
the plateau of Mousty-Ceroux, would have resisted without 
difficulty with 33,000 men the 40,000 Prussians of Ziethen and 
Thielmann. But would he have been able, between eleven 
and four o'clock, to inflict upon them a defeat sufficiently de- 
cisive to put them out of action and to become free again to 
march on Maransart? It is doubtful. 

By this battle Grouchy would have at any rate detained 
far from Mont Saint-Jean the corps of Ziethen and Thielmann, 
which would not have been without importance. First, it 
would have prevented the panic which took place at the end 
of the battle of Waterloo, when Ziethen debouched on Pape- 
lotte. It would have done more. We have seen that at half- 
past six, at the moment when, according to the avowal of 
Colonel Kennedy, Alten's aide-de-camp, "the center of the 
EngHsh line was open," the approach of Ziethen's corps per- 



26o Watehloo. 

mitted Generals Vandeleur and Vivian to move from the ex- 
treme left to the center with their 2,600 fresh horsemen and to 
reaffirm the confidence of Wellington. If this support — sup- 
port effective and moral — had failed him, it is probable that he 
would have been unable to reestablish his position before the 
assault of the Middle Guard, and that, under this supreme 
push, the English line would have yielded. Wellington has ad- 
mitted that on June i8th he was in dire peril. "Twice," said 
he, "did I save the day by my obstinacy; but I hope that I 
shall never have to fight another such battle." We may also 
believe that if Bliicher had heard at noon, at two leagues on his 
left flank, the cannonade of a great battle, and that if couriers 
had come from hour to hour to announce to him the successive 
checks of his lieutenants, he would have attacked Plancenoit 
with less resolution. We should not forget, finally, that if the 
Emperor had been informed between eight and nine o'clock, 
by a despatch from Gembloux, that Grouchy was on the point 
of passing the Dyle at Ottignies, he would have been able, long 
before noon, to send him new orders and to remain all day in 
close communication with him. What consequences ! 

Grouchy would have been able to repair the grave strate- 
gical fault which he had committed in the morning by servilely 
following the traces of the Prussians, by marching at half -past 
eleven towards the sound of the cannon, according to the 
counsel of Gerard. At that hour Exelmans had three brigades 
of dragoons between Corbaix and La Baraque and one brigade 
at the farm of La Plaquerie (1,500 yards from Ottignies); the 
corps of Vandamme was halted at Nil Saint- Vincent ; that of 
Gerard had arrived at Walhain; and Pajol with his cavalry 
and the division of Teste was on the march from Grand Leez 
to Tourinnes. It was only necessary to push Exelmans as 
far as the wood of La Huzelle — or further towards Wavre, if it 
could be done without compromising him — so as to disquiet 
the enemy and to mask from him the movement of the French 
Army; to direct Vandamme on Ottignies by way of Mont 
Saint-Guibert, and Gerard on Mousty by way of Cour Saint- 
Etieune; and, finally, to recall Pajol, who would come to form 
the rear guard. Put en route at noon, the head of Vandamme's 
column would have attained the bridge at Ottignies (ten kil- 
ometers from Nil Saint-Vincent) towards a quarter-past three, 
whilst that of Gerard, starting a quarter of an hour earlier, 
would have arrived at the bridge of Mousty (thirteen kilometers 



The CAMrAiGN of 1815. 261 

from Walhain) about four. After having passed the Dyle, 
the troops having to march henceforth upon a single route, 
Vandamme would have taken the lead and his first division 
would have reached Maransart (two leagues from Ottignies, 
by way of Ceroux) towards six o'clock. For this, doubtless, 
it would have been necessary to march, during this journey of 
eighteen kilometers, at the rate of three kilometers per hour. 
Notwithstanding the bad roads, all of which, moreover, as far 
as the Dyle shelved downwards towards this river, and in spite 
of the time required for crossing the bridges, this pace was pos- 
sible, especially if we remember that at each step the soldiers 
would have heard the cannon thundering nearer and more 
intense. What a moral factor for soldiers of 18 15 to go to the 
support of the Emperor and to combat under his eye! 

Let us now see if, as Charras and others have pretended, 
the Prussians would have been able to interfere with this move- 
ment. At noon Bulow was at Chapelle Saint-Lambert with 
his cavalry and two divisions ; his other two were on the march 
to rejoin him at this point. The corps of Pirch I., which had 
bivouacked at Aisemont, had hardly commenced to pass the 
bridge of Wavre ; and the corps of Ziethen, which had camped 
at Bierges, was just taking up its line of march for Ohain by 
way of Fromont. The corps of Thielmann, destined to remain 
last in position on the banks of the Dyle, was massed between 
Wavre and La Bavette. Finally, Ledebur with his detachment 
occupied Mont Saint-Guibert, where he remained tranquilly, 
little suspecting that he was outflanked on his left. 

If Grouchy had marched on Ottignies and Maransart in- 
stead of Wavre, things on the side of the Prussians would have 
passed, at least until three o'clock, exactly as they did. Be- 
tween one and two Ledebur would have cut his way through 
the cavalry of Exelmans; at two the divisions of Brause and 
Langen (corps of Pirch), hearing the combat in the wood 
of La Huzelle between the skirmishers of Ledebur and the 
dragoons of Exelmans, who had two batteries, would have 
marched in the direction of this wood, and Thielmann would 
have deferred his departure until the end of the combat. 
About three, it is true, the enemy would have discovered that 
the attack of Exelmans, unsupported by infantry, was only a 
feint. The Prussians would have then resumed the prescribed 
movement. The second echelon of Pirch (divisions of Brause 
and Langen) would have passed the bridge of Wavre and would 



2 62 Waterloo. 

have proceeded towa ds Chapelle Saint-Lambert. Thielmann 
would have left only a few battalions in Wavre, and would have 
prepared to march on Couture with the bulk of his troops. 
But in order to advance from La Bavette in the direction of 
Couture he would have been forced to await the defile of the 
divisions of Brause and Langen and the cavalry of Sohr (of 
Pirch's corps), which, as we have seen, were compelled to await 
the passage of the entire corps of Ziethen, which itself had been 
forced to permit the rear of Bulow's corps and the leading 
divisions of Pirch to precede it. The Prussian Staff had so 
badly conceived the disposition of the march that the crossing 
of the different columns was inevitable. The principal column 
(Bulow and Pirch I.), on the march from Dion-le-Mont and 
Aisemont by way of Wavre to Chapelle Saint- Lambert, was 
bound to cross the route of Ziethen' s corps advancing from 
Bierges to Ohain by way of Fromont, and Thielmann's corps, 
which had orders to direct itself from La Bavette on Couture. 

Under these conditions, Thielmann would not have set 
himself in motion until four o'clock at the earliest. The dis- 
tance from La Bavette to Maransart by way of Couture is 
nearly nine miles. The III. Prussian Corps would have then 
been unable to reach Maransart before a quarter to nine, much 
too late, consequently, to arrest Grouchy. At that moment, 
Bulow, attacked in flank by the troops of Grouchy, whilst he 
was fighting against Lobau and the Young Guard, would have 
been for more than an hour driven back beyond the wood of 
Paris, if not perhaps exterminated in the valley of the Lasne. 

Grouchy acted like a blind man, but Napoleon did nothing 
to enlighten him. Though informed on the evening of June 
I yth, by Milhaud, of the retreat of a hostile column towards the 
Dyle ; though advised in the night, by a despatch from Grouchy, 
of the march of at least one Prussian corps towards Wavre ; and 
though warned on the morning of June i8th, by Prince Jerome, 
against a possible junction of the two hostile armies in front of 
the Forest of Soignes, it was only at one in the afternoon, when 
the battle was engaged, that the Emperor despatched to 
Grouchy the formal and precise order to cover his right. 
Doubtless he had believed until then — he even yet believed — 
that the Marshal would manoeuvre to fulfil this great object; 
and doubtless the letter of Grouchy in which he had said : "I 
shall follow the Prussians, in order to separate them from Wel- 
lington," had strengthened this opinion. But ought he Ito 



The Ca]\[paign of 1S15. 263 

have put so much confidence in Grouchy? Was it not very 
hazardous to rely, for the safety of his right flank, with an 
adversary as bold as Bliicher, upon the strategical intelligence, 
the initiative, and resolution of a commander who had never 
exercised so important a command? The Emperor, at any 
rate, ought to have renewed his instructions much sooner, 
and should have explained them more fully than he had at 
first done 

IV. 

At Waterloo, Napoleon wished to begin the action early in 
the morning — his orders show it. If the battle had begun 
about six or seven o'clock, the great strategical fault of Grouchy 
and the negligence of the Emperor in reiterating to him his 
orders would have had no consequences, for the English Army 
would have been overthrown before the arrival of the Prussians. 
The corps of Lobau, the Young Guard, the cavalry of Domon 
and Subervic, which the Emperor employed against Bulow, 
and the Old Guard itself, which, being uneasy for his right, he 
had held in reserve until the last moment, would have certainly, 
by supporting the other troops, determined towards noon or 
one o'clock — perhaps earlier — the retreat of Wellington. 

The condition of the ground, or, if one wishes to quibble, 
the false appreciation of the condition of the ground, by 
Drouot and the artillery officers, obliged the Emperor to 
modify his orders. The attack was put off from six or seven 
o'clock until nine and then again delayed, as the troops had 
not yet reached their positions. This delay saved the English 
Army. 

It is certain that an attack against the left of the enemy, 
very weak and in the air, or even against his right, which would 
have permitted of a vast deployment, would have been more 
easy and less murderous than the assault against the center. 
But Napoleon, manoeuvring between two armies, found himself 
between the chops of a vise. It was not sufficient to get rid 
of one of the Allied Armies for a day or two, as he had done 
at I/igny ; it was necessary to crush it. For this, the Emperor 
must pierce the center of the English Army and crush the 
broken wings. "Napoleon," said Wellington, "attacked me 
in the old manner, and I repulsed him in the old manner." 
Under the circumstances, and in spite of the compact position 



264 Wateeloo. 

of the enemy, "the old manner" was for the Emperor the 
best to employ. 

But how many mistakes, how much negligence, and how 
many faults in the execution ! We have seen that the demon- 
stration against Hougoumont, ordered by the Emperor, had 
developed through the ardor of Jerome, the impetuosity of the 
soldiers, the lack of vigilance and firmness of Reille, into a real 
attack, in which half of the 2nd Corps had been uselessly sac- 
rificed. We have also seen that the heavy formation of the 
four divisions of General d'Erlon was the virtual cause of the 
confusion in which they found themselves on attaining the 
crest of the plateau and of the lamentable rout in which they 
were thrown by the English cavalry. 

Why was it that Reille, who, according to the order of the 
Emperor, was "to advance so as to keep abreast of the corps 
of Count d'Erlon," did not operate this movement? One of 
his divisions (that of Jerome) was, it is true, engaged at Hou- 
goumont, but Bachelu and Foy remained available for marching 
against the right center of the enemy. 

Why was it that Ney, who had under his immediate com- 
mand all the first line, consisting of the corps of d'Erlon and 
Reille — more than 30,000 bayonets — delivered vainly two as- 
saults against La Haye Sainte, defended by five companies? 
Why did he not demolish its walls with cannon-balls? Why, 
having failed twice in the attack of this farm, did he not renew 
the assaults? Why did he not obey the orders of the Emperor? 
Why did he not understand that the possession of La Haye 
Sainte — "the key to the English position," says the aide-de- 
camp of Alten, Kennedy — was his first objective? 

Ney found it shorter to begin at the end. Too circum- 
spect at Ouatre-Bras, he was too audacious at Mont Saint- 
Jean. He risked before the hour, without orders, without 
preparation, and without support, the great cavalry movement 
planned by the Emperor. He thought to overthrow with 
cavalry an infantry as yet unshaken and occupying a com- 
manding position. He launched rashly to the assault the two 
corps of cuirassiers, the Horse Guard, and even the brigade of 
carbineers — the last cavalry reserve of the Army — which Keller- 
mann had halted with the formal order not to budge. In spite 
of their temerity, these heroic charges would have succeeded, 
however, if they had been supported by infantry. There was 
near La Belle Alliance, within short cannon-range of the English 



The Campaign of 1815. 265 

position, half of Reille's corps. These twelve battalions had not 
yet been engaged; they waited with grounded arms the order 
to take part in the action. Ney, who, according to the words 
of Napoleon, "forgot in the heat of the action the troops who 
were not under his eye," did not think to summon them upon 
the plateau. It was only when the last charges had been 
repulsed, and when the intervention of the infantry was no 
longer opportune, that he launched these 6,000 men against the 
slope of Mont Saint -Jean, where they were decimated without 
advantage. 

It was nearly six o'clock. La Haye Sainte, of which Ney 
had attempted to take possession at two, then at four, was still 
held by the enemy. It was necessary, however, for the Em- 
peror to renew the order to capture it at any price. This time 
Ney carried the position, and it was only then that Wellington 
deemed himself in peril. Unfortunately, it was too late to 
profit by this point of support. Men and horses were har- 
assed. Napoleon gave to the Marshal the Middle Guard for a 
supreme effort ; but instead of making a breach in the English 
line with these five battalions of heroes formed in a single 
column, Ney arranged them in echelons, so that each one 
found itself outnumbered by the enemy at every point. 

It would seem that on the right there were also some 
negligence and faults. The cavalry of Domon and Subervic 
advanced upon the skirts of the wood of Paris when it ought 
to have watched its approaches. The defense of I^obau was 
valorous, but badly conceived and prepared. It was not at 
1,200 yards to the east of La Belle Alliance and upon open 
ground that he should have established himself to arrest the 
Prussians. At half-past one, when the corps of Bulow was in- 
active at Chapelle Saint-Lambert, Lobau had received from the 
Emperor the order to move in that direction "and to choose 
a good intermediate position in which he could, with 10,000 
men, arrest 30,000." This "good intermediate position" Lo- 
bau did not seek. It was the rugged heights which com- 
mand the valley of the Lasne in front of the only bridge over 
this river. There, his communications with the main body of 
the Army being assured by the numerous squadrons of Domon 
and Subervic, Lobau would have been able to make a longer 
and more efficacious resistance than in front of Plancenoit. 
Perhaps this position would have even been impregnable. 
Clausewitz admits that Bliicher would have been obliged to 
—18— 



266 Watekloo. 

turn it by way of Couture. This would have been much time 
gained for the Emperor! Even in case lyobau had felt some 
hesitancy in advancing so far en fleche (a league from La Belle 
Alliance), he at least ought to have occupied the wood of Paris. 

In the different phases of the battle one can follow the de- 
velopment of the Emperor's plan such as he had explained it 
in the morning to Prince Jerome — preparation by the artillery ; 
attack of d'Erlon and Reille's corps; charges of the cavalry; 
and the final assault by Lobau's corps and the Foot Guard. 
But the presence of the Prussians on his right made it necessary 
for the Emperor to employ, in order to hold them in check, the 
6th Corps and the Young Guard and to hold the Old Guard 
too long in reserve. On the other hand, instead of operating 
against the English with method and ensemble, one acted by 
fits and starts, at first awkwardly, then at an unseasonable 
time, and, finally, desperately. 

In order to judge with equity the Commander-in-chief, 
who was the greatest of captains, it is necessary to bear in 
mind the manner in which his orders were understood and 
executed, when they were not obeyed. Marshal de Saxe has 
said in his "Reveries uponHhe Art of War": "The disposi- 
tion of the commander-in-chief should be correct and simple, 
as: Such a corps will attack and such an one will support. 
The generals under him would need to be very ignorant in- 
deed, if they did not know how to execute this order and to 
manoeuvre as the circumstances required. Thus the com- 
mander-in-chief should not occupy and embarrass himself with 
the details. He will be able to see everything better and main- 
tain a sounder judgment, and will be in a better position to 
profit by circumstances. He should not be everywhere and 
attempt to perform the duties of a sergent de bataille." 

From the many faults committed at Waterloo, Charras, 
York von Wartenbourg, and Marshal Wolseley conclude that 
the Emperor, prostrated by sickness, lost all hope, remained 
inert and blind far from the field of battle, and left the com- 
bat without direction. Regarding the physical and moral con- 
dition of Napoleon on June i8th, the testimonies are con- 
tradictory. Colonel Baudus relates that the Emperor "was 
plunged into a sort of apathy." According to oral traditions 
mentioned by Marshal Canrobert and General du Barail, Na- 
poleon slept during the battle of Waterloo. (He slept also 
at Jena and Wagram, and directed no less victoriously the 



The Campaign of 1815. 267 

combat.) But Marshal Regnault de Saint Jean d'Angely, who 
made thel Campaign of 1S15 in the Imperial Staff, related 
that, far from sleeping, the Emperor was nervous and impa- 
tient, and lashed his boot incessantly with his riding-whip. 
(It is thus Coignet pictures Bonaparte at Marengo before the 
arrival of Desaix's division.) In his manuscript Journal, Gen- 
eral Foy writes that he saw the Emperor walking to and fro, 
with his hands behind his back. I have read nowhere that 
the guide Decoster, so loquacious and lavish of details, has ev- 
er spoken of the prostration of Napoleon. Walter Scott, who 
had quest, oned the inn-keeper some months after the battle, 
learned from him that the Emperor remained all the afternoon 
not far from I^a Belle Alliance, most of the time on horseback, 
and very attentive to all the phases of the battle. According 
to the words of Ney, spoken at Mezieres, where he passed the 
day of the 19th of June, the Emperor had shown himself very 
brave. In addition to all this testimony, there are the facts, 
which testify more surely than all words. At eleven o'clock 
the Emperor dictated his disposition for the attack. At a 
quarter-past eleven he ordered the demonstration against 
Hougoumont. At one he wrote to Grouchy. At half -past 
one he ordered Lobau to take position to arrest the Prussians, 
and enjoined Ney to begin the attack of Mont Saint-Jean. In 
the meantime he had caused Hougoumont to be bombarded 
by a battery of howitzers. At three he launched a brigade of 
cuirassiers against the cavalry of Lord Uxbridge, which had 
attacked the great I'attery. At half -past three he ordered Ney 
to take possession of La Haye Sainte. At half-past four he 
caused the Guard to advance near I^a Belle Alliance. At five 
he sent the Young Guard to the assistance of Lobau. At half- 
past five he ordered Kellermann to second the charges of Mil- 
haud. At six he renewed the order to take La Haye Sainte. 
Soon after he detached two battalions of the Old Guard to 
drive the Prussians from Plancenoit. At seven he led his 
Guard into the bottoms of La Haye Sainte for the final assault. 
On the way he harangued the soldiers of Durutte, who were be- 
ginning to give way, and sent them back into the fire, and 
directed all his officers to traverse the line of battle and an- 
nounce the arrival of Marshal Grouchy. In the evening he 
formed in squares in the valley the second echelon of the Guard, 
hastened to Rossomme, still resisted there with the grenadiers 



2 68 Waterloo. 

of Petit, and fired the last volley of grape at the English 
cavalry. 

Never did Napoleon exercise more effectively the com- 
mand, and never was his action more direct. But, obliged 
precisely to play that role of "sergent de bataille" which is 
condemned by Maurice de Saxe, he employed himself entirely 
in repairing the mistakes, the forgetfulness, and the faults of 
his lieutenants. And, seeing all his combinations miscarrying, 
all the attacks proving unsuccessful, his generals wasting his 
finest troops, his last Army melting away in their hands, and 
the enemy laying down the law to him, he lost resolution with 
confidence, hesitated, confined himself to providing for the 
most imminent perils, awaited the hour, allowed it to pass, 
and dared not risk all in time to save all. 



jUN 29 19G5 



